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THESIS ABSTRACT: 
This thesis critically examines the concepts of civil discourse and civil disobedience 
expounded by John Rawls, Jürgen Habermas and Charles Taylor. I claim that their 
accounts fail to consider the impacts of epistemic injustices, which lead to the unfair 
dismissal of the political claims made by marginalized communities in the political 
realm, and the impacts of social practices of ignorance which render the contestation of 
social and political injustices extremely difficult.  
Consequently, I develop an account of civil discourse and civil disobedience inspired by 
feminist epistemological theory. I claim that this framework is more attuned to 
inequalities of epistemic status, leading to my argument that civil discourse should be 
re-thought as a relationship of trust which requires interlocutors to fulfil particular 
epistemic responsibilities towards each other.  
I further argue that this re-conceptualization of civil discourse allows us to transcend a 
dominant dichotomous interpretation of the concept in the current academic literature. 
This discourse either claims that civility is an essential political practice in the face of 
deep political and moral disagreement or that civil discourse is simply a means to stifle 
contentious political struggles and to solidify the political dominance of privileged social 
individuals, groups and communities. 
Furthermore, I also claim that civil disobedience should be re-conceived as a political 
practice which challenges patterns of vested social ignorance regarding oppressive 
social, economic and political arrangements while also contesting epistemic injustices. I 
develop this argument by critically appraising the theories of civil disobedience 
proffered by John Rawls and Jürgen Habermas. Like their theories of public reason, I 
maintain that they fail to consider the operation of oppressive epistemic norms, thereby 
severely limiting the insights of their accounts. 
Consequently, I develop a different set of normative criteria for analysing acts of civil 
disobedience which adequately considers the impact of oppressive epistemic norms 
while also proffering an explanation of how civil discourse is reconcilable with coercive 
political disobedience.  
Ultimately, therefore, I hope to illustrate that extending feminist epistemological insights 
into discussions of civil disobedience and civil discourse offers a fruitful way of 
exploring the broader connection between persuasion and coercion in contemporary 
liberal democracies.  
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Literature Review and Introduction to Thesis: 
It is clear that one of the most profound challenges faced by contemporary 
liberal-democratic societies is how to negotiate ethically the relationship 
between public claim-making and religious, cultural, ethnic and moral pluralism. 
Of course, this is not to suggest that political communities from different 
historical eras did not have to negotiate the realities of pluralism as well.  
Nevertheless, with deepening globalization these challenges seem more 
pronounced and problematic to address, especially given the intensification, 
compression and acceleration of 'flows' of people, social relations and networks 
of governance. 
The first reality that renders the connection between pluralism and public claim-
making more morally urgent are the ongoing struggles of oppressed social 
groups and communities against various political, social and economic 
injustices. These efforts have aimed to re-assert or reclaim cultural 
distinctiveness, to challenge pejorative stereotypes and prejudices, to demand 
autonomous political institutions or to advocate for fundamental changes in 
patterns of economic distribution. (Fraser, 2000; Taylor, 1994) 
For instance, indigenous peoples have fought for political self-governance, 
special funding to protect their languages and cultural heritage, financial 
compensation for colonial invasion and dispossession or have advocated for 
separate educational institutions. Importantly, it is also worth noting that these 
struggles were simultaneously accompanied by academic critiques of dominant 
ontological interpretations of personhood within the liberal political tradition.  
Indeed, a wide range of critics have noted its exclusion and neglect of 
marginalised social groups and communities, its limited focus on negative 
interpretations of liberty and its rigid distinction between “the public” and “the 
private”. Not to mention its ratio-centric tendencies, an extremely gendered 
dismissal of emotion and affect, its historic silence about gendered and 
racialized forms of domination and its ontological privileging of the individual 
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over communal relations. (Losurdo, 2014; MacIntyre, 2007, Pateman & Mills, 
2013; Sandel, 1998; Taylor, 1994) 
Unsurprisingly, in response, a significant body of inter-disciplinary literature 
emerged under the umbrella terms 'identity politics', 'the politics of recognition' 
and the 'politics of difference'. This body of research has profoundly challenged 
prevailing liberal theories and institutional practices of justice, claiming that 
liberalism has failed provide an inclusive structure for the accommodation of 
plural identities. 
Another significant aspect of the challenges associated with public-claim 
making in diverse liberal democracies is the reality of persistent and intractable 
disagreement over contested moral issues. Indeed, it is now rather 
unremarkable to note the frequency of highly charged and polarised disputes 
over a broad range of moral controversies in contemporary liberal-democracies. 
Certain commentators have suggested that these conflicts are further 
exacerbated by the reality that many contemporary moral disagreements are 
animated by partially incommensurable cultural, moral or religious vocabularies 
that render the achievement of compromise or consensus extremely difficult. 
(Hinkley, 2005; Hsieh, 2007; Schutte, 1998, 2000)  
This difficulty stems from the reality that participants might find it difficult to 
reach a shared understanding of their conflict situation given their 
incommensurable standards of moral evaluation and interpretation. (Docherty, 
2001)  
For instance, it often seems profoundly difficult to reconcile indigenous 
conceptions of the environment which might accord it sentience with dominant 
neo-liberal political vocabularies that merely treat the natural world as a passive 
object suitable for material exploitation. 
More alarmingly, the work of Alastair McIntyre provocatively argues there has 
been a broader, nightmarish fragmentation of collective standards of moral 
evaluation in contemporary Western societies. This fragmentation has resulted 
in a collective moral Babel, defined by intractable- and irresolvable- disputes 
between incommensurable moral and epistemological traditions. (MacIntyre, 
2007) 
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Meanwhile, other theorists stress that while it is possible to defend “objective” 
standards of morality and truth, individuals and political institutions are 
frequently obliged to make costly compromises between conflicting moral 
principles and values. This situation invariably entails a tragic pursuit of diverse 
yet incommensurable moral goods. (Berlin, 1969; Galston, 2002; Lassman, 
2011) 
Given that the terms of these trade-offs frequently stoke the flames of moral 
conflict, in response contemporary political theory has responded in a diversity 
of fashions. Some defend a “state decisionism”, while others advocate a 
“modus vivendi politics” or even advocate a “strategy of avoidance” that 
removes contentious disputes from the public agenda altogether. (Ackerman, 
1989; Galston, 2002; Gray, 2001; Horton, 2003; Lassman, 2011; Schmitt, 2006)  
Unsurprisingly, given these tendencies, a number of contemporary political 
theorists have opined that in the face of intractable moral and political 
polarisation, the opportunities for public decision-making bodies to reasonably 
compromise on contested issues seems increasingly bleak. (Aikin & Talisse, 
2014; Davis, 2010; Loomis, 2000; Uslaner, 2000)  
Nevertheless, it is worth reflecting that this concern is long-standing within 
liberal and republican political philosophy. For instance, James Madison 
famously decried the perils of "factionalism" where groups of citizens, animated 
by their vested material interests or passions, conspire to compromise the rights 
of other citizens or the common good of their society. (Madison, 1787) 
More recently, critics have suggested that intractable moral conflicts can 
endanger the social fabric via the encouragement of destructive forms of 
political discourse. They note that even the conceptual metaphors typically used 
to describe our actions in conversational encounters are profoundly redolent of 
violent, destructive conflict. 
For instance, Lakoff & Johnson (2003) and Cohen (2013) illustrate multiple 
instances of this tendency, noting that people often castigate their opponent’s 
claims as being "indefensible". They also note how people frequently describe 
the use of “killer”, “knock-down” or “shot-down” rebuttals or celebrate the 
“demolishing” of their argumentative opponent’s claims. Alternatively, people 
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lament how their opponents have “attacked” their claims or “wiped them out” 
altogether. (Cohen, 2013; Lakoff & Johnson, 2003) 
Meanwhile, other theorists have explored how political conflicts become 
exacerbated by discourses that portray one's opponents in deeply dehumanised 
fashions. (Bandura, 2002; Haslam, 2006; Opotow, 1990) From this point of 
view, uncivil kinds of discourse compromise the relational bonds of diverse 
polities or even encourage discrimination and mistreatment. (Herbst, 2010; 
Tannen, 1998) 
Ultimately, therefore, it is feared that moral polarisation threatens to destabilise 
the functionality of political institutions while fostering public dissatisfaction with 
the political process. (Mutz & Reeves, 2005) At its worst, the concern lingers 
that moral polarization can even culminate in violent outbreaks of antagonism, 
as the case of so-called “deeply divided” societies tragically demonstrates.  
This situation is complicated further by profound disagreement in many liberal 
democracies over the legitimacy of the State, especially in post-colonial 
societies. There is also significant political controversy over what kinds of 
arguments, claims and appeals can legitimate coercive public policy. 
(Habermas, 2006; Ivison, 2002; Rawls, 2005) 
Alternatively, other commentators have noted how political debates in 
contemporary democracies seem to degrade rapidly into ad hominem attacks or 
involve the imputation of intellectual stupidity or moral vice to one’s opponents. 
(Aikin & Talisse, 2014)  
This concern stems from a fear that “uncivil” kinds of political communication 
are becoming increasingly normalized in public discourse with destructive 
impacts. Although the notion of “destructive” political discourse is widely 
interpreted in the academic literature, Johnson and Johnson (2000) provide a 
concise summation of its negative political ramifications: 
“Destructive political persuasion exists when misleading, superficial, or 
irrelevant information is presented in ways that decreases citizens’ 
understanding of the issue, results in an absence of thoughtful consideration of 
the issue, and decreases citizen participation in the political process. Discourse 
may be replaced by other means of persuasion, such as using deceit through 
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misinformation, de-emphasising and ignoring important issues, positioning, 
pandering to voters, and focusing on the candidates (not the issues) through 
commercials (imagery and slogans) or argumentum ad hominem.” (Johnson & 
Johnson, 2000, pg 6) 
More recently, Toni Massaro and Robin Stryker (2012) have developed a 
comprehensive taxonomy of different kinds of uncivil political discourse: 
“1. Speech that is excessively ad hominem, demonizes political opponents, and 
relies on globalizing attacks on their character rather than their ideas and 
conduct. 
2. Speech that is recklessly false and negative about a political opponent, or 
that is intentionally misleading regarding opponents' views, character, or 
conduct. 
3. Speech that is excessively vulgar or disrespectful, or relies on excessive 
profanity aimed at a person (versus an idea or institution) to advance an 
argument. 
4. Speech that pejoratively, hyperbolically, and falsely paints political opponents 
as “traitors,” “deadbeats,” “Nazis,” “lunatics,” “rednecks,” “satanic,” or 
“unpatriotic” rather than as fellow citizens within a pluralistic political order, with 
whom one vigorously, even passionately, disagrees on specific issues for 
specific reasons. 
5. Speech that is intentionally threatening to political opponents' physical well-
being or that encourages others to cause physical harm to them 
6. Speech that deploys racial, sexual, religious, or other epithets against a 
political opponent that a reasonable person would consider extremely 
demeaning. 
7. Speech intentionally aimed at closing down “spaces of reason” and ceasing 
discourse, rather than maintaining speech zones for future consideration of 
issues and policies. 
8. Speech that intentionally denies the right of political opponents to participate 
equally in applicable procedural or political processes or debates, or that denies 
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the legitimacy of their participation, where they have a lawful right to do so.” 
(Stryker & Massaro, 2012, cited in Stryker & Danielson, 2013, pg 8) 
Accordingly, given this deeper background anxiety regarding political paralysis 
and dysfunction I have been describing, numerous political theorists have 
argued that it is vital to develop common principles and norms of “civil” 
discourse to negotiate moral and political conflict. (Calhoun, 2000; Grayling, 
2000; Jamieson, 1999; Kamber, 2003; Laverty, 2009; Makau & Marty, 2013, 
Mutz & Reeves, 2005; Pearce & Littlejohn, 1997; Sinclair, 2000; Uslaner, 2000)  
From this point of view, civility is essential if participants in public discourses are 
to treat each other with appropriate respect by fairly considering and responding 
to each other's claims. (Arnett & Arneson, 1999) It is typically argued that 
liberal-democratic regimes need to sustain a political and civic culture defined 
by the willingness to compromise on contested issues and the consideration of 
the common good if they are to avoid degenerating into destructive conflict. 
(Eicher-Catt, 2013; Ivie, 2008) 
Advocates of civility, therefore, argue that it can instil a vital democratic ethos or 
reflect the practice of fundamental civic virtues necessary to the vitality of a 
diverse democracy. Of course, this whole discussion thus far begs the question: 
what is "civil discourse" or "civility". The concept of “civility”, from an 
etymological point of view, has a rich and complex historical genesis as it is 
profoundly connected with related discourses of “civilisation”, “citizenship” and 
“the city”. (Davetian, 2013; Vollp, 2014; Weeks, 2014)  
In addition, civility is also profoundly associated with diverse yet historically and 
culturally contingent norms of social behaviour, including notions of “decorum”, 
“politeness”, “etiquette” and “propriety”. Alternatively, it has been connected to 
the intonation of one’s voice, especially in terms of how the use of tone can be 
expressed to express derision, contempt and hostility towards other people and 
their viewpoints. (Aikin & Talisse, 2014) 
However, in spite of these common motifs, as Cornell notes, conceptions of civil 
discourse are “neither fixed or universal”. (Clayton, 2010) Unsurprisingly, 
therefore, there is no general academic consensus regarding the definition of 
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the concept of civility- or for that matter- the notion of incivility. (Clayton, 2010; 
Santana, 2014). 
This point is underscored by disputes as to whether the concept should be 
interpreted in “thick” terms, connected to other essential liberal virtues such as 
autonomy and tolerance, or whether it should be explained in “thin” terms, 
related to formalistic conventions or protocols of propriety. (See for instance 
Guttman & Thompson, 1996; Habermas, 2003; Kingwell, 1995; Rawls, 2005; 
Waldron, 2014) 
Nevertheless, it might be suggested that two broad trends have emerged from 
the academic literature. Firstly, the notion of civil discourse has been connected 
to discursive restrictions on the kinds of justifications or reasons that individuals 
in a diverse liberal polity can use when staking their claims publicly. This 
understanding of civility is commonly framed via the theoretical vocabulary of 
“public reason”.  
Public reason accounts of civility insist that individuals should exclusively stake 
their political claims with reference to generally acceptable justifications or 
reasons, thereby requiring them to exercise significant discursive self-restraint. 
This is to say that citizens and public officials should strive to justify their 
collective political arrangements without exclusively appealing to partial, 
controversial, sectarian or “comprehensive” conceptions of the good. Without 
these normative and epistemic guidelines, it is feared that coercive public policy 
could be implemented illegitimately by appeals to justifications that are simply 
unacceptable to all persons affected by a given public policy. (Newman, 2015; 
Rawls, 2005; Sperling, 2012; Quong, 2013) 
This strand of thought sometimes assumes that certain kinds of moral 
justifications can effectively act as a “conversation stopper” given that their 
normative premises and conclusions are unacceptable to citizens with different 
worldviews. (Rorty, 1994)  
Crucially though, this strand of thought overwhelmingly argues that civility has 
an epistemic filtering function, allowing participants in public disputes to 
distinguish between which political claims should be deemed worthy or 
unworthy for deliberation. From this perspective, civil discourse constitutes an 
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essential means via which individuals who hold irreconcilable yet reasonable 
differences in moral values and beliefs can co-exist in relations of peace and 
mutual respect. (Rawls, 2005)  
Importantly, it is also important to note that public reason accounts of civility 
have placed particular attention to the idea of ‘reasonableness’. 
Reasonableness reflects the willingness of citizens and public officials to accept 
that coercive political power can only be legitimated by referencing generally 
acceptable reasons. It also indicates a willingness to accept all members of our 
political community as equal and free persons. 
Given that public reason accounts of civility place substantive constraints on 
permissible political discourse, justifications that are incompatible with the moral 
principles of reciprocity and reasonableness deserve exclusion from public 
consideration. 
Nevertheless, this interpretation of civility has been fiercely rejected by critics 
who argue that the requirements of public reason are profoundly exclusionary. 
(Greenawalt, 1994; Vallier, 2011; Wolterstorff, 1997) These critics typically argue 
that restricting the expression of views animated by comprehensive doctrines is 
an extremely problematic strategy for democratic inclusion. 
Instead, it is claimed that staking of comprehensive doctrines in public debate is 
vital for a number of reasons. Firstly, any process of public discourse must 
recognize the existential import of citizens’ claims- that is, it must recognize the 
deeper normative, epistemological and ontological background understandings 
which shape the articulation of political claims and demands. (Taylor, 2007b) 
Secondly, it is claimed that the public discussion of different comprehensive 
world views will engender relations of deeper trust, respect and solidarity. It can 
encourage robust social criticism while deepening mutual understanding of 
difference. (Eberle, 2002; Stout, 2004; Wolterstorff, 2013) 
Civility, according to this picture, is less connected to the political justification of 
coercive power but more to engendering a particular kind of relationality 
between citizens and public officials. The advocates of this conceptualisation of 
civil discourse emphasise how it constitutes a self-reflexive mode of 
receptiveness or responsiveness to other people's moral and political claims. 
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Rather than defining civility as a kind of discursive self-restraint, civility is a form 
of social solidarity that encourages citizens to stake their claims in a manner 
that sustains social connection and co-operation across thick lines of difference.  
It orientates participants towards conceptions of the “common” or “public” good. 
It signifies that other people's viewpoints are epistemically worthy for further 
discussion because it validates and supports their public expression. (Carter, 
1998; Forni, 2002) It demands that people should treat their interlocutors with 
respect by considering their claims fairly and by being willing to change one's 
own position as a result. 
Consequently, civil discourse encourages conflicting parties to reach a common 
understanding of a given contested issue while motivating them to consider 
each other's perspectives fairly. It helps them to work co-operatively in a spirit of 
mutual compromise and sacrifice. (Arnett & Arneson, 1999; Sampson, 1999; 
Shils, 1997) 
Civil discourse is, therefore, a panacea to the vulnerabilities of human beings 
towards dogmatism and other epistemic vices. It reflects an egalitarian impulse 
not to treat others with contempt, even if one passionately disagrees with their 
commitments and viewpoints.  
The discussion thus far has been rather academic and abstract. Consequently, 
it is important to stress that that notions of civility occupy a conspicuous place in 
contemporary public political discourse and institutional practice. For instance, 
in the United States, the concept has informed the conduct of electoral 
campaigns in the form of “civility pledges” between political opponents.  
Moreover, public surveys in the United States have consistently identified 
dissatisfaction with the quality of public political discourse. (Piacenza, 2014; 
Rasmussen, 2009) Indeed, as Kenski et al (2012) note, one survey by the 
Public Religion Research Institute in 2010 indicated that 80% of survey 
participants labelled uncivil discourse in American political life to be a 
“somewhat serious” or “very serious issue”. (Kenski et al, 2012) 
Even more prominently, the satirists Stephen Colbert and Jon Stewart 
organised a “Rally to Restore Sanity” in 2010 partly out of frustration at the 
highly polarised discourse characteristic of the American media system. During 
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the same year, a group of concerned citizens even established the “Chamomile 
Tea Party” which publicly campaigns for greater civility in political discourse 
through a broad range of visual media.  
In addition, President Barack Obama has repeatedly criticised the manner in 
which political opponents are frequently caricatured and demonized in American 
political debates. Obama's emphasis on civility was demonstrated clearly 
following the 2011 Tuscon shooting tragedy when he beseeched Americans to 
talk to each other “in a way that heals, not a way that wounds”. (Obama, 2011) 
Indeed, as he argued in an earlier address to the University of Michigan's 2010 
commencement: 
“The problem is that this kind of vilification and over-the-top rhetoric closes the 
door to the possibility of compromise. It undermines democratic deliberation. It 
prevents learning—since, after all, why should we listen to a “fascist” or a 
“socialist” or a “right wing nut” or a “left wing nut”? It makes it nearly impossible 
for people who have legitimate but bridgeable differences to sit down at the 
same table and hash things out.” (Obama, 2010) 
Accordingly, given this broad outline of two different accounts of civility, and its 
broader academic and political significance, it is now appropriate to examine 
some central criticisms of the concept to situate the concerns of this thesis in its 
proper context. 
Criticisms of Civil Discourse: 
It is clear that advocates of civil discourse have had to face a broad range of 
strident objections to their entire political project. Firstly, it has been argued that 
theories of civil discourse have ignored problems of discursive manipulation and 
exploitation in political life. From this point of view, it is commonplace that 
political actors frequently manipulate norms of civility to pursue their vested and 
pernicious interests under a beguiling egalitarian fiction or to simply peddle 
“bullshit” or other forms of misinformation. (Kimbrough, 2006; McKerrow, 2001, 
2001b) 
Alternatively, it is feared that advocating civility ultimately has a profoundly 
conservative impetus that can serve to legitimate, rationalise and justify social 
and economic inequalities. For instance, it is noteworthy that far-right parties 
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have adopted notions of “civility” as part of their public policy platforms as 
exemplified by the British National Party.  
Indeed, the BNP's 2010 General Election manifesto even mentions civility on 
multiple occasions, pledging to “promote the traditional British concepts of 
civility and courteousness” in the public education system and to “support a 
return to the traditional standards of civility and politeness in British life”. (BNP, 
2010, pg 44) 
Moreover, accounts of civility are also vulnerable to the conceptual objection of 
where the precise limits of civil discourse ought to lie. Is it morally desirable, for 
instance, to participate in a “civil” discourse with political groups or individuals 
that hold bigoted or discriminatory world-views?  
Secondly, critics argue the recent preoccupation with civil discourse within 
liberal political theory is misguided as it ignores how “uncivil” speech can help 
challenge unjust power relationships and institutions. (Harcourt, 2012; 
Papacharissi, 2004; Scott & Smith, 1969) 
From this viewpoint, encouraging civil discourses alone will be insufficient to 
challenge deeply institutionalised injustices. After all, a society, as Peter 
Johnson notes, might value civility while remaining “exploitative, unjustifiably 
discriminatory and indifferent to the existence of wide inequalities between rich 
and poor”. (Johnson, 2008, 596) 
For instance, Dana Cloud suggests, the term civility “appeared in the context of 
courtly manners requiring obeisance to aristocratic power”, thereby serving the 
reproduction of “hierarchical social relations”. (Cloud, 2015, pg 15) From this 
perspective, she argues that advocating civil discourse in political life serves to 
undermine political contestation while solidifying the dominance of political and 
economic elites. (Cloud, 2015, pg 16) 
Indeed, calls for “civil discourse” can either depoliticise the contestability of 
public political life or even legitimate prevailing injustices by dissipating the 
strength of demands for structural or systemic change. (Reich & Cloud, 2009) 
An emphasis on civility, therefore, is futile in the face of ever deepening 
economic inequalities in western democracies as it presupposes that political 
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elites would be willing to re-distribute economic wealth simply through dialogue 
alone. 
This criticism, as Goldberg notes, is rather unsurprising given that calls for 
greater political civility have often been expounded by theorists with a socially 
conservative bent, who see civility as a panacea to “selfish and hyper-
individualised societies” and even supposedly to increasing rates of crime. 
(Goldberg, 2005, pg 337) 
Conversely, the capacity to label certain groups or individuals as “uncivil” has 
clearly been a powerful means for privileged actors to portray demands for 
justice as being fundamentally delusional or even perverse. According to this 
argument, norms of civility are invariably slanted to the advantage of dominant 
groups and communities as opposed to improving the communicative standing 
of the oppressed. 
Indeed, it has been widely noted how notions of “civility” have historically been 
used as an exclusionary device or a justificatory regime for colonialism, 
imperialism, racism and sexism, legitimating unjust social institutions while 
dehumanizing their victims. (Cloud, 2015; Elias, 2000; Filmer, 2000; Goldberg, 
2005; Keane, 1998; Nehring, 2011; Reich & Cloud, 2009; Taylor, 2004; Zurn, 
2013) 
Unsurprisingly, critics fear that advocating civil discourse is profoundly 
misguided as its norms might exclude marginalised communities and social 
groups while stifling social criticism. (Cloud, 2015; Reich & Cloud, 2009) Given 
the harsh criticism of the concept of civility in political theory, there have been a 
number of calls to acknowledge the importance of coercive and non-persuasive 
political tactics and strategies as a vital- and integral- aspect of democratic life.  
Coercive political disobedience and “uncivil” political discourse, from this 
viewpoint, are more effective means to contest dominant power relations and to 
challenge the boundaries of “acceptable” discourse. (Fung, 2005; Galston, 
2010; Goldberg, 2005; Medearis, 2005; Stears & Humphrey, 2012; Young, 
2004) 
This observation is frequently tied to the observation that uncivil discourse might 
not necessarily undermine the political process as it might encourage critical 
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argumentation and the airing of claims that previously had been ignored or 
marginalised. 
Finally, one of the most important lines of criticism regarding civil discourse 
stems from feminist theories of epistemology that foreground the significance of 
power relations in the production, exchange, and consumption of knowledge. In 
addition, feminist accounts also stress how our social positioning profoundly 
influences our access to different epistemic resources. This issue constitutes 
the crux of the 'situated knowledge thesis' which Wylie (2009) explains thus: 
“...what we experience, and what we know, is conditioned by social location, not 
just in an idiosyncratic sense--as a consequence of our individual talents and 
dispositions, our unique personal histories--but as a function of structural 
conditions of social differentiation that make a systematic difference to the 
material conditions of our lives, to the relations of production and reproduction 
that shape our identities and opportunities, to the cultural/conceptual resources 
available to us for understanding these relations”. (Wylie, 2009, pg 11) 
Wylie stresses, therefore, that our social locations serve to potentially delimit 
the content of our knowledge and influence the epistemic norms that regulate 
what counts as valuable or redundant knowledge on a structural basis. (Wylie, 
2004, pg 343) Consequently, as she elaborates further: 
“What individuals experience and understand is shaped by their location in a 
hierarchically structured system of power relations: by the material conditions of 
their lives, by the relations of production and reproduction that structure their 
social interactions, and by the conceptual resources they have to represent and 
interpret these relations”. (Wylie, 2004, pg 343) 
Feminist epistemologists have further argued that our differing social locations 
can serve to produce different interpretations of social life and reality. (Bergin, 
2002; Mohanty, 1993; Narayan, 2004) Indeed, as Code argues, “differing social 
positions generate variable constructions of reality”, thereby meaning that 
knowers are simultaneously “limited and enabled by the specificities of their 
locations”. (Code, 1995, pgs 52-3) 
Alternatively, Linda Alcoff suggests that our social identities constitute an 
epistemic horizon “from which certain aspects or layers of reality can be made 
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visible. In stratified societies, differently identified individuals do not always have 
the same access to points of view or perceptual planes of observation”. (Alcoff, 
2006, pg 43) 
Unsurprisingly, some theorists have noted that differential access to epistemic 
resources can not only breed misunderstandings but that they are also 
inherently implicated in relations and structures of oppression. It is claimed in 
particular that access to epistemic resources are profoundly connected to social 
practices of silencing on both an individual and collective level. (Fricker, 2007; 
Medina, 2013) 
It is clear that one of the most systemic outlines of this problem is Miranda 
Fricker 's distinction between two forms of epistemic inequality- namely 
'testimonial' and 'hermeneutical' kinds of injustice. Fricker (2007) presents these 
kinds of injustice as being analytically distinctive albeit she also stresses how 
they are complexly interconnected in practice. 
Fricker describes testimonial injustice as a situation in which a speaker's 
testimonial credibility is unjustly devalued by virtue of the operation of identity-
based prejudicial beliefs, attitudes and values. As a consequence, prejudicial 
attitudes about the social identities of a given speaker leads other people to 
dismiss them as being untrustworthy, insincere, incompetent or unreliable 
testifiers of knowledge. (Fricker, 2007) 
Hermeneutical injustice, on the other hand, refers to a situation whereby a 
speaker cannot articulate their experiences of injustice to others by virtue of 
'gaps' in a community's shared epistemic resources. These flaws in dominant 
epistemic resources render it difficult for victims of injustice to understand their 
suffering intelligibly and to articulate their claims in a manner easily receivable 
by their fellow members of society. (Fricker, 2007) 
One example of the operation of hermeneutical injustices in society stem from 
collective practices of denial which prevent commonly shared knowledge from 
being articulated openly in public as they establish social taboos that render 
some subjects 'discussable' or 'unmentionable'.  
Political acts of denial, therefore, are deeply implicated in asymmetries of social 
power. They allow dominant actors to gain, maintain and reproduce their 
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dominance while also positioning their victims in difficult political and moral 
predicaments. (Cohen, 2000; Norgaard, 2011; Taylor, 2008; Zerubavel, 2006) 
For example, challenging conspiracies of silence might risk potential social 
sanction, public opprobrium, and hostility.  
The issue of historical denial is obviously pressing in post-colonial and deeply 
divided societies as they can render claims of injustice unintelligible, obscure 
institutional responsibility for abusive mistreatment and impede accurate 
historical knowledge of the past. Moreover, they can also allow beneficiaries of 
injustices to dismiss arrogantly the claims of oppressed groups and 
communities as being inherently flawed or nonsensical. (Cohen, 2000; Taylor, 
2008; Zerubavel, 2006) 
Consequently, hermeneutical gaps can conceptually deprive people of 
adequate semantic terms to describe their experiences as well as expressively 
deprive people of suitable idioms and styles through which their testimony can 
be articulated and interpreted. (Fricker, 2007) 
Ultimately, therefore, relations of epistemic injustice serve to silence particular 
actors by virtue of their social identities, their choice of communicative style or 
the vocabularies in which they stake their claims publicly. 
Unsurprisingly, given these concerns, there is a suspicion that norms of civility 
might reproduce relations of epistemic injustice in multiple fashions. Firstly, 
norms of civil discourse might foster practices of self-censorship by members of 
marginalised communities who feel that they will unjustly stifle their preferred 
public discourses, vocabularies or communicative styles. 
Secondly, there is the concern that advocating norms of civil discourse fails to 
tackle the problem of how dominant relations of power privilege some actors, 
styles of communication or social discourses while ignoring or marginalising 
other contributions and persons. Norms of civility, from this perspective, will 
likely to be ineffective in challenging vested forms of ignorance that serve to 
reproduce social hierarchies and injustices in society. They might also further 
impede political criticism by restricting the terms of public debate to established 
“moderate” or “widely shared” positions.  
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Ironically, therefore, from this point of view, rather than assisting democracies to 
negotiate moral and political conflict, norms of civility can restrict the expression 
of genuine disagreement, dissent and the expression of provocative, 
controversial and uncomfortable claims. Indeed, the central issue here is that 
there seems to be no point in advocating civil discourse if listeners from more 
advantaged communities are motivationally unprepared to fairly consider 
marginalized voices or if they lack adequate interpretive resources altogether.  
This is a central concern I examine in my fourth chapter where I note how some 
theorists have argued that advocating civil discourse in the face of power 
asymmetries is essentially futile if not morally pernicious.  
Accordingly, having outlined the general background context of this study, it is 
important now to precisely explicate my central concerns and claims in this 
thesis. 
Thesis Introduction: 
My introduction has highlighted so far that academic interpretations of the 
position of civil discourse in contemporary liberal-democracies is highly 
polarized. 
On the one hand, advocates argue that civil discourse is an essential pre-
condition for the fair consideration of political claims and the consideration of 
the common good. Indeed, without fostering civility in political institutions and 
wider society, it is feared that liberal-democracies shall invariably succumb to 
devastating moral polarisation and institutional gridlock. 
On the other hand, critics argue that civil kinds of discourse unduly constrain the 
terms of public discourse in favour of advantaged social groups and 
communities while dissipating contentious struggles.  
From this point of view, advocating civil discourse is merely an academic 
thought bubble that evades meaningful questions of power while obscuring the 
essential role of civil disobedience and other forms of coercive political 
contestation in challenging relations of oppression.  
I hope that this dissertation will contribute to transcending this unproductive 
binary understanding of civil discourse. My first original contribution to 
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knowledge in this thesis is to critically appraise two highly influential models of 
civil discourse from different schools of philosophical thought. 
The first model of civil discourse I consider is the proceduralist model of John 
Rawls and Jürgen Habermas. This model defends the idea that citizens and 
public officials must stake their political claims without referencing their 
comprehensive conceptions of the good.  
It thereby mandates a normative duty of translation which requires participants 
in public debates to frame their political arguments with reference to principles, 
values and norms which could be generally accepted by all members of society, 
irrespective of their diverging conceptions of the good. 
Consequently, I argue that Rawls and Habermas maintain that the ultimate end 
of civil discourse is the public justification of coercive state power. They share 
the concern that without practices of civil discourse the state could justify public 
policies on the basis of reasons which are not acceptable by all citizens.  
From their point of view, citizens act uncivilly if they refuse to translate their 
claims into more generalizable frames because it signifies an unwillingness to 
propose “reasonable” terms of social co-operation to each other. Accordingly, 
both understand civil discourse as an essential technique to preserve freedom 
in a diverse polity while fostering social relations of deeper respect, solidarity 
and trust. 
Nevertheless, I also acknowledge that there are some important differences 
between Rawls and Habermas’ approaches and I strive to outline the broader 
historical evolution of their conceptions of civil discourse. 
The second model of civil discourse I consider is the hermeneutical model of 
Charles Taylor. Taylor’s conception of civil discourse is profoundly suspicious of 
the proceduralist attempt to establish rigid distinctions between the right and the 
good for the purposes of public discourse.  
Rather than connecting civil discourse to the justification of coercive state 
power, Taylor emphasises its capacities to orientate citizens towards the 
common good in the face of his diagnosis of the growing political polarization, 
fragmentation and factionalism of contemporary democracies.  
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Without an orientation towards the common good, Taylor believes that it will be 
impossible for citizens and public officials to provisionally form an “overlapping 
consensus” concerning their central regulating principles of Justice. 
Significantly, Taylor also believes that civil discourse is an essential vehicle of 
social criticism. He claims that civil discourse facilitates the deconstruction of 
pejorative stereotypes and prejudicial attitudes towards minority groups.  
Indeed, he also emphasizes how crucial civil discourse is to the fair recognition 
and accommodation of cultural, religious and ethnic difference more broadly. 
Civil discourse allows individuals from different communities to forge an 
overlapping consensus by appreciating the universal insights in each other’s 
cultural, religious and moral traditions.  
Nevertheless, I claim that the proceduralist and the hermeneutical 
understandings of civil discourse suffer from significant limitations. Firstly, the 
proceduralist position is exclusionary, thereby rendering it inappropriate as a 
workable model of civil discourse. Rawls and Habermas’ attempt to differentiate 
between the private and the public and the good and the right simply will not be 
accepted by a significant portion of citizens in contemporary democracies.  
I argue that they fail to explain why citizens who feel that they cannot separate 
their comprehensive doctrines from their political claim-making activities would 
wish to partake in any translation process. Their approach is exclusionary in the 
sense that it will likely motivationally decrease the willingness of such citizens to 
participate in formal decision-making processes.  
In addition, I also note that Rawls and Habermas fail to consider how citizens 
who refuse to translate their claims into a generalized idiom might be castigated 
as “unreasonable” by their fellow citizens, thereby generating potential social 
opprobrium and hostility against them. 
Secondly, I argue that Rawls and Habermas’ conceptions of civility ignore how 
the moral expectation for citizens to translate their claims into a more 
generalizable discourse could create an exclusionary epistemic climate. I 
discuss the case of indigenous Australian political claims regarding the natural 
environment to question whether public reason models of civility can fairly 
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accommodate claims which are incommensurable with dominant normative, 
epistemological and ontological social discourses. 
In addition, I also argue that their conceptions of civility are flawed because they 
ignore the problem of epistemic kinds of injustice and practices of social 
ignorance which marginalize the claims of oppressed communities while 
according an unjust level of credibility, trustworthiness and reliability to the 
claims made by members of privileged communities. Unfortunately, there are no 
critical resources within their approaches which allows for the critical 
interrogation of dominant epistemic norms. 
I also argue that Taylor’s hermeneutical interpretation of civil discourse suffers 
from similar defects, in spite of the considerable advantages it offers over the 
proceduralist model. Firstly, I note while Taylor emphasizes the critical 
capacities of civil discourse, a tension exists between his dialogical conception 
of personal identity and his rather static conception of group-based identity.  
I discuss Taylor’s famous defence of “cultural survivalism” in Quebec to illustrate 
the strain between his idea that civil discourse can culminate in a “fusion of 
horizons” between different epistemic, normative and ontological frameworks 
and his attempt to justify practices of accommodation which ultimately would 
restrict changes in a dominant majority’s culture.  
Secondly, I claim that Taylor fails to adequately consider some of the moral and 
political difficulties associated with civil discourse in the face of power 
differentials. Taylor, like Rawls and Habermas, fails to consider how dominant 
epistemic norms can serve to hinder receptivity to the claims of marginalized 
communities.  
This is to say that he fails to consider how dominant epistemic norms and 
relations can breed practices of epistemic malevolence by members of 
privileged communities, particularly in terms of motivated refusals to re-consider 
their viewpoints and interests.  
Consequently, the influence of practices of social ignorance and relations of 
epistemic injustice can render it extremely difficult to engender the critical self-
reflexive stance Taylor believes is instigated by civil discourse.  
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Conversely, I also argue that Taylor fails to consider how practices of social 
ignorance and relations of epistemic injustice create a set of difficult moral 
quandaries for members of oppressed communities in public discourses.  
I discuss Kristie Dotson’s notion of “testimonial smothering” to illustrate that 
members of marginalized communities often have legitimate reasons not to 
share their knowledge with members of more privileged communities, 
particularly in cases where they are concerned that expressing their claims 
might reinforce pejorative assumptions about them. 
Ultimately, I claim that given Taylor's insensitivity to the problem of testimonial 
smothering, he fails to offer any account of what interpretive stances or 
institutional practices are required to identify and mitigate, offset or eliminate the 
flaws in dominant epistemic norms which incentivize individuals from 
marginalized groups to restrict their testimonial claims in public. 
Finally, it will be suggested that Taylor does not offer adequate criteria for how 
citizens and public officials should approach situations where people speak 
“uncivilly” or where people stake claims in a dogmatic fashion. He further fails to 
offer a principled account which outlines what kinds of claims or justifications 
ought to be excluded from public deliberation. 
This brings me to the second area where I hope to make an original contribution 
to knowledge- namely, the development of an account of civil discourse which 
places practices of social ignorance and epistemic injustices at the forefront of 
concern.  
I develop this argument by suggesting that feminist epistemological theories of 
knowledge and ignorance should be extended to scholarship regarding civil 
discourse as they offer distinctive insights and theoretical opportunities.  
My central claim is that civil discourse is a relationship of trust between 
interlocutors who mutually accept meeting certain epistemic responsibilities with 
respect to the connection between their public claim-making activities and their 
worldviews. Accordingly, I understand civil discourse as a trust-building process 
between people who come from very different social backgrounds and who 
have diverse opinions on contested public issues. Civility entails a relationship 
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of trust because fairly receiving one’s claims is a duty others owe to us just as 
fairly staking our claims is a duty we owe to others.  
I argue that there are three key epistemic responsibilities integral to civility.  
Firstly, participants in civil discourse must be mutually willing to learn about 
each other’s worldviews and to be particularly sensitive to how their social 
positioning influences the character of their claims.  
Secondly, I argue that participants must be mutually willing to question their own 
worldviews in order to effectively learn from other’s worldviews and to 
appreciate their areas of ignorance.  
Finally, I argue that individuals must be willing to question their own positioning 
in relations of power in order to develop a critical consciousness with respect to 
how the staking of their own claims and the reception of the claims of others 
might be unjustly distorted by dominant relations of power.  
From this perspective, it is vital to question how relations of power might lead us 
to inappropriately place our trust in some actors and their claims while 
neglecting to put warranted trust in others. Without this self-interrogation, it will 
be impossible to appropriately re-adjust one's credibility assessments in order to 
ensure that one accords appropriate attention and consideration to the 
perspectives of others. 
Moreover, self-questioning is also important given the intersectionality of our 
social identities. It might contingently be the case that certain facets of our 
identities might render individuals vulnerable to losing an appropriate degree of 
epistemic self-confidence in our beliefs.  
This lack of self-confidence stems from the operation of oppressive social 
categorizations, stereotypes and prejudicial attitudes. Accordingly, questioning 
our own positioning in relations of power might be an important means of 
building warranted trust and epistemic confidence in our own commitments in 
public discourse, thereby potentially contributing to the challenging of unjust 
epistemic norms. 
However, I also insist that the distorting influences of epistemic injustices and 
practices of social ignorance require individuals in any discursive exchange to 
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simultaneously exercise a degree of epistemic caution towards our interlocutors 
if we are to place warranted trust in their public claims.  
Consequently, I argue that it is important for individuals to question the 
benevolence of our discursive partners by monitoring for signs of possible 
discursive manipulation and exploitation.  
This critical questioning is necessary to ensure that not only are the claims of 
others epistemically sound and reliable but also because a failure to critically 
question other people's testimony might leave one vulnerable to manipulation or 
exploitation. I claim that this focus can help assuage fears that civil discourse is 
merely a façade for discursive manipulation and exploitation.  
However, as I also acknowledge, the process of other questioning can also 
erode relations of trust between interlocutors. Consequently, when questioning 
the epistemic motivations of others, it is vital to be sensitive to the possibility 
that one’s estimations of their benevolence might be flawed. 
Finally, in my fourth chapter, I hope to make my third original contribution to 
knowledge where I return to one of the most fundamental objections staked 
against the idea of advocating civil discourse in the face of power asymmetries- 
namely what I term the “exclusion objection”.  
This line of objection suggests that the only effective means of challenging 
oppressive social relations is via coercive practices of political disobedience and 
the use of “uncivil” political rhetoric. While I am profoundly sympathetic to this 
objection, I also maintain that while advocating civil kinds of discourse in the 
face of significant power differentials can be irresponsible in certain contexts, so 
can the advocacy of political coercion without any reference to norms of civility.  
This is because the use of coercion in pluralistic democracies cannot occur 
carte blanche. There must be principled limitations on the scope of political 
disobedience given that the use of coercion risks disrespecting the autonomy 
and dignity of our fellow citizens and threatens the goods that arise from social 
order. 
I hope therefore that my discussion shall illustrate that civil discourse and 
coercive political disobedience can be mutually compatible and complementary 
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as opposed to be diametrically opposed as much of the academic literature 
currently presupposes. But what precisely is my line of argument? 
I begin my discussion by surveying the broader academic literature on the 
concept of civil disobedience before critically interrogating Rawls’ and 
Habermas’ conceptualizations of civil disobedience for a number of reasons.  
Firstly, discussions of public reason and civil disobedience in Rawls' and 
Habermas' work have predominantly occurred in isolation within much of the 
academic literature- a most unfortunate oversight given the interesting 
intersections between them. 
More importantly for my purposes, both construct theories of public reason and 
civil disobedience which set strenuous conditions for 'legitimate' claim-making 
and political disobedience.  
I suggest that Rawls and Habermas’ understanding of civil disobedience 
privileges an untenable distinction between the right and the good and places 
unwarranted focus on appealing to constitutional principles as part of the public 
justification of civil disobedience.  
These requirements, I argue, mean that their frameworks of civil disobedience 
are not attuned to the problem of epistemic injustice and practices of social 
ignorance which serve to rationalize, justify and legitimate unjust political, social 
and economic relationships and institutions. 
Accordingly, given these central limitations, I maintain that it is important to 
develop a new account of civil disobedience that transcends these limitations 
yet which can differentiate between morally praiseworthy and morally 
blameworthy kinds of political disobedience.  
Consequently, I propose that civil disobedience should be understood as a 
means to challenge practices of social silencing and forms of vested ignorance 
in a polity as opposed to merely understanding it as an appeal for redress to 
constitutional authorities via referencing constitutional principles.  
In addition, I also argue that civil disobedience can provoke social criticism by 
challenging dominant epistemic norms which allow members from dominant 
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groups or institutional actors to remain ignorant in their complicity in unjust 
social relationships.  
It particularly aims to challenge “common sense” frameworks of understanding 
which render relations of injustice invisible or natural by either subverting 
hegemonic discourses or introducing new counter-hegemonic discourses which 
open different political possibilities. However, I claim that such a re-framing of 
the purpose of civil disobedience requires a re-framing of how political 
disobedience is reconcilable with civil discourse.  
Consequently, I argue that civility in coercive political disobedience is reflected 
when participants offer non-participants reasoned moral justifications to explain 
the motivations and intentions for their actions, articulate reasoned moral 
justifications to explain the selection of tactics involved and justify why they 
were appropriate relative to the moral ends of civil disobedience.  
I also argue that it requires participants to refrain from hate speech and act non-
violently unless faced by unreasonable aggression from their opponents and to 
demonstrate adequate consideration to the viewpoints, interests and needs of 
non-participant bystanders. 
Ultimately, therefore, I hope that this dissertation hopes to offer insight into the 
moral complexities of the relationship between persuasion and coercion in 
liberal-democratic regimes.  
It hopes to develop an account of civility that is reconcilable with the 
demonstrable need to use coercive tactics and strategies to challenge unjust 
social relations and structures while placing the neglected problem of epistemic 
injustice and practices of social ignorance to the forefront of theorization about 
the place of civil discourse in contemporary democracies. 
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Chapter One- John Rawls and Jürgen Habermas- The 
limitations of public reason as a form of civil discourse. 
 
This chapter shall argue that Rawls and Habermas understand civil discourse to 
be essential in sustaining the political legitimacy of the state in light of the deep 
diversity of contemporary liberal-democratic societies. I claim that they connect 
civility with the problem of how to publicly justify the coercive use of state power 
in the face of deep moral disagreement and cultural, religious and ethnic 
difference.  
Moreover, both share the idea that civility is a necessary vehicle for behavioural 
regulation, allowing citizens and public officials in diverse societies to negotiate 
their differences and disagreements while respectfully affirming each other’s 
autonomy and dignity as moral persons. 
Civility, they both maintain, is associated with a distinctive set of communicative 
behaviours, which impose a moral duty of self-restraint on one's public claim-
making activities. Citizens and public officials, they stress, must try to “translate” 
their claims into a more generalised fashion, avoiding appeals to controversial 
and partial conceptions of the good in “formal” political institutions and forums. 
Both emphasise that this translation process will ensure that any legislation 
implemented by formal political institutions will be able to command the assent- 
at least in principle- of all citizens while also cultivating social relations of 
respect, trust and solidarity. 
However, there are also significant differences of emphasis in their accounts of 
civility. Habermas appears to attach greater importance to the idea that civility 
involves a willingness by citizens to adopt an impartial and generalizable 
viewpoint as opposed to defending their political claims with respect to their own 
self-interest or their partial conceptions of the good.  
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For Habermas, this activity is crucial to ‘discovering’ principles, norms, and 
values which transcend particularistic conceptions of the good, thereby allowing 
for the political legitimation of power in a manner potentially acceptable to all. 
In addition, Habermas' work also suggests that civility has epistemic dimensions 
as well, connecting it to the need to discover the “better argument” in the course 
of any public dialogue. (Habermas, 1984; 1987) His epistemic focus thereby 
reflects the concern in his early work to clearly distinguish between manipulative 
and non-manipulative kinds of discourse.  
By contrast, Rawls seems to connect civility more closely with a need for 
political stability, implying that civility constitutes an essential means to prevent 
liberal democracies from disintegrating into destructive kinds of political and 
moral conflict.  
Furthermore, as I shall note later, Rawls seems to differ from Habermas in that 
he more closely connects civility with the idea of ‘reasonableness’, developing a 
normative account of “reasonable” personhood to justify the imposition of 
discursive restraints required by public reason. 
Finally, in the concluding part of the chapter, I critically interrogate some 
criticisms of their accounts of civility. I argue that their rigid distinctions between 
the public and the private and the good and the right are exclusionary to citizens 
who cannot accept this differentiation.  
More troublingly, I suggest that Rawls and Habermas' interpretation of civil 
discourse fails to consider the exclusionary impacts of epistemic injustices and 
practices of social ignorance which throw into question the capacity of public 
reason to be an inclusive model of civil discourse. 
Before developing these critiques in further depth though, it is important to 
understand the broader similarities and differences between the work of Rawls 
and Habermas and their broader political implications for their respective 
accounts of civility. 
Similarities of approach: 
The first most apparent similarity between John Rawls and Jürgen Habermas 
lies in their common intention to develop a systematic, impartial theory of 
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political justification through the concept of “public reason”. Both, as Todd notes, 
reject a foundationalist understanding of political reasoning which insists that 
the justification of a particular claim can be settled by appeals to 
unquestionable, a priori normative foundations. (Todd, 2010) 
Their work, as Todd (2010, pg 14) further suggests, constitutes a continuation 
and a defence of a genre of political theory subjected to a substantial number of 
critiques in recent times. These commentaries range from post-modern 
scepticism towards “grand narratives”, feminist challenges to the universalist 
aspirations of liberal political theory as well as post-colonial deconstructions of 
Euro-centric thinking. (Todd, 2010, pg 14) 
This latter point highlights another central similarity in their thought. Both 
theorists are immensely interested in how the cultural, religious and moral 
diversity of liberal-democratic societies impacts on the legitimacy and authority 
of the State. They both thereby contribute to a strand of political theory that can 
be traced back as far as Hobbes, Locke and Kant which stresses the 
importance of the public justification of coercive political power. (Chambers, 
2010, pg 894; Horton, 2000, pg 1) 
Although there are multiple interpretations of this idea, the concept of public 
reason not only establishes epistemic principles of public deliberation but it also 
develops a normative account of appropriate discursive behaviour by citizens 
and public officials. (Quong, 2011) 
Accordingly, as Jonathan Quong (2011) notes, the fundamental puzzle that the 
notion of public reason attempts to resolve is “how is the public justification of 
liberal rules and institutions possible in light of the deep pluralism or 
disagreement that is a feature of contemporary societies?” (Quong, 2011, pg 5)  
The notion, as Simone Chambers (2010) further notes, suggests that the 
exercise of political power should be legitimated by “seeking, constructing and 
offering” justifications acceptable to all potentially affected by proposed 
governmental legislation. (Chambers, 2010, pg 895) From this point of view, the 
process of public reason allows democratic institutions to be publicly 
transparent and accountable to the citizenry. 
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Habermas closely connects this problem with his account of the complexity of 
contemporary societies in light of various modernization processes, particularly 
concerning rationalisation and the proliferation of “subsystems” that orientate 
the social order. In addition, Habermas’ understanding of this problem is 
profoundly guided by his belief that reason “no longer provides a direct blueprint 
for a normative theory of law and morality”. (Habermas, 1996, pg 5) 
Rawls, on the other hand, suggests that the diversity of “comprehensive 
doctrines” within contemporary societies renders the ambition of human reason 
to achieve mutual consensus on the justification of political relationships 
considerably more difficult. This situation demands the identification of 
principles of Justice which can be accepted internally across divergent notions 
of the good. 
Consequently, as Andrea Baumeister notes, both theorists defend a 
commitment to the neutrality and impartiality of the State towards conflicting 
notions of the good. They believe that this arrangement will best ensure the 
willing assent of most, if not all, citizens within contemporary liberal 
democracies. (Baumeister, 2000, pg 48) 
Finally, it is worth noting that both are optimistic that liberal democracies can 
effectively adjudicate social conflicts in a manner acceptable to all. This 
tendency is exemplified by Habermas' partial rejection of the early Frankfurt 
School's diagnosis of deepening public depoliticisation abetted by the 'culture 
industry'. Instead, he cautiously advocates the potential use of public reasoning 
to emancipate human beings from oppressive political relationships. (Johnson, 
2006) 
Similarly, Rawls argues that political philosophy expands the horizons of 
political possibility. It allows people to creatively articulate principles of a 
“realistic utopia” in spite of historical injustices and political imperfections. 
(Rawls, 2001) Unsurprisingly, given this optimistic stance, both advocate for 
more “deliberative” forms of democracy and attempt to outline the normative 
principles that would regulate their formal procedures as well as the 
interpersonal conduct of participants. 
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Accordingly, having briefly outlined some fundamental similarities in terms of 
their academic concerns and methodological stances, it is vital to note some 
important areas of difference and disagreement between them. 
Differences of approach: 
The previous section has highlighted a number of significant similarities 
between Rawls and Habermas. Despite this reality, it is apparent that there are 
some significant differences too between their political theories. First of all, 
there are considerable methodological differences between their approaches 
which reflect their different understandings of the role of political philosophy. 
This difference is rendered particularly conspicuous via Rawls “non-
metaphysical” conception of political justice and Habermas' “post-metaphysical” 
account of reason. 
Rawls argues that a “non-metaphysical conception” of Justice can be 
discovered within the values of different “reasonable” comprehensive doctrines 
in a political community. This affirmation, in turn, allows for the development of 
an “overlapping consensus” regarding regulatory principles of justice. (Rawls, 
2005)  
Habermas, by contrast, develops a theory of reason not based on metaphysical 
foundations but rather one which claims its authority from the normativity 
inherently embedded within procedures of discourse. It is in this regard that one 
of the central differences between Rawls' and Habermas' understanding of 
deliberative kinds of democracy is their respective “thin” and “thick” character. 
But what does this difference precisely imply?  
According to Habermas, a universal logic of “communicative” reason is internal 
to the process of public discourse. This internal logic allows discursive 
participants to reach a consensus that, at least in principle, is potentially 
acceptable to all.  
Given the innate human capacity for reasoning, Habermas claims, a form of 
deliberative politics is most conducive to “unleashing” the intrinsic qualities of 
human linguistic communication that is understood teleologically as being 
orientated toward mutual understanding.  
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Habermas, therefore, claims that the public exchange of validity claims will 
facilitate the eventual emergence of the “better argument”. (Habermas, 1984, 
1987) Indeed, Habermas insists that public deliberation has a peculiar 
“motivational force” to change sensibilities, perspectives and interests. 
(Habermas, 1996) 
These assumptions allow Habermas to argue that while power relationships 
pervade contemporary societies, it is still possible to develop political 
procedures that will facilitate collective “communicative action”. (Habermas, 
1984) Communicative action allows citizens and public officials to justify their 
political relationships in a manner acceptable to all, at least in principle, and it 
enables them to undertake collective political action.  
Accordingly, Habermas develops an account of an “ideal speech situation” 
which constitutes a counter-factual vehicle to critique existing processes of 
public deliberation. The ideal speech situation stipulates different normative 
conditions for meaningful inclusion in any discursive situation as well as for the 
pursuit of the most epistemically worthy arguments. (Habermas, 1973, 1984, 
2003) 
Given this account, Habermas insists that “distortions” in public communication 
pose a fundamental threat to achieving mutual understanding. These distortions 
can be overcome if inequalities of power can be removed or “bracketed” as far 
as possible. (Habermas, 1989) A failure to address power differences, he 
argues, will invariably undermine the most optimal exchange of validity claims 
via which the most compelling argument can guide public decision-making.  
Moreover, Habermas argues that these distortions are complicit in the 
production and reproduction of various “social pathologies” which hinder mutual 
perspective-taking and drive social alienation and social distancing. For 
instance, Habermas has argued the development of global Terrorism in the 21st 
century reflects a situation where distorted mechanisms of public 
communication have bred the social alienation of minority groups in many 
“Western” liberal democracies. (Habermas IN Borradori, 2003, pg 35) 
Rawls, on the other hand, advocates a considerably “thinner” notion of public 
reason. This account is culture-specific rather than universalistic in its 
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orientation, arguing that it is most applicable to Western liberal-democratic 
regimes that have undergone favourable historical transformations. It is 
unsurprising, therefore, that Rawls was attributed by Richard Rorty to be a 
“Liberal ironist”, albeit arguably somewhat mistakenly. (Rorty, 1991)  
Accordingly, he insists that a political “overlapping consensus” is creatable via 
latent ideas within the public sphere or the broader historical and political 
culture. Rawls further claims that his account of public reason: 
“does not...use (or deny) the concept of truth; nor does it question that concept, 
not could it say that the concept of truth and its idea of the reasonable are the 
same. Rather within itself the political conception does without the concept of 
truth...” (Rawls, 2005, pg 93) 
Instead, the criterion Rawls uses to develop his free-standing account of 
political legitimacy and justice is “reasonableness” as opposed to notions of the 
truth. This is because, according to Rawls, the notion of truth is bound to remain 
highly controversial given the diversity of comprehensive doctrines. (Rawls, 
2005) 
In addition, Rawls seems less sanguine about the possibilities of public 
discourse to resolve political differences, foregrounding the role of “the burdens 
of judgement” as a fundamental feature of persistent moral disagreement. This 
point highlights a pivotal difference between Rawlsian and Habermasian public 
reason.  
Rawls develops a substantive account of public reason that requires public 
officials and citizens to act according to a “duty of civility” when expressing their 
political claims or voting for public officials. 
Habermas, by contrast, develops a predominantly procedural account of public 
reason that does not place restrictions on political expression, with the notable 
exception of religious justifications in the legislative sphere as we shall see later. 
Habermas mostly devotes his energies to developing discursive procedures that 
will guide public deliberation in an inclusive and fair manner. 
Another significant difference in their respective accounts of public reason 
concerns their scope of application. Rawls, on the one hand, posits a strong 
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distinction between “public” and “non-public” reasoning. The former is 
associated with the “public political culture”.  
This includes governmental and quasi-governmental forums and processes- for 
instance parliamentary debates, political announcements, campaigns for 
political office, the act of voting and the operations of the judiciary. (Rawls, 
2005) 
The use of “non-public” reason is associated strictly with organisations and 
private individuals within civil society- for instance, universities, churches, 
professional and voluntary associations. (Rawls, 2005) 
This conceptualization contrasts with Habermas' account of public reason that 
understands the “public sphere” as the most vibrant dimension of public 
communication concerning issues of the common good. According to his 
account, civil society functions as a “translating” organ, articulating common 
concerns for the efficient functioning and scrutiny of governing institutions. 
Indeed, this point reflects a central criticism that Habermas tenders against 
Rawls. This is the criticism that Rawls' account of the “overlapping consensus” 
divorces its empirical acceptance from its moral acceptability. Habermas raises 
the problem that while an overlapping consensus might be accepted empirically 
by all, this does not necessarily entail its moral validity. (Habermas, 1995, pgs 
121-2) 
This critique reflects Habermas' more strenuous account of justification where 
moral correctness is connected to the validity of truth claims. According to 
Habermas, a political agreement can only be legitimate if it is the outcome of a 
rational consensus motivated by the “force of the better argument” to which all 
parties agree for identical reasons. (Habermas, 1984, 1987, 1990) As 
Habermas maintains: 
“Rawls imposes a common perspective on the parties in the original position 
through informational constraints and thereby neutralizes the multiplicity of 
particular interpretive perspectives from the outset. Discourse ethics, by 
contrast, views the moral point of view as embodied in an inter-subjective 
practice of argumentation which enjoins those involved to an idealising 
enlargement of their interpretive perspectives.” (Habermas, 1995, pg 117) 
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Habermas, therefore, also criticises Rawls' account of the “original position” in 
his A Theory of Justice, arguing that it is significantly flawed. This is a function 
of Rawls’ claim that conceptions of Justice are only “free-standing” if they are 
affirmable by “reasonable” comprehensive doctrines.  
Instead, Habermas insists that accounts of Justice should not depend on any 
substantive moral values or principles, as their public acceptability rests on their 
remaining entirely procedural, neutral between conflicting conceptions of the 
good. Rather, Habermas maintains that his conception of public reasoning is not 
premised on substantive principles of justice characteristic of Rawls’ approach 
and that it does not “bracket the pluralism of convictions and world-views from 
the outset”. (Habermas, 1995, pgs 118-9) 
Unsurprisingly, Habermas proposes that his alternative is more “modest” in that 
it only focuses on the procedural aspects of public reasoning. His approach 
attempts to define a system of rights which facilitates the critical exchange of 
rational opinion and will formation. (Habermas, 1995, pg 131) 
This point, once again, highlights the deeper philosophical difference between 
them in Habermas' estimation. According to him, Rawls is misguided in his 
philosophical approach. He alleges that Rawls attempts to articulate a 
normative outline of a just society which then could be used to judge existing 
political arrangements.  
However, Habermas insists that the role of philosophy should confine itself 
merely to the clarification of procedural guidelines of democratic legitimation. 
Moreover, philosophy should devote itself purely to the “analysis of rational 
discourses and negotiations”. (Habermas, 1995, pg 131) 
By contrast, Rawls insists that it is plausible for his theory not to comment on 
questions of truth and validity. He argues that his account does not overly 
privilege liberal rights over the democratic process of norm justification. Instead, 
he maintains that his account of legitimacy and justice, like Habermas', is an 
ongoing, inter-generational project. He rejects Habermas' criticism that his 
approach fixates citizens' conceptions of justice indefinitely or rigidly. (Rawls, 
1995, pg 153) 
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In addition, Rawls' also raises a number of objections relating to the political 
viability of Habermas' project. He argues that Habermas is unclear with respect 
to how the interests of all persons can be given “equal consideration” in his 
highly theoretical conceptualization of “ideal discourses”. (Rawls, 1995, pg 177)  
Finally, Rawls' suggests that Habermas' account of discourse is too 
controversial to be accepted by citizens who hold widely divergent notions of 
the good. He argues that his framework covers “many things far beyond political 
philosophy”, particularly in relation to his account of communicative action. 
(Rawls, 1995, pg 135) 
In conclusion, therefore, there are substantial differences between the positions 
of Rawls and Habermas regarding their methodological assumptions and their 
particular accounts of public reason. Interestingly, it is worth noting that these 
differences exist in spite of Habermas' claim that he “shares the {same} 
intentions” of John Rawls’ work and deems the “essential results” of his 
framework as being correct. (Habermas, 1995, pg 110)  
It is appropriate, then, to explore further their accounts of public reason given 
this broad statement of their similarities and differences of approach and 
argumentation, proceeding with Habermas' account. 
Habermas' Early work on the Public Sphere 
It is important to begin a discussion of Habermas’ conceptualization of civil 
discourse by situating it within this broader theory of the “public sphere”. It is 
clear that the concept of the “public sphere” was one of the earliest concerns of 
Habermas work. His first attempt to develop a comprehensive theory of the 
public sphere began with his 1962 Habilitationschrift “Strukturwandel der 
Öffentlichkeit” which was published in English in 1989. (Habermas, 1989).  
Habermas, in this text, attempted to develop a historical narrative that explained 
the political significance of the bourgeois public sphere from the 18th century 
until the ascendancy of contemporary mass media. Indeed, as James Bohman 
notes, this work instigated a central concern of Habermas’ entire philosophical 
project, namely:  
“…the idea of inclusive critical discussion, free of social and economic 
pressures, in which interlocutors treat each other as equals in a cooperative 
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attempt to reach an understanding on matters of common concern.” (Bohman, 
2007, no page numbers available.) 
According to Habermas, the emergence of the bourgeois public sphere 
stemmed from a form of “representative publicity” that prevailed during and prior 
to the Renaissance period. Publicity of this kind merely reflected the display of 
prestige and status rather than providing space for critical discussion, spectacle 
or debate. (Habermas, 1989, pg 7) 
However, with the rise of a bourgeois reading public, fostered in turn by the 
growth of early finance and trade capitalism, a “critical” ideal of publicity 
emerged which challenged the secrecy of the absolutist State. This recast 
political legitimacy from the arbitrary will of the monarch to the reason of the 
citizenry. (Habermas, 1989) 
This process, he suggests, was mainly reflected in the emerging newsletters of 
merchants that provided continuous information about current trade affairs and 
later political journals that developed a novel space of critical reflection about 
public affairs.  
This space, divorced from state interference, eventually culminated in the roles 
of salons, coffee houses and Tischgesellschaften. All of these public forums 
provided an egalitarian space for the discussion of issues of public import. As 
he argues, by this point: 
“Because, on the one hand, the society now confronting the state clearly 
separated a private domain from public authority and because, on the other 
hand, it turned the reproduction of life into something transcending the confines 
of private domestic authority and becoming a subject of public interest, that 
zone of continuous administrative contact became “critical” also in the sense 
that it provoked the critical judgement of a public making use of its reason. The 
public could take on this challenge all the better as it required merely a change 
in the function of the instrument with whose help the state administration had 
already turned society into a public affair in a specific sense- the press.” 
(Habermas, 1989, pg 24) 
Habermas, therefore, argues that the public sphere is a realm where “private 
people come together as a public”, allowing citizens to scrutinize the actions of 
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public authorities in a historically unprecedented fashion. (Habermas, 1989, pg 
27) Interestingly, Habermas argues that while the different forums of the public 
sphere varied in their size, composition, procedure style and their climate of 
debate they all “they preserved a kind of social intercourse that, far from 
presupposing the equality of status, disregarded status altogether.” (Habermas, 
1989, pg 36) 
Moreover, Habermas argues that the public sphere was historically unique as it 
allowed the problematizing of social issues that previously went unquestioned. 
This development was a threat to the monopoly of social interpretation by the 
State and ecclesiastical authorities. It provided an unprecedented forum for the 
“competition of private arguments” that would facilitate the emergence of a 
collective consensus regarding the common good. (Habermas, 1989, pg 83) 
Of course, Habermas recognizes in practice that the ideal of the bourgeois 
public sphere was never fully realised and that it harboured significant 
exclusions, notably of women. However, he insists that it was not merely a 
thought experiment but rather a historically significant political and social 
innovation. Indeed, he contends that the principle of publicity that it expounded 
still informs the functioning of contemporary political institutions. (Habermas, 
1989, pg 4) 
However, Habermas' faith in the public sphere as a vehicle for social criticism is 
tempered by the recognition of a number of troubling historical developments. 
These developments include the expansion of the welfare state which has 
eroded the distinction between the state and society, the growing influence of 
consumer society, the corruption of parliamentary process by vested interests 
as well as the distortion of media reporting by advertising imperatives. 
(Habermas, 1989)  
The consequences of these developments have been momentous, he argues, 
as the previously “intelligent criticism of publicly discussed affairs” transformed 
into a “mood of conformity with publicly presented persons or personifications”. 
(Habermas, 1989, pg 195) 
Consequently, Habermas claims that that the public sphere has increasingly 
undergone a “re-feudalisation” process where critical publicity has succumbed 
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to a more “representational” model as the contemporary state increasingly 
addresses its citizens as consumers. 
In conclusion, Habermas’ account of the public sphere offers a pre-sentiment of 
his later conceptualization of civil discourse. The idea of the public sphere 
presupposes a communicative ethos whereby discursive partners treat each 
other as epistemic and moral equals in a co-operative process of 
communication, orientated towards reaching a shared consensus on public 
issues. It is in Habermas’ account of the public sphere that one finds an early 
intuition with respect to how he understands civility: namely, as a means to 
forge a consensus on public matters which respects the interests and 
viewpoints of all.  
Accordingly, in order to appreciate how Habermas’ work develops an idea of 
civil discourse, it is important to turn to his later work on ‘communicative action’ 
and his conception of “translation” which constitute the two pillars of his 
conception of civil discourse. 
Communicative action: 
It is evident that the crucial notion of “publicity” within Habermas' work is further 
developed in his work during the 1970s in light of the “linguistic turn” within 
critical theory. This development prompted Habermas to develop an account of 
the rational co-ordination of social action via an analysis of language use. From 
this development, Habermas conception of civil discourse can be divided into 
two broad stages- namely the stages of communicative action and public 
reason. 
The first stage of Habermas conceptualization of civil discourse reflected his 
interest in differentiating between manipulative and coercive forms of 
communication and forms of communication orientated towards fostering 
mutual understanding between interlocutors.  This is the stage of 
“communicative action”. 
 According to Habermas, communicative action has three essential social 
purposes. Firstly, it allows for the reproduction and renewal of “cultural 
knowledge”, secondly it facilitates “social integration” and the development of 
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relations of social solidarity and thirdly, it orientates the “formation of personal 
identities”. (Habermas, 1984, pg 138) 
Accordingly, in his The Theory of Communicative Action, Habermas articulates 
a conception of civil discourse that presupposes a “performative attitude” that all 
competent participants in a given discourse must inherently accept as a pre-
condition for engaging in discourse itself. Habermas argues that this 
performative attitude reflects a set of deeper presuppositions that all 
participants in a discourse tacitly accept during the exchange of their own 
justifications and the reception of the claims of others. (Habermas, 1984) 
This performative attitude is reflective of Habermas' claim that the reaching of 
mutual understanding constitutes the “inherent telos” of our human 
communicative abilities. (Habermas, 1984, pg 287) Habermas argues that our 
capacities to reach mutual understanding are dependent on the critical 
exchange of valid reasons in the face of a mutual acknowledgement of the 
legitimacy of all parties to participate as epistemic and discursive equals.  
Indeed, Habermas stresses that forming an understanding between 
interlocutors’ entails reaching a “valid agreement”- this is to say, an uncoerced 
consensus- which allows for their future actions to be co-ordinated successfully. 
(Habermas, 1984, pg 392) 
Consequently, Habermas distinguishes between communicative action, which 
he maintains constitutes a rational mode of discourse orientated towards the 
achievement of a non-coercive consensus, and strategic action in which parties 
simply strive to fulfil their “egocentric {calculations} of utility”, thereby potentially 
leading to the discursive manipulation of others in order to suit their own vested 
purposes. (Habermas, 1984, pgs 85; 88)   
Later, in Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action (1990), Habermas 
more clearly explains that strategic action involves actors seeking to “influence 
the behaviour of another by means of the threat of sanctions or the prospect of 
gratification in order to cause the interaction to continue as the first actor 
desires”. (Habermas, 1990, pg 58, emphasis original) This contrasts sharply to 
communicative action where parties seek to “rationally to motivate another” via 
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the exchange of validity claims to change each other’s points of view and each 
other’s interests. (Habermas, 1990, pg 58, emphasis original) 
In addition, Habermas argues that both of these discourses can be 
differentiated on the basis that communicative action requires participants to 
critically self-reflect on their own interests, beliefs, values and preferences in 
response to the claims of others. On the other hand, the strategic action can 
entail that participants dogmatically treat their own interests, beliefs, values and 
preferences as being non-revisable or questionable. 
Moreover, Habermas connects this idea of communicative action to the need of 
interlocutors to justify their claims as if they were addressing an ideal audience. 
This process of justification is predicated on interlocutors accepting a set of 
ideal presuppositions or conditions about human speech which serve to 
regulate the manner in which their claims are staked, exchanged, critiqued and 
revised towards the formation of a normatively valid consensus over conflicting 
norms. 
Importantly, Habermas argues that this process of communicative action allows 
discursive interlocutors to reach a consensus over the better argument 
regarding conflicting claims of norm-validity. Indeed, Habermas particularly 
stresses that communicative action is inherently premised on a self-
understanding by interlocutors that their arguments are premised on the 
assertion of truth claims which can be rationally defended or “redeemed” in his 
terminology. (Habermas, 1984, pg 11) As Habermas stresses:  
“It is constitutive of the rationality of the utterance that the speaker raises a 
criticisable validity claim for the proposition p, a claim that the hearer can accept 
or reject for good reason”. (Habermas, 1984, pg 11) 
Accordingly, Habermas argues that interlocutors can respond in three ways to 
the assertion of validity claim- one can adopt a “yes” or “no” position with 
respect to an argument or one can abstain from forming a judgement until one 
has more completely understood the nature of our discursive partners’ claims. 
(Habermas, 1984, pg 39) As Habermas summarizes:  
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“The speech act of one person succeeds only if the other accepts the offer 
contained in by taking (however implicitly) a yes or no position on a validity 
claim that is in principle criticisable”. (Habermas, 1984, pg 297) 
This point is significant to stress because Habermas claims that interlocutors 
should judge the strength of a particular claim with reference to the epistemic 
soundness of its justificatory reasons. If these reasons are sufficiently sound 
from an epistemic point of view, Habermas believes that this recognition alone 
will motivate one’s interlocutors to accept our claims to argumentative validity. 
(Habermas, 1984, pg 18)  
Habermas argues that if these ideal conditions are realized, then it will be 
impossible for discursive interactions to be grounded through manipulation or 
coercion as all participants would possess equal voice and influence and no 
possible contributions would have been excluded from consideration in the 
collective orientation towards reaching consensus. 
Importantly, while Habermas insists that the norms of ideal speech condition are 
not necessarily achievable in actual 'real life' deliberations, he argues that they 
can serve as a counter-factual device to critique actually existing public 
deliberative interactions. Indeed, Habermas' conception of “ideal speech” 
conditions articulates a latent conception of civility that has a number of 
interconnecting aspects. 
Firstly, Habermas’ conception of civil discourse requires participants in a 
discourse to mutually commit to a particular set of communicative behaviours. It 
requires them to be receptive to criticism regarding their claims and to be 
prepared to offer relevant justifications to defend their viewpoints in reply. In 
addition, he further claims that individuals can only be discursively responsible if 
they “orient their actions to intersubjectively recognised validity claims” and if 
they are sincere when staking their arguments. (Habermas, 1984, pg 14) 
In addition, it requires discursive partners to stake their claims in a manner that 
is logically consistent and comprehensible to their interlocutors.  It is also a non 
ego-centric form of communication where interlocutors mutually strive to 
empathically engage with each other’s claims by striving to understand them 
from their point of view.  
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Importantly, civil discourse as communicative action understands discursive 
interaction as an ongoing learning process which demands that interlocutors 
strive to learn from epistemic tension- that is, when they confronted with 
situations where their interlocutors refuse to accept their validity claims on the 
basis of criticism with respect to the epistemic soundness of one’s claims. 
(Habermas, 1984, pg 18) 
Secondly, Habermas conception of civil discourse entails a mutual commitment 
by interlocutors to the progress of their interchange. It requires them to refrain 
from placing any limitations as to the scope of the discourse- this is to say that 
there should be no a priori restraints placed on the subject matter- and it 
requires them to be responsive to any new contributions regarding the subject 
matter. 
In addition, because Habermas insists that participants must be sincere when 
staking their claims while also critically engaging with each other's arguments, 
civil discourse is inherently a truth-seeking process of discursive co-operation. It 
aims, in his words, to reach consensus with respect to the “force of the better 
argument” regarding any contentious issue or subject. (Habermas, 1984, pg 25) 
Moreover, Habermas understands civil discourse as requiring a mutual 
commitment by interlocutors to understand and treat each other as epistemic 
equals. This means not simply assuming prima facie that our interlocutors have 
valuable insights to proffer but that one has no right to impose one's claims on 
others. 
Habermas' conception of civil discourse, therefore, encourages participants in a 
discursive exchange to learn from a diversity of epistemic resources and 
facilitates the rational and voluntary transformation of their interests, values, 
beliefs and preferences in a manner which is oriented towards establishing the 
moral validity of binding norms for the purposes of political decision-making.  
Habermas believes that this transformation is possible by virtue of the fact that 
interlocutors possess an intersubjectively shared “life-world” that articulates a 
set of background understandings that allows them to negotiate conflicting 
validity claims. 
46 
 
The second stage of Habermas' conceptualization of civil discourse reflected his 
deepening interest in how democratic legitimacy can be grounded through 
practices of public reasoning and it loosely emerged during the early 1990s. 
This interest stems from his previously elaborated concerns with respect to the 
“re-feudalization” of the public sphere as well as growing awareness of the 
political complexities created by increasing ethnic, cultural and religious 
difference and moral disagreement in contemporary democracies.  
The key question framing Habermas’ work now became: how is it possible to 
legitimate democratic regimes in light of the reality that conflicting moral, 
religious and cultural traditions can no longer stake any claim to universal 
acceptability? It is worth reading the following quotation in length: 
“Under modern conditions of life none of the various rival traditions can claim 
prima facie general validity any longer. Even in answering questions of direct 
practical relevance, convincing reasons can no longer appeal to the authority of 
unquestioned traditions. If we do not want to settle questions by open or covert 
force- by coercion, influence or the power of the stronger interest- but by the 
unforced conviction of a rationally motivated agreement, then we must 
concentrate on those questions that are amenable to impartial judgement. We 
can't expect to find a generally binding answer when we ask what is good for 
me for us or for them; instead, we must ask what is equally good for all”. 
(Habermas, 1993, pg 151)  
Accordingly, Habermas stresses that the purpose of civil discourse is to 
legitimate the exercise of coercive political power. Civil discourse is important 
because it constitutes an alternative merely to aggregating the preferences of 
citizens. It offers citizens with the opportunity to attempt to change each other's 
interests and perspectives non-coercively, it promotes deeper knowledge of 
political disputes through promoting reasoned deliberation and reflection and 
encourages citizens to develop relations of mutual solidarity, trust and respect.  
Civility is also important, implies Habermas, because it entails a mutual 
commitment to the idea that all citizens are simultaneously the subjects and the 
authors of the legal-constitutional order. This normative self-understanding 
implies that a democratic regime can only claim legitimacy if it has been 
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discursively justified through inclusive legislative processes and only if the 
outcomes can be accepted by all those affected. 
This emphasis reflects an important distinction in Habermas' work between 
“moral” and “ethical” discourses. The former demands that individuals embrace 
an impartial perspective when considering contested norms to discern whether 
it should be universally binding. The latter merely reflects the importance of 
one's own self-understandings and one's own comprehensive notions of the 
good life. 
Habermas argues that for the purposes of public deliberation it is important to 
privilege moral over ethical discourses with respect to the justification of 
universally binding norms because it is only through moral discourses that 
interlocutors can broaden their perspectives and alter their values, preferences, 
beliefs and interests in a manner compatible with reaching a consensus. 
Unsurprisingly, therefore, Habermas maintains that ethical discourses only have 
“relative” validity because, unlike moral discourses, they are not universally and 
unconditionally valid. Indeed, as Habermas insists: 
“Politics may not be assimilated to a hermeneutical process of self-explication of 
a shared form of life or collective identity. Political questions may not be 
reduced to the type of ethical questions where we, as members of a community, 
ask ourselves who we are and who we would like to be.” (Habermas, 1994, pg 
4) 
Habermas argues that such a stance is increasingly urgent in light of religious 
and cultural pluralism as “ethical” discourses are inadequate to the task of 
justifying political relationships. This is because, he explains, “politically relevant 
goals are often selected by interests and value orientations that are by no 
means constitutive for the identity of the community at large, hence for the 
whole of an intersubjectively shared form of life.” (Habermas, 1994, pg 5) 
Consequently, Habermas understands moral discourses to be the primary 
resource for resolving life-world conflicts as they remove contentious values 
from the process of consensus seeking. (Habermas, 1993) It is only through 
participants eventually reaching a consensus through moral discourses that 
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“laws that lie in the equal interest of each can meet with the reasonable 
agreement of all”. (Habermas & Rehg, 2001, pg 768) 
Habermas, therefore, argues that social integration can only occur if collective 
political norms are legitimated on the basis of universally acceptable 
justifications. This requirement is utterly necessary if liberal-democracies are 
not to decide on contested public issues via the exercise of coercive force or 
simply by allowing the strongest political interests and actors to impose their 
agendas on their fellow citizens.  
Accordingly, Habermas insists that the negotiation of generally acceptable 
justifications can only emerge if citizens choose to concentrate their deliberative 
efforts on issues that can be settled via the exercise of impartial reasoning and 
judgement. (Habermas & Nielsen, 1990, pgs 95-6) 
Consequently, he suggests that the establishment of universal, valid norms 
ought to be an outcome of a procedure non-contingent on mere bargaining or 
compromising processes.  This process must remain divorced from the taint of 
“power-politics” and it should legitimate norms on the basis of reasons that are 
“neutral” with respect to contested notions of the good. Political justifications 
that are particularistic or partial are simply not acceptable for the formation of 
democratic norms in diverse polities. 
Habermas, therefore, advocates a “discourse-theoretic interpretation” of 
democracy which disavows the need for a substantive ethical consensus in the 
process of democratic legitimation. Rather than political justification proceeding 
from a “previous convergence of settled ethical convictions” it should begin with 
fair institutional and discursive procedures and protocols. (Habermas, 1994, pg 
4) 
Accordingly, Habermas suggests that moral discourses are central to discursive 
processes of law-making because they strive to develop norms that are capable 
of being assented to by all citizens via legally constituted legislative procedures. 
Consequently, Habermas articulates two fundamental principles that underpin 
his understanding of the legitimation of democratic norms: namely the principle 
of discourse (D) and the principle of universalization (U). Principle D states that: 
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“Just those action norms are valid to which all possibly affected persons could 
agree as participants in rational discourses”. (Habermas, 1996, pg 107) 
Principle U, on the other hand, is a stronger principle that develops from 
principle D: (U) “A norm is valid when the foreseeable consequences and side 
effects of its general observance for the interests and value-orientations of each 
individual could be jointly accepted by all concerned without coercion”. 
(Habermas, 1998, pg 42) 
Accordingly, Habermas argues that the principles of popular sovereignty and 
the rule of law are “co-original” principles for democratic legitimation which 
impose mutual limitations upon each other. This is an important point of 
emphasis because Habermas insists that his discursive account of political 
legitimation does not grant citizens “a voluntaristic, carte blanche permission to 
make whatever decisions they like”. (Habermas & Rehg, 2001, pg 767) 
Instead, the rule of law provides a space to pursue one's “private ends” while 
the notion of popular sovereignty allows for the exercise of the public’s agency. 
Consequently, as Habermas, argues, the “freedom of everyone- that is, self-
legislation-depends on the equal consideration of the individual freedom of each 
individual to take a yes/no position-that is, self-legislation.” (Habermas & Rehg, 
2001, pgs 767-8) 
Nevertheless, while Habermas prioritises the importance of “ethical” over 
“moral” discourse, he also recognises the importance of “balancing competing 
interests” via a political process of bargaining. These practices depend on “a 
prior regulation of fair terms of achieving results, which are acceptable for all 
parties on the basis of their differing preferences.” (Habermas, 1994, pg 5) 
Accordingly, he stresses that given fair procedural conditions, bargaining 
practices can justly mediate strategically-driven interactions. (Habermas, 1994, 
pg 5) This is because fair procedural conditions can encourage citizens to reach 
an agreement on the basis of generalizable principles of justice, thereby 
allowing a reconciliation of their conflicting perspectives and interests supportive 
of the common good. (Habermas, 1994, pg 5) 
Habermas conception of “deliberative politics”, therefore, involves a broad 
range of argumentation forms (e.g. pragmatic, ethical and moral discourses) 
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that respectively rely on “different communicative presuppositions and 
procedures”. (Habermas, 1994, pg 6) The variety of discursive forms 
guarantees that democratic will-formation is not dependent on a prior 
agreement on ethical worldviews but rather from the “communicative 
presuppositions” that facilitate the emergence of the better argument under fair 
procedural conditions. (Habermas, 1994, pg 5)  
Habermas argues that any coercive political law can only claim legitimacy if all 
those potentially affected by it could accept the grounds of its justification via 
their participation in “rational” discourses. (Habermas, 1995, pg 16) 
In addition, Habermas establishes three further conditions in this idealised 
understanding of constitution-making. Firstly, he insists that participants ought 
to be “united by a common resolution to legitimately regulate their future life 
together by means of positive law.” (Habermas, 2001, pg 776) Secondly, he 
stresses the importance of citizens being able and willing to participate in 
“rational discourses and thus to satisfy the demanding, pragmatic 
presuppositions of a practice of argumentation”. (Habermas, 2001, pg 776) 
Thirdly, he argues that participants must be willing to render the meaning of 
constitution-creating an “explicit topic”. (Habermas, 2001, pg 776). This requires 
a continual process of reflection on the principles of the Constitution in the face 
of changing social circumstances (Habermas, 2001, pg 776).  
Indeed, for Habermas, the Constitution is a future-orientated, provisional project 
with future generations tasked with the actualization of the “still untapped 
normative substance” of the legal principles articulated in the constitutional 
framework. (Habermas, 2001, pg 774) The Constitution, therefore, is deemed to 
be a “self-correcting learning process” unless contingently interrupted and 
undermined by “historical regressions”. (Habermas, 2001, pg 774)  
Finally, it is worth noting that Habermas understands the legal process as a 
means to offset the tendencies of human beings towards moral corruption. This 
is because legal processes can “relieve the morally judging and acting person 
of the considerable cognitive, motivational, and organisational demands of a 
morality based entirely on individual conscience.” (Habermas, 1995, pg 15) 
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Habermas emphasis on the law as constituting a complementary force to 
morality is a significant because his account of democratic legitimacy is 
fundamentally hypothetical in nature. Indeed, he maintains the procedure he 
outlines cannot attain actual consensus in contemporary democracies due to its 
strenuous demands. As Weymans et al argue: 
“Rather than arguing for an actual consent by everyone involved, Habermas 
states that this consent is ‘counter-factual’ or, as Geuss put it, ‘hypothetical’, 
because it refers not to the act of consent that people give but rather to the 
consent they would have given if they had been asked to do so” (Weymans et 
al, 2012, pg 29) 
The hypothetical status of consent expressed through the constitutional legal 
process, as Weymans et al note, is actually a useful decision-making procedure 
as it discharges individual citizens with the burden of expressing their actual 
consent. It is this expression of hypothetical consent as well as the coercive 
powers of the law that ensures the legitimation of the democratic process for 
Habermas. (Weymans et al, 2012)  
Nevertheless, Habermas still insists that the formation of hypothetical consent 
does not undermine the principle of popular sovereignty. Why? Because public 
opinion or “communicative power” is articulated in the diffuse, unregulated, 
chaotic and “autochthonous” public spheres that are conceived to be multiple 
and overlapping.  
This process of articulation develops “subjectless” forms of public opinion which 
are eventually transferred into the realm of official law-making, thereby allowing 
lawmakers to translate and re-conceptualize public opinion into universally 
acceptable political justifications which would justly legitimate coercive public 
policy. (Habermas, 1996) 
In conclusion, therefore, Habermas argues given contemporary conditions of 
complexity and diversity the legitimacy of the democratic order is dependent on 
broad normative agreement on “constitutional essentials”. This moral 
consensus transcends mere pragmatic or prudential compliance with the 
principles of the constitution. (Habermas, 2003, pg 187) 
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Given that citizens are not united by a substantive value consensus, Habermas 
argues that only consensus is possible on the procedures for the proper 
execution of power and the formation of legitimate legislation. This in turn, 
requires fair procedures for conflict resolution, avenues for the constitutional 
checking of political power and communicative freedom in the public sphere.  
Moreover, it also requires citizens to be willing to stake their political claims in a 
manner that are potentially acceptable to all, especially when such claims are 
being staked in “formal” political institutions. However, it is profoundly interesting 
to note that Habermas' understanding of what is precisely involved discursive 
justification has changed quite significantly in recent years.  
It was demonstrated previously that Habermas' initial view of democratic 
legitimation was partially formed in opposition to aspects of Rawls' account of 
public reason. Habermas initially rejects the assumption that there ought to be 
pre-fixed constraints on the kinds of justifications permissible for deliberation in 
the public sphere. 
Instead, Habermas argues that the public sphere and legislative arenas must 
embrace a diversity of arguments depending on the particular situational 
circumstances. Habermas maintains that providing the provision of certain 
communicative conditions- for instance, the ability of participants to effectively 
introduce their claims without coercion, manipulation or interference- it will be 
possible for participants to eventually identify norms that are universally binding 
to all. 
This is an important point of emphasis because Habermas initially understands 
civil discourse to be an open-ended process of discovery as it is only through 
the critical exchange of validity claims that citizens can identify universally valid 
norms for the purposes of public policy making.  
Without this open-ended process of discovery, not only will reaching a 
normative consensus be frustrated but citizens will be incapable of discerning 
the better argument from the diversity of available possibilities or to understand 
what constitutes a 'reasonable' or 'generally acceptable' claim in the first place. 
Civil discourse, he implicitly suggests, is therefore impossible if citizens cannot 
accept the idea that contested political issues can be resolved, at least in 
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principle, of a singular correct answer that enables the formation of a binding 
consensus. 
This argument is an important point of contrast with Rawls who, it is claimed by 
Habermas, sacrifices the moral validity and truth-orientation of particular norms 
in exchange for securing a consensus on claims that citizens simply happen to 
'reasonably' accept. Interestingly, therefore, in Habermas' earliest conception of 
civility he rejected Rawls assumption that citizens and public officials must stake 
their claims in a manner which they reasonably expect to be acceptable to their 
interlocutors. 
Rather, he argues that it is perfectly permissible for citizens to frame their 
political claims in any manner they desire, providing that it conforms with certain 
communicative standards and providing that public policy is ultimately grounded 
on 'moral discourses' as opposed to 'ethical' discourses. 
However, it is clear that Habermas' understanding of the connection between 
civil discourse and democratic legitimation shifts more towards Rawls position 
from the mid-1990s onwards in light of his growing interest in the position of 
religion in contemporary political life. Unfortunately, a more detailed appraisal of 
Habermas' evolving views on religion cannot be attempted here for reasons of 
space. 
Nevertheless, in broad terms, Habermas’ viewpoints on religion have altered 
from a deep suspicion of the function of religion in social life to the view that 
contemporary societies have entered a “post-secular” age. Habermas now 
acknowledges that religious claims play a significant role in public, political 
discourse while attempting to place certain constrictions on their public 
expression. Habermas’ growing interest in the position of religion in public 
discourse signifies a major pivot point in his conception of civil discourse. 
Habermas stresses that it is fundamentally important that public policy in 
diverse contemporary democracies must be formulated in terms intelligible to all 
citizens and it must also be possible to justify public policy in a language 
universally acceptable to all. (Habermas, 2008)  
This implies that there are limitations with respect to the abilities of religious 
citizens to stake their claims with reference to their comprehensive doctrines. 
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Instead, they must strive to “translate” their comprehensive doctrines in terms 
that are generally acceptable to and shared by their fellow citizens. 
Importantly, though, Habermas does not understand this process to be mono-
directional between religious and secular citizens. Rather, Habermas strongly 
argues that religious and secular citizens should understand themselves to be 
mutually implicated in a “complementary learning process”. (Habermas, 2008) 
Habermas frames this relationship as what citizens ought to “reciprocally expect 
from one another in order to ensure that...social relations remain civil despite of 
the growth of a plurality of cultures and religious worldviews.” (Habermas, 2008, 
pg 22, emphasis mine)  
According, both religious and secular citizens must accept the right of each 
other to hold their convictions and to practice their customs, rituals and 
traditions in spite of the fact that one might disagree with them. Importantly, he 
argues, such a tolerance should not be conflated with appreciating different 
ways of life. (Habermas, 2008, pg 23) 
The significance of tolerance, therefore, stems from Habermas claim that a 
democratic order requires an “ethics of citizenship” to sustain its vitality. This 
ethics transcends a willingness to obey the law for merely pragmatic or 
prudential reasons, such as the fear of being punished. 
He suggests that the development of this ethos is the result of a social learning 
process that emerges from a “secular self-understanding of modernity”. It is an 
ethos that cannot be prescribed or politically manipulated or fostered via the 
law. (Habermas, 2008b, pgs 28) 
Subsequently Habermas argues that if relations of toleration are to be socially 
sustained, it is essential that the political principles of a society are publicly 
justified in a “language that all citizens understand”. (Habermas, 2008b, pg 28) 
While Habermas does not oppose the expression of religious discourse in the 
realm of civil society, he argues that it is imperative that religious discourse 
does not influence the legislative, judicial and executive functions. (Habermas, 
2008; 2008b) 
Moreover, Habermas also argues that if relations of toleration are to be 
cultivated in a diverse society, it is imperative that religious citizens publicly 
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commit to accepting the constitutional framework, especially its articulation of 
equal rights and entitlements.  
In addition, religious citizens are also obliged to publicly renounce the use of 
violence for the purposes of political contestation and they must also recognise 
that religious identification and association can only occur on a voluntary basis. 
(Habermas, 2003b, pgs 6-7) Importantly, Habermas also insists that religious 
citizens must also accept the priority of scientific experts, develop an 
understanding of secular knowledge and accord priority to secular justifications 
for the purposes of public policy making. (Habermas, 2008, pg 137) 
Indeed, one of the strongest motifs evident in Between Naturalism and Religion 
is the principle that the state ought to be neutral between conflicting world-
views. This neutrality, he argues, is vital as it constitutes the “institutional 
precondition for the equal guarantee of freedom of religion for all.” (Habermas, 
2008, pg 128) 
Religious citizens must have the ability and motivation to consider their religious 
convictions “reflexively” and “connect them with secular views” within the formal 
public sphere”. In addition, as he insists: 
“Every citizen must know and accept that only secular reasons count beyond 
the institutional threshold separating the informal public sphere from 
parliaments, courts, ministries and administrations.” (Habermas, 2008, pg 130) 
Habermas describes this requirement as an “institutional translation proviso”. 
Importantly, though, the proviso does not disqualify citizens from expressing 
their religious convictions altogether. Rather, they can express such convictions 
only if they are subsequently willing to translate their claims in a “generally 
accessible” language. (Habermas, 2008, pg 130) 
Nevertheless, he insists that arguments articulated with reference to religious 
doctrines are only permissible within the realm of “institutionalized” practices of 
“deliberation and decision-making” after their translation occurs within the “pre-
parliamentarian domain”. (Habermas, 2008, pg 131) The process of translation, 
therefore, must occur within the realm of civil society before being “filtered” into 
formal decision-making bodies.  
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Significantly though, Habermas views this process as a “co-operative task” 
between secular and religious citizens. This cooperation is essential to avoid 
the unjust burdening of religious citizens during the process of translation. 
(Habermas, 2008, pg 132) 
Secular citizens, therefore, must be willing to accept the “possible truth content” 
of religious claims and assist religious citizens to discover and articulate more 
“generally accessible argument”. (Habermas, 2008, pg 132) In addition, they 
must also recognize that their disagreements with religious citizens are 
“reasonable” in nature as opposed to assuming that the contributions of 
religious citizens are fundamentally flawed. (Habermas, 2008, pg 139) 
Accordingly, religious citizens are permitted to articulate political positions via 
referencing their religious worldviews without restriction in the realm of civil 
society- or what Habermas terms the “informal” public sphere. (Habermas, 
2008, pgs 128-9) Importantly, unlike Rawls, Habermas also allows citizens to 
vote in light of their religious beliefs and values. (Habermas, 2008, pg 129) 
Ultimately, though, all religious citizens must accept the principle that the 
implementation of government policy must remain as neutral as possible 
between different and conflicting worldviews. This requirement demands that 
religious citizens ultimately ought to frame their arguments in a manner which 
does not appeal to their religious convictions. Instead, they must appeal to 
exclusively secular justifications that could in principle by accepted by all. 
(Habermas, 2008, pg 130)  
In conclusion, therefore, we can see a shift in Habermas’ position away from an 
emphasis in his early work on communicative action from an analysis of the 
necessary conditions for discursive inclusion which framed a very different 
understanding of civility, compared to his most recent works which focus more 
specifically on the political legitimation of coercive political power.  
It is in this regard that Habermas seems to have developed an interpretation of 
civil discourse closer to Rawls’ framework, albeit there are some significant 
differences of nuance between their theories of public reason. Accordingly, 
having outlined Habermas’ notion of civil discourse, it is appropriate now to 
investigate Rawls' understanding of civil discourse. 
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John Rawls: Public Reason and Civility: 
The general role of political philosophy: 
 
Any investigation of Rawls' political theory must proceed with a brief summary 
of his understanding of the purpose of political philosophy as it profoundly 
influences his conceptualization of civil discourse. There are four broad 
purposes of political philosophy in Rawls' estimation.  
First of all, he emphasises that it ought to extend, in a “realistically utopian” 
manner the boundaries of current political possibility. (Rawls, 1999, pg 6) 
Indeed, Rawls particularly stresses the significance of political philosophy 
assuming an optimistic stance when considering questions of institutional 
design. This is due to the claim that any democratic society is dependent on a 
shared sense of optimism that human beings can devise imperfect yet 
sufficiently decent political orders. (Rawls, 2001, pg 4)   
This assumption is important as it motivates two central background questions 
which animate his understanding of how contemporary liberal-democratic 
societies can face the challenges of deep pluralism- namely: 
“What would a just democratic society be like under reasonably favourable but 
still possible historical conditions, conditions allowed by the laws and 
tendencies of the social world?” (Rawls, 2001, pg 4) 
AND: 
“What ideals and principles would such a society try to realize given the 
circumstances of justice in a democratic culture as we know them?” (Rawls, 
2001, pg 4) 
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Secondly, Rawls insists that political philosophy's practical role is to interrogate 
deeply contested issues in order to discover whether any “underlying basis of 
philosophical and moral agreement can be uncovered”. (Rawls, 2001, pg 2) 
Alternatively, even if such agreement remains elusive, Rawls maintains that 
political philosophy can help “narrow” any such divergences. 
From his point of view, therefore, political philosophy can articulate visions of 
social co-operation premised on relations of mutual respect between citizens 
from diverse backgrounds. (Rawls, 2001, pg 2) 
Accordingly, political philosophy has a heuristic function through the 
specification of normative principles that will form a “well-articulated conception 
of a just and reasonable society”. (Rawls, 2001, pg 3) This offers citizens and 
public officials a “unified framework” via which deep disagreements can be 
negotiated on a normatively consistent basis. (Rawls, 2001, pg 3) Importantly, it 
must be emphasised that Rawls' understanding of this “unified framework” 
underwent significant revision between his A Theory of Justice and his works 
Political Liberalism and Justice as Fairness.  
Rawls maintained that his first account of the “original position” in A Theory of 
Justice failed to consider the implications of “reasonable pluralism” with respect 
to how conceptions of justice can be divergently interpreted by citizens, thereby 
inspiring a major later revision of his work. 
Rawls’ mature interpretation maintains that liberal-democratic regimes require a 
political conception of justice which is not indebted to any substantive 
comprehensive doctrines as grounds for its justification. Rather, its principles 
serve to support a distribution of political and economic liberties, entitlements 
and benefits in a manner supportive of the commitments free and equal citizens 
would mutually commit to in the hypothetical “original position”. 
Rawls therefore introduces an important distinction between “comprehensive” 
and “political” conceptions of liberalism to denote his new theoretical approach 
towards the legitimation of coercive political power in diverse liberal-
democracies. Rawls, therefore, agrees with Habermas’ claim that contemporary 
western democracies must negotiate the reality that they exist in a “post-
metaphysical” era whereby strong assumptions about the truth of particular 
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conceptions of the good can no longer serve to orientate our collective political 
arrangements.  
Rawls rejects comprehensive conceptions of liberalism on the basis that they 
supposedly entail a commitment to a strong conception regarding the 
connection between rationality and truth which simply will not be shared by all 
citizens in a diverse polity. This is an important point because Rawls insists that 
political theory should avoid constructing theoretical frameworks premised on 
epistemic and metaphysical foundations. It must remain divorced from any 
commitment- implicit or explicit- to particular comprehensive notions of the good 
and their truth value.  (Rawls, 1999)  
Rawls argues that comprehensive conceptions of liberalism cannot serve to 
justify our political relationships in the face of “reasonable pluralism” because it 
requires public justifications to originate from a commitment to substantive 
moral doctrines. 
For instance, Rawls cites John Stuart Mill’s conception of liberalism as an 
example of a comprehensive doctrine which would substantively influence the 
nature of political justification, given its underlying, foundational utilitarian 
assumptions, and Immanuel Kant’s substantive understanding of the moral 
principle of autonomy as instances of comprehensive liberalisms which are 
unlikely to solicit unanimous support in diverse liberal-democracies. 
Rawls maintains that individuals in contemporary diverse societies are unlikely 
to subscribe to a particular and over-arching comprehensive conception of 
liberalism. Instead, Rawls believes that a “political” conception of liberalism is 
more appropriate in the face of profound yet reasonable moral and political 
disagreement as the practice of public justification proceeds from arguments 
which all “reasonable” persons can share, justified by principles internal to their 
own comprehensive conceptions of the good. 
From a pragmatic point of view, Rawls hopes that a political conception of 
liberalism is more likely to secure agreement on an “overlapping consensus” of 
political ideals, principles, beliefs and norms which would serve as a platform to 
justify our collective political relations via justifications potentially acceptable to 
all. The site of this overlapping consensus stems from broadly shared values, 
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norms, ideas and principles which are already circulating within the realm of civil 
society or which are already immanent to the workings of political institutions. 
From a moral point of view, Rawls sincerely believes that a political conception 
of liberalism is essential if the state is to avoid coercively imposing its policies 
via justifications which some citizens are unwilling to accept, thereby trampling 
on their political liberties and undermining their “moral powers” as individuals. 
Indeed, Rawls explicitly articulates the fear that any liberal-democratic society 
which orientated its conceptions of justice around comprehensive liberal 
doctrines would invariably require the exercise of significant coercion to 
oppressively enforce them. 
Accordingly, Rawls claims that all democratic regimes must respect two key 
principles of justice if they are to remain just and stable given profound moral 
and political disagreement. The first principle is to guarantee an entitlement to a 
fair, adequate scheme of fundamental liberties which will facilitate the equal 
participation of all citizens.  
The second principle is the requirement that social inequalities should be to the 
maximal advantage of the most disadvantaged, thereby ensuring that economic 
inequalities do not stifle people’s equal entitlements to democratic participation. 
In addition, a democratic regime must cultivate the capacities of citizens to grow 
two central moral powers which Rawls believes are intrinsic to human beings. 
The first is a capacity for a sense of justice and the second is the capacity to 
interpret and develop and our conceptions of the good or our interpretations of 
our own rational self-interest in the absence of any unjust coercion or 
interference. 
According to Rawls, the former capacity allows human beings to constrain one's 
ambitions in a manner that fairly considers the interests of others. This quality 
allows human beings to establish fair and lasting terms of social co-operation. 
On the other hand, Rawls argues that the latter capacity constitutes an essential 
part of one's moral identity. It provides “shape to a person's way of life”, 
orientating our goals in the social world by articulating what is of moral 
significance in our lives. It helps shape our understandings of our social 
commitments and fidelities. (Rawls, 2005, KL, 1159)  
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Accordingly, Rawls maintains that an enduring democratic regime must respect 
these capacities, thereby ruling out the “oppressive use of state power” in order 
to enforce a “shared adherence” to a particular comprehensive doctrine. (Rawls, 
2001, pg 34) 
Thirdly, Rawls maintains that political philosophy contributes to the public 
understanding of their political and social institutions, particularly in terms of 
explicating a polity's central aims and purposes and interpreting its historical 
evolution. (Rawls, 2001, pg 2)  
This is an important point as he argues that citizens require a well-developed 
appreciation of their equal political status as citizens and “how this status affects 
their relation to their social world”. (Rawls, 2001, pgs 2-3) 
Finally, Rawls insists that the fourth function of political philosophy is 
“reconciliation”. It serves to “calm our frustration and rage against our society 
and its history” by illustrating that the historical evolution of our institutions 
culminated in a “rational” manner. (Rawls, 2001, pg 3)  
This function is accorded great significance in The Law of Peoples where Rawls 
ruminates over “great evils of human history”- such as religious persecution, 
genocide and poverty- and suggests that these historical realities urgently 
demand the establishment of just political and economic institutions. (Rawls, 
1999, pgs 6-7) 
Given this outline of the central principles which animate Rawls' understanding 
of political philosophy, it is now appropriate to turn to the specific concerns 
which animate his account of civil discourse. 
The general problem motivating Rawls work: 
The fundamental issue which motivates Rawls conceptualization of civil 
discourse is the “fact of reasonable pluralism” which he believes constitutes a 
“permanent condition of a democratic society”. (Rawls, 2001, pg 33) It is 
important to distinguish between “reasonable” pluralism and pluralism per se in 
his account.  Reasonable pluralism in Rawls’ estimation refers to a 
characteristic of human reasoning which is explanative of the connection 
between democratic institutions and human diversity.  
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Rawls argues that besides the persistence of “narrow interests” and the flaws 
and limitations of human reasoning normative disagreements are primarily an 
outcome of the “burdens of judgement”. These burdens include some of the 
following considerations: (Rawls, 2001, pg 35) 
a) The fact that the evidence- empirical and scientific- bearing on a case may 
be conflicting and complex, and thus hard to assess and evaluate 
b) The fact that even where we agree fully about the kinds of considerations 
that are relevant, we may disagree about their weight, and so arrive at different 
judgements 
c) The fact that to some degree all our concepts, and not only our moral and 
political concepts, are vague and subject to hard cases. This indeterminacy 
means we must rely on judgement and interpretation (and on judgements about 
interpretations) within some range (not sharply specifiable) where reasonable 
persons may differ 
d) The fact that the way we assess evidence and weight moral and political 
values is shared (how much so we cannot tell) by our total experience, our 
whole course of life up to now; and our total experiences surely differ. So in a 
modern society with its numerous offices and positions, its many divisions of 
labour, its many social groups and often their ethnic diversity, citizens’ total 
experiences differ enough for their judgements to diverge to some degree on 
many if not most cases of any significant complexity.  
e) The fact that there are often there are different kinds of normative 
considerations of different force on both sides of a question and it is difficult to 
make an overall assessment. (Rawls, 2001, 36) 
The nature of “reasonable pluralism”, therefore, poses the following problematic 
for Rawls- namely: “How is it possible to exist over time a just and stable society 
of free and equal citizens, who remain profoundly divided by reasonable 
religious, philosophical and moral doctrines?” (Rawls, 2005, KL 789) 
Rawls response to this question is to suggest that the legitimation of coercive 
political power must be justified in a manner which does not favour or 
advantage any particular conception of the good. 
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Citizens and public officials, Rawls argues, mutually agree to justify their 
political claims with respect to reasons which “reasonable” comprehensive 
doctrines could accept as plausible or valid justifications because they believe 
that this mode of deliberation is ultimately neutral between their conflicting and 
divergent conceptions of the good and because they can accept its 
requirements from within the values and beliefs articulated by their 
comprehensive conceptions of the good.  
Consequently, given this outline it is appropriate to outline precisely the domain 
of public reason- that is, where do the requirements of public reason precisely 
apply? 
The domain of public reason: 
The previous section has highlighted the importance Rawls' attaches to widely 
shared conceptions of Justice. These conceptions are essential to practices of 
political justification in diverse liberal-democratic societies. But how is it possible 
to critically identify these principles of justice?  
According to Rawls, if agreements on principles of Justice are to be efficacious, 
there must be a “companion agreement on the guidelines for public inquiry”. 
(Rawls, 2001, pg, 89) In addition, there must be acceptable “criteria as to what 
kind of information and knowledge is relevant in discussing political questions”. 
(Rawls, 2001, pg, 89) There are a number of important aspects to this notion of 
justification. 
First of all, Rawls insists that public reason “neither criticises nor attacks any 
comprehensive doctrine” unless it is “incompatible” with democratic principles, 
particularly in cases where comprehensive doctrines do not support the 
requirements of public reason. (Rawls, 2005, KL 6747) Rawls especially 
stresses that public reason remains agonistic with respect to the claims of truth 
made by any particular comprehensive conception of the good. 
In addition, he argues that public reason is limited by its ambitions and the 
scope of its subjects. It only concerns “questions of fundamental political justice” 
which are “constitutional essentials” and “matters of basic justice”. (Rawls, 
2005, KL 6767) Constitutional essentials, on his account, are composed of two 
central elements: 
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a) The fundamental principles that specify the general structure of government 
and the political process: the powers of the legislature, executive and judiciary 
and the scope of majority rule; 
b) The equal basic rights and liberties of citizenship that legislative majorities 
ought to accept: such as the right to vote and to participate in politics, liberty of 
conscience, freedom of thought and of association, as well as the protections of 
the rule of law. (Rawls, 2005, KL 3809) 
Matters of basic Justice, on the other hand, allow different social institutions to 
effectively integrate as part of one coherent political system and they articulate 
a framework of fundamental political, civil and economic liberties and duties. 
Moreover, they also articulate the “division of advantages” in a given society- 
that is, their patterns of economic distribution. (Rawls, 2005, KL 4166)  
Rawls stresses that public reason does not universally cover all political 
discourse in a liberal-democracy. Instead, he argues that it is confined to the 
“public political forum”. A broad range of actors and discourses participate in 
this forum, such as: 
1) The discourse of public officials, especially chief executives. 
2) The discourse of the judiciary and legislative officials. 
3) The discourse of candidates for public office and their campaign managers, 
including their public oratory, party platforms and political statements. (Rawls, 
2005, KL 4143; 6787) 
He maintains, therefore, that the “public political forum” is distinctive from the 
“background culture”. The latter is the realm of civil society. It includes “diverse 
agencies and associations” where the requirements of public reason are non-
applicable, including “media of any kind”. (Rawls, 1997, pg. 768) 
Moreover, in a significant revision of his thought, which he termed “the proviso”, 
Rawls later allowed for the introduction within the “public political forum” of 
comprehensive doctrines at any time. This possibility is tempered though by the 
strict requirement that citizens eventually provide public reasons that do not 
appeal exclusively to their comprehensive doctrines. (Rawls, 2005, KL, 6907) 
Alternatively, in his more extended articulation of this idea: 
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“...reasonable comprehensive doctrines, religious or non-religious, may be 
introduced in public political discussion at any time, provided that in due course 
proper political reasons- and not reasons given solely by comprehensive 
doctrines- are presented that are sufficient to support whatever the 
comprehensive doctrines introduced are said to support”. (Rawls, 2005, KL, 
7027) 
Correspondingly, he insists that the use of his “proviso” ought to be governed on 
the basis of “good faith” and “good sense and understanding”. He insists that 
the “details about how to satisfy this proviso must be worked out in practice and 
cannot feasibly be governed by a clear family of rules given in advance”. 
(Rawls, 2005, KL, 7027) 
This 'good faith' condition reflects his belief that there are occasional situations 
where legitimate reasons exist to stake political claims with reference to one's 
own comprehensive doctrines. This argument provides the bridge for permitting 
two other forms of discourse into a political debate- namely declaration and 
conjecture. According to Rawls, declaration is permissible as it allows 
individuals to persuade others that our comprehensive doctrines are sufficiently 
“reasonable” for the purposes of further discussion. 
Conjecture is also permissible in political debate because it allows participants 
to demonstrate that other people's conceptions of the good are capable of 
endorsing “reasonable political conceptions”. This capability means that their 
claims are translatable according to the requirements of public reason. (Rawls, 
2005, KL, 7057) 
The idea of a “family of reasonable political conceptions of justice” represents 
another significant facet of his thought. (Rawls, 2005, KL, 6865) Rawls 
maintains that given the diversities of contemporary democracies the standards 
of public reason cannot be articulated from the perspective of a singular 
“reasonable” conception of justice alone. Instead, as he insists: 
“There are many liberalisms and related views, and therefore many forms of 
public reason specified by a family of reasonable political conceptions...the 
limiting feature of these forms is the criterion of reciprocity, viewed as applied 
between free and equal citizens, themselves seen as reasonable and rational”. 
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(Rawls, 2005, KL, 6865) The guidelines for public reason, therefore, stem from 
a “family of political conceptions of Justice”.  
The only obligatory shared condition between them is a normative commitment 
to reciprocity, defined as a capacity to treat one's fellow citizens as free, equal, 
rational and reasonable persons. (Rawls, 1997, pg 770) However, where 
precisely are these principles of Justice found? 
This question reveals another fundamental aspect of Rawl's Political Liberalism. 
Rawls insists that conceptions of (liberal) Justice are located within the “public 
culture” which articulates a shared historical fund of political ideas, norms and 
principles. (Rawls, 2005, KL 851) For instance, Rawls cites traditions of judicial 
interpretation, historical texts and documents as well as the customs of public 
institutions as examples of resources of the public culture. (Rawls, 2005, KL 
914)  
These resources allow citizens to 'translate' their conceptions of the good into a 
conception of justice which would subsequently frame their political claims in a 
manner which respects the equality and liberty of their fellow citizens and public 
officials. 
Consequently, Rawls highlights the importance of attaining an “overlapping 
consensus” over shared principles of justice which are internally acceptable to 
diverse, comprehensive worldviews. (Rawls, 2005, KL 851) An overlapping 
consensus occurs when citizens affirm a shared conception of Justice 
compatible with the values, principles and ideas internal to their own 
comprehensive doctrines. (Rawls, 2005, KL 851-914) 
This account has significant implications, once again, for Rawls’ normative 
understanding of citizenship because he maintains that the affirmation of this 
political conception of justice does not detriment citizen's comprehensive 
notions of the good.  
Rawls distinguishes between citizens “political” or “institutional” and their “non-
political” or “non-institutional identities”. Rawls argues that citizens must 
continually adjust and reconcile their moral values in “non-public life” with an 
affirmation of public values of political justice. (Rawls, 2005, KL 1163) 
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However, this process of adjustment must respect three fundamental criteria. 
Firstly, citizens must accept a list of fundamental basic political rights, liberties 
and opportunities.  
Secondly, they must assume a “special priority” to these rights, liberties and 
opportunities over their conceptions of the good. Finally, they must accept 
measures that will allow all citizens to “make effective use of their freedoms”. 
(Rawls, 2005, KL, 6865) 
Nevertheless, despite these universal commitments, he insists that his account 
does not “fix public reason once and for all in the form of one favoured political 
conception of justice”. (Rawls, 2005, KL, 6884) Indeed, he argues that there is 
an internal dynamism to his account of public reason which can incorporate 
shifts in public discourse- for instance, via the articulation of new interpretations 
of key political values, principles, ideas, etc. (Rawls, 2005, KL 6865)  
Given this outline of the domain of public reason, it is now relevant to reflect on 
how Rawls understands public reason as a normative ideal as well. 
The ideal of Public Reason: 
In addition to this formal delineation of the domain of public reason, Rawls also 
articulates an “ideal” of public reason. Rawls demands that key public officials, 
including chief executives, judges, candidates for public office and legislators, 
to: 
“…act and follow the idea of public reason and explain to other citizens their 
reasons for supporting fundamental political positions in terms of the political 
conception of justice they regard as most reasonable...in this way they fulfil 
what I shall call their duty of civility to one another to other citizens.” (Rawls, 
1997, pg 769) 
This “duty of civility”, Rawls argues, also ought to be fulfilled by citizens when 
voting on issues of fundamental political justice. They are expected to act “as if 
they were legislators”, demanding that they ask themselves which statutes or 
policy proposals are the “most reasonable to enact”, especially in terms of 
assessing whether they satisfy the key principle of reciprocity. (Rawls, 1997, pg 
770) 
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Moreover, he stresses that this duty also “involves a willingness to listen to 
others and a fair mindedness in deciding when accommodations to their views 
should be reasonably be made”. (Rawls, 2005, KL 3634) It is worth stressing 
though that this duty is “intrinsically moral” as opposed to being a legal 
obligation because it might endanger essential liberties of speech. (Rawls, 
1997, pg 769) 
In addition, it is also important to emphasize that this duty is “intrinsically moral” 
because citizens accept the requirements of public reason on the basis that it is 
compatible with the values and beliefs internal to their own conceptions of the 
good. Citizens and public officials, in Rawls' estimation, do not merely accept its 
requirements for self-interested or prudential reasons or out of a need to 
temporarily settle a modus vivendi political arrangement. 
Indeed, the significance he accords to this ideal of public reason is highlighted 
when he suggests that: 
“...the disposition of citizens to view themselves as ideal legislators, and to 
repudiate government officials and candidates for public office who violate 
public reason, is one of the political and social roots of democracy, and is vital 
to its enduring strength and vigour” (Rawls, 1997, pg 769) 
This account of the duty of civility reflects a central normative problem 
motivating Rawls’ political theory, namely: 
“By what ideals and principles, then, are citizens who share equally ultimate 
political power to exercise that power so that each can reasonably justify his or 
her political decisions to everyone?” (Rawls, 1997, pg 770) 
Rawls argues the practice of public reason is essential if citizens and public 
officials are to justify their political relationships in a fashion which respects their 
status as free and equal persons. This is because the practice of public reason 
generates an orientation towards one's fellow citizens where one becomes less 
inclined to justify the restriction of each other's fundamental liberties or to 
legitimate the exercise of political power for reasons which they cannot accept. 
This ideal for Rawls is manifested through the idea of “reasonableness”. It is 
important to stress that, following his commitment to a “political” as opposed to 
a “comprehensive” conception of liberalism, Rawls argues that his conception of 
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“reasonable” individuals is not grounded on particular ontological or 
essentialized assumptions about human nature or is derived from a particular 
comprehensive conception of the good.  
Rather, he argues that his understanding of a “reasonable” person stems from 
implicit normative understandings which are broadly accepted by members of a 
political community. Rawls argues that citizens are only reasonable if they treat 
their fellow citizens as being “free and equal” and recognize that they are 
members of a shared enterprise of social co-operation.  
Importantly, Rawls stresses that citizens can only be considered reasonable if 
they believe it is morally unacceptable for them to exercise political power in 
order to repress the reasonable yet different comprehensive doctrines of their 
fellow citizens. 
Indeed, citizens are only considered reasonable if they are prepared to 
exchange “fair terms of cooperation” by referencing widely acceptable 
conceptions of Justice. Conversely, an unreasonable person refuses to propose 
any principles of justice which are conducive to implementing fair terms of social 
co-operation. (Rawls, 2005, KL 1373/1401) They will also recognize that 
different interpretations of 'reasonable' conceptions of Justice are a function of 
the “burdens of judgement”. 
It is important to stress that “reasonableness” is closely associated with the 
significant concept of “reciprocity” throughout his work. Rawls argues that 
reciprocity is manifested when individuals propose terms of Justice which might 
reasonably be accepted by other citizens.  
Any proposal of principles of justice, he further insists, should never occur under 
a climate of domination or manipulation. (Rawls, 1997, 770) The concept of 
reciprocity, therefore, grounds Rawls' account of political legitimacy. Rawls 
defines political legitimacy thus: 
“Our exercise of political power is proper only when we sincerely believe that 
the reasons we would offer for our political actions- were we to state them as 
government officials- are sufficient, and we also reasonably think that other 
citizens might also reasonably accept those reasons. This criterion applies on 
two levels: one is to the constitutional structure itself, the other is to particular 
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statutes and laws enacted in accordance with that structure. To be reasonable, 
political conceptions must justify only constitutions that satisfy this principle.” 
(Rawls, 1997, pg 771) 
The law is legitimate, on this account, when all public officials and citizens act 
as if they were legislators following the requirements of public reason. Rawls 
maintains that although citizens might believe that a particular law is flawed, 
they must recognise and accept its binding authority. (Rawls, 1997) 
In conclusion, Rawls’ is attempting to articulate an ideal of a “well-ordered 
society”. He stresses the importance of citizens mutually affirming a shared 
political conception of Justice in spite of divergent worldviews. This affirmation is 
achieved via reaching an overlapping consensus which is dependent on 
articulating “reasonable” ideas drawn from a polity's shared political culture. 
(Rawls, 2005, KL 1289) The implication of this thought, therefore, is that a 
democratic society ought not to be construed either as an association or as a 
coherent community. As he suggests: 
“...citizens do not believe that there are antecedent social ends that justify them 
in viewing some people as having more or less worth to society than others and 
assigning them different basic rights and privileges accordingly...By contrast, a 
democratic society with its political conception does not see itself as an 
association at all. It is not entitled, as associations within society generally are, 
to offer different terms to its members (in this case those born into it) depending 
the worth of their potential contribution to society as a whole, or to the ends of 
those already members of it.” (Rawls, 2005, KL 1289) 
This idea of a well-ordered society reflects another significant dimension of 
Rawls’ thought which can be traced back to A Theory of Justice- the notion of 
publicity. Publicity for Rawls is an essential attribute of a just democratic society 
because it serves to justify coercive political power. He argues that the ideal of 
publicity is essential to ensuring that public institutions are accountable to 
public, critical scrutiny and oversight. 
This essential demand for publicity is ultimately closely associated with what 
might be termed the “central thesis” of Rawlsian political theory- namely the 
“liberal principle of legitimacy”. This principle requires that the exercise of 
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political power must be conducted with reference to constitutional principles. 
These principles, in turn, must be acceptable to all citizens and justified through 
a process of continual dialogue and negotiation. (Rawls, 2005, KL 2556) 
In conclusion, therefore, it has been argued that Rawls' theory of public reason 
defends the idea that in the “public political culture” all participants ought to 
comply with a normative duty of civility. This moral duty requires them to frame 
their political justifications only via generally acceptable political claims which 
“reasonable” citizens might accept. 
It is important to reflect that Rawls' theory of public reason is animated by 
multiple admirable goals. These ambitions include the fostering of civil 
friendship, the protection of citizens' autonomy and the securing of social co-
operation and stability. These goals are also supplemented with his earnest 
attempt to develop an account of justice that all citizens could affirm for moral, 
rather than merely prudential, reasons. He believes that such an account of 
Justice serves to legitimate the coercive exercise of power by the state. 
Importantly, civility for Rawls is particularly attached to what it means to be 
‘reasonable’ person, thereby suggesting that civility constitutes an important 
virtue in democratic societies as people attempt to forge agreement over basic 
political values despite the existence of conflicting worldviews. Civil discourse 
allows citizens who hold divergent conceptions of the good to legitimate their 
collective political arrangements in a manner which respects their status as free 
and equal persons. 
It also regulates the political conduct of citizens not simply in terms of how they 
vote but how they stake their claims in vital political institutions while regulating 
the conduct of citizens who hold public office as they decide over matters of 
“basic justice” and the constitutional framework. Accordingly, given this outline 
of the positions of Rawls and Habermas with respect to civil discourse, it is now 
appropriate to interrogate some important limitations of their accounts. 
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Problems with Rawlsian and Habermasian Public Reason: 
 
The previous two sections have outlined Rawls' and Habermas' theories of 
public reason and how they are committed to some notion of ‘civility’. This 
section shall argue that there are three principle problems with their accounts. 
Firstly, Rawls and Habermas’ accounts harbour exclusionary potentials, 
particularly in terms of religious voices in the public sphere. 
This critique is not novel of course as a number of critics have questioned the 
Rawlsian and Habermasian constrictions of public discourse from a diversity of 
perspectives, I hope to develop these critiques in a different direction by 
connecting the problem of exclusion to the idea of epistemic injustice. (E.g. 
Bader, 2009; Baumeister, 2011; Bohman, 2003, Chambers, 2010; Friedman, 
2000; Gaus & Vallier, 2009; Lafont, 2007; Maclure, 2006; Taylor, 2007b; 
Weithman, 2002; Wolterstorff & Audi, 1997; Yates, 2007) 
Secondly, it shall be argued that their accounts of civility are flawed by their rigid 
and an implausible distinction between the right and the good as well as the 
public and the private. 
Finally, it shall be maintained that their accounts of civility are overly rigid, thus 
delimiting the creative capacities of public dialogue and ignoring how norms of 
civility can facilitate the emergence of new self and other understandings. Let us 
now explore these criticisms in further depth. 
The distinction between the Right and the Good and the Public and the 
Private: 
One of the most contentious dimensions of Rawls and Habermas’ work stems 
from their strict division between the right/the good and their differentiation 
between the public/ the private. This problem arises from a number of 
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questionable assumptions Habermas and Rawls make concerning the 
connection between our social identities and political claim-making. 
Firstly, both of their conceptions of public reason assume that individuals are 
easily capable of distinguishing between the right and the good for the purposes 
of public justification. They also assume that individuals are capable of 
deploying this distinction to formulate their political claims in terms that all could 
potentially accept. Significantly, they also believe that individuals have a default 
motivational willingness to engage in their process of translation and that they 
will have the requisite abilities to do so. 
This criticism suggests that there is a fundamental methodological problem with 
their approach that delineates what kinds of justifications are “public” or “private” 
via the articulation of a fixed philosophical framework. They ignore that such 
distinctions are invariably subject to political contestation and remain historically 
fluid and contingent. 
There is simply no means of distinguishing between the right and the good in a 
non-arbitrary and incontestable fashion yet the entire framework of their 
conceptions of public reason already presumes that such a position is possible. 
Instead, Habermas and Rawls they treat our conceptions of good as merely 
articulating a framework of value orientations or as constituting a coherent 
scheme of beliefs that can easily be abstracted away for the purposes of public 
justification.  
However, this conceptualisation is flawed as it ignores how our conceptions of 
the good have an existential character that stems from deeply internalised 
processes of socialisation and acculturation. They articulate a series of 
substantive beliefs and commitments that are profoundly important to the self-
identities of persons, informing our social judgements via referencing a number 
of substantive moral prescriptions or proscriptions. 
Accordingly, one of the central problems with their conceptualization of public 
reason is an empirical one. They fail to appreciate that public reasoning 
processes will invariably involve citizens and public officials referencing ideas 
derived from their own world-views at all levels of democratic deliberation, 
including in formal decision-making processes.  
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Consequently, questions must be raised as to the political viability of their 
project, given that they require citizens to abstract themselves from their 
worldviews if they are permitted to participate in "formal" political institutions. 
It is not simply the case, therefore, that citizens will find it difficult to “translate” 
their claims into a more generalised vocabulary but also that they will invariably 
interpret and assess the claims of other people with reference to their 
particularistic conceptions of the good.  
Consequently, it is deeply questionable whether Rawls and Habermas’ accounts 
of public reason have the adequate resources to negotiate conflicts 
characterised by partial incommensurable epistemic and moral frameworks.  
The problem of incommensurability is particularly pressing for Habermas’ 
conceptualization of civility as he believes that interlocutors’ share a common 
lifeworld which allows them to evaluate competing validity claims and forge a 
consensus on the basis of reasons all could accept. (Habermas, 1987) Yet the 
problem of incommensurability arises precisely when individuals do not share a 
similar lifeworld by virtue of their radically different worldviews.   
This divide frustrates the possibilities for reaching a discursive consensus via 
the rational evaluation of competing validity claims precisely because there are 
interpretive and evaluative normative disagreements about particular subjects 
as well as ontological disagreements about the nature of the world, including 
the meaning of human rationality.  
This of course means that participants might find it difficult to be orientated 
towards reaching mutual understanding as part of the process of reaching a 
consensus.  Unsurprisingly, practices of bargaining and interest-based 
negotiation might be more appropriate in such contexts, especially in the face of 
communicative break-downs caused by radical differences of worldview. 
For instance, indigenous Australians often make environmental political claims 
that accord sentience to aspects of the land and which express a profoundly 
existential sense of identification with nature. This connection is often 
expressed by the term “country” which reflects a complex set of obligations 
inherited from and practised with a variety of human and non-human actors and 
descendants. Indeed, in particular, people and land are engaged in a reciprocal 
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and communicative relationship of care encoded through sacred stories that 
explain the creation of the earth by ancestor beings. (Grieves, 2008, pg 364) 
In addition, these beings also established principles to govern the interactions of 
all living creatures. This framework is commonly referred to as “The Law” as it 
delineates the obligations each person has for other people, their country as 
well as with the ancestor spirits themselves. (Grieves, 2009, pg 7)  
Unsurprisingly, there is no customary distinction between the secular and the 
profane as common to European-derived political thought. (Fryer-Smith, 2008, 
pg 225) Indeed, more broadly as W.E.H Stanner argues, there is a certain 
poverty of the English language to convey the meaning of indigenous cultural 
relationships to the land, he suggests that: 
“No English words are good enough to give a sense of the links between an 
Aboriginal group and its homeland. Our word ‘home’, as warm and suggestive 
though it may be, does not match the Aboriginal word that may mean ‘camp’, 
‘heart’, ‘country’, ‘everlasting home’, ‘totem place’, ‘life source’, ‘spirit centre’ and 
much else in one. Our word land is too spare and meagre. We can now 
scarcely use it except with economic overtones unless we happen to be poets… 
The Aboriginal would speak of earth and use it in a rich symbolic way to mean 
his ‘shoulder’ or his ‘side’. I have seen an Aboriginal embrace the earth he 
walked on… a different tradition leaves us tongue-less and earless towards this 
other world of meaning and significance” (Stanner IN Grieves, 2009, pg 13) 
Indigenous environmental claims, therefore, often reflect an ontology, 
epistemology and axiology that cannot be readily translated into “generally 
acceptable” terms without significant loss of meaning. This point is particularly 
poignant given one the central aspect of colonial oppression was the systematic 
denigration of the value of indigenous environmental knowledge.  
Consequently, indigenous peoples face a situation in which dominant epistemic 
norms and ideological constructs require them to frame their political claims in a 
manner which might cause them to avoid referencing fundamentally important 
information or to translate them into a language which does not faithfully 
describe their grievances.  
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This example illustrates that a failure to appreciate the existential and 
perspectival aspects of political claim-making can have exclusionary 
implications. It is an especially poignant example as neither Rawls nor 
Habermas conceptualise the role of independent political institutions and 
traditions of indigenous peoples within their accounts of public reason. (Tully, 
1995, pg 82) 
Ultimately, what this example suggests is that their accounts of public reason 
position individuals who either cannot translate their terms into a more 
“generalizable” vocabulary or who refuse to do so in a difficult predicament.  
Firstly, Rawls and Habermas ignore how difficult it can be to articulate 
generalised principles divorced entirely from citizens own parochial conceptions 
of the good.  As a consequence, they have no account of how citizens and 
public officials can overcome any cognitive or affective obstacles that might 
arise during this process. 
Secondly, as the literature on “recognition” and the “politics of difference” has 
repeatedly illustrated, it is clear that many political struggles by oppressed 
minority groups have been animated by a desire for majorities or public 
institutions to specifically recognize the substantive nature of their ethical 
commitments publicly.  
The danger with Rawls and Habermas' accounts of public reason is that the 
translation process might fail to adequately express the uniqueness and 
distinctiveness of their political claims, thereby fostering the public 
misrecognition of their identities.  
Simply put, if citizens feel that the discursive restraints of public reason do not 
adequately express the richness of their substantive values and beliefs, this can 
have serious, negative implications for their political participation.  
It is worth noting again that Rawls and Habermas treat the translation process 
as a normative obligation for participation in “formal” political institutions. 
However, this requirement is profoundly problematic as by insisting that citizens 
and public officials abstract themselves from their conceptions of the good, it 
can deprive individuals of reasons to participate in public discourse in the first 
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place. This point is particularly well articulated by Iris Marion Young who notes 
that: 
“It is impossible to reason about substantive moral issues without understanding 
their substance, which always presupposes some particular social and historical 
context; and one has no motive for making moral judgements and resolving 
moral dilemmas unless the outcome matters unless one has a particular and 
passionate interest in the outcome.” (Young, 1990, pgs 103-104) 
Legitimate questions can be raised, therefore, as to whether their right/good 
division can potentially exclude citizens who believe that their 'comprehensive' 
doctrines and/or group-based identities are fundamentally connected to their 
political aspirations, goals and convictions. Indeed, as Monique Deveaux (2000) 
worries: 
“In particular, cultural groups that seek special constitutional status would be 
prevented by neutral liberalism's deliberate constraints from appealing to their 
community's distinct traditions, language, history and ways of life to justify their 
political claims and proposals. It is unlikely that the claims of minorities for 
cultural recognition can be articulated effectively in terms of neutral, public 
reasons”. (Deveaux, 2000, pg 94) 
It is unsurprising, therefore, that Rawls and Habermas' conceptions of public 
reason have widely been deemed to be exclusionary on the basis that it signals 
to individuals, groups or political parties that wish to stake their public claims 
with reference to their comprehensive doctrines that their justifications are 
ultimately unworthy of inclusion in democratic debates. 
This sentiment, in turn, can breed a sense of alienation and discontent with 
democracy, thereby potentially producing destructive kinds of political conflict. 
This possibility, of course, is particularly ironic given that Rawls' account of 
public reason was precisely orientated towards promoting social and political 
stability.  
This point brings us to the problems raised by Rawls and Habermas' attempts to 
delineate between the realm of the public and private that underpins their 
account of the discursive responsibilities of public reason. 
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The public/private differentiation is long-standing within liberal political theory 
and has been subjected to a plurality of interpretations. (Benhabib, 1992b) The 
realm of the private has been presented as a space where individuals can 
safely exercise their freedom of conscience and act as economic agents and 
acquire private property without interference from state or ecclesiastical 
authorities, subject to the constraints of the law. (Benhabib, 1987; 1992; 1992b) 
This distinction is manifested in the work of Rawls and Habermas in a variety of 
fashions. Firstly, it is significant to note that Rawls' account of public reason not 
only places restraints upon the reasons acceptable in political deliberation but it 
also constricts the forms of acceptable political participation.  
This problem is evidenced in Rawls' discussion of the duty of civility where 
citizens cannot vote in agreement with their comprehensive doctrines. Rather, 
they ought to vote on the basis of public values articulated in the Constitution. 
Citizens who refuse in this regard are deemed to be 'unreasonable' as they fail 
to conform to an essential requisite of democratic citizenship.  
In addition, as Robert B. Talisse notes, in a telling remark Rawls argues that “It 
is unreasonable for us to use political power...to repress comprehensive 
doctrines that are not unreasonable”. (Rawls in Talisse, 2005, pg 146) 
This implies that it might be reasonable to use political power in particular 
instances to coercively suppress “unreasonable” comprehensive doctrines. 
Talisse suggests, therefore, that Rawls' framework might justify restricting the 
equal participation of those who cannot offer “non-public” political justifications. 
(Talisse, 2005, pg 146) 
In addition, Rawls also characterises those who refuse to offer non-public 
reasons for acting in an “uncivil” fashion. This issue is a significant problem 
because, as David Thunder notes, it risks casting those who fail to follow the 
normative restraints of civility to social opprobrium and hostility by their fellow 
citizens who wish to follow the restraints of public reason. (Thunder, 2006, pg 
681) 
This social pressure might foster political exclusion because it might morally 
coerce certain citizens to stake their claims in a manner contrary to their 
conscience. (Thunder, 2006) In addition, as Thunder suggests, this scenario 
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raises the possibility that particular groups of citizens might simply withdraw 
their participation altogether from political processes. (Thunder, 2006, pg 688) 
From this perspective, the problem with Rawls and Habermas' accounts of 
public reason is that they underestimate the possibility that their moral duties of 
translation might constrict or even exclude the participation of certain individuals 
on the basis of conventional and widely held public opinion or sentiment. This 
danger is especially prevalent where certain comprehensive notions of the good 
directly challenge socially dominant viewpoints and values, thereby potentially 
encouraging practices of self-censorship. 
Thirdly, if even citizens can collaboratively assist each other in the translation 
process, it might be the case that their conceptions of the good might produce 
disagreements as to whether a public justification is suitably acceptable to all 
citizens.  
Rawls and Habermas believe that the translation of political claims from 
parochialism to generality is essential to legitimating the political order by 
articulating generally acceptable principles of Justice. 
Yet, as I have been arguing, this rigid distinction is profoundly difficult to sustain 
in practice. Indeed, one of the most significant facets of contemporary political 
life, as Jeremy Waldron notes, are struggles over the very meaning of “Justice”. 
(Waldron, 1999) Their strict differentiation is only possible in light of their 
assumption that there is significant agreement over conceptions of Justice in 
contemporary society.  
However, in reality, both principles of Justice and particularistic conceptions of 
the good are intimately intertwined and subject to contestation. This 
circumstance renders it futile to privilege the former over the latter in the fashion 
Rawls and Habermas have done. 
The problems associated with the right/good differentiation are also related to 
their distinctions between “public” and “private” reasons within their frameworks. 
According to Rawls and Habermas, citizens must accept that their 
comprehensive doctrines have to be translated into more generalizable terms 
as a pre-condition for the consideration of their claims in “formal” public 
institutions.  
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It is questionable though whether it is possible and desirable to distinguish so 
strongly between a “public” and “private” reason in the first place. For instance, 
as a number of feminist critics have noted, Rawls and Habermas have failed to 
adequately interrogate the reality that distinctions between the public and the 
private are a site of considerable political contestation and have been 
historically fluid.  (Benhabib, 1987, 1992; Fraser, 1990) 
Moreover, Rawls and Habermas fail to seriously consider the reality that 
distinctions between the public and the private have historically been biased in 
a manner which serves to advantage particular groups in society while 
disadvantaging others. 
One important manifestation of this tendency is the way in which public 
institutions have frequently failed to intervene to regulate oppressive social 
practices on the basis of an assumption that these practices were confined to 
the ‘private’ activities of members of civil society. For instance, until relatively 
recently in many Western polities marital rape was not considered to be a crime 
by virtue of patriarchal social norms. 
Indeed, it is striking how little this fundamental problem is considered 
throughout the corpus of Rawls’ and Habermas’ work. This theoretical lacuna 
means that they cannot adequately consider how relations of power shape 
social understandings of what kinds of public justifications are considered to be 
‘public’, thereby worthy of consideration, and those which are merely private, 
thereby unsuitable for the purposes of public discussion making. 
In addition, as suggested previously, Rawls and Habermas take it for granted 
that citizens will be able to easily translate their comprehensive conceptions of 
the good into politically claims which are generally acceptable. Yet, as I have 
just argued, the problem with this assumption is that it presupposes that there is 
little disagreement over what constitutes a “public” as opposed to a “private” 
justification. Yet, as Jocelyn Maclure notes, in practice this is an immense site 
of political controversy in contemporary liberal democracies. (Maclure, 2000, pg 
47) 
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Accordingly, there can be no ‘neutral’ or universally accepted means of 
articulating the distinction between the public and the private as it is inherently 
related to relations of asymmetries of political, social and economic power and 
is dependent on a set of contestable substantive value judgements.  
Indeed, as my discussion of Charles Taylor shall illustrate later, in reality liberal-
democracies are inevitably committed to particularistic values which renders it 
impossible for them to be entirely neutral between conflicting conceptions of the 
good. Given that political disputes are animated precisely by conflicting 
substantive values, it is often extremely difficult for citizens and public officials to 
discover “neutral” public justifications without referencing particularistic values. 
For instance, to simply take one of many possible illustrations, it is clear that 
one contemporary site of contestation over the public/private division revolves 
around the moral and political legitimacy of dominant financial institutions to 
create the vast majority of the money supply in contemporary democracies. 
This is clearly an issue of public concern given the vested interests financial 
institutions have in issuing debt (credit) to clients in the pursuit of short-term 
profits in light of a regulatory regime that considers such institutions ‘too big to 
fail’. This arrangement inevitably creates the moral hazard that financial 
institutions can issue unsustainable levels of debt, resulting in speculative asset 
bubbles that significantly exacerbate economic inequalities and which prolong 
resulting economic recessions. 
However, within dominant economic analyses, not only is it typically overlooked 
that financial institutions issue the majority of credit/debt in contemporary 
economies but the issuing of debt is frequently understood to be a strictly 
‘private’ problem. It is considered to be a mere contractual undertaking between 
one financial institution and its individual customers or between different 
financial institutions. 
This ignores the reality that the culmination of so-called ‘private’ debts (e.g. 
mortgage obligations, personal credit card debt and student loans) not simply 
differentially impacts on individuals, communities and social groups by virtue of 
the distribution of economic resources in a society but also that the 
accumulation of ‘private’ debt results in public calamities in the form of debt 
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deflation, home re-possessions, pension write-downs, negative equity and 
public spending cuts. 
Unsurprisingly, this model of finance has been the site of considerable 
contestation and public argumentation. Critics highlight the particularistic and 
controversial economic assumptions underlying policy frameworks, particularly 
the idea that financial institutions can adequately ‘self-police’ themselves with 
regards to the extension of credit due to their self-interest in their economic 
survival. This example, therefore, highlights how an issue that is supposedly a 
‘private’ affair, in fact, is profoundly publicly contestable. 
From this perspective, the Rawlsian and Habermasian attempt to distinguish 
between the public and the private under-estimates the extent to which this 
distinction is politically questionable. Indeed, their particular account of this 
distinction will likely be rejected by a considerable number of citizens within 
contemporary liberal democratic societies because they precisely aim for their 
“private” concerns to be treated as a “public” concern, worthy of informing 
political decision-making processes. 
This is because, as James Bohman argues, one of the most significant aspects 
of contemporary democratic struggle is the “character of public life itself, as well 
as the meaning and scope of political values”, thereby foregrounding the 
limitations of any attempt which tries to place the “'values” of public reason 
beyond political contestation”. (Bohman, 1995, pgs 264-5) This point is also 
emphasised by Seyla Benhabib who stresses that: 
“All struggles against oppression in the modern world begin by redefining what 
had previously been considered private, non-public and non-political issues as 
matters of public concern, issues of justice, and sites of power that need 
discursive legitimation” (Benhabib, 1992b, pg 100) 
Consequently, Rawls and Habermas seem to ignore the very contestability of 
the distinction between the private/public, a point particularly emphasised by 
feminist critics who argued that by designating certain issues as belonging to 
the private realm public authorities were failing to recognize them as political 
problems worthy of addressing as opposed to being private, individual troubles.  
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Indeed, as Fish (1999, pg 95-6) notes, Rawls and Habermas thereby ignore 
how their requirements for public discourse constitute an “act of power” as 
opposed to being morally and politically neutral. It is important at this stage 
therefore to explore the next line of criticism of their accounts of public reason- 
namely their rigidity which under-estimates the creative, transformative potential 
of public dialogue in creating new self and other understandings. 
The Rigidity of Rawlsian and Habermasian Public Reason: 
It has been noted previously that Rawls and Habermas advocate the translation 
of ‘private’ reasons into ‘public reason’s because a failure to do so would 
indicate a) fundamental disrespect to one’s fellow citizens who hold different 
ideas of the good and b) undermine political legitimacy as political deliberations 
could ultimately be justified on non-generalizable grounds. However, it is clear 
that both of these assumptions are questionable. 
Firstly, these two assumptions imply a rather narrow understanding of political 
reasoning in which citizens enter public deliberations with relatively pre-fixed 
and coherent conceptions of the good- or ‘comprehensive’ doctrines which then 
ought to be “translated” at some point during public debates. 
It is clear though, as Iris Marion Young notes, that it is often typically the case 
that people’s political opinions are capable of revision in the following dialogue 
and internal deliberation and that people’s conceptions of the good tend to be 
rather fragmented and non-unitary. (Young, 2002, pg 135) 
Another issue which signifies the rigidity of Habermas’ account of civility stems 
from his assumption that during communicative action participants should 
assume a performative attitude orientated towards the discovery of the truth- 
that is, he believes that the force of the better argument shall organically 
emerge via the exchange of yes/no claims and counter-claims.  
Yet given the previous discussion of incommensurability, it is possible that 
discursive participants will bitterly disagree with respect to what counts as an 
appropriate or inappropriate argument given their deeper background 
normative, epistemic and ontological disputes. The problem here is that there is 
no underlying meta-agreement with respect to what kinds of reasons are 
acceptable or unacceptable for the purpose of public policy making. 
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A similar issue arises for Rawls given his claim that, in attempting to justify 
public policy, citizens should only stake their claims via reference “plain truths 
now widely accepted, or available to citizens generally”. (Rawls, 2001, pg 90, 
my emphasis) The source of this” reasonable expectation” is the “shared fund of 
implicitly recognised basic ideas and principles”, which Rawls locates within the 
“public culture” of democratic societies. (Rawls, 2005, pg 8)  
However, this assumption is immediately problematic because it could 
potentially exclude justifications which cannot be easily articulated within the 
present 'shared fund' of common and implicitly endorsed principles, irrespective 
of their argumentative merits and how widely these principles are held by 
citizens. 
Unsurprisingly, therefore, while Rawls insists that public reason is temporally 
and conceptually mutable in terms of the kind of subjects it covers, critics have 
charged Rawlsian public reason from suffering from what might be termed an 
‘imaginative deficit” or a conservative predisposition. (Bader, 2009; Waldron, 
1993) For instance, Jeremy Waldron suggests that: 
“...what this conception seems to rule out is the novel or disconcerting move in 
political argumentation...Rawls' conception seems to assume an inherent limit in 
the human capacity for imagination and creativity in politics, implying as it does 
that something only counts as a legitimate move in public reasoning only to the 
extent that it latches on to existing premises that everyone already shares” 
(Waldron, 1993, pg 838) 
Indeed, it is clear that one of the most important facets of political contestation 
in contemporary liberal-democratic regimes are attempts by protest groups to 
challenge dominant vocabularies which serve to obscure injustices or hinder the 
expression of different conceptions of Justice.  
For instance, animal rights activists frequently attempt to draw attention to the 
systemic exploitation and extreme suffering of animals in factory farming 
practices. The process of raising public awareness is extremely difficult because 
these practices are socially invisible. (Humphrey, 2008) 
Given the pervasive normalisation of animal consumption, the influence of 
powerful agricultural lobbies and the reticence of media organisations to 
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confront divisive issues, the way animals are exploited in factory farms remains 
often very difficult to articulate publicly.  
Indeed, the task of raising public consciousness is difficult because the claims 
of animal rights protesters often conflict with dominant frames of public 
discourse. People also frequently lack a willingness to consider the claims of 
animal rights protesters given that their claims might provoke an uncomfortable 
process of moral soul-searching. 
Consequently, questions can be raised as to whether Rawls and Habermas 
accounts of public reason effectively restrict the inclusion of transformative 
political discourses that, in varying degrees and kinds, transcend commonly 
held political beliefs, values, norms, principles and ideals.  
As a result, there seems to be no mechanism internal to their frameworks of 
public reason that will allow for epistemic innovation because it might 
marginalize the expression of transformative political claims. 
Rawls and Habermas’ accounts of public reason, therefore, suffer from a critical 
deficit. Given that their exclusive emphasis is on the political justification of 
power, both accounts fail to treat public discourse as a means of social criticism, 
requiring the critical interrogation of prejudicial social attitudes, pejorative social 
categorizations or ideological delusions. (Rostbull, 2008, KL 1701)  
They both fail to critically interrogate the social and psychological processes 
through which individual’s receptivity to other people’s claims can be distorted 
or compromised by virtue of dominant power relationships. 
This point is not to suggest that the problem of how individuals who hold diverse 
conceptions of the good can co-exist in a peaceful manner is an unimportant 
question. However, it is to suggest that their account’s failure to elaborate an 
account of how public reason can contribute to the public critique of dominant 
power relations is a significant problem.  
This failure is particularly unfortunate for Habermas given that his more recent 
writings have become increasingly detached from his earlier emphasis on 
ideology critique and its connection to political freedom. Accordingly, Rawls and 
Habermas need to develop theories of public discourse that critically 
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interrogates the nature of prevailing epistemic norms that shape which kinds of 
justifications are publicly validated or publicly marginalised or excluded.  
In addition, they also need an account of how dominant epistemic norms can be 
challenged and revised by marginalised communities whose concerns fail to 
receive a fair hearing by virtue of these norms. Unfortunately, this aspect of 
political contestation is erased from their frameworks, as they fail to consider 
how memberships in certain communities or social groups grant on epistemic 
privilege or marginalisation.  
From this perspective, I argue that any account of civil discourse is redundant if 
it fails to consider questions of what kinds of knowledge are publicly validated or 
invalidated and which actors are granted- or denied- epistemic credibility. 
Consequently, it seems questionable that a theory of public reason which 
emphasises a notion of “reasonableness” is suitable to include marginalised 
groups on a genuine basis.  
Again, it is problematic precisely, as Bashir (2012) points out, because it might 
marginalise or exclude some claims that seem difficult to express in presently 
‘reasonable’ terms. This problem is pronounced in cases of historical exclusion, 
exploitation and domination where hegemonic groups have universalised their 
“norms, values and reasons” and have depicted “the excluded or oppressed as 
inferior, irrational and unreasonable”. (Bashir, 2012, pgs 138-9) 
Another dimension of Rawls' rather rigid understanding of public reason is his 
construal of reasonableness. Unlike Habermas (albeit with the notable 
exception of religious justifications) Rawls partly defines “reasonableness” by 
virtue of the substantive content of political claims.  
He insists that citizens and public officials should exchange claims that (they 
reasonably believe) might also reasonably be accepted by others. These claims 
should, therefore, rely upon values that currently implicit in the so-called public 
political culture and should not attempt to appeal to notions of the 'whole truth'. 
However, this seems to presuppose that individuals can form an understanding 
of what constitutes a 'reasonable' political claim prior to its articulation in public 
simply through the exercise of self-reflection or internal deliberation.  
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Moreover, we can also see this rigidity in the work of Habermas in the form of 
his treatment of religious justifications in the public sphere as well as his 
commitment to a strictly procedural account of reason. Cooke (2007) offers the 
insightful criticism that Habermas’ insistence that religious claims ought to be 
“translated” before their admission into the ‘formal’ public sphere presupposes 
that it is possible to pre-suppose or pre-determine what is of need in justification 
in public deliberation. 
Indeed, she maintains that the institutional translation proviso contradicts 
Habermas’ emphasis upon the “transformative power of deliberation” in his 
previous works, notably the Theory of Communicative Action. (Cooke, 2007, pg 
228) However, his most recent work on religion and secularism seems to ignore 
this possibility by assuming that people enter political dialogue with pre-fixed 
conceptions of the good.  
Consequently, Cooke points to the following problem- if Habermas consider the 
staking of generally acceptable political justifications as a normative pre-
condition for political involvement in the “formal” political sphere, he risks 
denying the “transformative power of different, unexpected and unfamiliar 
arguments”. (Cooke, 2007, pg 230)   
Cooke instead stresses that individuals are typically most challenged by claims 
which are epistemically different and which one has no previously 
acquaintance. This has the important implication that any discursive framework 
which renders the staking of generalizable political claims a precondition for 
participation is likely to epistemically impoverish any discursive interaction as it 
might marginalize the staking of “different, unexpected and unfamiliar” claims. It 
prevents a kind of epistemic friction where new perspectives can be gained. 
(Cooke, 2007, pg 230) 
This critique has also been developed by Nikolas Kompridis who suggests that 
the rigid character of Rawlsian and Habermasian public reason reflects a 
deeper and questionable philosophical commitment to a strictly procedural 
notion of reason. This model of reason, Kompridis argues, strictly prioritises 
questions of justice and political justification at the expense of adequately 
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accounting for crisis of intelligibility and the possibility-disclosing potentials of 
reason. (Kompridis, 2007) 
According to Kompridis’ position, politics should be understood as the “art of 
disclosing new possibilities” which implies a moral responsibility for making 
room “for the call of another, rendering intelligible what may have been 
previously unintelligible.” (Kompridis, 2011, pgs 256;264) As he further stresses: 
“Becoming receptive to such a call means facilitating its voicing, letting it 
become a voice that we did not allow ourselves to hear before, and responding 
to it in a way that demands something of us that we could not have recognised 
before.” (Kompridis, 2011, pg 264)  
Ultimately, the problem with Kantian conceptualizations of public discourse, 
Kompridis suggests, is that they ignore the problem of “how to voice what for 
now cannot be voiced intelligibly in the available media of public discourse”. 
(Kompridis, 2011, pg 267) This quotation provides a useful segue into the final 
serious problem associated with Rawls and Habermas conceptualisation of 
public reason- namely the problem of epistemic exclusion. 
The problem of power, exclusion and epistemic injustice. 
The concept of political exclusion is quite broad ranging in character. It can refer 
to processes or actions where certain individuals, groups or communities are 
simply prevented from participation in public bodies or spaces or where political 
authorities attempt to leverage unacceptable costs on political participation. 
(Young, 2000) 
In addition, political exclusion can occur in contexts where individuals are 
formally included in political processes yet their interests, viewpoints and needs 
are ignored or denied, thereby debarring them from decision-making processes. 
(Young, 2000) 
Relations of epistemic injustice are an important manifestation of this kind of 
political exclusion because it denotes a situation where particular claims, 
perspectives or arguments are excluded from public consideration via the 
creation of impediments to their voicing. 
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From this perspective, dominant epistemic norms can marginalise or exclude 
the contributions of certain individuals by virtue of their stigmatised social 
identities, their communicative styles or the content of their claims. This 
exclusion might be a function of stifling conventions of moral behaviour or 
extremely strenuous guidelines of epistemic justification that effectively de-
motivate people from voicing their claims publicly. 
In addition, it is also important to note how dominant epistemic norms can 
shape our understandings of particular social and political processes. For 
instance, a wide range of 'standpoint theorists' has suggested that people's 
differing social locations are implicated in differential levels of understanding 
and insight regarding experiences of injustice. (Collins, 1991; Harding, 1991; 
Wylie, 2004) 
Indeed, in particular it has been suggested that relations and structures of 
oppression are more likely to be more 'visible' from the situation of marginalized 
social groups and individuals in comparison to more advantaged social groups 
and persons. Indeed, members of advantaged groups might, in fact, be 'blind' to 
certain aspects of social reality given their superior social and structural 
positioning. 
This 'blindness' partially stems from the manner in which oppressive social 
relationships influence patterns of social knowledge as well as the differential 
epistemic authority of socially situated knower. The valuable insights of feminist 
epistemology highlight the profound interconnections between social location 
and how claims are treated, with varying degrees and kinds, as being credible 
or non-credible, thereby influencing the distribution of social knowledge and 
ignorance across society as a whole. 
From this perceptive, as Elizabeth Anderson (2011) notes, dominant 
conceptualizations of knowledge production, acquisition and justification 
systematically advantage and disadvantage particular groups whilst 
advantaging overs as power relations inherently shape our conceptualisations 
of knowledge, the “knowing” subject as well as “practices of inquiry and 
justification”. (Anderson, 2011, no page numbers available) 
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Anderson (2011) further categories the manner in which feminist scholars have 
understood the connection between power and social knowledge practices via 
suggesting that it can be 'operationalized' in six inter-related senses- namely 
that dominant knowledge practices function to: 
 Exclude certain groups of people from knowledge inquiry  
 Systematically and systemically deny certain groups of people from 
epistemic authority  
 Denigrate certain kinds of cognitive styles and modes of knowledge  
 Articulate theories of people which represent them as being inherently 
inferior, deficient or significantly only in the manner in which they serve 
particular interest  
 Produce understandings of social phenomena which make invisible 
certain people's activities, interests or power relations  
 Develop knowledge which is not useful for people in subordinate 
positions but instead functions to reinforces hierarchical relations 
(Anderson, 2011, no page numbers available) 
Importantly, asymmetries of power profoundly govern social practices of 
ignorance via the marginalisation of knowledge useful to subordinated groups or 
by suppressing or denying knowledge of injustices committed against minority 
groups. From this perspective, as Dotson notes, ignorance should not be 
understood naively as just a lack of knowledge but rather as an active social 
process of knowledge production and reproduction. (Dotson, 2011) 
Indeed, recent work in feminist epistemology foregrounds how our social 
positioning can limit our capacities to interpret certain aspects of social life. For 
instance, members of dominant social groups and communities might find it 
difficult to understand the lived experiences and realities of people from more 
disadvantaged communities and groups. 
Consequently, feminist epistemology has highlighted the importance of how 
power relations shape the capacities of people to access information and to 
interpret and to publicly articulate their experiences. 
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It is helpful again to re-visit Miranda Fricker's distinctions between 'testimonial' 
and 'hermeneutic' forms of epistemic injustice to explicate this point further. 
According to Fricker, the former generally happens “prejudice causes a hearer 
to give a deflated level of credibility to a speaker's word” whereas the latter 
occurs “when a gap in collective interpretive resources puts someone at an 
unfair disadvantage when it comes to making sense of their social experiences”. 
(Fricker, 2007, KL 59) 
This situation causes “hermeneutical marginalisation” in which epistemically 
oppressed persons participate “unequally in the practices through which social 
meanings are generated” and suffer an injustice specifically in terms of their 
capacities as a knower. (Fricker, 2007, KL 60-62; 132-3; 295-6) Indeed, she 
suggests that one of the most deleterious consequences of this process is that 
the experiences of marginalised groups are frequently: 
“...left inadequately conceptualised and so ill-understood, perhaps even by the 
subjects themselves; and/or attempts at communication made by such groups, 
where they do have an adequate grip on the content of what they aim to 
convey, are not heard as rational owing to their expressive style being 
inadequately understood”. (Fricker, 2007, KL 134-5) 
In addition, she also suggests that it renders those epistemically disadvantaged 
susceptible to various different forms of systemic actual or potential injustices. 
Importantly, epistemic injustices can also undermine the autonomy of the 
epistemically disadvantaged. It causes victims to lose confidence in their beliefs 
and their respective justifications as well as inhibiting the formation of their 
subjectivities. (Fricker, 2007, KL 401-2; KL 655-57; KL 1,869-70)  
The obvious implication for Rawls and Habermas' accounts of public reason is 
that the articulation of political claims can never be divorced from the nature of 
power relations in a given society which differentially cast some kinds of 
testimony as being more or less credible and some agents as being more or 
less reliable and trustworthy qua knowers. 
The other implication is that epistemic injustices profoundly influence our 
receptivity towards people's claims, especially if they come from social 
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backgrounds that are deemed to be of inferior social status and if they come 
from marginalized, stigmatised or excluded social groups or communities. 
Unfortunately, though, Rawls and Habermas entrust significantly motivational 
faith in the idea that the principle of reciprocity that animates acts of translation 
will be sufficient to include genuinely all participants in a given discursive 
interaction.  
It is also unfortunate that Habermas’ account of communicative action, while 
emphasising that it constitutes an ideal set of conditions, does not adequately 
explore how imbalances of power can frustrate the capacities and motivations 
of individuals to question the validity claims of their interlocutors because they 
are simply motivationally unwilling or unable to consider others’ discursive 
challenges. 
However, this faith seems naive as it is not clear how merely exchanging 
generalizable claims will be enough to challenge norms and conditions of 
epistemic subordination and dominance, particularly when these processes are 
occurring at sub-conscious levels and when these social relations are 
institutionalized and normalised. 
If people's claims are simply not taken seriously, the manner of a claim's 
articulation does not seem to matter significantly as a means of epistemic 
inclusion and recognition. Rather, relations of epistemic injustice breed morally 
culpable failures of epistemic recognition as certain individuals or social groups 
are deemed unworthy as potential epistemic equals. 
This denial of epistemic fairness means that the capacities of marginalised 
individuals, social groups and communities to advance their claims as equal 
citizens are significantly compromised. Indeed, relations of epistemic injustice 
are distinctive kind of discursive disrespect as individuals unjustly ignore or 
refuse to engage with other people's claims.  
Ultimately, therefore, Rawls and Habermas’ failure to appreciate that practices 
of translation can fail as a function of a lack of adequate social vocabularies to 
express political grievances is a significant limitation of their theories. 
Consequently, any theory of public reasoning must consider how marginalised 
social groups and communities can develop new conceptual vocabularies in 
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which to explain publicly their grievances. Without being able to name their 
problems in a publicly intelligible manner, they shall continue to be ignored by 
virtue of their social invisibility. 
This point foregrounds another central problem with Rawls' and Habermas' 
accounts of public reason- namely their motivational assumption that all 
individuals will fairly consider whether the claims of other citizens are “generally 
accessible”, thereby rendering them suitable for the purposes of further 
discussion or even for the justification of coercive public policy.  
However, as I shall outline in greater detail later in this dissertation, this 
assumption is questionable given that individuals by virtue of the limitations of 
dominant social resources of interpretation, cognitive or affective biases of 
judgement, practices of social ignorance and other epistemic vices frequently 
fail to consider fairly the claims of others. This tendency, I suggest, is 
particularly manifested when members from advantaged social communities are 
urged to consider the claims of individuals who come from oppressed 
communities.  
Consequently, the political claims of marginalised groups are either ignored or 
misrecognised by virtue of their supposed “unreasonableness” and by virtue of 
judgements which maintain that individuals making the claims are being 
“unreasonable” as persons. Given this reality, it is simply unclear as to how 
practices of translation alone will be able to challenge these unjust epistemic 
relations.  
From this perspective, Rawls and Habermas fail to pay sufficient attention to 
how dominant relations of power can distort the interpretative practices of 
members from privileged social groups or communities. This distortion can 
make people unwilling or incapable to fairly consider the claims of marginalized 
individuals by virtue of prejudicial attitudes or pejorative stereotypes. As Kevin 
Olson (2011) argues, this reality represents a significant difficulty for 
marginalised groups: 
“Facing connotations of failure and incompetence, the symbolic challenge to 
marginalised groups is a substantial one. They must make a public case that 
the accepted, 'legitimate' standards of political speech should be broadened to 
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include idioms normally termed signs of failure and incompetence. They must 
overcome the stigma and de-legitimation of their own idiom to argue for its 
legitimation. And they must make this argument within or in contrast to 
hegemonic idioms themselves. This task is difficult because of the dilemma it 
poses: to legitimate oneself either by using a dominant idiom poorly as a non-
native speaker, or a stigmatised idiom well as a native speaker. Either choice 
can be considered a sign of incompetence”. (Olson, 2011, pg 539) 
Rawls and Habermas' accounts of public reasoning are flawed because they fail 
to explore the conditions necessary to promote greater epistemic equality 
between participants in a discursive interaction. This is a salient point as in 
Habermas' account on particular issues where “ethical” or “pragmatic” 
discourses cannot generate consensus it becomes imperative to adopt “moral” 
discourses that aim at articulating binding principles that are “equally good for 
all”.  
Conflicts ought to be resolved in a manner which appeals to generalizable 
interests which requires participants adopting the “the perspective of everyone 
else in order to test whether a proposed regulation is also acceptable from the 
viewpoint of every other's persons understanding of himself and the world.” 
(Habermas, 1993, pg 154) 
However, as Young points ought, this assumption of impartiality ultimately 
denies differences amongst subjects who are classified through markers of 
social distinction, particularly in relation to class, race, ethnicity, gender, 
sexuality and age. As she notes these social differentiations suggests that 
“....one subject cannot fully emphasise with one another in a different social 
location, adopt her point of view; if that were possible then the social locations 
would not be different”. (Young, 1990, pgs 103; 104) 
Ultimately, therefore, the conceptions of civil discourse of Rawls and Habermas 
are significantly limited by virtue of their failing to appreciate how the reception 
of the claims of marginalized groups and communities is hindered by relations 
of epistemic injustice and practices of social ignorance. 
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Conclusion: 
In conclusion, it must be recognised that the problem Rawls and Habermas 
attempt to tackle is extremely worthy of consideration. Both are deeply 
concerned with how participants in political dialogues should stake their claims 
with reference to commonly accepted (or acceptable) principles of Justice as 
opposed to staking one's claims with exclusive reference to one's self-interest 
or advantage. 
In addition, they are also attempting to articulate a model of public reasoning 
which attempts to engender relations of greater trust, solidarity and respect 
across deep moral and political divisions and disagreements. The practice of 
public reason, they both hope, can engender a civic and political culture that will 
foster greater mutual understanding and political compromise. 
However, I have been arguing, there are a number of fundamental problems 
with their account of public reason. Firstly, contrary to Rawls and Habermas 
insistence, it is not entirely “unreasonable” for citizens or public officials to 
publicly articulate their particularistic ideas of the good in public debates. 
This is because one does not necessarily show people disrespect by referring 
to one’s particular ideas of the good. In fact, robust discussion of these ideas 
might be essential in order to more deeply comprehend someone’s position and 
might even be a key pre-condition for people to come to appreciate the 
attractiveness and plausibility of one’s own viewpoints- and vice versa. 
This is particularly important given the reality that public claim-making will 
inevitably reference deeper ontological and normative assumptions which 
reflect broader differences of worldview which have to be negotiated with 
sensitivity.  
Rather than orientating discourse towards the attainment of consensus, it 
seems more realistic in many contexts to encourage participants to learn from 
and about each other’s worldviews. This learning process is essential if 
discursive participants are to identify any areas of common concern and interest 
and whether there are possibilities to agree on particular issues for diverging or 
occasionally identical reasons. 
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A robust discussion of contested ideas of the good can open the possibility for 
new self and other understandings while also making room for new 
perspectives that were previously ignored or were difficult to articulate within the 
prevailing social context.  
Indeed, as Iris Marion Young notes, robust dialogue over competing 
conceptions of the good and ideals of justice can be an important vehicle for 
social criticism. This is because it allows people from different social 
backgrounds to draw upon their situated knowledge as a “resource” which will 
benefit all participants in a given dialogue. (Young, 1997b, pg 399) 
At their best, such discussions can allow individuals, especially those from more 
privileged backgrounds, to question whether they have assumed that their life 
experiences to be universally normative. (Young, 1997b, pg 403) As she 
continues: 
“Expressing, questioning and challenging differently situated knowledge adds to 
social knowledge. While not abandoning their perspectives, people who listen 
across differences come to understanding something about the ways that 
proposals and policies affect others differently situated. They gain knowledge of 
what is going on in different social locations and how social processes appear 
to connect and conflict from different points of view. By internalising such a 
mediated understanding, participants in democratic discussion and decision-
making gain a wider picture of the social processes in which their own partial 
experience is embedded. Such a more comprehensive social knowledge better 
enables them to arrive at wise solutions to collective knowledge to the extent 
that they are committed to doing so”. (Young 1997b, pg 403-4) 
In addition, one does not necessarily indicate disrespect for other persons if one 
refuses- or cannot- translate one's claims into generalizable terms but rather 
depends on one's comprehensive worldviews to articulate a political claim. This 
case is obviously manifested in cases of epistemic injustice, but it also reflects 
the reality that many citizens cannot divorce their political claims from their 
substantive moral beliefs and values. 
Although citizens might disagree or disrespect different worldviews, they might 
not necessarily feel disrespected per se by the decision by their fellow citizens 
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to articulate their claims with reference to their own worldviews. Instead, it might 
be more important how their fellow citizens communicate with them as well as 
the broader social circumstances which surround their communicative 
interactions. 
After all, the decision to express one's claims with reference to comprehensive 
doctrines might reflect an earnest desire for others to understand one's position 
more clearly. Alternatively, one might express comprehensive doctrines while 
clearly recognising the limitations of one's perspectives and acknowledge the 
validity of different viewpoints. 
Conversely, if one refuses to acknowledge other people's criticisms or 
objections to one's conceptions of the good or dogmatically try to impose one's 
viewpoints by silencing other people's contributions, then clearly the manner of 
the expression of one's own comprehensive doctrines is open to criticism. The 
over-ridding point, again though, is that staking one's claims with reference to 
ideas of the good is not intrinsically disrespectful to others, despite profound 
controversy and contention. 
Moreover, it is not necessarily the case that one needs to appeal to notions of 
reasonableness in order to distinguish between morally appropriate or morally 
inappropriate justifications for the purposes of public policy making. For 
instance, certain actors or claims can legitimately be restricted from public 
debate on the basis that they fundamentally violate the established rights of 
certain individuals or groups or that they threaten public order and security. 
This point also highlights the limitations of narrowly conflating public reason with 
political legitimacy. I have argued previously that there are serious problems 
with treating civil discourse merely as a vehicle to legitimate coercive public 
policy in the face of contestation regarding the distinctions between the 
public/private and the good/right. 
Consequently, I would propose that rather than insisting that public policies can 
only be deemed legitimate if they are justified by reasons acceptable to all, it is 
more realistic to suggest that public policies can be considered legitimate if they 
were implemented through procedures are that were considered to be 
sufficiently just by all parties involved. 
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Of course, there will invariably be contestation not only over the rules of any 
democratic procedures but also disagreement over the validity of the 
procedures themselves. This is to say that these procedures will invariably be 
subjected to contestation and, as a consequence, any public policy decisions 
will likely be regarded as provisional and revisable by those subject to them. 
There is a further problem with Rawls and Habermas' narrow conflation of 
civility with the legitimation of coercive political power. This narrow focus means 
that they ignore other possible interpretations of what civil discourse involves. 
By emphasising discursive self-restraint, they ignore other important 
manifestations of civility such as listening to others claims fairly and subjecting 
one's viewpoints to critical interrogation and scrutiny. 
It is on this note, therefore, that it is appropriate to outline the final limitation of 
Rawls and Habermas' theories of public reason. This objection stems from their 
inadequate conceptualisation of epistemic injustices and the exclusionary 
potential of their accounts of public reason.  
It was argued that while Rawls and Habermas accounts of civil discourse 
restrict its importance to the public justification of coercive state power. 
Moreover, Rawls and Habermas argue that civility has an epistemic function, as 
public reason constitutes a 'filter' which delineates permissible and non-
permissible justifications for the purposes of public policy making. 
In addition, both stress that civility constitutes an important normative principle 
of behavioural regulation, allowing people in diverse societies to respectfully 
negotiate their differences and disagreements while also affirming each other’s 
autonomy and dignity as individuals.  
Civil discourse, in this framework, is closely connected with the staking of 
generalizable political claims that could be acceptable by all citizens, thereby 
supposedly ensuring that people's status as free and equal persons is 
respected while also serving to publicly legitimate coercive public policy. 
However, their accounts of civility are flawed by their strict right/good distinction. 
The distinction serves to obscure the contested nature of public justifications 
and underestimates the degree of disagreement about justice and political 
legitimacy in contemporary societies. 
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Moreover, the previous section has attempted to illustrate the limitations of any 
account of civility which attempts to insulate political reasoning from 
disagreements over the good on the grounds that it is likely to be exclusionary 
as well as the mere fact that disputes over the good constitute a central 
dimension of contemporary political life are inescapable. 
It is has been argued therefore that any account of civility which attempts to 
impose a priori restrictions on public debate is likely to suffer from a critical and 
creative deficit as it seems to presuppose that people enter public deliberations 
with a) static conceptions of the good and b) a willingness and ability to 
translate these static conceptions of the good into terms which could be 
acceptable by all. 
This is not to suggest that there is no place for some discursive guidelines to 
orientate public dialogue. However, it is to suggest that such regulations should 
be open to contestation and should be seen as provisional and revisable in 
recognition that these norms might harbour epistemic exclusions. 
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, accounts of civility that do not adequately 
consider forms of epistemic injustice will inevitably be significantly flawed. From 
this point of view, any account of civility should be able to illustrate how it is 
compatible with robust social criticism, particularly in terms of whether 'civil' 
forms of dialogue can encourage insight into one's own areas of ignorance and 
to how one's social location and position might potentiality render oneself 
unreceptive to certain kinds of claims staked by marginalized individuals, 
communities and social groups. 
In addition, an account of civil discourse will have to explicitly acknowledge that 
dominant epistemic norms can undermine the participation of certain individuals 
by virtue of the content of their claims, by their choice of communicative styles 
or because they belong to a socially demeaned identity group.  
Unfortunately, though, Rawls' and Habermas' accounts lack a mechanism 
through which marginalised social groups and communities can challenge and 
revise collective epistemic resources and norms. From this perspective, their 
emphasis on translation as a means of political legitimation is misguided. 
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Rather, the focus should be placed on how relations of epistemic injustice can 
be contested prior or during any discursive exchange. Any regulations regarding 
the acceptable parameters of a public dialogue- if deemed necessary in the first 
place- should be treated as a secondary issue and subject to negotiation 
between the involved parties. 
Given their skewed focus, ultimately their frameworks of civil discourse cannot 
adequately conceptualize how counter-hegemonic claims can be heard fairly in 
public dialogue processes. This central problem shall preoccupy the third 
chapter. However, in the meantime, it is important to explore another 
imperative- and very different- account of civility that is articulated in the work of 
Charles Taylor. 
Taylor's account of public reasoning seems to overcome many of the limitations 
of Rawlsian and Habermasian public reason. For instance, he stresses the 
importance for public dialogue processes to challenge prejudicial social 
attitudes and categorizations. Indeed, he is remarkably confident that over time 
and with continual public dialogue that these obstacles are surmountable, 
thereby allowing individuals from different cultural, religious and ethnic 
backgrounds to consider fairly each other's claims. 
Importantly, he also stresses the inherently embodied nature of human 
communication and acknowledges the harms faced by oppressed social groups 
and communities if they internalise negative social stereotypes or prejudices 
about themselves. Taylor, therefore, evinces an awareness of the threat that 
demeaning social interpretations imply for the epistemic agency of marginalised 
communities and groups. Accordingly, let us unpack Taylor's work in further 
detail. 
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Chapter Two- Charles Taylor’s account of civil discourse 
This chapter shall interpret and critically evaluate Charles Taylor's conception of 
civil discourse. Taylor's hermeneutical approach stresses the importance of 
substantive and robust dialogue in cultivating deeper relations of solidarity, trust 
and respect across cultural, religious and ethnic difference as well as “deep 
differences of moral vision”. (Taylor, 1980, pg 90)  
Taylor aims to develop a theory of civility which directly addresses some of the 
fears evoked in the introductory chapter- namely anti-realist suspicions that 
resolving moral disagreement is an impossibility and relativist suspicions that it 
is impossible to critically judge the practices and worldviews of different 
communities without unjustly imposing ethnocentric criteria of judgement on 
them. 
In addition, it is also vital to appreciate that Taylor's conception of civil discourse 
strives to avoid four central epistemological and normative pitfalls. Firstly, he 
rejects what he terms “neo-Nietzschean” scepticism regarding the possibility of 
critical dialogue across differences on the basis that such exchanges invariably 
involve the imposition of power by dominant parties. The central problem he has 
with this line of argument is that there can be there can be no “epistemic gain” 
from discussing our different world-views if one holds this doctrine to be true. 
(Taylor, 1995, pg 17) 
Secondly, Taylor also rejects the idea that understanding human beings is akin 
to scientific models of knowledge acquisition- that is to say, he differentiates 
between “knowing an object” and “coming to an understanding with an 
interlocutor” on the basis that the former is only a “unilateral” operation while the 
latter is invariably a “bilateral” process of dialogue. (Taylor, 2002c, pg 280) 
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Thirdly, Taylor rejects the idea that human beings are inherently imprisoned 
within ethnocentric frameworks of understanding, claiming that through dialogue 
it is possible to critically reflect on the limitations of our cultural frameworks and 
to expand our interpretative horizons. (Taylor, 1985c) 
And finally, Taylor is opposed to cultural relativist arguments which defend what 
he terms an “incorrigibility thesis”. This thesis claims that individuals from 
different communities cannot meaningfully criticise each other's self-
understandings and that the proclaimed beliefs and values of an individual from 
a different community constitutes an unquestionable last say on a given issue 
by virtue of their identity and life experiences. (Taylor, 1985c) 
Given these foundational assumptions of Taylor’s work, it shall be suggested 
that Taylor largely understands civility as an instrument to achieve particular 
social and political goods which he believes are increasingly imperilled in 
contemporary democracies. 
Indeed, as Ruth Abbey stresses, one of Taylor's chief ambitions is to construct a 
“model of democratic inclusion” which actively “celebrates differences” and 
which aims to support citizens “to learn about and engage with one another in 
the understanding that their differences enrich one another and the polity as a 
whole” (Abbey, 2000, pg 124) Unsurprisingly, Taylor famously insists that: 
“The great challenge of the coming century is that of understanding the other. 
The days are long gone when Europeans and other ‘Westerners’ could consider 
their experience and culture as the norm toward which the whole of humanity 
was headed”. (Taylor 2002b, pg 126) 
Moreover, it is also interesting to note that there is a gritty, pragmatic aspect to 
Taylor's account of civil discourse. Taylor stresses that social belonging in 
diverse societies requires constant, difficult negotiation and creative 
compromise between members of different communities.  
Taylor’s account of civil discourse is therefore animated by a concern highly 
similar to Rawls and Habermas’ theories of public reason- namely: “How can 
people live together in difference, in a democratic regime, under conditions of 
fairness and equality?” (Taylor, 1999, pg 284) 
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The most difficult aspect of this effort, he argues, is that negotiated outcomes 
can only be provisional and suitably tailored for the dynamics of particular 
situations of disagreement. (Taylor, 1999b, Taylor, 2011f) This reality, therefore, 
requires citizens to orientate themselves towards the common good and to give 
each other's claims a fair hearing. 
Accordingly, given this broad outline of Taylor's philosophical framework, my 
reading of Taylor's work stresses that his model of civility requires citizens to 
continually re-assess their self-understandings as well as their pre-judgements 
held about individuals from different communities and social groups.  
Taylor's philosophical approach presents an interesting account of civility 
because he stresses its de-constructive capacities. He implies that civil 
discourse is central to questioning pejorative stereotypes and attitudes, 
particularly towards cultural, ethnic and religious minorities. He also offers a 
compelling account of how individuals from different social backgrounds can 
expand their mutual understandings of each other while questioning their 
previously unexamined self-interpretations of their own identities. 
Nevertheless, I also suggest that Taylor in certain respects inadequately 
accounts for differentials in power. These power differentials hinder the fair 
hearing of the perspectives of marginalised individuals, social groups and 
communities, contradicting some of the central principles of his own 
understanding of civility. 
I argue that while Taylor's conception of civil discourse correctly aims to critique 
pejorative social categorizations and stereotypes, he fails to connect this 
problem to collective practices of social ignorance and the operation of 
epistemic injustices. 
In addition, there are unfortunate tensions between Taylor's advocacy of 
“cultural survivalism” for dominant cultural majorities and his account of civil 
discourse. I argue that his framework of cultural survivalism contradicts his 
emphasis on the dialogical character of our identities. However, before 
explicating these criticisms, it is important to note Taylor's general philosophical 
approach. I shall proceed by articulating Taylor's critical engagements with the 
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work of Rawls and Habermas before describing his conceptualization of civil 
discourse. 
The conceptual connections between Rawls, Habermas and Taylor: 
The relationship between Rawls, Habermas and Taylor is profoundly interesting 
given that Taylor is at once deeply critical and sympathetic to their projects. On 
the one hand, Taylor is critical of Habermasian discourse ethics and Rawls' 
early work in A Theory of Justice. Taylor strongly critiques their formalist, 
deontological and universalistic approaches because they supposedly ignore 
the socially situated character of practical reasoning. (Taylor, 2011) He argues 
that they unduly prioritise the right over the good. 
In addition, Taylor is also critical of their accounts of 'public reason' on the basis 
that they rest on a faulty epistemological distinction between 'religious' and 
'secular' justifications.  For instance, Taylor cites the example of the civil rights 
discourse of Martin Luther King to illustrate that religious-political discourse is 
often highly intelligible to non-religious citizens.  
From Taylor's point of view, secular and religious discourses are profoundly 
intertwined from a historical point of view and share common moral 
understandings. (Taylor, 2011d, pg 63) Unsurprisingly, given this argument 
Taylor claims that their conceptions of public reason place unfair epistemic 
burdens on religious citizens.  
While Taylor further suggests that occasionally “prudence” demands translating 
one's claims in a more generalized manner, citizens generally ought to place 
greater focus on how their claims will likely be “perceived by others” and how 
their claims might “impact on the social bond”. (Taylor, 2011, pg 109) 
Consequently, Taylor argues that a democratic regime must allow all citizens to 
defend their public claims in a manner which is “most meaningful to them” and 
to use the “explanatory and justificatory language of their choice.” (Taylor, 
2007b, pg 532; Taylor & Maclure, 2011e, pg 108) This means that there should 
not be any mandated requirements of translation as this would likely impose 
unjustifiable restrictions on freedom of expression.  
Accordingly, Taylor rejects the assumption made by Rawls and Habermas that 
framing one's justifications with respect to one's own comprehensive doctrines 
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is an intrinsic sign of disrespect to others- that is, it is a reflection of “uncivil” 
conduct. Rather, Taylor believes that mutual respect can actually be deepened 
through critical public discussions between different worldviews. (Taylor & 
Maclure, 2011e) 
At the same time, Taylor insists that the principle of state neutrality demands 
that public policy should not be exclusively justified with reference to a singular 
comprehensive doctrine. Crucially though, this kind of neutrality is indifferent as 
to whether these doctrines are religious or non-religious in nature. As he insists: 
“The state can neither be Christian nor Muslim nor Jewish, but, by the same 
token, it should also neither be Marxist, nor Kantian nor utilitarian”. (Taylor, 
2011b, pg 321) 
Taylor insists, therefore, that political decisions should never bestow “special 
recognition” to any comprehensive doctrine, religious or non-religious, albeit he 
recognizes that this ideal is difficult to achieve in practice. (Taylor, 2011b, pg 
321) 
Finally, Taylor also expresses a deeper dissatisfaction with their accounts of 
public reason. He argues that there can be no universalistic principles to 
regulate public discourse given the complexity and variability of circumstances 
between different political communities.  
Instead, he argues that civil discourse involves a process of negotiation where 
all parties strive to forge an acceptable yet provisional agreement on general 
principles of Justice to regulate their political affairs. Importantly, though there 
does not have to be a meta-agreement with respect to the principles of public 
discourse on the basis that any discursive guidelines will invariably be subject to 
continual disagreement. (Taylor, 2013, pg 37) 
In addition, it is also important to stress that Taylor's objection stems from his 
long-standing criticisms of rigid distinctions between the right and the good 
within liberal-political philosophy, thereby rendering any attempt to delineate 
universal rules of public discourse on the basis that such a distinction is highly 
problematic.  
Moreover, it is also important to situate Taylor's resistance to the public reason 
frameworks of Rawls and Habermas vis-à-vis his broader philosophical defence 
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of the notion that human beings are intrinsically “self-interpretive” animals. 
Taylor claims that human beings necessarily depend on substantive “moral 
sources” which allow us to make qualitative distinctions of value between 
competing moral goods. (Taylor, 1989; Taylor, 1995c)  
Taylor insists that these “moral sources” are situated within broader “moral 
spaces” which enable critical questions with respect to “what is good and bad, 
what is worth doing and what not, what has meaning and importance for you 
and what is trivial and secondary”. (Taylor, 1989, pg 28) 
An emphasis on this point is important as Taylor inherently believes that our 
identities are intrinsically rooted in diverse “webs of interlocution” (1989, pg 39) 
and that they are mediated by the various background understandings 
articulated through collective social imaginaries. These imaginaries, in turn, help 
explain “how we stand to each other, how we got to where we are, how we 
relate to other groups”. (Taylor, 2004, pg 25)  
Accordingly, the purpose of public dialogue is to critically explore these 
background understandings because their impact on our interpretations and 
evaluations are “invisible as long as we're operating within {them}”. (Taylor, 
2003, pg 171) The implication here is that any public dialogue process which 
does not involve the exploration of our moral sources and their connection to 
broader moral spaces and imaginaries will invariably be impoverished. 
On the other hand, it is also important to acknowledge that Taylor is sympathetic 
to certain aspects of Rawls and Habermas' thought. For instance, Taylor adapts 
Rawls notion of an “overlapping consensus” on basic political principles of 
Justice as an essential means for people from diverse moral, religious and 
cultural backgrounds to peacefully co-exist together.  
Indeed, both insist that the legitimacy of shared political institutions must rest on 
an agreement on basic procedural mechanisms even if these arrangements are 
justified politically for different reasons. 
Taylor's conception differs slightly from Rawls' conception though in that Taylor 
seems to tie it more closely to substantive principles of liberty, equality and 
fraternity which he maintains are most conducive to developing relations of 
mutual trust, respect and solidarity between different social groups and 
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communities. (Taylor, 1999c, Taylor, 2010) These principles became deeply 
embedded with the contemporary social imaginaries of western democracies in 
the wake of the French Revolution. 
Unsurprisingly, Taylor, like Rawls and Habermas, also advocates some degree 
of separation between the state and particular worldviews- for example he 
supports the removal of religious symbols from public institutions. He also 
endorses the notion that liberal democratic societies cannot accommodate all 
forms of cultural, religious and moral diversity given their substantive 
commitments, norms and values. 
Consequently, he appreciates that liberalism is an exclusionary doctrine as its 
philosophical commitments occasionally cannot accommodate the beliefs, 
values and practices of non-liberal groups and communities. Before further 
explicating these points though, it is important to articulate the broader 
background assumptions that animate Taylor's political thought. 
The background assumptions of Taylor's Political Philosophy: 
The first significant point animating Taylor's political thought is his rejection of 
“monistic” understandings of politics. Monism maintains that political life can be 
mediated with reference to singular principles, values or rules. Taylor argues 
this approach is flawed as it ignores the reality that liberal democracies must 
negotiate multiple, and often conflicting goods. (Taylor, 1985d; 2001)  
Taylor further insists that in diverse liberal-democracies there can be “no single-
consideration procedure, be that of utilitarianism, or a theory of justice based on 
an ideal contract, {which} can do justice to the diversity of goods we have to 
weight together in normative political thinking”. (Taylor, 1985d, pg 245)  
Consequently, Taylor is suspicious of political frameworks, like the work of 
Rawls and Habermas, which are pre-occupied with a focus on questions of 
morality over questions of ethics. He maintains that this narrow focus has meant 
contemporary political philosophy has laboured to develop abstract theories of 
Justice and political legitimation. As a result, he claims that it ignores the 
fundamentally important question of the common goods and commitments that 
are essential to sustaining a diverse democratic society. 
108 
 
From Taylor's perspective, the most significant problem with the idea that 
morality is definable in terms of a “code of obligatory and forbidden actions” is 
that it ignores how situations are “unforeably various”. (Taylor, 2007b, pg 704) 
This epistemic problem frustrates the development of pre-fixed codes or a priori 
political frameworks to negotiate political conflicts. 
For example, Taylor stresses that there might be difficult trade-offs between 
ideals of justice and the achievement of other social goods- such as social 
stability in certain contexts. He cites the case of post-conflict societies that have 
to negotiate the tension between calls for retributive justice while preserving 
inter-group harmony. 
Accordingly, he maintains that political theorisation has to cognizant of how 
important goods can clash, thereby creating profound political predicaments 
and dilemmas. (Taylor, 2011a, pg 348) Contemporary democracies must 
inescapably make difficult choices between competing and incompatible ends. 
Taylor, therefore, claims that monistic accounts of political life suffer from a 
complexity deficit. 
Another central concern of Taylor's work is his diagnosis of growing political 
alienation, polarisation and fragmentation within contemporary democracies. He 
argues that modern democracies are particularly vulnerable to alienation in 
large, centralised and bureaucratic societies given that citizens frequently 
believe that their government is unresponsive and distanced from their lived 
realities. (Taylor, 1993, pg 22) Interestingly, this concern has been evinced in 
some of Taylor's earliest work from the 1950s. (Taylor, 1958) 
Indeed, he argues that there is a growing sense of political powerlessness in 
contemporary democracies. This collective sentiment of powerlessness 
frustrates the exercise of democratic agency. It also enables the behaviour of 
the political elites who fail to advance the interests of their citizenry, who, in turn, 
increasing have only limited avenues to influence the political process. (Taylor, 
1993, pg 22) 
Moreover, Taylor also argues that this 'hypercentralization' of government has 
deleterious consequences for the public sphere. Public discourse is increasingly 
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being mediated via dominant media corporations which provide a narrow 
output, indifferent to localized input. (Taylor, 1993, pg 22-3)  
Consequently, Taylor advocates a form of 'Tocquevillian decentralization'. This 
involves the delegation of political power and functions to more local entities, 
thereby encouraging greater citizen participation and mobilisation, as well as 
the proliferation of more localised and diverse media outlets.  
Importantly, Taylor argues that this process is not simply about connecting the 
operation of power with the more localised political entities but it is also about 
ensuring that the terms of national debates can be influenced by local public 
spheres. (Taylor, 1993, pg 23) 
The third danger which Taylor foregrounds is the tendency towards factionalism 
and divided publics in contemporary democracies. These internal rifts of the 
polity are manifested in numerous ways. Taylor particularly stresses the impacts 
of “class warfare” that reflects the frustration of society's “least favoured 
citizens” who believe that their interests are not being fairly represented by 
dominant political elites. (Taylor, 1993, pg 24)  
Another manifestation of social conflict for Taylor arises from what he famously 
terms “the politics of recognition”. This kind of social conflict arises when a 
social group or community believes that its traditions, customs, beliefs and 
practices are not being justly recognised by broader society, thereby breeding 
sentiments of alienation towards broader society. Social relations of 
misrecognition, for Taylor, amount to a grave and urgent injustice. (Taylor, 1993, 
pgs 24-5) 
Accordingly, misrecognition is characterised by a political and social 
environment unreceptive to the political claims made by minority groups and 
communities. As a consequence, Taylor stresses that one of the most important 
objectives of democratic politics should be to prevent misrecognition from 
occurring in the first place. (Taylor, 1993, pg 25) 
A fourth and related danger Taylor notes within contemporary democracies is 
their vulnerability to political fragmentation which significantly undermines any 
prospects for civil discourse across difference and disagreement. This 
fragmentation occurs when the citizenry increasingly becomes polarized along a 
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set of intractable moral disagreements and institutional gridlocks. (Taylor, 1993, 
pg 25) 
Fragmentation prevents citizens from forging political alliances and projects 
regarding the common good. It encourages factional interest groups to mobilise 
behind their “narrow agendas” at the expense of the community as a whole. 
Indeed, fragmentation for Taylor is particularly deleterious because it renders 
any invocation of the “common good” as profoundly suspicious. (Taylor, 1993, 
pg 25) 
Taylor further argues that combating political fragmentation is profoundly 
difficult. He maintains that there are no universal solutions given the varying 
historical circumstances different democracies find themselves. Nevertheless, 
he suggests that fragmentation can only develop in contexts where citizens 
struggle to “identify” with their political community. It occurs when their sense of 
collective belonging is “transferred elsewhere or atrophies altogether” and 
where a sense of political powerlessness is deepening. (Taylor, 1993, pg 29) 
Consequently, Taylor suggests that “successful common action” can cultivate a 
sense of empowerment. It strengthens citizens' identifications with the political 
community. In addition, he argues that framing political debates with respect to 
perceived “common goals” can offset the tendency to depict one's political 
adversaries as a devotee of “utterly alien values”.  (Taylor, 1993, pg 29)  
Ultimately, these three problems are mutually interrelated and mutually self-
perpetuating, culminating in what Taylor terms “soft despotism”. Following de 
Tocqueville, Taylor fears that citizens of modern democratic states are 
becoming increasingly incapable of forming “a common purpose and carrying it 
out'. (Taylor, 1993, pg 26)  
This diminishment in collective solidarity potentially renders the populace more 
vulnerable to arbitrary state power while also reducing avenues for political 
conflict resolution. Although Taylor is concerned about these trends, and clearly 
opposes any political frameworks which assert that they can be addressed 
exclusively through procedural mechanisms, he does recognize that 
proceduralist kinds of politics have significant attractions. 
111 
 
Firstly, he notes, that they have the potential to stabilise political conflicts. 
Impartial procedures seem divorced from contested conceptions of the good 
because they focus on the universalistic rights and entitlements of individuals, 
remaining divorced from their conflicting preferences and worldviews. (Taylor, 
1999, pg 283)  
These procedures serve as a guarantee of individual rights irrespective of one's 
social background or memberships. Accordingly, they seem to allow individuals 
to find an “immediate common terrain on which all can gather”. (Taylor, 1999, pg 
284) 
Given that the proceduralist paradigm provides an essential re-requisite to allow 
people to exercise meaningful freedom of choice, Taylor also suggests that 
much of its appeal reflects the deeper anti-paternalistic world-view of Modernity. 
However, as noted previously, Taylor harbours significant reservations about 
proceduralist forms of conflict resolution.  
Ultimately, despite its apparent merits, he questions whether it can constitute 
the only mechanism of peaceful co-existence in democratic societies and 
whether it constitutes a “valid approach in all contexts”. (Taylor, 1999, pg 284) 
Indeed, he stresses that proceduralism can actually inhibit conflict resolution in 
diverse democratic societies. 
It can breed sentiments of growing alienation between citizens in the face of 
disagreements about the outcomes of procedural decision-making processes. 
This argument stems from Taylor's claim that a democratic 'people' must be 
able to relate to a sense of shared identity. They must be able to possess a 
common sense of identity if they are to exercise collective political agency. 
(Taylor, 1999 pg 284) 
Proceduralism, from this viewpoint, is deeply limited as it fails to address 
questions of cultural and historical identity which are viewed as fundamentally 
important to different sub-groups of the citizenry. (Taylor, 1999, pg 285) For 
example, Taylor cites the example of Quebec whose citizens have long been 
advocating the protection of their supposedly 'distinct society' within the 
Canadian Federation. 
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Taylor is concerned that an approach that emphasises neutral, abstract 
procedural norms might alienate sub-groups of a population from identifying 
with a broader political framework. Accordingly, from his standpoint, the failure 
of proceduralism to recognise the importance of cultural distinctiveness in its 
defence of abstract, neutral procedures constitutes a threat to forging a 
common political identity. It can encourage minority sub-groups to reject any 
political union while undermining the sense of commonality essential to the 
sustenance of key public goods. 
The second criticism Taylor makes of political proceduralism is that it 
supposedly believes that it is possible to construct procedures that will be 
universally perceived as 'neutral' in their operation. In addition, he claims that 
proceduralism falsely presupposes that it is possible to differentiate “neutral” 
processes from substantive goals without controversy. (Taylor, 1999, pg 285) 
For instance, Taylor argues that this problem is particularly evident with respect 
to conflicts over principles of distributive justice. He argues that in the face of 
“different, mutually irreducible perspectives” concerning economic justice it is 
futile to develop a single set of distributive principles. (Taylor, 1985g, pg 311)  
Rather, contemporary societies have to negotiate plural interpretations of 
economic justice which will require the development of distributive models that 
acknowledge “different degrees of mutual obligation”, which consider a society's 
particular historical, social and economic circumstances and which make 
substantive reference to contested notions of human dignity and the good. 
(Taylor, 1985g, pg 312) 
Ultimately, therefore, Taylor stresses that the differentiation between 'neutral' 
procedures from substantive goals is frequently impossible in practice. (Taylor, 
1999, pg 285) He alleges that proceduralism suffers from a degree of political 
naivety. It neglects the reality that democratic procedures are a significant site 
of political contestation. It is not simply that their principles are frequently 
interpreted in diverging directions. Rather, the principles, values and routines of 
procedural institutions are rarely considered 'neutral' by actors who contest their 
decisions. 
113 
 
Furthermore, Taylor claims that there are significant limitations to relying on 
procedural mechanisms as an instrument of conflict resolution. Indeed, the 
imposition of procedural decisions can exacerbate political conflicts as parties 
adopt a 'winner-take-all' stance. This problem is compounded by the reality that 
losing parties can feel that their claims have been socially and politically de-
legitimated. (Taylor, 1999, pg 285) 
Finally, Taylor argues that proceduralism is flawed because it undermines the 
possibilities for negotiation and compromise between competing demands and 
parties. It minimizes opportunities for conflicting parties to fairly consider each 
other's claims. It breeds an atmosphere of uncivil political debate framed in 
zero-sum terms. (Taylor, 1999, pg 285) 
Unsurprisingly, Taylor believes that societal fragmentation undermines civil 
discourse by encouraging political elites to engage increasingly self-serving 
soundbites and ad hominem debates. This tendency further contributes to 
declining political engagement and participation by the citizenry. (Taylor, 1999, 
pg 286) 
However, Taylor also articulates a deeper critique of proceduralism beyond its 
dysfunctional consequences for political institutions. This critique is tied to 
Taylor's broader criticisms of Western political thought with respect to its 
understanding of the relationship between questions of justice and questions of 
morality. He profoundly disagrees with a liberal tradition of thought that asserts 
a sharp distinction between the right and the good. 
Taylor maintains these theories are fundamentally misguided. He alleges that 
they unduly restrict our understanding of morality. They supposedly “occlude or 
exclude questions about what it is good to be or what it is good to love” given 
their emphasis on universal moral obligations of Justice. (Taylor, 2011c, pg 3) 
Consequently, Taylor suggests that analytical philosophy- and empiricist or 
naturalist kinds of social science- ignore or marginalize the fact that human 
beings are “self-interpretative” animals. He argues that appreciating this reality 
has significant implications for understanding human agency and the nature of 
human subjectivity. Taylor stresses that self-evaluations fundamentally orient 
our social experiences and our social interactions with others. (Taylor, 1985a, 
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pg 37). Human beings are constantly making internal, qualitative and existential 
evaluations of worth and value about what matters to us. 
In addition, Taylor also stresses that our acts of self-interpretation inherently 
occur via dialogues with others and reference historically inherited cultural 
norms, values and beliefs. He emphasizes that human beings construct their 
identities in a “social space” as we define ourselves via dialogical interactions 
with others. 
Accordingly, Taylor firmly rejects ontological and normative conceptualisations 
of self-hood that emphasise our detachment and isolation from other people. 
(Taylor, 2006) Indeed, Taylor particularly rejects Cartesian accounts of human 
subjectivity, stressing that it is impossible to evaluate social life: 
“...merely in terms of individual subjects, who frame representations about and 
respond to others, because a great deal of human actions happens only insofar 
as the agent understands and constitutes himself or herself as integrally part of 
a 'we”. (Taylor, 1991, pg 311)  
Taylor's philosophical project, therefore, constitutes a profound challenge to 
essentialist conceptions of identity as it stresses that our identities are 
continually being constructed through social interaction and exchange with 
others, thereby implying that our identities are subject to constant re-negotiation 
and change. Unsurprisingly, Taylor stresses the following: 
“Thus discovering my own identity doesn't mean that I work it out in isolation, 
but that I negotiate it through dialogue, partly overt, partly internal, with 
others…My own identity crucially depends on my dialogical relations with 
others.” (Taylor, 1994, pg 34) 
Taylor’s point was also earlier evoked in his paper Philosophy and Social 
Science where he suggests that the Western epistemological tradition has 
defended an impoverished conception of the individual subject which ignores 
both how the development of our identities and our basic knowledge about the 
world is intrinsically dependent on others. (Taylor, 1985f, pg 40) 
This point brings us to another fundamental pivot of Taylor's thought- namely his 
rejection of epistemological accounts of language that assert that it merely 
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constitutes a system of object representation or designation. However, what 
precisely constitutes 'designative' accounts of language? 
Designative accounts of language assert that the meaning of words is derived 
from their ability to designate particular objects. From this perspective, the 
meaning of a word stems from the “things or relations that they can be used to 
refer or to talk about”. (Taylor, 1985e, pg 218) Taylor attempts to trace the 
complex genealogy of designative theories of language in his essay “Language 
and Human Nature”. (Taylor, 1985e) He suggests that it progressively 
developed in an intermingling of ideas from Medieval Nominalism, Cartesian 
epistemologies of (self) knowledge and the political theories of Locke and 
Hobbes. 
Ultimately, what unites these disparate trends of thought is an implicit 
commitment to an understanding of human agency that Taylor describes as 
“disengaged”?  In addition, he maintains that these frameworks are committed 
to an understanding of reasoning which is supposedly instrumental and “value-
neutral”. It is an account of “disengaged” agency in that it ignores the 
importance of inter-subjectively shared background understandings as a 
necessary pre-condition for exercising human agency. This blindside is a 
function of their commitment to a highly individualised or “atomistic” 
conceptualization of person-hood. 
Nevertheless, Taylor also acknowledges some particular merits of this viewpoint 
as, on the face of it, it promises human beings that they can describe meaning 
and value in an objective manner akin to the procedures of the natural sciences. 
(Taylor, 1985e, pg 221) In fact, Taylor suggests that designative theories of 
meaning have been extremely influential as they apparently conform to 
quotidian understandings of language-use.  He notes how it often appears that 
linguistic meaning seems intrinsically built into particular words. 
However, more importantly, Taylor argues that designative theories of language 
have been attractive as they implicitly favour a picture of human agency that is 
powerful and independent. They render meaning “something relatively 
unpuzzling, unmysterious” (Taylor, 1985e, pg 220) while also providing human 
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beings with the reassurance that they can gain knowledge of the word on an 
objective basis. (Taylor, 1985e, pg 226) 
Nevertheless, Taylor argues that this conceptualisation of language as an 
instrument of control or as a source of autonomous agency is deeply flawed 
because language use inevitably occurs with reference to a historically 
conditioned “wider matrix” which cannot be controlled by individuals. Indeed, as 
he argues, our use of words only makes sense vis-a-vis their “place in the 
whole web”. (Taylor, 1995d, pg 96) This reality renders it impossible for people 
to have a “clear oversight of the implications of what we say at any moment”. 
(Taylor, 1995d, pg 96)1  
Moreover, Taylor argues that designative accounts of language are flawed in 
another important sense. It ignores how human beings actually “use” language 
in self-reflective ways and how language itself constitutes a vehicle for reflective 
self-awareness. As he puts it “Speaking is not only the expression of this 
capacity {for reflection}, but also its realisation”. (Taylor, 1985e, pg 229) 
Consequently, Taylor rejects designative theories of language in favour of an 
expressivist understanding of language as the former cannot account for the 
social context in which language use is fundamentally intertwined. He is 
particularly interested in our capacities to judge whether our use of certain 
words or signs is appropriate in a given social context. Taylor famously explains 
this point with reference to the example of a rat- it worth quoting this passage in 
detail: 
“I have the word 'triangle' in my lexicon. This means that I can recognise things 
as triangles, identify them, pick them out as such...But what does this capacity 
amount to? Let us see by comparing it with an analogous animal capacity. I 
might train an animal (a rat), to react differentially, say, to go through a door 
which had a triangle painted on it, as against one which had a circle. So my rat 
would be in a sense recognising a triangle. But there is a crucial difference: the 
rat in a sense recognises the triangle, because he reacts to it. But the human 
language-user recognises that this is a triangle, he recognises that 'triangle' is 
the right word to use there...This capacity to recognise that X is the right 
description is essentially invoked in our capacity to use language...the implicit 
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claim in speaking languages that they (our words) are appropriate; and we can 
all understand the challenge that someone might make at any point: “Is x the 
right word? Or do you really mean x?' And we would all be able to give some 
kind of reply. (Taylor, 1985e, pg 228) 
But how is our capacity to exercise this judgement possible? The answer is that 
our ability to judge stems from a holistically structured set of background 
understandings mediated through and by language. For instance, Taylor argues 
that in order to be able to understand the term 'triangle' a person would 
necessarily have to know a whole host of different terms that would allow one to 
contrast the meanings of words associated with various shapes. Moreover, one 
would have to be self-reflective aware of the social conventions that regulate 
whether a particular term is appropriate to use in a given context. 
Accordingly, Taylor stresses that language from this viewpoint constitutes a 
“pattern of activity” via which people can “express/realise a certain way of being 
in the world”. (Taylor, 1985e, pg 231) Interestingly, he stresses that our 
capacities to express/realise ourselves can “only be deployed against a 
background that we can never fully dominate”. (Taylor, 1985e, pg 232) 
Moreover, Taylor also argues that while this backdrop profoundly shapes our 
reflective awareness we are never fully dominated by it. The background is 
always undergoing change through the use of language itself. It is inherently 
open to revision, extension and alteration through speech acts. Indeed, as 
Taylor stresses, one of the central advantages of understanding language in 
expressivist terms is its capacity to explain human creativity. Designative 
theories “implicitly restrict” language as only a means to describe external 
objects.  
By contrast, Taylor argues that understanding language in expressivist terms 
allows us to appreciate how it can facilitate different and new kinds of 
understandings, capacities to describe things differently and to reflectively 
articulate “new kinds of normative response and feeling.” (Taylor, 1985e, pg 
233) 
In conclusion, Taylor emphasises that language should not be understood as a 
passive instrument, allowing us to express ourselves accurately or precisely 
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with reference to an external object or to accurately 'name' objects via 
communicative signals. Instead, language constitutes a self-reflective process 
and practice in which people collectively participate in activities of signification 
within a given speech community. 
More importantly, the expressivist nature of language necessarily implies that 
our identities are shaped with reference to our social connections with our 
defining communities as we only learn to use language via ongoing practices of 
socialisation. Taylor's expressivist account of language emphasises that while 
our historically inherited communal frameworks are essential to our identities 
this influence is not unilinear or determinative. 
This point is also crucial in understanding Taylor's conception of civil discourse. 
If our language practices are inherently intertwined with their communal and 
social context, then our capacity to understand people from different 
communities hinges on our ability or willingness to learn new languages of 
expression as these vocabularies articulate a particular community's norms, 
values, ideals and beliefs. However, how is this possible precisely? 
I shall explain this later in greater depth but suffice to say that Taylor addresses 
this challenge by referencing the work of the German classicist and 
hermeneutic philosopher Hans-Georg Gadamer. Before this, though, it is 
important to re-visit one last strand of Taylor's political theory- the need for 
democratic regimes to develop a strong sense of collective agency and identity- 
because it underpins his understanding of the purpose of civil discourse in 
society. 
This central pivot of Taylor's political philosophy follows from his critique of 
proceduralism. Taylor argues that the collective identity of a polity requires a 
sense of common identity in order for it to exercise democratic agency. (Taylor, 
1994b) A shared sense of identity, he notes though, inevitably results in 
exclusion due to the functional requirement of democratic societies to have a 
significant degree of social cohesion. Taylor argues that there are a number of 
manifestations of this 'thrust for exclusion'. First of all, he notes the most tragic 
and obvious circumstance is one where a social group deemed to be 'non-
assimilable' and subjected to “ethnic cleansing”. (Taylor, 1999, pg 272) 
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Secondly, Taylor argues that “forced inclusion” constitutes another form of 
exclusion are in contexts where perceived difference threatens the dominant 
sense of identity. For example, he cites the attempted forced assimilation during 
the nineteenth century of Slovak and Romanian minorities by the Hungarian 
nationalist movement. Taylor argues that forced inclusion has the following 
ultimate consequence: 
“It is saying in effect: as you are or consider yourselves to be, you have no 
place here: that is why we are going to make you over”. (Taylor, 1999, pg 272) 
Another form of exclusion stems from the refusal to extend citizenship rights to 
minority groups. Taylor notes the possible fear that such extensions might seem 
to undermine a shared sense of commitment and connection to a common 
language, culture, history and ancestry. This anxiety, as Taylor notes, is 
exemplified by the refusal of the German state to grant citizenship rights to 
third-generation Turkish migrants until quite recently. 
Unsurprisingly, Taylor argues that the very notion of self-government is 
predicated upon popular sovereignty that correspondingly requires 'the people' 
to possess a sense of collective agency. This sense of identity- as evidenced by 
the example of the American and French revolutions- is a continual process of 
creation and innovation, particularly in terms of the cultivating of new forms of 
collective mobilisation. (Taylor, 1999, pg 265) 
Taylor, therefore, rejects the notion that popular sovereignty merely reflects the 
will of the majority constrained by constitutional checks and balances. Rather, 
popular sovereignty offers a particular justification for democratic agency as it 
offers an answer to the fundamentally significant question: 
“What is the feature of our “imagined communities” by which people very often 
do readily accept that they are free under a democratic regime, even where 
their will is over-ridden on important issues?” (Taylor, 1999, pg 267) 
Taylor's answer proposes that our liberties are guaranteed by a common sense 
“...that we are ruling ourselves in common, and not being ruled by some agency 
which need take no account of us”. (Taylor, 1999, pg 267) Accordingly, it is a 
freedom that also must be collectively defended if it is to remain a viable 
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possibility and which can only be realised by the ongoing exercise of collective 
agency through ongoing political mobilisations. 
Taylor believes that this recognition of mutual dependency is crucial to 
developing a collective sense of identity in democratic societies because it 
orientates citizens towards the common good. It motivates the willingness to 
participate in democratic decision-making processes and to discuss 
disagreements of worldviews respectfully. 
Importantly though, Taylor also notes that the political identity of the state is also 
constantly a site of contention, taking note of the example of the position of 
Quebec nationalism within the Canadian federation. This reality necessarily 
implies that democratic citizens should engage in an ongoing, public dialogue 
process in order to articulate an inclusive collective sense of identity. (2001b) 
Civil discourse is therefore essential to developing relations of solidarity in a 
diverse polity, Taylor arguing that: 
“To some extent, the members must know one another, listen to one another 
and understand one another. If they are not acquainted, or if they cannot really 
understand one another, how can they engage in joint deliberation? This is a 
matter that concerns the very conditions of legitimacy of democratic states.” 
(Taylor, 1999, pg 270) 
Furthermore, Taylor also claims that the quest for mutual understanding is 
profoundly connected with the ensuring legitimacy of democratic states. Without 
collective dialogue between different communities’ social polarization and 
division will inevitably occur. (Taylor, 1999, pg 270) It is here that Taylor's work 
seems closely aligned to Rawls' concerns to ensure the stability of liberal-
democratic governance in the face of deep moral and political disagreement. 
Indeed, Taylor stresses that a democratic society cannot function if its members 
refuse or are unable to effectively listen to each other’s claims and 
perspectives. (Taylor, 1999, pg 270) 
More strongly, Taylor argues that the legitimacy of a diverse democratic society 
can only be assured if citizens commit to seriously considering each other’s 
claims into the future. A democratic society, therefore, requires a significant 
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degree of common allegiance, reciprocal commitment and shared trust between 
its members if it is to ensure its ongoing reproduction. 
In conclusion, Taylor argues that democratic societies require firm commitments 
to commonly shared goals, aspirations and goods. Taylor is therefore 
suspicious of individualistic or 'atomistic' accounts of liberal selfhood on the 
basis that they are ultimately too narrow. Taylor is fundamentally critical of an 
understanding of political life which foregrounds individual freedom at the 
expense of considering mutual commitments and identifications.  
Without this sense of commonality, it is impossible for liberal-democratic 
regimes to sustain themselves. (Taylor, 2012b) Ultimately, Taylor's work aims to 
avoid dangerous, exclusionary interpretations of nationalism while defending 
the proposition that democratic societies require a collectively articulated sense 
of shared goods and senses of belonging and identity. 
It might seem therefore that Taylor's conception of civil discourse is merely 
orientated towards discovering common goods and to the cultivation of relations 
of respect, trust and solidarity between citizens across their epistemic and 
normative differences and disagreements.  
However, as we shall note shortly, Taylor also connects strongly connects a 
conception of civil discourse to the fair recognition of cultural differences which 
he argues is a fundamental pre-condition for the equal political and social 
inclusion of minority groups in society. Interestingly, he also believes that civil 
discourse can also help to deconstruct pejorative stereotypes and social 
categorizations about minority groups. 
The importance of Recognition, Dialogue and Identity Transformations: 
The previous section has emphasised Taylor's concerns in relation to the 
limitations of procedural politics. It outlined his fears that contemporary 
democracies are plagued by deepening polarisation and fragmentation. It noted 
his emphasis on the importance of democracies developing social cohesion and 
strong sense of collective identity.  
Yet while this is an important motif of Taylor’s political theory, it is also important 
to stress that he is also profoundly interested how identity transformations can 
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be fostered through ongoing civil discourses between members of society who 
come from different cultural, ethnic and religious backgrounds. 
Taylor's understanding of identity starts with the assumption that it ultimately 
refers to our most fundamental existential orientations, providing human beings 
with an intelligible background via which our values, beliefs and commitments 
become intelligible to us. (Taylor, 1994, pgs 34) Importantly, though, Taylor 
insists that our own identities can never be discovered or developed in isolation. 
Rather, as we shall note subsequently, he maintains our identities are 
undergoing constant change via dialogical exchanges. 
In addition, Taylor constantly stresses the complexity of our identities. They are 
constituted by constantly re-negotiated strands and markers. Our identities are 
subject to plural pressures by a wide range of social forces. (Taylor, 2012) 
These forces, he argues, have becoming increasingly pronounced in the face of 
deepening cultural, ethnic, religious and moral pluralism. 
Indeed, Taylor argues that a new political phenomenon has become increasing 
important in contemporary liberal-democratic societies. He terms this 
development the “politics of recognition”. It reflects a broad range of political 
struggles for freedom and self-determination by previously marginalised cultural 
and ethnic groups.  
Taylor argues that the politics of recognition has now become “universally 
acknowledged in one form or another”. (Taylor, 1994, pg 25) Contemporary 
political life, he claims, frequently revolves around the “need, sometimes the 
demand, for recognition” of cultural particularity and difference. (Taylor, 1994, pg 
25) 
Taylor makes the firm claim that demands for recognition are intimately tied with 
the collective self-understandings of minority groups. (Taylor, 1994, pg 25) 
Indeed, as he argues, the fashion in which our identities develop is profoundly 
influenced by whether they are unjustly misrecognised or fairly acknowledged 
by our fellow members of society. (Taylor, 1994, pg 25) 
It is important to stress, therefore, that while Taylor's theory of recognition 
describes an ethical ideal which should guide the social relations between 
members of different cultural communities. Taylor therefore develops an 
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account of civility which implies that recognition requires an open orientation to 
understanding the diversities of human experience as well as a willingness to 
appreciate the “humanity of other”, even in the face of confronting difference. 
(Taylor, 1993b, pg 192) 
Given this backdrop, it is understandable why Taylor believes that social 
relations of misrecognition constitute a significant form of oppression. It 
imprisons particular groups and individuals in false, distorted and demeaning 
self-conceptualizations which typically serve the interests of cultural majorities 
or dominant social groups. Hence, for Taylor, the most pernicious aspect of 
misrecognition occurs when minority group members internalise pejorative 
societal values, norms, principles and beliefs about themselves. (Taylor, 1994, 
pg 25) 
Relations of social misrecognition not only violate the fundamental moral value 
of respect but they can also cause “grievous” emotional wounds on its victims. 
Importantly, it also effectively excludes minority groups from democratic 
deliberation over a society's sense of collective identity. (Taylor, 1994, pg 26) 
Consequently, Taylor insists that bestowing appropriate recognition to other 
people’s identities reflects the meeting of a fundamental human need as 
opposed to constituting a simple social courtesy. 
Taylor argues that it is important to distinguish two historical processes that 
have rendered the “modern preoccupation with identity and recognition 
inevitable”. (Taylor, 1994, pg 26) The first is the disintegration of traditional 
social hierarchies with the rise of modernity, particularly in terms of the decline 
of justificatory regimes which supported the maintenance of various social 
inequities and inequalities. 
The displacement of what he terms the “honour regime” occurred in light of the 
emergence of universalist and egalitarian understandings of personhood and 
citizenship. This development, in turn, encouraged the growth of democratic 
government as well as a “horizontalization” of social identities as inherited 
distinctions of social status became increasingly discredited. (Taylor, 1994, pg 
27) 
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The second process- intimately related and intertwined with the first- refers to 
the emergence of new understandings of individual personhood that emerged 
during the 18th century. This new understanding stressed the uniqueness of 
each person, reflecting an individualised sense of selfhood- “one that is 
particular to me, and that I discover in myself”. (Taylor, 1994, pg 28) It stressed 
the importance of “being true” to one's own sense of self identity. 
Accordingly, Taylor suggests that this process tracked a broader social change 
in which “being in touch with our feelings” increasingly assumes “independent 
and crucial moral significance. It comes to be something we have to attain if we 
are to be true and full human beings”. (Taylor, 1994, pg 28) 
The pursuit of authenticity, therefore, is not merely expressed in personal 
judgements of morality. Rather, it constitutes a significant collective transition 
within contemporary society as people increasingly understood themselves as 
distinctive and unique individual persons. (Taylor, 1994, pg 30) Indeed, Taylor 
makes the strong claim that prior to the 18th century, “no one thought that 
differences between human beings had this kind of moral significance”. (Taylor, 
1994, pg 30) 
Taylor explains the consequences of this shift of consciousness, suggesting that 
it accords “moral importance” to individuals being able to form authentic moral 
commitments and social connections, to being able to understand one’s own 
self in an intelligible fashion and to be able to affirm the uniqueness of our own 
identities and claims. (Taylor, 1994, pg 30) 
Following this historical transition, human beings increasingly relate to their self-
identities with a presumption of self-authorship as being 'true to myself' means 
articulating and discovering one's uniqueness and originality as a person. It 
therefore entailed a rejection of social hierarchy. Individuals' saw their identities 
less fixed by one's (inherited) position or location within society. Instead, identity 
became increasingly “inwardly generated” rather than being socially derived. 
(Taylor, 1994, pg 28) 
Taylor does not claim, of course, that contemporary society is defined by a lack 
of social interdependencies. Nor is he claiming that in the past people lacked a 
sense of self identity. Rather, the problem of misrecognition never arose as a 
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social issue prior to Modernity as our identities were based on taken-for-granted 
and inherited social identifications. 
In addition, while Taylor stresses that while our identities became increasingly 
inwardly generated, he also maintains that they should never be understood in 
monological terms. From this perspective, our identities cannot be 'discovered' 
or 'generated' mono-logically because human identities are intrinsically 
dialogical. (Taylor, 1994, pg 32) 
Subsequently, Taylor stresses that we can only become “full human 
agents....through our acquisition of rich human languages of expression”. 
(Taylor, 1994, pg 29) He argues that the formation of our identities can never 
occur in isolation. Rather, they can only be negotiated “through dialogue, partly 
overt, partly internal, with others”. (Taylor, 1994, 34) 
Furthermore, Taylor argues that the transition from a society governed by the 
principle of honour to the principle of equal dignity has fostered a 'politics of 
universalism'. This kind of politics is concerned with ensuring the equalization of 
political rights, immunities and entitlements. It reflects the normative principle 
that all persons command equal respect simply by virtue of being human 
beings- it reflects a metaphysical and universalist account of human status, 
capacity and potential. (Taylor, 1994, pg 57)  
However, Taylor argues that the transition also fostered a second change with 
often sits in tension with the first development. He argues that a “politics of 
difference” has also become increasingly important in contemporary political 
life. 
This development reflected more forceful calls for the social recognition of the 
unique identities and practices of minority groups and communities. These 
struggles, he suggests, are particularly important in circumstances where 
dominant conceptions of identity have ignored or overlooked the identity claims 
of minority communities. (Taylor, 1994, pg 42) 
Taylor notes that from a global perspective minority groups are continually 
striving to challenge homogenous moulds of citizenship that are unresponsive 
to their historical experiences, imposing a discriminatory imposition of a singular 
and hegemonic culture or way of life. These political responses demand a re-
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negotiation of the meaning of non-discrimination towards a willingness to 
consider differential political and social treatment in the face of recognising the 
particularities of different social groups and communities. (Taylor, 1994, pg 83) 
Accordingly, Taylor rejects accounts of equal dignity liberalism which insist on a 
uniform application of political and civil rights. He argues that such models are 
overly suspicious of collective social goals. They can be inhospitable to 
difference as they ignore the collective aspirations for their cultural practices or 
collective goals to survive or succeed into the future. 
For instance, Taylor cites the example of Quebec as a situation where the 
collective goals of its population challenge a difference blind model of liberalism. 
Taylor argues that the Quebec political situation foregrounds the popular 
support for the continual flourishing of Francophone culture into the future, 
thereby legitimating public policies which aim to socialize new generations into 
Francophone culture. (Taylor, 1992, pg 58-59) 
Despite this public policy orientation, Quebec's society, according to Taylor, has 
managed to articulate a shared, collective vision of the good while respecting 
the liberties of individuals who do not share this collective framework. He 
maintains that Quebec's liberalism is premised on a continual negotiation 
between protecting fundamental democratic rights while advocating socially 
valuable goals that are “sought in common” by the majority. (Taylor, 1994, pg 
59) As he insists: 
“One has to distinguish the fundamental liberties, those that should never be 
infringed and, therefore, ought to be unassailably entrenched, on one hand, 
from privileges and immunities that are important, but that can be revoked or 
restricted for reasons of public policy—although one would need a strong 
reason to do this—on the other.” (Taylor, 1994, pg 59) 
Taylor, therefore, contends that a society can promote “strong collective goals” 
without compromising fundamental democratic rights, on the condition that it 
adequately respects diversity and provides adequate safeguards for individual 
liberties. (Taylor, 1994, pg 59)  
Moreover, Taylor stresses that liberalism cannot aspire to be a “possible 
meeting ground for all cultures”. It ultimately reflects a “political expression of 
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one range of cultures” that remains “quite incompatible with other ranges”. 
(Taylor, 1994, pg 62) Consequently, Taylor famously terms liberalism a “fighting 
creed” and argues that it “can't and shouldn't claim complete cultural neutrality”, 
thereby inevitably raising substantive distinctions as to where boundaries of 
toleration ought to lie. (Taylor, 1994, pg 62)  
Moreover, he insists that this question is increasingly pressing given the 
profound diversity and “porousness” of contemporary societies. These 
conditions necessarily mean that citizens increasingly question the historical 
boundaries of belonging to a polity. (Taylor, 1994, pg 63) 
However, Taylor also notes that this transition has generated significant 
problems. Struggles for recognition are always difficult for claimants. But they 
are also difficult for those who receive demands for recognition as they raise 
normative demands for a change in one's self-understandings and one's sense 
of identity. Taylor's recognition of these difficulties has profound implications in 
terms of how he interprets the connection between civil discourse and relations 
of recognition and misrecognition in society. 
Indeed, Taylor believes the central epistemic challenge faced by liberal-
democracies is how to instigate transitions between distorted frameworks of 
understanding regarding different worldviews towards frameworks which 
facilitate genuine dialogical learning of different cultural, ethnic, or religious 
worldviews. (Taylor, 2002b, pg 138) Taylor's conception of civil discourse 
suggests that citizens can address this challenge via extending a “presumption 
of equal worth” to different cultural claims and frameworks. 
This means rejecting positions that deny distinctions of worth and value 
between different cultures and positions that reduce different cultural 
frameworks to certain essentialist characteristics or standards. (Taylor, 1994, pg 
66) Instead, it is a process which demands that individuals be prepared to be 
“transformed” through “the study of the other, so that we are not simply judging 
by our original familiar standards” (Taylor 1992, 70). 
The extension of this presumption, as part of a process of civil discourse, can 
eventually culminate in a potential “fusion of horizons” where people expand 
their interpretive horizons, questioning the background assumptions that they 
128 
 
had previously taken for granted. (Taylor, 1994, pg 67) The fusion of horizons 
invariably requires a transformation in our self-understandings as a 
consequence as people develop an understanding of the values, norms and 
beliefs of a different culture.  
Taylor argues, therefore, that an integral feature of civil discourse is avoiding the 
judgement of different cultural frameworks by interpreting them exclusively from 
the perspective of our own traditions and norms of epistemic and moral 
evaluation, interpretation and inquiry. As he further argues: 
“The “fusion of horizons” operates through our developing new vocabularies of 
comparison, by means of which we can articulate these contrasts. So that if and 
when we ultimately find substantive support for our initial presumption, it is on 
the basis of an understanding of what constitutes worth that we couldn’t 
possibly have had at the beginning. We have reached the judgement partly 
through transforming our standards...what the presumption requires of us is not 
peremptory and inauthentic judgements of equal value, but a willingness to be 
open to comparative cultural study of the kind that must displace our horizons in 
the resulting fusions”. (Taylor, 1994, pgs 67; 73) 
Ultimately, it is by presuming, prima facie, that other cultures and different 
worldviews have potential epistemic and moral value to offer which opens the 
possibility to develop a “language of perspicuous contrast” between 
communities who share different cultural beliefs and values. Taylor defends the 
importance of this idea in a recent interview with Chris Bloor: 
“I think that’s what we have to aim at if we want to get these differences out into 
a sphere where there can be a rational and calm discussion of how to live 
together with tension between different groups. It’s only by coming to such a 
language that we can have a discussion that doesn’t degenerate into a kind of 
stigmatising of the other. It’s not just important in the classroom or the 
anthropology monograph, it’s tremendously important in our public debate. We 
need it very badly in our diverse societies.” (Taylor, 2015, no page number 
available) 
This is an important point as Taylor argues that civil discourse fundamentally 
constitutes a comparative activity which not only requires participants to place 
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their own self-understandings into question and to learn from different 
worldviews, but it also demands co-operation to develop an appropriate 
language or vocabulary which the essential pre-condition for this exchange to 
occur in the first place. (Taylor, 1995c; 1995e; 1995f)  
Given that Taylor rejects what he terms the cultural “incorrigibility thesis”, he 
argues that an important aspect of civil discourse is the development of 
languages of comparison which will allow members from different communities 
to appreciate the “human constants” which animate their competing worldviews. 
(Taylor, 1985c, pg 125) Importantly, though, this process of contrast can also 
enable social criticism of different worldviews by generating new “possibilities of 
reinterpretation and reappropriation”. (Taylor, 2011f, pg 122) 
Accordingly, the fusion of horizons is possible for Taylor as all cultures reflect a 
set of universal human values, aspirations and ideals albeit their justification in 
practice differs from historical and cultural context. Moreover, it is also possible 
because human societies face a common set of social and political problems, 
difficulties and dilemmas. The task of civil discourse, therefore, is to elucidate 
the universalistic aspects of different worldviews. 
Taylor argues though that these commonalities can be obscured from people by 
virtue of people's immersion in a set of complex background understandings 
that are not quite articulate and which are often implicitly or unconsciously held. 
Indeed, these background understandings can effectively obscure certain 
questions from being posed and which responses can be articulated in 
response.  
In addition, Taylor also acknowledges that this process of civil discourse can 
sometimes be immensely confronting because it inevitably generates significant 
cognitive and affective resistance that reflects our deep investments in our 
“distorted images of others”. (Taylor, 2002) It can often be extremely painful to 
acknowledge and come to value new perspectives to our own. 
Furthermore, Taylor suggests that this extending a presumption of equal worth 
is often problematic and “involves something like an act of faith”. Nevertheless, 
it is worthwhile as a starting point for intercultural dialogue as he claims that all 
130 
 
human cultures have universal insights into the human condition which are 
worthy of consideration. (Taylor, 1994, pg 66)  
Moreover, Taylor also suggests that a willingness to accord this presumption 
might be animated by recognizing our own culture's limitations. (Taylor, 1994, pg 
73) Ultimately, the extension of an initial presumption of equal worth is essential 
if citizens are to fairly assess conflicting world-views and if they are to recognize 
their connection to different languages of expression- as he stresses: 
“The rather different understandings of the good which we see in different 
cultures are the correlative of the different languages which have evolved in 
those cultures. A vision of the good becomes available for the people of a given 
culture through being given expression in some manner. Consequently we need 
to recognise a plurality of goods, and the conflicts that arise from these, and not 
mask the conflict by de-legitimising one or other of the contested goods.” 
(Taylor, 1989, pg 518). 
In conclusion, therefore, Taylor argues that democratic societies are obliged to 
share identity space that involves the negotiation and compromise between 
different personal and group identities through practices of civil discourse in 
order to articulate a commonly acceptable sense of collective political identity. 
Taylor argues though that there will be certain limitations on the nature of the 
compromise as key democratic principles cannot be negotiated or bargained in 
exchange for other social purposes or goods.  
Consequently, as he further suggests, civil discourse is a problematic activity 
because liberal-democracies are in a constant “standing dilemma” with respect 
to the political negotiation of diverse identities and claims. This dilemma stems 
from their need for a sense of deep cohesion around a shared political identity. 
However, this requirement precisely fuels the temptation to exclude 
communities and groups that supposedly fail to conform to majoritarian 
identities.  
Obviously, from a moral standpoint this is deeply problematic. However, Taylor 
also notes that this temptation constantly risks undermining the principle of 
popular sovereignty while breeding social alienation and division. Taylor 
suggests that one means via which this dilemma can be reconciled is the open, 
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public acknowledgement of its existence. He argues that this acknowledgement 
might foster creative and critical articulations of a political community's sense of 
collective identity. (Taylor, 2004b, pg 38)  
Taylor, therefore, argues for the importance of the idea of 'sharing identity space 
which refers to the process of political identities being continually publicly re-
negotiated. (Taylor, 2004b, pg 39) Indeed, Taylor argues that this form of co-
existence has to be “discovered or invented anew by succeeding generations.” 
(1999, pg 281)  
Taylor suggests that civil discourse can facilitate this process by encouraging 
references to the shared historical-cultural conceptions and ideals of the good 
life via which citizens define their personal identities. Ongoing identity 
negotiations, according to Taylor, will never work simply by referencing 
individual rights and democratic procedures. 
Taylor argues that this process might help to alleviate experiences of “identity 
fright” felt by individuals who feel threatened by cultural, religious or ethnic 
diversity. This sense of threat can only be combatted, he claims, by 
demonstrating how one's polity has elements of historical continuity and 
elements of historical change. It will allow citizens to reject an understanding of 
collective identity premised on a notion of a “leitkultur”. It might help frustrate a 
politics that demands the assimilation of difference into an imagined, 
homogenous mold.  
In addition, he also claims that this process of civil discourse can allow 
individuals to critically question their “implicit assumptions” about members from 
different social groups and communities. However, how can this ambition be 
achieved precisely? Taylor suggests it can occur via two principal mechanisms. 
First of all, one might begin to see our peculiarities as “facts about us, and not 
simply as taken-for-granted features of the general human condition”. (Taylor, 
2002) This involves the acknowledgement that 'our way of being' is not natural 
but rather constitutes one among multiple possibilities. It is in this regard that it 
becomes vital to relate to our cultural practices with greater reflexiveness by 
challenging those aspects of our traditions which were 'too obvious to mention'. 
(Taylor, 2002) 
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Secondly, one might begin to perceive 'without distorting, corresponding 
features in the lives of others'. (Taylor, 2002) Importantly, this implies that a 
change in our evaluations of individuals from different cultural, ethnic or 
religious backgrounds requires a change in our interpretations of our own 
identifications. As he suggests, it entails: 
“…an identity shift that alters our understanding of ourselves, our goals, and our 
values.” (Taylor, 2002) This change of sensibility, he suggests, occurs if 
perceived differences become reinterpreted as “a challenge posed by a viable 
human alternative.” (Taylor, 2002) 
This process of self-change inevitably generates significant resistance that 
reflects our deep investment in our “distorted images of others”. (Taylor, 2002) 
He stresses that it can often be extremely painful to learn from different 
worldviews as it requires a shift in our own self-interpretations. 
Indeed, Taylor emphasises that our understanding of others from different 
cultural, religious and ethnic worldviews will always remain imperfect and 
distorted. However, he argues it might be possible to improve our knowledge 
through a series of corrections and revisions in response to learning through 
mutual dialogue. 
This process requires a certain measure of goodwill. It requires a recognition 
that we can be enriched by understanding of different worldviews and a 
willingness to accept that “other societies present us with different and often 
disconcerting ways of being human”. (Taylor, 2002) This is an important point as 
this reflects the influence of the work of Hans-Georg Gadamer and the 
hermeneutic tradition on Taylor's conception of civil discourse. He particularly 
develops the idea of “moral frameworks” or “horizons” from Gadamer and 
places it as a central concept which his account of civil discourse. 
Ruth Abbey (2000) notes that Taylor believes that these frameworks or horizons 
serve to “shape and meaning to individuals’ lives and provide answers, no 
matter how tacitly, to existential questions that he believes face all individuals 
about the purposes, conduct and direction of their lives”. (Abbey, 2000, pg 34) 
This is an important point because Taylor believes that such frameworks are 
essential to understanding human agency and identity, as he argues: 
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“I want to defend the strong thesis that doing without frameworks is utterly 
impossible for us; otherwise put that the horizons within which we live our lives 
and which make sense of them have to include these strong qualitative 
discriminations. Moreover, this is not meant just as a contingently true 
psychological fact about human beings...Rather the claim is that living within 
such strongly qualified horizons is constitutive of human agency, that stepping 
outside these limits would be tantamount to stepping outside what we would 
recognise as integral, that is, undamaged personhood”. (Taylor IN Abbey, 2000, 
pg 34) 
More recently, Taylor in a recent interview with Ulf Bohmann and Dario Montero 
explains the concept of a “horizon” thus: 
“‘Horizon’ is when you want to talk about the whole understanding of one culture 
regardless of what the issue is. Supposing I'm into anthropology, and I find 
people are doing a sacrifice. Is this their religion? At first, I don't know; so you 
have to get over a too easy familiarity with religion and only then can you see 
the ‘horizons’: the whole surrounding understanding within which distinctions of 
religion/non-religion could figure, and then you have to try to find a way for 
building bridges in a language of perspicuous contrasts. ‘Horizons’ figure in that 
kind of broad context, but they don't focus on particular issues, like how political 
society actually works. “(Taylor IN Bohmann & Montero, 2014, pg 5) 
Taylor suggests that frameworks or horizons are interpreted within individual 
and social narratives which provide meaning to the past and direction to the 
future. Remember that Taylor defends the proposition that human beings are 
‘self-interpreting animals’; our understandings- self and collective- play a crucial 
role in shaping who we are and what we do. 
Consequently, Taylor poses a fundamentally important yet problematic question: 
“If our tacit sense of the human condition can block our understanding of others, 
and yet we cannot neutralise it at the outset, then how can we come to know 
others? Are we utterly imprisoned in our unreflecting outlook?” (Taylor, 2002b, 
pg 132)  
Taylor suggests that Gadamer offers us an avenue from this impasse via the 
principle that mutual understanding can occur “through the patient identification 
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and undoing of those facets of our implicit understanding that distort the reality 
of the other”. (Taylor, 2002b, pg 132) This process of 'undoing' occurs when one 
realizes that differences of perspective between individuals reflect the influence 
of a deeper set of background understandings. (Taylor, 2002b, pg 132) 
He argues, therefore, that if individuals question their background 
understandings they will be able to appreciate how they had taken the 
“naturalness” of our own perspectives for granted. (Taylor, 2002b, pg 132) 
Taylor notes however that our understanding can only be improved with the 
correction of previous 'distortions' albeit only likely imperfectly. Horizons, as he 
stresses, are often initially distinct and divisive, but they are also movable and 
can be altered and extended. Indeed, as he argues: 
“Gadamer's concept of “horizon” has an inner complexity that is essential to it. 
On one hand, horizons can be identified and distinguished; it is through such 
distinctions that we come to grasp what is distorting understanding and 
impeding communication. But, on the other hand, horizons evolve, change. 
There is no such thing as a fixed horizon”. (Taylor, 2002b, pg 136) 
Taylor argues that Gadamer's account is highly germane to our attempts to 
understand “quite alien societies and epochs”. It articulates the necessity of 
changes in one's own self-understandings as we recognise that different others 
“present us different and often disconcerting ways of being human”. (Taylor, 
2002b, pg 142) 
The challenge faced by individuals in diverse liberal-democracies, Taylor 
therefore suggests, is how to “acknowledge the humanity” of different 
worldviews while continuing to practice our own. (Taylor, 2002b, pg 142) 
Accordingly, Taylor suggests that the metaphor of an interpretive horizon is 
important. It reflects the need to acknowledge “systematic differences in 
construal” between different cultures “without either reifying them or branding 
them as ineradicable”. (Taylor, 2002b, pg 138) 
Moreover, Taylor stresses, in light with his claim that understanding different 
cultures is not redolent of scientific modes of understanding, that our 
comparative efforts will constantly be an ongoing and ever incomplete process 
as it is impossible to form a complete and objective understanding of different 
135 
 
worldviews. But this sounds rather abstract- does Taylor offer any political 
examples of this fusion of horizon in practice? 
Although not directly implied, Taylor argues that the collective narrative which 
defines Canadian multiculturalism since the 60s was defined by the dethroning 
of an Anglo-normative understanding of national identity. This story, he 
suggests, was not appealing to the Quebec situation given its demographic 
composition as well as a historical legacy and threat of cultural assimilation by 
the Anglophone majority. 
Accordingly, Taylor suggests that one significant policy difference between 
Quebec and Canada is the fact that its political history has attempted to 
integrate new immigrants in French rather than English. The challenge for 
Quebec, from Taylor's point of view, is to encourage a process of 'decentering' 
its sense of historical ethnic identity.  
This process requires that all citizens have the voice and stake in the evolution 
of this traditional identity with no particular group's input privileged. This is an 
important point because Taylor argues that Quebecois model of 
“interculturalism” is often confused with a dogmatic refusal to recognise diversity 
whereas, in fact “it can be part of a different way of opening to difference”. 
(Taylor, 2013, no page number available.) 
This is an important aspect of civil discourse because Taylor suggests that it 
has the capacity to de-construct pejorative stereotypes and prejudicial attitudes. 
For instance, Taylor is particular concerned about the social portrayal of Islam in 
many “Western” liberal-democracies following the events of September the 11th 
with the entrenchment of negative social impressions. He categorizes this 
development under the umbrella term “block-thinking” and he maintains that it 
has been manifested in two particular social circumstances. (Gaonkar & Taylor, 
2006; Taylor, 2007)  
The first circumstance is the tendency for even relatively simple requests for 
cultural and religious accommodation by Muslim communities- for instance 
demands for schoolgirls to be given permission to wear headscarves in class- to 
become sites of immense public opprobrium and hostility. This trend has been 
exemplified by the rise of far right, reactionary parties which deem Islam to be 
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an inherently violent religion incompatible with the perceived values of 'Western' 
liberal-democracy. (Taylor, 2007) 
Taylor argues that this tendency to treat Muslim citizens as if they belong 
uncritically to a singular homogeneous entity is profoundly problematic. Not only 
does it encourage discriminatory attitudes and policies but it actually becomes a 
self-fulfilling prophecy as Muslims become increasingly alienated from 
mainstream society and internally factionalized. 
From this viewpoint, ignorance constitutes a powerful contributor to what he 
terms 'block-thinking'. Consequently, the viability of a multicultural state requires 
profound mutual learning between different cultural groups and communities. 
According to Taylor, while block-thinking is inescapable and is an 'age-old 
phenomenon' it has become profoundly dangerous within the contemporary 
social context. (Taylor, 2007) 
Indeed, block-thinking can serve as a self-fulfilling prophecy as the tendency to 
treat Islam as one homogeneous, unvaried block renders it difficult for Muslim 
activists to engage in internal criticism of their block thinkers and traditions. 
(Taylor, 2007) Accordingly, Taylor advocates the proliferation of social spaces 
where people from differing social backgrounds can discuss public issues with 
civility. This will allow members from different communities to slowly de-stabilize 
the faulty preconceptions about each other. 
In conclusion, this section has attempted to articulate Taylor's understanding of 
civility. It is differentiated from Rawls and Habermas' approach in that it insists 
that robust, substantive discussions in regards to competing ideas of the good 
is an essential aspect of contemporary life in pluralist societies.  
However, Taylor is optimistic that these discussions can help foster a sense of 
collective identity that is inclusive and which can command the assent of its 
minority groups. This is particularly important given Taylor's strong emphasis on 
the importance of robust solidarity and cohesion in order to maintain the vitality 
and viability of liberal-democratic regimes. 
More importantly, civil discourse constitutes an important means of expressing 
recognition for cultural, religious, moral and ethnic differences. It involves an 
appreciation of the historically and culturally specific values, interests, ideals 
137 
 
and standards which renders different cultures unique and distinctive. Civility, 
therefore, in the context of cultural differences demands a presumption of equal 
worth which paves the way for citizens to develop a new sense of shared 
identity space and a more inclusive sense of collective identity. 
Importantly, this kind of recognition also seems to involve an awareness of how 
stereotypical pre-judgements or pre-conceptions can distort one's perceptions 
of individuals and groups from different cultural, ethnic and religious 
backgrounds. Taylor recognises how these pre-conceptions and pre-
judgements have constituted a powerful mean of exclusion and marginalisation. 
This awareness is dependent on our ability to articulate our own background 
presuppositions about different cultural practices or people from different social 
backgrounds. It requires a willingness to allow others to explain their practices 
through their vocabularies and semantic frameworks. In particular, this activity is 
possible if people engaged in dialogue come to note the nature of the 
'conspicuous contrasts' which emerge during the course of discussion(s). 
Finally, there a sense in which Taylor's work highlights how mutual 
understanding is contingent upon people's abilities, opportunities and 
motivations to learn new vocabularies and background understandings during 
the course of dialogue. This learning process is essential as particular disputes 
cannot be divorced from the deeper set of values, norms, ideals and appeals 
which animate differing world-views. From this perspective, civil kinds of 
dialogue involve inviting those from different cultural, ethnic and religious 
backgrounds to articulate their claims in their vocabularies. 
Ultimately, Taylor stresses the difficulties involved in this project, he also 
underscores its inevitability and even the desirability of these risky, decentering 
dialogues. Civil kinds of dialogue can allow us to question the implicitly held 
negative evaluations held by people towards those from different social 
locations and backgrounds. It also allows people to de-centre their sense of 
identity rather than construing it as the manifestation of a singular and 
generalizable human condition. 
However, as it shall be noted, Taylor's approach suffers from a number of 
significant limitations which are worth exploring in further detail below, 
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particularly in terms of his failure to acknowledge the powerful influence of 
hermeneutical and testimonial injustices as well as his potentially essentialist 
understanding of identity. 
The Problems with Taylor's account: 
The first major problem which emerges with respect to Taylor's interpretation of 
civility is his conception of our group or communal identities. While Taylor 
stresses that civil discourse allows us to develop a sense of self more capable 
of accepting and learning from different worldviews, his account of this learning 
process seems to be in tension with his rather rigid account of group-based 
recognition as a number of critics have noted. (Abbey, 2000; Baumeister, 2003; 
Dick, 2011; Lehman, 2006; Lyshaug, 2004; Redhead, 2002; Smith, 2002; Wolff, 
1992) 
Indeed, in particular, as Andrew Schapp suggests, Taylor's understanding of 
recognition “tends to trade on an ambiguous account of identity as both 
constituted through dialogue with others but also somehow fundamental and 
non-negotiable”. (Schapp, 2004, pg 38) This tension is demonstrated by Taylor's 
discussions of individual and group-based identities. 
On the one hand, Taylor is keen to stress the dialogical nature of personal 
identity as well as the manner in which people can self-reflexively question, 
critique and revise their worldviews. However, Taylor also occasionally 
advocates a rather static conceptualization of group-based identity which sits in 
tension with his inclusive, dialogical account of identity formation. This tension, 
Andrea Baumeister (2003) argues, creates the following problem for Taylor’s 
philosophical framework: 
“For Taylor the members of a cultural community share meanings and values 
and are collectively committed to the promotion of their particular conception of 
the good. Such an emphasis upon shared meanings and goals, however, 
appears to underestimate the extent to which cultural identity will always remain 
internally contested”. (Baumeister, 2003, pg 404) 
Nowhere is this problem more apparent than his discussion of the cultural 
politics of Quebec and his defence of 'cultural survivalism'. Remember that 
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Taylor argues that it is possible to reject exclusionary interpretations of 
Quebecois political identity while continuing to advocate for special provisions 
designed to protect the social dominance of its Francophone culture.  
Unfortunately, Taylor's framework grants insufficient attention to the problem 
that such a stance might be potentially exclusionary of minority groups and 
communities as any project aimed at protecting a majority culture will invariably 
require the assimilation of minority group members. 
Taylor’s defence of cultural preservation consequently ignores that minority 
groups and communities frequently not only seek particular social 
accommodations which recognize aspects of their cultural and religious 
distinctiveness but that they also desire to alter dominant, collective conceptions 
of identity which they believe unjustly marginalize them in their society's 
“imagined community”.   
There is a serious potential tension, therefore, between Taylor’s account of civil 
discourse, which entails a “fusion of horizons” between different cultural, 
religious and ethnic traditions, and his attempt to justify practices of 
accommodation which ultimately would restrict changes in a dominant majority’s 
culture.  
Indeed, Taylor seems particularly insensitive to the danger that cultural 
survivalism can be animated by discourses of “paranoid nationalism” which 
construe minority cultures as inherently constituting an existential threat to 
dominant cultural norms and values. (Hage, 2003; Nicholson, 1995) Moreover, 
Taylor’s account of multicultural recognition suffers from an interpretative bias 
which renders it incapable of appreciating important aspects of political 
contestation with respect to the relations between majority and minority groups.  
This is because Taylor's account rests on an assumption that majority groups 
ought to confer recognition on minority groups, thereby raising significant 
questions as to whether his framework of recognition can adequately include 
the recognition of indigenous peoples given that the very legitimacy of the 
status of the colonial state to exercise power in name of non-indigenous people 
is deeply contested. (Coulthard, 2000) 
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In addition, Linda Nicholson suggests that Taylor’s account of multiculturalism 
often problematically assumes that the values, norms, beliefs of cultural 
majorities constitute an unquestioned fixed backdrop against which the needs of 
minority groups ought to be accommodated. This is a problematic assumption, 
she notes, because many contemporary struggles for recognition are not 
reducible to demands by minority groups for majority groups to acknowledge 
the worth of their traditions, customs, beliefs, norms and values. (Nicholson, 
1996) 
Instead, Nicholson argues that many contemporary struggles are more 
animated by a desire to critique and revise dominant evaluative standards in the 
first place via making majority group member critically conscious of their 
operation. (Nicholson, 1996)  
Nicholson’s critique thereby implies that Taylor’s account of recognition is 
asymmetrically focused on the claimants of recognition as opposed to focusing 
on the subjects receiving recognition claims, a concern which has been 
elaborated differently by Patchen Markell and Nikolas Kompridis. (Kompridis, 
2007; 2013; Markell, 2003) 
This asymmetry means that Taylor’s approach evades important questions 
about the social composition of the dominant majority as his discussion of 
Quebec tends to articulate a rather static and homogenous depiction of 
Francophone society. This means that Taylor fails to adequately conceptualize 
the internal disagreements, contradictions and tensions within any group 
identity and how they shift in the face of ever-changing social circumstance. 
From this perspective, as Patchen Markell points out, Taylor’s account of 
recognition is limited by his insistence that “others recognise us as who we 
already really are” as opposed to acknowledging how our identities are revised 
during the “course of the ongoing and risky interactions through which we 
become who we are”. (Markell, 2003, pg xxxi) 
In addition, a further difficulty associated with Taylor’s conception of cultural 
survivalism is that it seems insensitive to the claim that the advocacy of shared, 
collective goods, norms, and values might serve to disadvantage or socially 
alienate minority group members in a given political community. Indeed, in 
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particular, his approach ignores that the protection of majoritarian values might 
compromise the cultural rights of minority groups by virtue of the prevailing 
relations of power. 
For instance, Quebec is currently experiencing social tension with respect to 
Muslim women wearing the niqab in public spaces. This tension has been 
exploited by nationalist political parties and associations to advocate significant 
state intrusion into individual freedoms of religious belief and conscience, 
particularly via the promotion of dress codes in public institutions which minority 
groups believe unfairly targets, stigmatizes and discriminates against them. 
Of course, Taylor is fundamentally opposed to this kind of reactionary politics. 
Nevertheless, his account of recognition fails to accord significant attention to 
this potential problem. This failure of consideration is also problematic because 
while Taylor stresses the pains of misrecognition he underplays the social 
injuries that can result from a politics of cultural survivalism. 
Where a cultural or religious majority is socially validated and supported by 
public policies that support its dominant status, minority groups might feel that 
their cultural identities are being systemically socially devalued. Indeed, they 
might believe that their cultural rights are compromised by systemic, institutional 
discrimination. For instance, Muslim women might legitimately feel aggrieved 
that they must effectively choose between wearing the niqab and refusing to 
accept a job in the public service that bans religious symbols. 
In addition, Taylor does not seem to adequately appreciate how a politics of 
“cultural survivalism” might impede individual's political rights. A politics of 
cultural survivalism can circumscribe in advance the limitations of cultural, 
religious and social inclusion, in a manner slanted towards the interests of a 
cultural majority. 
It thereby hinders a more agonistic approach to cultural negotiation that has 
been outlined variously by Joseph Carens, Jim Tully and Bhikhu Parekh. This 
approach stresses the contestability of norms of recognition, the need to fairly 
consider the interests of both majority and minority groups as well as the 
inevitable incomplete, provisional and revisable character of any agreements. 
(Carens, 2000; Parekh, 2002; Tully, 2008) 
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Taylor, as Kukathas suggests, does not reach such a position because he tends 
to treat group-based identities in a rather rigid fashion, failing to interpret our 
identities as “mutable social formations that change shape, size and character 
as society and circumstances vary”. (Kukathas, 1998, pg 693) 
The pressing problem here is whether his advocacy of the politics of cultural 
survival is compatible with his defence of robust dialogical engagement across 
difference. It is questionable, therefore, whether Taylor's account of cultural 
survivalism is reconcilable with his idea that cross-cutting dialogue is essential 
for communities to negotiate an inclusive sense of collective identity. 
Given that Taylor's defence of group-based survivalism is dependent upon an 
'ethics of authenticity,' it might be argued that it overly concentrates on cultural 
identity at the expense of considering other valuable and inter-related influences 
on our identities. This point is made forcibly by Oksenberg-Rorty, who notes that 
the distinction between identifying what precisely constitutes a “cultural” group 
can be problematic given their relationship with other economic and political 
processes. 
She stresses that the politics of recognition inevitably is interlinked with 
“determining public policy on a vast range of substantive issues”. (Oksenberg- 
Rorty, 1994b, pgs 155; 177) Indeed, she argues distinguishing between cultural 
identities can be profoundly contested, citing the following example: 
“For instance, how far might the preservation of Irish-American culture commit 
us to subsidising the parochial schools of the Catholic population, recognising 
that Catholic schools typically attempt to develop specific attitudes to many 
morally and politically charged divisive issues (publicly supported abortion, 
euthanasia, etc.) In funding parochial schools, does the state become an active 
party in determining not only their curricular standards, but also the direction of 
teaching?” (Rorty, 1994b, pg 157) 
A similar strident objection in this respect comes from Habermas (1994b). He 
argues that that Taylor's attempt to defend group-based rights- particularly in 
terms of advocating a right to cultural survival- is deeply flawed as it potentially 
undermines individual autonomy. Habermas stresses that the notion of rights is 
only attributable to individuals exclusively as opposed to social groups. 
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This argument stems from the claim that individuals have a fundamental right to 
criticise all historically inherited and culturally articulated values, norms, 
principles and beliefs. From Habermas' perspective, Taylor's defence of group-
based rights is ultimately grounded on a naturalistic fallacy as it compares the 
survival of cultural entities as being analogous to the survival of entire animal 
species. (Habermas, 1994b, pg 130) 
It is in this regard that his account of cultural survivalism seems problematic as 
it under-emphasises the principle that individuals must have the active 
capacities or opportunities to question and disassociate from their cultural 
memberships. It compromises the autonomy not only of groups who do not 
belong to a given cultural minority, but it also compromises members of cultural 
majorities to question the future evolution of their cultural inheritances. 
Consequently, Habermas upholds that individual autonomy is a vital principle of 
human agency given the accelerated social change of contemporary societies. 
Modern relations of social change, he explains, serve to “explode” all “stationary 
forms of life”. (Habermas, 1994b, pg 132) 
Cultural survivalism is, therefore, an atavistic form of political organization. 
Habermas fears that it encourages the coercive imposition of a singular model 
of identification. It ignores the complexities of our individual identities, and it 
could breed practices of social ostracism in cases where people refuse to 
conform to socially ascribed, group-based norms of behaviour. (Habermas, 
1994b) 
Similarly, other critics of Taylor's conceptualization of group rights raise the 
concern that it also potentially undermines the autonomy of future generations 
with respect to their social identification options. It serves to unjustly delimit the 
boundaries of collective political identity both for members of Quebec’s non-
Francophone minorities and individual members of Quebec’s francophone 
population. (Appiah, 1994, pg 157)  
This is because cultural survivalism could not only exclude minority groups but it 
could also exclude members of the dominant social group as it falsely construes 
its membership to be homogenous, thereby ignoring differences between 
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members of the dominant culture while ignoring facets of their identities which 
are not connected to their cultural and linguistic memberships. 
Consequently, given this difficulty, a number of critics have stressed the 
importance of people's capacity to 'exit' from their inherited cultural attachments 
and values. (Benhabib, 2002; Green, 1998; Okin, 2002) Although this 'right of 
exit' is not a process of complete disassociation it seems vital for persons to 
have meaningful opportunities to criticise and disassociate from their cultural 
memberships and practices.  
However, this is not to suggest that there is no legitimate scope for the 
protection of group rights in a diverse polity. There are many legitimate reasons 
to support cultural minorities whose collective way of life is threatened via 
practices of institutional accommodation. For instance, indigenous peoples 
might require compensation or land right grants in order to atone for colonial 
injustices. (Rorty, 1994b, pg 153)  
Nevertheless, as Andrea Baumeister notes, Taylor’s defence of cultural 
survivalism does present the concern that coercive political power- or even 
pressure from dominant social norms and values- might place undue pressure 
on individuals to define themselves “primarily in terms of their cultural 
membership rather than a whole host of alternative criteria that may shape their 
identity”, including a person’s membership in non-cultural communities and 
groups. (Baumeister, 2003, pg 404) 
Another issue with Taylor's account of group identity is that it seems to 
underplay the potentially destructive nature of group-based political claims. 
Indeed, in particular, Taylor could be accused in this regard of failing to 
appreciate how the very notion of collective 'identity' is implicated in destructive 
social conflicts. (Rorty, 1994b, pg 152) This point is also particularly emphasised 
by Bauman (1997): 
“More often than not the 'survivance' postulate turns into an awesome weapon 
of subjugation and tyranny, exercised by the acclaimed or self-proclaimed 
guardians of the 'community' (ethnic, racial, religious) and its traditional values 
in order to exact obeisance from their hapless wards and to stamp out every 
inkling of autonomous choice.” (Bauman, 1997, pg 197) 
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Taylor, from this viewpoint, has failed to consider the reality that struggles for 
recognition- rather than leading to reconciliation or deeper mutual 
understanding can exacerbate intractable political conflicts even further. 
Struggles for recognition, rather than leading to a “fusion of horizons”, might 
simply lead to an alienation of horizons. Indeed, as Chandran Kukathas argues, 
there is the real possibility that the politics of recognition can degenerate into 
the “politics of interest group conflict” (Kukathas, 1998, pgs 632-3) 
From this point of view, by prioritising the survival of a majority, collective ethnic 
identity there is the danger that the “politics of survivalism” might encourage 
demagogic political actors to stoke inter-group tensions for their own vested 
interests. Obviously, such a situation would entail an attempt to impose a 
dominating degree of social conformism which would undermine individual 
autonomy and agency. 
Ultimately, rather than the recognition of group-based rights leading to greater 
political legitimacy and reconciliation the politics of survivalism can deepen 
political conflicts by ossifying social identities and social distinctions of 
difference. Taylor’s account of political survivalism thereby inadequately 
considers the reality that even dominant social groups are internally fractured, 
thereby resulting in an illusionary and oppressive imposition of “shared” values 
and norms on minority and majority group members. 
Another implication concern in this respect is the claim that Taylor suffers from a 
degree of inflated optimism regarding the capacity of civil discourse to decentre 
our identities and promote understanding across difference. 
Taylor appears to defaultly assume that dialogue will foster deeper mutual 
tolerance of difference while promoting critical self-reflection with respect to our 
identities. However, a more sceptical perspective would argue that there can be 
no a priori guarantees that dialogue will promote such outcomes. Indeed, civil 
discourse might only foster deeper mutual alienation or estrangement, 
particularly concerning divisive subjects such as the distribution of economic 
and political power. 
This is an especially vexing problem in deeply divided societies with legacies of 
political violence, intergroup mistrust, bitter institutional disagreements, broad 
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social and residential segregation and salient and hostile ethnic identities. From 
this point of view, under certain circumstances there might be a broad range of 
prudent reasons to avoid cross-cutting dialogue between members of different 
communities. For instance, in cases where such dialogues involve irresolvable 
predicaments or where the broader political climate is hostile and volatile. 
Another problem with Taylor's hermeneutical emphasis is the awkward reality 
that certain groups within democratic societies might be unwilling to engage 
with political institutions that might impel some form of change in their identities 
and ways of life. For example, it is not clear whether Taylor's approach is 
compatible with communities that voluntarily desire to segregate themselves 
from broader society. While their motivations are often diverse, one possibility 
could be the fear that cross-cutting dialogue might compromise communal 
solidarity and cohesion. 
In addition, Taylor's approach has little to say about individuals or groups that 
dogmatically attempt to impose their perspectives on other people or groups 
which advocate violence, the denial of basic democratic rights to certain groups 
and communities or which demonize, stigmatise or demean certain groups and 
communities.  
Indeed, the only time Taylor seems to engage with the expression of dogmatic 
claims occurs in his recent book co-authored with Jocelyn Maclure where he 
briefly argues that legitimate restrictions can be placed on “flagrant cases of 
defamation or incitement to hatred”. (Taylor & Maclure, 2011e, pg 108) 
However, beyond this vague and brief remark, Taylor fails to develop a 
comprehensive account of how to politically treat dogmatic claims in the public 
sphere. 
For instance, Springs (2012) insightfully critiques Taylor's account of cross-
cutting dialogue with reference to recent controversies in the United States 
about fundamentalist Christian groups dogmatically attempting to impose their 
religious perspectives on the Texas School Board curriculum review. (Springs, 
2012, pg 12) 
The fundamental problem here, according to Springs, is that Taylor insufficiently 
takes into account the profound divisiveness of certain political conflicts. He 
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inadequately considers how particular groups in the public realm believe that 
their world-views are taken to be the only just framework. They construe all 
other viewpoints as being categorically morally bankrupt or socially deviant. 
(Springs, 2012, pg 14)  
From this point of view, it is not only questionable to presume that a 'fusion of 
horizons' is possible. It is also politically naïve to presume that fundamentalist 
groups would motivate to engage in the cross-cutting dialogue Taylor models in 
the first place. Yet, Taylor's framework rests on a rather optimistic psychological 
assumption that individuals are easily motivated to engage in the critical self-
questioning he advocates. 
Indeed, as Linda Nicholson notes, Taylor fails to outline precisely how majority 
group members can develop a critical awareness that their standards of 
evaluation require revision in the face of normative demands for recognition by 
minority groups and communities. (Nicholson, 1996) 
This optimism blinds him to the possibility that certain individuals might be 
animated by a kind of epistemic malevolence in their discursive interactions with 
others or might be fundamentally unwilling to critically question their viewpoints.  
Epistemic malevolence is a wide-ranging phenomenon. It includes attempts to 
obstruct access to knowledge, to stake claims in a deceitful or misleading 
manner, to provide highly exaggerated information, to understate vitally 
important information or to furnish esoteric, contradictory or ambiguous 
information. (Baehr, 2010) 
Irrespective of a particular agent's intentions and motivations, which can be 
complex, epistemic malevolence constitutes an abuse of epistemic power which 
leverages costs on other parties, typically to serve one's own vested interests 
and typically without consideration for another person's well-being. 
The problem of epistemic malevolence, especially when practiced by members 
of privileged communities or social groups, is that it renders them fundamentally 
unwilling to renounce the privileges or advantages accorded to them by virtue of 
biases in dominant epistemic norms. 
For instance, it is hard to appreciate how Taylor would conceptualize the 
position of powerful individuals who argue, contrary to scientifically accepted 
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standards of evidence, that climate change is not happening, that vaccinations 
cause auto-immune and psychological disorders or that it is possible- and 
desirable- to “treat” homosexuals via so-called “gay conversion therapy”. 
This raises the question as to where to draw the boundaries of receptivity to 
different political persuasions and viewpoints. However, Taylor does not 
adequately address with the exception of the expression of sentiments that are 
clearly discriminatory, prejudiced or incite violence. For instance, a number of 
legitimate questions might be posed here: 
To what extent is it legitimate to be hermeneutically receptive to viewpoints that 
one finds deeply morally offensive? 
To what extent is it normatively desirable to open one's commitments, ideas, 
values and beliefs to the scrutiny of others, under conditions of asymmetrical 
power? 
This problem also mirrors Taylor's failure to discuss what ought to happen if, 
following a process of prolonged inter-cultural dialogue in the realms of civil 
society and governmental institutions, particular cultural practices are deemed 
to be unacceptable given the commitments, values and principles of a liberal-
democratic society.  
Indeed, it is worthwhile in this regard to note the criticisms made by feminist 
scholars of ideas of 'open' and 'cross-cutting' kinds of communicative exchange. 
There is little acknowledgement of Taylor's work of how relations of power might 
negatively impact on the public reception of claims and justifications made by 
members of marginalised groups and communities and received by individuals 
from dominant groups and communities. 
This seems to be a function of Taylor's implicit belief that partners in a dialogical 
exchange should be equally willing to question their background understandings 
and to learn from the worldviews of their interlocutors. Indeed, he stresses that 
citizens must continually strive to demonstrate “sensitivity or empathy toward 
core convictions that are an integral part of their fellow citizens’ moral identity”. 
(Taylor & Maclure, 2011e, pg 108) 
Yet, as Kristie Dotson’s notion of “testimonial smothering” suggests, members of 
marginalised groups might have legitimate reasons not to disclose certain kinds 
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of information to non-group members. (Dotson, 2011) They might also feel 
obliged regulate their discursive behaviour in a highly taxing fashion to confirm 
or disconfirm social stereotypes about them.  
For instance, Dotson cites Kimberlé Crenshaw’s observation that African 
American women might feel reticence to discuss the issue of sexual violence 
within their communities in order to avoid re-producing the stereotype of the 
violent black male. (Crenshaw 1991 IN Dotson, 2011)  
These criticisms suggest marginalised group-members might in practice have 
reasonable desires to “protect their lives from scrutiny” by those from more 
advantaged social groups. Public discourses can occasionally place them into 
moral dilemmas, risking the loss of self-respect and triggering fears that their 
communal solidarities and loyalties might be compromised. (Jaggar, 2004, pg 
235) 
From this perspective, as Allison Jaggar argues, the refusal to engage in “open” 
dialogue is not necessarily an attempt to foreclose critical scrutiny of their 
perspectives. Rather, it is an attempt to claim greater “discursive autonomy” on 
behalf of their social group. (Jaggar, 2004, pg 236) Alternatively, it could be an 
attempt to prevent the re-confirmation of prejudicial social attitudes about one's 
group or communities and to ensure that one's claims are not unfairly treated. 
While practices of testimonial smothering are a rational response by individuals 
in the face of an inability or unwillingness by a receiving party to understand and 
fairly consider their testimony, Dotson implies that they can have significantly 
baleful consequences for society as a whole. It can reproduce continual factual 
ignorance about the circumstances of people from marginalised communities, 
thereby leading unfair and inaccurate assumptions about their lived realities and 
circumstances. (Dotson, 2011) 
Secondly, practices of testimonial smothering also hinder the capacities for 
effective social criticism because it deprives epistemic communities of counter-
hegemonic resources to critique potential flaws and distortions in dominant 
epistemic resources, thereby further solidifying their dominance. (Dotson, 2011) 
Given Taylor's insensitivity to the problem of testimonial smothering, he fails to 
offer any account of what interpretive stances or institutional practices are 
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required to identify and mitigate, offset or eliminate the flaws in dominant 
epistemic norms which incentivize individuals from marginalized groups to 
restrict their testimonial claims in public. 
Indeed, in this regard Taylor's conception of civil discourse could be accused of 
being overly sanguine about the willingness of members of privileged social 
communities to question their worldviews. This is an important point, as 
Nicholson notes, as Taylor’s account of civility is premised on the key 
assumption that through learning about different cultural or religious worldviews 
one automatically becomes cognizant of the limitations of our own worldviews. 
(Nicholson, 1996)  
However, as feminist epistemologists have comprehensively illustrated, there is 
often a tendency of people from privileged and advantaged communities to be 
wilfully ignorant of social injustices. While I shall explore this problem in greater 
depth in the next chapter, this wilful ignorance stems from a desire to avoid 
questioning their moral complicity in morally unjustified material and social 
benefits which accrue from their social positioning. Indeed, this ignorance can 
be so deeply rooted that people from privileged communities do not even 
consider the need for critical self-questioning in the first place.  
The problem with wilful kinds of ignorance, as Applebaum (2010) notes, is that 
they impede the receptivity of members of privileged groups and communities 
towards the claims of individuals from less powerful social positions because it 
serves to “safeguard privilege”, justifies “denials of complicity” and “shields 
unjust systems from being interrogated”. (Applebaum, 2010, pgs 7; 38) 
Ignorance, as Applebaum argues, involves an active and social process of 
knowledge creation which “generates specific types of delusion or wrong ways 
of perceiving the world”, thereby breeding epistemically and morally corrupt 
practices of perception, evaluation and interpretation. (Applebaum, 2010, pg 37) 
Importantly, from this perspective, ignorance should not be considered as 
involving a deficit or a simple lack of appropriate knowledge but as a social 
practice which privileges certain kinds of knowledge while marginalizing other 
kinds. (Applebaum, 2010, pg 37)  
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Practices of social ignorance, therefore, are profoundly connected with 
practices of epistemic marginalisation and exclusion. Taylor's failure to 
adequately consider the impacts of social ignorance is particularly frustrating 
given his keen understanding of the importance of “social imaginaries” in the 
construction of collective conceptions of identity.  
Taylor argues that a social imaginary refers to the “ways people imagine their 
social existence, how they fit together with others, how things go on between 
them and their fellows, the expectations that are normally met, and the deeper 
normative notions and images that underlie these expectations”. (Taylor, 2004, 
pg 23) 
Nevertheless, Taylor's account of civil discourse simply does not consider how 
social imaginaries help to create and sustain epistemic rifts or gulfs between 
people who come from very different social backgrounds nor the impact of 
deeper social imaginaries which hinder the ability of privileged groups to 
acknowledge their social privileges.  
This is to say that while Taylor stresses the importance of the connection 
between our identities and our conceptions of the good, he does not appreciate 
our identities, as Linda Alcoff notes, can render certain aspects of social life 
visible while rendering other aspects invisible. (Alcoff, 2006, pg 43) As a 
consequence, he does not properly acknowledge the importance of how our 
social identities profoundly influence our access to certain domains of 
knowledge and our capacities to judge different epistemic resources. 
(Applebaum, 2010, pg 40) 
These epistemic gulfs can make it extremely difficult for people occupying 
privileged positions from being able to intellectually and emotionally relate to the 
material conditions and lived realities of oppressed people. This conceptual 
point has been supported recently by findings in empirical social psychological 
experiments.  
For instance, the empirical psychological research of Dixon et al notes that 
dialogical contact between advantaged and disadvantaged social groups might 
facilitate the alleviation of prejudicial attitudes and pejorative stereotypes. 
(Dixon et al, 2012) 
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However, they also note that such communication is typically characterised by 
an unwillingness of privileged individuals to acknowledge the structural 
character of social injustices. (Dixon et al, 2012, pg 421) Conversely, they 
suggest, inter-group contact can even contingently de-motivate members from 
marginalised communities to engage in collective action to challenge structural 
inequalities! (Dixon et al, 2012) 
Although Taylor clearly recognizes the impacts of prejudicial attitudes and 
pejorative stereotypes and how these factors breed practices of economic and 
social discrimination, he fails to connect these attitudes and stereotypes to the 
re-production dominant epistemic norms of credibility, trustworthiness and 
reliability. Given that dominant epistemic norms accord epistemic privilege or 
marginalisation to certain actors, it can be extremely difficult to challenge these 
norms through dialogical means given that people from marginalised actors 
suffer from a lack of recognition as worthy knowers. 
This lack of recognition means that they are not considered to be worthy 
knowers, thereby allowing individuals from more advantaged backgrounds to 
ignore, dismiss or trivialize their demands to alter the terms of dominant 
epistemic frameworks.  
Of course, Taylor is absolutely correct to illustrate how practices of stereotyping 
and prejudicial social attitudes breed misunderstandings between members of 
different social groups and communities. However, it is also vitally important to 
appreciate how they are profoundly implicated in what kinds of discourses are 
deemed to be worthy of inclusion or exclusion, which kinds of communicative 
styles are socially validated or demeaned and whether the content of a given 
claim is intelligible or unintelligible by virtue of dominant social resources of 
interpretation. 
On the face of it, it might seem strange to critique Taylor from the perspective of 
testimonial and hermeneutical injustice. After all, one of the most important 
insights of Taylor's work is how dominant social groups and institutions have 
historically refused to recognize the cultural practices and identities of 
marginalized communities.  
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In addition, Taylor is well aware of the moral costs associated with the 
internalization of pejorative social categorizations, discourses or prejudicial 
attitudes by oppressed minority groups.  
Indeed, even his notion of a “social imaginary” has been used by some feminist 
critiques to deepen their insights into epistemic injustices. (See for example, 
Code, 2011b) And of course, as his famous critique of negative conceptions of 
liberty illustrates, Taylor is very much aware how freedom is meaningless if one 
is suffering from internal psychological or motivational barriers to exercising 
autonomous choice. 
Nevertheless, Taylor's failure to adequately conceptualize the problem of 
epistemic injustice seems to stem from a number of problematic assumptions 
within his philosophical framework. Firstly, he only narrowly confines the 
problem of misrecognition to cultural practices and identities while failing to 
consider other kinds of social misrecognition.  
Secondly, Taylor has a profound faith in the capacity of dialogue to instigate 
critical reflection regarding our own identities, a faith which blinds him to how 
epistemic kinds of injustices can profoundly distort or hinder the kind of 
dialogical engagement across difference he advocates. 
Thirdly, perhaps Taylor's inability to conceptualize epistemic injustices stems 
from a deeper suspicion about critiques of power. Taylor, of course, is well 
known for rejecting Foucaultian analyses of power supposedly because they 
exclusively focus on relations of oppression and the conditions and practices 
necessary to subvert and challenge them.  
Taylor argues that a stance is problematic because it ignores how individuals 
“previously related by modes of dominance” might instead “re-associate on a 
better basis”. (Taylor, 2001c, pg 94) Taylor seems to dismiss Foucaultian 
critiques of power because he believes that they narrowly reduce social 
relations to the machinations of dominant relations of power.  
Consequently, Taylor presents a more teleological conceptualization of dialogue 
which suggests that individuals can enrich their self-interpretations via achieving 
mutual understanding with people from very different backgrounds. Indeed, he 
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claims that the dialogical constitution of our identities necessarily implies that 
human beings are orientated towards mutual understanding. 
However, Taylor's stance is flawed because it is precisely the willingness to 
reach mutual understanding which is frustrated by asymmetrical power 
relationships which frequently involve a fundamental failure to be receptive to 
the claims and perspectives of different “others”. The perspectives of 
marginalised individuals or communities are deemed epistemically unreliable, 
non-credible or untrustworthy by virtue of dominant relations of power. 
Alternatively, their justifications are misunderstood or misinterpreted as being 
irrelevant or misguided as they are incompatible with dominant conceptual 
understandings or evaluative frameworks. Taylor's work therefore requires 
greater attention both to how our own identities are deeply permeated by 
relationships of power. (McNay, 2008; Weir, 2013) 
Moreover, his framework also needs to consider under what conditions those in 
relatively superior positions of power and privileged social locations can 
become motivated to listen fairly to the claims of marginalised individuals, 
communities and social groups. 
Consequently, Taylor's work suffers from a significant critical deficit. While he 
acknowledges the intersubjective and linguistic dimensions of our identities, he 
fails to adequately interrogate the connection between power, identity and 
language.  
Taylor's approach particularly needs to articulate how relations of power 
profoundly influence the manner in which the contents of claims are validated or 
marginalised, the manner in which claims are expressed as well as the 
influence of broader social frameworks on the limitations of our knowledge 
resources. 
Accordingly, given this outline of the limitations of Taylor's approach, it is worth 
now generally summarizing Taylor's contribution to this thesis and how some of 
his ideas interlink with the arguments which shall be presented in the next 
chapter. 
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Conclusion: 
In conclusion, Taylor's philosophical framework is remarkable for its depth of 
insight and breadth of consideration. Taylor is particularly interesting as while he 
recognizes the importance of formal democratic procedures to adjudicate 
political conflict he also stresses the significance of deepening the relational ties 
between citizens via the cultivation of key political virtues and the promotion of 
shared goods worthy of collective affirmation.  
Indeed, one of the most important insights Taylor's work offers this the idea that 
justice in diverse contemporary liberal-democratic regimes cannot be achieved 
by procedural rights guarantees alone. Rather, such guarantees need to be 
accompanied by an appropriate public recognition of our social identities. 
In addition, Taylor’s hermeneutical approach also stresses the importance of 
substantive and robust dialogue in cultivating connections of deeper solidarity, 
trust and respect across multiple lines of difference. From his perspective, the 
central challenge which liberal-democratic regimes have to negotiate is how 
“people can bond together in difference without abstracting from their 
differences” (Taylor, 1998, p 153). 
My reading of Taylor's work explicitly stresses that his model of dialogue 
foregrounds the importance of civility as citizens re-assess their self-
understandings as well as the preconceptions held by individuals from different 
communities and social groups. His work, therefore, provides an insightful 
normative account of how citizens should negotiate the deep disagreements 
characteristic of contemporary democracies. 
In addition, Taylor's work also offers a number of empirical suggestions about 
how the robust model of dialogue he advocates could be institutionally 
cultivated. This is an important point because Taylor's work largely avoids the 
abstractness of Rawlsian and Habermasian accounts of public reasoning, 
offering us with a viable 'roadmap' for ethically negotiating political conflict. 
Unfortunately, for all of its strengths, Taylor's understanding of civility has some 
central limitations. Taylor has an inadequate theorization of how relations of 
power shape the public credibility of individual claims and the perceived 
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competency, authority and sincerity of marginalized individuals, communities 
and social groups in social dialogue processes.  
This is a rather unfortunate limitation given Taylor's insights into the baleful 
impacts of social misrecognition and how wider social forces can impact on 
individual's capacities to act autonomously. For instance, Taylor notes how 
individual vices such as “fear, sloth, {and} ignorance” and broader social forces 
such as “superstition”, “tradition” and moral dictates from society can impede 
our capacities to act autonomously. (Taylor, 1985b, pg 197) 
Moreover, it is also the case that his account of civility inadequately considers 
the moral and political difficulties that might be faced by marginalised 
individuals, groups and communities in public dialogue processes. For instance, 
in the face of fears of unethical appropriation of their knowledge or concerns 
that publicly sharing their claims might compromise their communal solidarity 
and loyalties. 
In addition, it has also been clear that Taylor does not offer adequate criteria for 
how citizens and denizens should approach situations in which they are faced 
with the expression of 'uncivil' sentiments, viewpoints and attitudes- for 
example, the expression of racist sentiments- or instances where citizens are 
unwilling to partake in ethical kinds of communication. 
The next chapter therefore shall attempt to wrestle with the issue of power and 
civility as well as outline some principled standards which might allow 
individuals partaking in cross-cutting dialogues to address circumstances in 
which they are faced with the expression of discriminatory viewpoints or where 
their fellow citizens are unwilling to respond to their attempts to engage in civil 
discourse.  
I shall claim that feminist reflections on testimony and the political implications 
of our social positioning offer us with a more nuanced account of civil discourse 
which recognises its strengths and limitations in the face of power differentials. 
This might seem to be an abrupt change in focus. Nevertheless, it is worth 
noting that there are a number of interesting similarities of concern between 
Taylor's philosophical framework and the field of feminist political theory which 
are worth emphasising. 
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Firstly, both are sceptical of dominant tendencies within Western epistemology 
to privilege an “atomistic” or highly individualised conceptualization of social 
knowledge production and exchange. (Grasswick, 2011; Taylor, 1992) Instead, 
both have consistently stressed the socially situated and historical character of 
knowledge and surveyed the baleful consequences of “possessive 
individualism”. 
Both are further sceptical of liberal conceptions of person-hood which ignored 
the dialogical constitution and social embeddedness of our identities. As a 
result, both focus on the importance of social interdependencies and 
connections, rejecting “monological” understandings of consciousness and 
relationality. (Code, 2006; Grasswick 2011; Taylor, 1995a; Taylor, 1995b) 
Secondly, Taylor's work shares deep intellectual affinities with feminist critiques 
of rationalist and empiricist epistemological frameworks which allegedly ignore 
the embodied character of human knowledge. (Jaggar, 1996; Taylor, 1992, 
1995a, 1995b) 
Both have also been critical of how traditional liberal accounts of personhood 
ignored the importance of emotion and affect by its misguided privileging of 
rational cognitivism. In addition, they have also explored how emotions and 
affect are connected to our interpretations of justice and how they mediate our 
relations with “significant others”. (Jaggar, 1996; Taylor, 1992, 1995a, 1995b) 
Thirdly, both have expressed reservations about the narrow preoccupation of 
much of contemporary liberal political philosophy. They have expressed 
common dissatisfaction at attempts to develop universal accounts of justice 
which articulate fixed normative rules or obligations, as opposed to considering 
the importance of the human virtues and particularistic moral responsibilities, 
connections, obligations or duties or cares. (Porter, 2014; Sevenhuijsen, 1998; 
Taylor, 2011c) 
Fourthly, both explore the conditions of possibility for realising human freedom 
in contexts of political domination and misrecognition, particularly in terms of 
how the public recognition and political accommodation of our social identities 
are deeply related to our capacities to act as autonomous agents. 
Unsurprisingly, Taylor's work on recognition has been cited by feminist scholars 
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and his focus on questions of authenticity mirror feminist inquiries with respect 
to the impacts of patriarchal culture on the formation of our identities. (Orlie, 
2004) 
Finally, both are concerned with the problem of how democratic regimes can 
continually re-define themselves in order to accommodate historically excluded 
or marginalized identities and how contemporary polities can articulate a 
common sense of identity which can justly include diverse groups and 
communities. (Orlie, 2004) Accordingly, given this conceptual connection, it is 
important to unpack my arguments in greater depth in the next chapter where I 
attempt to develop an account of civil discourse informed by feminist 
epistemological theory. 
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Chapter Three: Rethinking Civil Discourse 
 The previous chapters have noted some problems with the accounts of 
civil discourse developed in the work of Rawls, Habermas and Taylor. It was 
argued that Rawls' and Habermas' conceptions of civil discourse were premised 
on an overly rigid distinction between the right and the good and the public and 
the private.  
These rigid distinctions meant that their approaches obscured the contested 
nature of public claim-making and the depth of disagreement regarding the 
meaning(s) of justice and political legitimacy in contemporary democratic 
societies. 
They also narrowly conflated civil discourse with the exchange of generalizable 
political claims orientated towards the political legitimation of coercive state 
power. As a result, they advocated a rather rigid conceptualization of civil 
discourse which might marginalise new political vocabularies.  
Most importantly, though, their accounts inadequately considered the impacts of 
epistemic kinds of injustice, thereby raising significant concerns as to whether 
their accounts of civil discourse are sufficiently inclusive. 
Consequently, I proposed that Taylor's dialogical or hermeneutical liberalism 
offered some advantages over the Rawlsian and Habermasian framework. It 
recognised the futility of a strong distinction between the right and the good, 
acknowledged the exclusionary impacts of defining civility as discursive self-
restraint and proffered the possibility of a critical account of civil discourse which 
aims to question pejorative cultural, ethnic and religious stereotypes. 
Nevertheless, I argued that Taylor's approach did not adequately consider how 
one's social location and position might potentiality render oneself unreceptive 
to claims staked by marginalized individuals, communities and social groups by 
virtue of dominant relations of power. This is to say that, like Rawls and 
Habermas, Taylor's approach failed to sufficiently consider epistemic kinds of 
injustice. 
While Taylor is correct to focus on the problem of dismantling relations of 
misrecognition and the undermining of distorted understandings of minority 
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groups, he failed to adequately connect this problem to epistemic status 
inequalities. This failure, in turn, meant that his theory of civil discourse fails to 
be sensitive to asymmetries of discursive power, particularly in terms of 
practices of social ignorance which potentially limit people's receptivity to claims 
of injustice. 
Moreover, it also did not adequately consider the moral and political difficulties 
faced by marginalised individuals, groups and communities in public dialogue 
processes. Taylor particularly fails to consider the ethical quandaries that 
marginalised groups face when staking their claims in public, difficulties that can 
lead to practices of self-censorship on the basis of fears that public dialogue 
processes might further entrench social hierarchies and inequalities. 
Finally, it was suggested that Taylor failed to offer reasonable proposals how to 
tackle the problem of dogmatism and the expression of sentiments which might 
be loosely classified under the term “hate speech”. This is an important point 
because any account of civil discourse must be prepared to clearly differentiate 
what constitutes “uncivil” discourse and how political institutions and actors 
should appropriately respond. 
This chapter, therefore, shall attempt to wrestle with the issue of power and 
civility, mainly focusing on the problem of epistemic injustice. Given these 
connections, and the limitations of Taylor's philosophical framework, I develop 
an account of civil discourse inspired by feminist epistemological theory. 
Firstly, I claim that a feminist approach towards civil discourse stresses that 
public discourse is inherently characterised by inequalities of epistemic status 
which track broader inequalities of political, economic and social power. These 
inequalities ensure that the testimony of powerful social groups and 
communities tends to be systematically privileged while the testimony of 
marginalised social groups and communities tend to be systematically 
marginalised or ignored in public discourses. 
Secondly, I claim that a feminist approach toward civil discourse recognizes that 
the discursive frames of public discourse are shaped by broader relations of 
power that enable and constrain public knowledge of contested political 
subjects. 
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Indeed, in particular, as I shall explore later, a feminist epistemological approach 
inherently foregrounds the importance of social practices of ignorance and how 
they constrain the terms of public discourse in favour of dominant interests, 
perspectives and social actors while marginalising or ignoring non-hegemonic 
interests, perspectives and social actors. 
Thirdly, I argue that a feminist understanding of civility acknowledges that public 
discourse is shaped by relations of power which influence the discursive 
behaviours of dialogue participants. Indeed, in particular, I argue that individuals 
from socially dominant communities or groups are often motivated to treat the 
political claims of marginalised communities with a variety of morally 
blameworthy stances, including callous indifference, arrogant dismissal or a 
wilful refusal to reconsider their own beliefs and values. 
Fourthly, I argue that a feminist approach towards civil discourse acknowledges 
that human beings are inherently social knowers who form and revise their 
beliefs and values through their relations with others.   
Consequently, a feminist approach foregrounds the importance of examining 
relationships of trust between individuals who come from different social 
backgrounds given our epistemic dependencies on others for knowledge about 
the world. From this perspective, it is vital to question how relations of power 
might lead us to inappropriately place our trust in some actors while neglecting 
to put warranted trust in others. 
Accordingly, given these insights, in this chapter I shall attempt to re-
conceptualize civility by connecting it with the normative concept of epistemic 
responsibility which is a central pillar of feminist epistemological theory. 
 My central claim is that civil discourse is a relationship of trust between 
interlocutors who mutually accept meeting certain epistemic responsibilities with 
respect to the connection between their public claim making activities and their 
worldviews. I argue that there are three key epistemic responsibilities integral to 
civility.  
Firstly, individuals must be mutually willing to learn about each other’s 
worldviews and to be particularly sensitive to how their social positioning 
influences the character of their claims. Secondly, I argue that individuals must 
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be mutually willing to question their own worldviews in order to effectively learn 
from other’s testimonial claims and to appreciate their areas of ignorance.  
Finally, I argue that individuals must be willing to question their own positioning 
in relations of power in order to develop a critical consciousness with respect to 
how the staking of their own claims and the reception of the claims of others 
might be unjustly distorted by dominant relations of power. 
From this perspective, the purpose of civil discourse is to facilitate the fair yet 
critical hearing of other’s testimonial claims and the self-reflective staking of 
one’s claims.  Accordingly, I understand civil discourse as a trust-building 
process between people who come from very different social backgrounds and 
who have diverse opinions on contested public issues. Civility entails a 
relationship of trust because fairly receiving one’s claims is a duty others owe to 
us just as fairly staking our claims is a duty we owe to others.  
Importantly, though, I stress that the exercise of our epistemic responsibilities 
are asymmetrical due to the operation of power asymmetries in certain 
contexts. On the one hand, it is clearly morally questionable to expect members 
from oppressed communities to learn about dominant worldviews which are 
deeply complicit in the justification and legitimation of injustice.  
On the other hand, it might occasionally be inappropriate for members of 
privileged social groups and communities to expect individuals from 
marginalised communities to share their knowledge with them in the face of 
deep trust deficits.  
Nevertheless, I argue that framing civility in terms of trust and epistemic 
responsibility affords a number of advantages. The first consideration is that it 
allows us to differentiate civil from uncivil discourse in a clearer fashion, not 
simply in terms of discursive or rhetorical techniques but also in terms of the 
epistemic motivations of participants in a given dialogue. 
Civil discourse, I claim, involves giving other people a fair hearing. It involves a 
willingness to understand different worldviews, to be prepared to change one’s 
perspectives and to appreciate the limitations of our knowledge and our areas 
of ignorance. 
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Uncivil discourse, by contrast, involves attempts by individuals to unjustly resist 
and avoid considering other people’s claims fairly and to stake one’s claims in a 
manipulative, deceptive or exploitative fashion.  
Moreover, it allows us to interrogate the profound connection between relations 
of power and the manner in which political claims are staked and received.  
Accordingly, it acknowledges that civil discourse is always dependent on the 
moral goodwill and good-faith of participants- something which cannot always 
be assured in the face of oppressive social relations.  
Consequently, civility in public discourse, I argue, is fundamentally dependent 
on our capacities to discriminate between trustworthy and untrustworthy 
testimony and trustworthy and untrustworthy interlocutors.  
Civility requires that people have sufficient trust in others to share their 
knowledge and to be sufficiently willing to change our own perspectives when 
considering their claims, providing that they have epistemic merit. Unfortunately, 
though, dominant relations of power- especially defects in collective knowledge 
resources and biased norms of epistemic credibility- frequently undermine the 
development of relations of trust which civil discourse necessarily depend. 
In addition, it provides an account of the limitations of civil discourse in the face 
of significant power asymmetries, particularly in terms of providing an account 
of where engaging in civil discourse is morally inappropriate or pragmatically 
futile.  
This is important in the face of objections that rather than privileging civil 
discourse, democratic theorists should be prioritising political coercion and 
claims that civil discourse is merely a veil for guileful manipulation and 
exploitation by the powerful. But what is “epistemic responsibility” precisely and 
how is it connected to the idea of trust? 
The central normative premise of epistemic responsibility is that social agents 
can be morally evaluated for their actions and inactions with respect to the 
formation, maintenance and revision of their beliefs and attitudes. 
This is to note, as Michael Williams suggests, that individuals ought to care 
about the justifications for their beliefs and that they should understand 
themselves to be morally accountable for them to others. (Williams, 2014, pg 
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230) This accountability stems from judgements as to whether an agent is 
fulfilling socially recognized standards of epistemic responsibility, thereby 
rendering it possible to judge particular actors as being liable and culpable for 
holding epistemically irresponsible beliefs. (Williams, 2014, pg 230) 
Indeed, as Linda Zagzebski explains, epistemic responsibility refers to the fact 
“that we ought to form beliefs in one way rather than another, to the fact that 
one way of believing is good, or at least better than some other”. (Zagzebski, 
1996, pg xxi, emphasis original) Nevertheless, it is also clear that the idea has 
been interpreted in multiple directions. 
Firstly, epistemic responsibility has connected to how epistemic agents should 
critically examine their beliefs to determine whether they should be retained, 
revised or abandoned in the face of the available evidence. (Grasswick, 2011; 
Mitova, 2011) 
Secondly, epistemic responsibility has been connected to the need to provide 
justifications for one's beliefs to others- that is, one needs to publicly justify the 
reasons why one believes X to be correct or true. (Williams, 1999) 
Thirdly, epistemic responsibility has been connected to questioning whether the 
formation of one’s beliefs has been negatively influenced by certain perceptual 
or interpretive errors or flaws in one's reasoning. (Kornblith, 1983) 
Moreover, as feminist epistemologists have stressed, epistemic responsibility 
might also require questioning the social influences which have informed our 
judgements regarding the soundness of our own beliefs, especially in terms of 
tracing how our beliefs are connected to asymmetries of power. 
Fourthly, epistemic responsibility has also been connected to an agent's 
motivations during the formation, maintenance and revision of our beliefs. 
(Corlett, 2008; Greco, 2010) In addition, it has also been related to how an 
epistemic agent attempts to defend their beliefs in the face of critical and 
reasonable questioning. (MacArthur, 2006, pg 109) 
Lastly, epistemic justification has been connected to how agents receive 
information from other persons, particularly in terms of whether an agent makes 
a fair evaluation of their epistemic trustworthiness, reliability and credibility. 
(Schweikard, 2013)  
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This insight is noteworthy as it signifies how individuals depend on forming their 
beliefs primarily via trusting other sources as opposed to forming them directly 
via our immediate perceptions and cognitive interpretations. 
Accordingly, given this outline of epistemic responsibility, it is important to 
describe how it is connected to a feminist conception of civil discourse. Firstly, I 
argue that if citizens are to exercise epistemic responsibility through civil 
discourse they must critically self-question their positioning within relations of 
power. This kind of self-questioning is vital if epistemic inequalities are to be 
challenged.  
I argue that this requirement is a necessary pre-condition to receiving other 
people's testimonial claims fairly and an essential pre-condition to staking one's 
claims with an appropriate degree of epistemic self-confidence and integrity. 
Without critically questioning one's positioning in relations of power, it will be 
difficult to understand how one's assessments of the credibility, trustworthiness 
and reliability of other knowers might be distorted by relations of epistemic 
injustice. As a result, it will be impossible to appropriately re-adjust one's 
credibility assessments to ensure that one accords appropriate epistemic 
validity to the perspectives of others. 
Secondly, without questioning our own position in relations of power it will also 
be impossible to develop a critical awareness of how one's evaluations of 
other's claims might be distorted by virtue of negative or positive assumptions 
about their particular communicative styles and by collective deficiencies and 
blind spots within collective social resources of interpretation. 
Conversely, without questioning our own position within relations of power one 
might either suffer from inappropriate deficits in epistemic confidence or an 
inappropriately inflated abundance of confidence in them by virtue of one's 
social position.  
This lack of self-confidence stems from the operation of oppressive social 
categorizations, stereotypes and prejudicial attitudes. This kind of self-
questioning particularly involves questioning social identity scripts that can lead 
us to suppress or distort our testimonial claims in public. The operation of these 
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scripts constitutes a serious discursive injustice as they necessarily entail that 
one's claims are not being considered on an equal basis with other claims. 
Another important facet of epistemic responsibility, I argue, is a willingness to 
critically reflect on epistemic strengths and weaknesses of our claims. I 
particularly suggest that this kind of self-questioning is essential in preventing 
tendencies to stake one's claims in a highly dogmatic, misleading or 
manipulative fashion. 
While this epistemic virtue is incumbent on all participations in a dialogue, this 
critical activity seems particularly important if individuals come from socially 
dominant or powerful groups or communities. In addition, I also maintain that a 
failure to critically self-question one's beliefs can be a significant indication of 
disrespect towards others, and it also undermines the possibilities for critical 
public discussion. 
Thirdly, I also claim that if epistemic responsibility is to be exercised through 
civil discourse it is vital that individuals appropriately question the validity of 
other people' perspectives and scrutinise their motivations as to whether they 
are worthy of one's epistemic trust.  
I argue that it is important to critically question other people’s epistemic 
benevolence towards oneself, especially in terms of their motivations and 
intentions when considering one’s claims. Other-questioning is vital if one is not 
to be manipulated or deceived by other people's testimonial claims or if one is to 
accept other people's epistemically faulty justifications.  
I believe such a stance of suspicion is appropriate- and more realistic than the 
framework offered by Rawls, Habermas and Taylor- in light of the reality that 
people engage in political dialogue with a broad range of moral motivations and 
intentions. Sometimes these motives and intentions will, unfortunately, be 
morally blameworthy, especially given that relations of epistemic injustices can 
breed malicious epistemic and communicative behaviours. 
Ultimately, therefore, I hope that by connecting civility to epistemic responsibility 
I will be able to develop an account of civil discourse that facilitates the fair yet 
critical hearing of others testimonial claims and which promotes the fair and 
critical staking of one's claims.  
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In addition, as my emphasis on other-questioning illustrates, I argue that 
framing civility with respect to epistemic responsibility allows us to appreciate 
some important limitations of the concept of civil discourse in the face of 
significant power asymmetries. 
This is the problem I identified in the chapter on Taylor when I raised the 
problem of people holding faulty epistemic and morally blameworthy beliefs or 
values. For example, it is morally obligatory to respectfully consider the claims 
of violent, discriminatory hate groups? I argue that apprising signs of our 
interlocutor’s benevolence are important in assessing when respectful 
engagement with other’s viewpoints is not morally appropriate. 
Accordingly, given this outline of the normative agenda, it is important to 
describe how this chapter shall proceed sequentially.  Firstly, I shall discuss the 
literature connecting trust and testimony, focusing on the vexed epistemic and 
normative problem of how to place responsible trust in other’s testimonial claims 
for the purposes of civil discourse.  
Secondly, I shall critically survey the feminist literature on the politics of our 
epistemic location and positioning and defend why it is vital to consider this 
literature when theorizing civil discourse. 
Finally, I shall then develop my account of civil discourse which builds on the 
insights garnered from my line of argument thus far, arguing that it centrally 
involves learning about and learning from other people’s worldviews while 
critically questioning our own beliefs and our positioning in broader relations of 
power. Accordingly, given this very brief outline, let us explore the relationship 
between trust and testimony. 
Understanding the connection between Trust and Testimony 
What does the idea of trust mean and what does it mean to appropriately trust 
other’s testimony in the first place? It is clear, as Maj Tuomela notes, that the 
concept of trust has been developed in a broad range of directions, with some 
theorists defining it in terms of a normative disposition or attitude, a social 
sentiment or as a process of cognitive evaluation. (Tuomela, 2006, pg 6) In 
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addition, there has also been a wide range of interpretations in terms of its 
social pre-conditions and terms of its social functions or merits. 
However, Jack Barbalet (2009) argues that it is vital to acknowledge that trust 
should be characterised in terms of the expectations of confidence held 
regarding other people's behaviour towards oneself and other parties. In 
addition, he claims that it should also be understood with respect to an 
individual's faith in the integrity of their judgements and their estimations of 
other people's attributes. (Barbalet, 2009) For instance, their competency or 
reliability as knowers in a particular knowledge domain. As he stresses: 
“A person’s trust of another will always be interactively generated not only in 
terms of perceptions of trustworthiness that might support a feeling of 
acceptance of dependence but principally in terms of feelings of confidence in 
the actor’s own capacities to form judgements or assessments of another and 
their future actions.” (2009, pg 376) 
In addition, he also notes that some of the essential pre-conditions for trust 
include situations defined by their uncertainty and incomplete knowledge 
regarding a subject matter and the intentions and motivations of other persons, 
particularly in terms of their future actions. Trust is characterised by 
asymmetries of dependency between different parties that potentially renders 
us vulnerable to negative consequences. (2009, pgs 367-368) 
Trust is, therefore, anticipatory in that it involves a willingness not to subject 
another party to vigorous suspicion and scrutiny as it is dependent upon 
assuming that other parties will act with a degree of benevolence towards 
oneself. Indeed, as McLeod (2011) stresses: “When we trust people, we are 
optimistic not only that they are competent to do what we trust them to do, but 
also that they are committed to doing it”. (McLeod, 2001, no page numbers 
available) 
However, as Barbalet stresses, trust should not be conflated with an 
appreciation of another person's qualities as it is precisely given before another 
person's actions “can be known or appraised”. (2009, pg 376) 
Importantly, Barbalet also stresses that trust constitutes an “anticipation of a 
future outcome that, if successful, it creates” itself- that is to say, trust “facilitates 
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and realises outcomes that could not occur without the giving of trust”, thereby 
rendering trust a creative and generative vehicle of new possibilities in our 
social relationships. (2009, pg 369) 
It is also important to stress that the basis on which trust is extended is 
pluralistic as it is simultaneously mediated via agent-dependent qualities (for 
instance, past experiences of another person) as well as broader social 
considerations (for example, cues of social status or social reputation). 
However, how can one trust in other’s testimony appropriately? 
On the one hand, trust is an essential aspect of acquiring, developing, revising 
or rejecting our testimonial-derived beliefs. It is simply an impossibility to 
validate all information received by consulting non-testimonial sources- for 
instance, due to a lack of time, a lack of expertise or a lack of epistemic 
confidence. Trust functions as an important vehicle for informational exchange 
as it increases both the willingness of people to render themselves vulnerable to 
receiving knowledge and to share knowledge with others. Indeed, as Broncano 
& Encabo (2008) stress in this regard: 
“Testimony seems to inherit a kind of rational responsiveness from this attitude 
of trust that is constitutive of our sociality. It is even the fact of creating a 
situation of vulnerability for the trusting person that constitutes the special 
reason to be trustworthy and cooperate. That means again that testimonial 
contexts cannot be understood without taking into account our character as 
persons engaged in a cooperative epistemic task. So testimony exhibits 
necessarily a moral dimension. In some epistemic practices, one cannot be 
dispensed from viewing them as ethically constrained. On the one hand, 
testimony creates obligations and responsibilities in the participants that are 
both epistemic and ethical”. (pg 8) 
Accordingly, the centrality of relations of trust in the context of testimonial 
exchange foregrounds our mutual dependencies as knowers as people must 
often defer to the judgements of sources perceived to be more authoritative, 
credible or reliable. However, as Robert Talisse (2013) notes, this relationship 
can be risky in that “one may defer to the wrong persons to the wrong extent”, 
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thereby rendering us vulnerable to “developing beliefs and epistemic habits” 
that “engender and sustain falsehood”. (Talisse, 2013, pg 137) 
In addition, relations of trust can also be distorted by the operation of epistemic 
injustices that constrict access to or undermine the intelligibility of conceptual 
resources necessary to reasonably consider other people's claims and 
justifications. Indeed, relations of epistemic injustice serve to significantly 
constrict and bias our interpretive resources as well as our intellectual and 
affective responsiveness. 
Indeed, as Louise Antony (2013) notes, it is often not simply the case that 
members of advantaged groups possess “defective conceptions of knowledge 
and employ ineffective norms”. Rather, they “fail to learn” because they 
fundamentally do not care. Their epistemic methods of inquiry are not flawed. It 
is more the case that their epistemic goals are morally blameworthy. (Antony, 
2013, no page numbers available) 
Conversely, members of oppressed communities are frequently placed in 
positions of epistemic vulnerability. For instance, attempts to empathetically 
understand the life experiences and viewpoints of members of advantaged 
groups can result in moral injuries or even symptoms of physical harm.   
This process can potentially compromise the self-trust, self-worth and self-
respect of marginalised individuals if they engage with epistemic resources that 
justify, rationalize or legitimate their political marginalisation and exploitation.  
Alternatively, as Townley notes, certain kinds of oppression significantly 
compromise our capacities to trust others. (Townley, 2011) 
This issue is particularly pressing in circumstances where marginalised 
individuals internalise dominant, negative social perceptions and assumptions 
about themselves. Alternatively, they might experience a sense of pressure to 
alter their social routines and behaviours to conform to dominant social 
perceptions and assumptions. This problem has been extensively highlighted by 
the literature regarding “adaptive preferences” and “internalised oppression”. 
In addition, as Louise Antony (2013) further notes, relations of epistemic 
injustice can also severely compromise the capacities of marginalised 
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individuals to understand the broader structural and institutional forces that 
shape one's life. For instance, as she notes: 
“Having the leisure time to read a newspaper every day, three or four journals a 
week, and a couple of books a month is an enormous privilege not available to 
people working two jobs while caring for small children” (Antony, 2013, no page 
numbers available) 
In conclusion, relations of injustice between social groups and communities can 
significantly impact upon relations of trust between them, thereby rendering it 
difficult to foster and sustain civil discourse across profound disagreement and 
difference.  
This is particularly important given that evaluations of trustworthiness regarding 
other persons and their testimony often occur automatically and unconsciously. 
Our judgements of trustworthiness are likely always to be influenced, to varying 
degrees, by prejudicial social discourses, categorizations, ideological constructs 
and prejudicial attitudes. 
Furthermore, research also highlights that trust is mediated by social category 
memberships. For instance, people tend to accord greater trust to perceived 
members of in-groups as opposed to out-groups. (Foddy & Yamagishi, 2009; 
Williams, 2001) However, what are the implications precisely of this discussion 
for the fair evaluation of people’s testimonial claims? I argue that feminist 
discussions of testimony can offer us significant insights here. 
Indeed, feminist epistemological theory has made vital contributions to the 
rejuvenation of the concept of testimony as a site of political inquiry. Feminist 
conceptions of testimony have particularly stressed how deeply dependent 
people are on trusting the testimony of others in a myriad of fashions without 
necessarily having the opportunities, abilities or willingness to subject their 
trusting to critical, rational reflection.  
This problematic occurs, as McLoed notes, because it seems practically 
impossible to submit “all of our trust to rational reflection” as it is simply 
unavoidable to ensuring the efficient functioning of social processes or to further 
develop social relationships. (McLeod, 2011)  
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Accordingly, feminist epistemologists have stressed how the exchange of 
testimonial knowledge is a primary source of knowledge in addition to non-
testimonial sources such as logical inference, memory and acculturation.  
Consequently, as they have argued that all persons invariably depend upon 
testimonial knowledge feminist inquiry has maintained that it is vital to explore 
the conditions under which it is appropriate or inappropriate to trust testimonial 
claims. But what constitutes 'testimony' precisely and on what grounds ought 
one to accept another person's testimony? The first question is relatively 
uncontroversial to answer.  
The notion of testimony, Elizabeth Fricker notes, can be defined as a process of 
communicative exchange in which knowledge is acquired from trusting the 
spoken or written reports of other people. (Fricker, 2004, pg 109)  
However, the second question has constituted one of the most divisive 
problems in social epistemology with two broad schools emerging with 
divergent conceptualizations of the grounds of justification for accepting other's 
testimony. 
The first school of thought outlines a reductionist account of testimony that 
stresses that any beliefs acquired via testimony should only be taken as being 
epistemically valid if they were verified through non-testimonial sources of 
knowledge as well. For instance, through our faculties of perception, memory 
and logical inference. (Gelfert, 2014; Green, 2008; Lackey, 2008)  
Reductionist accounts of testimony, therefore, stress the importance of listeners 
evaluating whether there are positive justifications for accepting the reliability, 
credibility and trustworthiness of other people's testimony. It argues that one 
should adopt a default stance of distrust toward testimony until one has positive 
justification to accept its epistemic reliability. (Adler, 2012; Lackey, 2006) 
It further foregrounds the importance of those receiving testimony to question its 
credibility and trustworthiness by probing its justificatory merits or demerits. It 
argues that one needs to assess all relevant information to judge the reliability 
of the person staking a claim and to judge whether, on the balance of the 
available evidence, whether their testimony is epistemically reliable and sound. 
(Shogenji, 2006) 
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The Reliabilist School, therefore, arguably reflects a more long-standing 
suspicion within “western” philosophy about the epistemic merits of testimony. 
This historical lineage links non-liberal and liberal philosophers, including the 
work of Plato, Descartes and Locke, who were profoundly suspicious about 
depending on other people's testimony as a source of knowledge. (Zagzebski, 
2012) 
Indeed, as Sperber et al (2010) note, it is often the case within that (so-called) 
“classical”' epistemological theory that the “uncritical acceptance of the claims of 
others” was a fundamental illustration of a “failure to meet rationality 
requirements imposed on genuine knowledge”. (pg 361) This point, in turn, 
reflects the concern that forming, revising or rejecting beliefs merely on the 
perceived authority of a speaker is deeply epistemically flawed. 
Firstly, from the perspective of transparency, it often seems difficult to discern a 
person's motivations and intentions in a communicative exchange- a point that 
has been well illustrated by research in social psychology. Secondly, from the 
perspective of exploitation, it is feared that testimony can render oneself 
vulnerable to manipulation and exploitation by people with morally dubious 
motivations and intentions towards oneself. 
Thirdly, from the perspective of epistemic accuracy, it is questioned how one 
can avoid being epistemically duped by deceptive, erroneous or vague 
testimony. This problem is especially vexing where people lack the epistemic 
resources to assess accurately a speaker's reliability, credibility and 
trustworthiness or where they face pressing situational factors. 
Finally, it is feared that relying on testimony will undermine our capacities to 
hold our beliefs in a rational fashion; that is, being able to justify our beliefs with 
epistemically sound reasons.  
However, a wide range of critics, particularly stemming from feminist critiques of 
classical epistemology, have rejected reductionist accounts of testimony. These 
critiques have argued that this picture ignores the reality that human agents are 
fundamentally dependent on other people's testimony for our basic knowledge 
about the world and that this dependency can be rationally justified. From this 
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perspective, people are prima facie entitled to trust the testimony of others on a 
default basis. (Coady, 1992; Fricker, 2005; Goldberg, 2007) 
Accordingly, an anti-reductionist position emerged which criticised reductionism 
on the basis that it ignored these considerations by unfairly- and inaccurately- 
placing exclusive emphasis on a hearer to justify the claims of a speaker. 
(Lackey, 2006)  
This position also argued that it is an essential communicative pre-condition for 
listeners to accept testimony as being reliable on a provisional basis. In 
addition, they stressed that it is often profoundly difficult for individuals to 
confirm the reliability of testimony by using their non-testimonial resources. 
Indeed, anti-reductionists emphasise that there are often excellent epistemic 
reasons to accept a speaker's testimony on a default basis. (McMyler, 2011; 
Sperber et al, 2010) 
One should accept testimony until one has strong reasons to question it. This 
advocacy of epistemic deference stems from the anti-reductionist claim that 
people often recognize others as being in more epistemically authoritative 
position than oneself with respect to certain kinds of knowledge. It is through 
deferring to others testimony that one can save significant cognitive energy, 
allowing people to access the benefits of diverse, collective epistemic resources 
with minimal cognitive effort. (Adler, 2012) 
Moreover, they argue that without occasionally deferring to other's testimonial 
claims it can be extremely difficult to develop new beliefs or to revise them in 
the face of different epistemic resources. Anti-reductionists, therefore, stress 
that testimony does not require prima facie positive reasons for its acceptance.  
(Lackey, 2006; McMyler, 2011) 
Finally, given the large scale nature of contemporary societies, anti-
reductionists claim that epistemic deference serves an important functional role 
in facilitating social co-operation. Epistemic deference to testimony is premised 
upon a listener trusting the authority of a speaker. Elizabeth Fricker defines the 
notion of testimonial deference quite concisely thus: 
“...it is rational to accept another's word on a topic, and even to allow her 
expressed judgement to override one's prior opinion, when one knows that she 
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is firmly placed epistemically, and better placed than oneself, regarding the 
matter in question. For each of us, her appreciation of her own circumscribed 
and feeble epistemic powers and small position in the larger scheme of things, 
together with her grasp of folk psychology, including where applicable 
appreciation of others' superior expertise and epistemically more advantageous 
position, entails that deference to others' opinions is rational in these 
circumstances. Lack of such appreciation of one's limited powers and others' 
superior ones, and an accompanying refusal to bow to others' judgement or 
advice even when they are clearly relatively expert, is pig-headed irrationality, 
not epistemic virtue or strength. (Fricker, 2006, pg 239) 
In conclusion, the central problem with the reductionist approach is that it 
seems to be profoundly cognitive and affectively taxing. This problem is 
particularly manifested where the testimony concerned is particularly complex in 
nature.  
Another problem with the reductionist approach, as Miranda Fricker notes, is 
that it is only quite rarely that people consciously reflect on the credibility of a 
speaker and the epistemic merits or demerits of their claims. Instead, the 
acceptance or rejection of testimony is often an unconscious and automatic 
process- that is, it occurs without critical reflection. (Fricker, 2007) 
The central problem of course with the anti-reductionist perspective is that a 
stance of default trust might lead us to accept the testimony of other people 
inappropriately as we failure to sufficiently question the justificatory merits of a 
given claim.  
This problem is particularly problematic given that the reality that people 
frequently engage in communicative exchanges with deeply malicious intentions 
and purposes. Critics of the anti-reductionist position, therefore, correctly fear 
that it does not adequately account the possibility of deception, manipulation or 
trickery. 
Moreover, as Miranda Fricker also notes, the anti-reductionist approach seems 
to lack critical purchase- how is it possible for people to critically question a 
viewpoint if one provisionally accepts it as being trustworthy? (Fricker, 2007)  
176 
 
Given the problems associated with both positions, therefore, perhaps it is more 
insightful to emphasize that dialogical exchanges are dependent on all parties 
exercising an appropriate kind of epistemic responsibility towards each other. 
On the one hand, it is vital not to irresponsibly accord undue epistemic weight to 
other people's claims as this would leave us vulnerable to manipulation, 
exploitation and the acquisition of distorted and false beliefs. On the other hand, 
if one is overly suspicious towards someone's testimony one can prevent 
oneself from acquiring epistemically sounder beliefs or unjustly marginalize, 
ignore or exclude valid testimonial claims. 
It seems, therefore, that given this requirement the distinction between 
reductionist and non-reductionist accounts of testimony is not particularly 
helpful. On some occasions, there might be excellent epistemic and social 
reasons merely to accept someone's testimony on the basis of their epistemic 
authority. In other circumstances, people will need to use a full range of 
epistemic resources, including knowledge derived from non-testimonial 
resources, to critically evaluate people's claims and justifications. 
From this point of view, people must continually negotiate a precarious tension 
that incorporates insights from both the reductionist and anti-reductionist 
schools. While human beings are fundamentally dependent on other's people 
testimony for valid epistemic and social reasons it is also vital to ensure that 
one develops capacities to discriminate between testimony which is worthy of 
one's beliefs or not. However, how is this discriminatory faculty possible? 
It is clear that there has been a wide range of responses to this problem. Firstly, 
it has been noted that people can use contextual and situational knowledge to 
assist them as to whether testimony is worthy of their acceptance or not. 
(Faulkner, 2003; Gelfert, 2014; Origgi, 2012) 
Secondly, one can use intuitions regarding the psychological state of a speaker, 
especially in terms of indicators from their verbal and non-verbal body 
language. (Faulkner, 2003; O'Brien, 2006; Origgi, 2012) 
Thirdly, one can use historically based knowledge of a person to guide whether 
their testimony should be deemed reliable or unreliable- for instance, the nature 
of one's previous experiences with another person. (Jones, 1996; Origgi, 2012) 
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Fourthly, one can rely on testimonies of testimonies- that is, the testimony of 
other people as to whether another person's testimony should be deemed 
reliable or not. (Faulkner, 2003; Gelfert, 2014) 
Fifthly, one can use information derived from social roles that can allow us to 
judge a person's reliability, trustworthiness and credibility. (Gelfert, 2014) For 
instance, it seems more epistemically responsible to defer to the medical 
opinion of a trained medical doctor rather than an herbalist to treat a severe 
viral infection in most circumstances.  
Sixthly, as reductionists note, one can attempt to verify testimony via non-
testimonial resources such as logical inference, memory and perceptive 
observations.  
Lastly, as Daukas argues, one can develop skills of discernment by developing 
individual character traits over time and by dialogically engaging with others in 
daily social practices. She argues that one can cultivate a more discerning 
epistemic character through gradual practice and habituation. (Daukas, 2006) 
In conclusion, it is evident that communicative exchange is not possible without 
interlocutors according each other a minimal, prima facie element of trust. 
(Origgi, 2004; 2008) This prima facie trust, as Haslanger notes, involves an 
initial presumption that communicative partners accord one another “a threshold 
degree of first-order epistemic credibility”. (Haslanger, 2012, pg 5) Indeed, as 
Wittgenstein pointed famously out, even the act of doubting is dependent upon 
trusting certain background principles to be true. (Wittgenstein, 1969)  
Unsurprisingly, therefore, as feminist critics have noted our pre-conceived 
notions of people who are worthy or unworthy of our testimonial trust will 
inevitably be shaped by asymmetries of power that also profoundly influence 
the manner in which one interprets and responds to the testimony of others. 
Accordingly, it is vital to stress that while reliance on others' testimony is an 
inevitable aspect of communicative exchange- and often immensely beneficial 
from an epistemic perspective- it also renders people vulnerable to certain risks. 
It is vital that participants in dialogical exchange are capable of discerning when 
trust is warranted or unwarranted in other people and their testimony.  
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While human beings are capable of using some of the tools I have just outlined 
to assess the trustworthiness of others testimony, I argue that such an approach 
needs to be complemented by people developing a greater awareness of the 
political implications of our epistemic location and positioning. This is because 
our epistemic location and positioning profoundly shape our worldviews, which 
in turn, shape how we stake and receive other people’s claims. 
 Fortunately, though, feminist epistemological theories have considered this 
problem in depth and so it is worthwhile to explore their understanding of the 
political dimensions of knowledge before explicating my account of civil 
discourse in greater depth. 
The Politics of Epistemic Location and Positioning: 
It is clear that one of the most fruitful avenues to interrogate the political and 
moral implications of knowledge and ignorance stem from feminist critiques of 
dominant epistemological frameworks of the 'western' philosophical canon. 
These critiques, as Elizabeth Anderson (2011) insightfully notes, have 
comprehensively demonstrated how women were excluded from certain areas 
of knowledge inquiry, denied women appropriate epistemic authority, credibility 
and trustworthiness in particular knowledge domains and ignored concerns 
central to women's lived realities and experiences. (Anderson, 2011) 
Moreover, they also typically positioned women as being inherently flawed 
knowers by virtue of their alleged deficiencies and limitations in their reasoning 
and affective styles, treating them as inherently inferior knowers by virtue of 
essentialized characteristics while positioning men as being innately superior 
knowers. (Anderson, 2011; Bordo 1999; Harding, 1991; Lloyd, 1986) 
Consequently, feminist epistemologists have engaged in a fundamental re-
thinking of traditional epistemic assumptions within the “western” philosophical 
canon. Indeed, in particular, feminist critiques of dominant western 
epistemologies have ferociously questioned its ontological assumptions about 
human nature. These assumptions typically suggested that human knowers' 
were atomistically individual, rationalistic and dis-embedded from their broader 
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social context and relationships. (Code, 1991; Grasswick, 2011, pg xvii; 
Narayan, 1989; Shuford, 2011)  
In addition, feminist epistemologists fundamentally stress the social character of 
knowledge, developing accounts of epistemic dependence and relationality that 
countered individualistic accounts of knowing. (Code, 1991)  
Importantly, acquiring more objective knowledge is also understood to involve 
negotiating one's social relations with others. As a consequence, feminist 
theories of epistemology have particularly defended the proposition human 
beings are profoundly reliant on trusting the testimony of other people to acquire 
social knowledge. (Grasswick, 2012; Scheman, 2011, pg 214) 
In addition, feminist epistemological theory has also stressed how all knowledge 
is social in that it is inherently situated within a given location at a given time 
and within a broader social imaginary that obscures certain types of knowledge 
while socially privileging others. (Code, 1991) 
Moreover, feminist epistemological theories generally stress that the social 
location or positioning of a knower has fundamentally important epistemic 
implications, particularly in terms of its capacity in contexts of power 
asymmetries to afford or limit access to knowledge and to privilege or 
marginalise certain claims. (Alcoff, 1991; Lennon & Whitford; 2002, pg 1) 
From a feminist epistemological perspective, therefore, knowledge inquiry is 
inherently a relational and intersubjective process. It is mediated by historical, 
cultural and social factors, particularly in terms of sets of implicit background 
understandings, social discourses and categorizations as well as social 
imaginaries. (Code, 2006; Code 2011) 
Another key focus of feminist epistemological theories concerns the idea that 
dominant standards of epistemic credibility are often disguised as being neutral 
or 'natural'. These processes occur by virtue of the operation of background 
ideologies, social discourses and social categorizations which position 
individuals from different communities and social groups as being credible/non-
credible, trustworthy/untrustworthy or reliable/non-reliable knowers and claim-
makers. (Fricker, 2007)  
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These norms foreground the profound connection between knowledge and 
power relations- indeed, as Harding notes, feminist epistemological theory is 
profoundly committed to the view that power and knowledge inherently “co-
constitute and co-maintain each other”. (Harding, 2004, pg 67) This is because, 
as Nancy Potter further notes, knowledge is “caused by social, economic and 
political interests”. (Potter, 1996, pg 239) 
Unsurprisingly, feminist epistemologists have investigated how power relations 
impact upon practices of knowledge production and exchange. They have 
notably explored which social groups and communities are accorded or denied 
epistemic authority, trustworthiness and credibility. They have also focused on 
how certain background assumptions or political commitments encourage 
certain kinds of knowledge inquiry while de-legitimating other kinds. 
Consequently, feminist epistemological accounts are particularly interested in 
analysing how epistemic norms are biased towards the viewpoints and interests 
of dominant social groups and communities. Importantly though, these accounts 
have also stressed the possibilities for resisting dominant epistemic 
frameworks. This interest means, as Tuana notes, that feminist epistemological 
theory “{is} concerned not simply with descriptive analyses of our current 
knowledge practices, they are also committed to developing accounts of how 
our knowledge practices can be improved”. (Tuana, 2001, pg 16)  
A feminist epistemological perspective not only aims to evaluate critically 
dominant epistemic norms, but it also seeks to identify how these norms can be 
contested and transformed. Unsurprisingly, as Tuana continues, feminist 
theories of epistemology frequently note the moral importance of individuals 
properly fulfilling their epistemic responsibilities if dominant regimes of 
knowledge are to be resisted. This claim entails a: 
“....belief that we have a responsibility to consider how social structures impact 
the generation of knowledge... as individuals and members of social orders 
{people} must take responsibility for how cognitive authority is established, for 
the values that knowledge practices embrace, and for those values that are 
rejected or rendered invisible.” (Tuana, 2001, pg 16) 
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In addition, it is also important to stress how feminist epistemological 
frameworks have closely connected patterns of social knowledge and ignorance 
to our social identities. This is to say that our social identities simultaneously 
serve to enable and frustrate knowledge production and exchange. For 
instance, as Linda Alcoff (2001) argues: 
“Social identities are relevant variables by which available interpretive 
processes regrouped and distinguished. This is not of course to say that 
differently identified individuals live in different worlds or experience globally 
different perceptions, but that prevalent narratives and concepts are often 
correlated to particular social identities…Social identity matters because 
experience and perception matter for the possibility of knowledge. No individual 
is capable of knowing from every experiential location...and our social identities 
are in some cases relevant to our experiential locations, though certainly not the 
most or only relevant feature.” (Alcoff, 2001, pgs 73-74) 
Accordingly, our social locations and social identities simultaneously afford and 
hinder access to certain epistemic resources, thereby simultaneously facilitating 
and inhibiting the critique of dominant relations of power. However, how do 
these epistemic inheritances and relationships frustrate and facilitate social 
criticism precisely? 
If one considers the first aspect of the question, feminist epistemologists have 
frequently stressed the importance of re-thinking the political significance of 
ignorance. Ignorance, as a number of critics have noted, has historically been 
defined as merely a process or a state of being deficient in one's knowledge of 
a particular subject or domain. (Applebaum, 2010; Proctor, 2008; Smithson, 
2008)  
However, feminist epistemological theories have countered that patterns of 
social ignorance in unequal societies do not reflect mere a lack or an omission 
of knowledge. (Proctor, 2008) Ignorance is not merely a function of cognitive 
imperfections of knowledge acquisition or contingent failings in institutional 
design rather it involves an active process of social construction. This is to say 
that patterns of ignorance in society produced and maintained via the operation 
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of asymmetrical relationships of power. (Applebaum, 2010; Code, 2014; Proctor, 
2008; Smithson, 2008; Tuana & Sullivan, 2009) 
Feminist epistemologists have argued, therefore, that members from dominant 
social groups or communities are often motivated to cultivate ignorance about 
the lived experiences of marginalised groups to legitimate their social 
advantages. Patterns of social ignorance are never morally innocent as they 
serve to silence, neglect, overlook, distort, devalue and delegitimate the 
interpretive resources of marginalised communities. 
This point has further developed by Pohlhaus (2012) who stresses the morally 
blameworthy aspects of situations where “dominantly situated knowers refuse to 
acknowledge epistemic tools developed from the experienced world of those 
situated marginally.” (Pohlhaus, 2012, pg 715) Consequently, this 
misrecognition allows relatively privileged individuals to “misunderstand, 
misinterpret and/or ignore whole parts of the world”. (Pohlhaus, 2012, pg 715) 
It constitutes both a moral failing as well as an epistemic failing as social 
relations of ignorance serve to unjustly privilege certain kinds of epistemic 
actors or knowledge forms while unjustly marginalising other types. (Bergin, 
2002)  
Importantly, practices of social ignorance are profoundly connected to the 
operation of epistemic injustices in society. Tuana (2008), for example, 
emphasises that “because ignorance is frequently constructed and actively 
preserved” it is inherently connected to “issues of cognitive authority, doubt, 
trust, silencing, and uncertainty”. (pg 109) Indeed, as McGoey further suggests, 
ignorance must be understood as an epistemic resource which can be deployed 
to deflect, obscure, conceal or magnify certain kinds of knowledge precisely to 
increase the “scope of what remains unintelligible”. (2012, pg 1)  
Accordingly, ignorance involves wilful self-deception by individuals in privileged 
social positions. This self-deception ultimately serves to deny, ignore and 
obscure how one is morally implicated in relations and practices of oppression. 
Unsurprisingly, both epistemologists of gender and race argue that it is in the 
material interests of dominant groups to maintain practices of ignorance. (Mills, 
1997; Mills & Pateman, 2013)  
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Importantly, there are domains of knowledge that members of privileged 
communities are simply encouraged or even rewarded not to consider. 
Dominant epistemic norms and resources serve to foster distorted social 
interpretations of the lived experiences of marginalised groups, thereby allowing 
advantaged groups and institutions to justify and rationalize policies which 
entrench their domination.  
Indeed, they might even allow such groups to maintain that these inequalities 
are for the benefit or well-being of the oppressed. This kind of culpable 
ignorance is particular deleterious because it breeds “arrogant” patterns of 
social perception that serve to reproduce the legitimation of unjust social 
arrangements. (Lugones, 1987) 
For instance, the work of Guy Standing (2011) and Owen Jones (2012) has 
outlined how moralistic discourses regarding the “undeserving poor” have 
positioned members of economically disadvantaged groups as being morally 
responsible for their impoverishment.  
These discourses cast such individuals as being social deviants who suffer from 
pathological personality defects, particularly sloth or mindless consumerism. 
This discourse of poverty thereby deliberately and intentionally ignores the 
structural factors and governmental policy decisions which create and maintain 
their disadvantaged status. 
Instead, such individuals are treated with contempt, pity and derision and are 
reduced to supplicating for ever-dwindling support from the state or are coerced 
into low-paid jobs with no opportunities for career development or social 
mobility. (Jones, 2012; Standing 2011) 
Tuana’s comprehensive taxonomy of ignorance further allows us to survey the 
political implications of this problem in further detail. (Tuana, 2006) The first kind 
of culpable ignorance, she argues, is “knowing that we do not know, but not 
caring to know”. (2006, pg 4) This kind of ignorance inhibits knowledge 
production and exchange because it positions certain types of knowledge as not 
being worthy of exploration and development due to their perceived social 
unimportance or irrelevancy.  
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Practices of social ignorance, therefore, can result in structural deficiencies in 
collective knowledge production and exchange. For instance, Tuana cites the 
historical lack of research into female ejaculation and menopause which was 
animated by morally and epistemically flawed assumptions about female 
sexuality. (Tuana, 2006; 2008) 
Tuana's second kind of ignorance is “not even knowing that we do not know”. 
(2006, pg 6) This type of ignorance is cultivated because “our current interests, 
beliefs and theories” marginalise key areas of social knowledge. (2006, pg 6) 
Significantly, this kind of ignorance is particularly implicated in epistemic types 
of injustice as it breeds the conditions for hermeneutical marginalisation, 
thereby rendering the contestation of areas of culpable ignorance extremely 
difficult.  
The third kind of ignorance occurs when “the ignorance of certain groups is 
systematically cultivated”. (2006, pg 9) This type of ignorance is often cultivated 
deliberately by social actors with vested interests and significant economic, 
political and social power.  
Tuana cites the example of tobacco companies attempting to withhold 
knowledge about the damaging health impacts of smoking as an exemplar of 
this kind of manufactured ignorance. (See Proctor (2008) for a further 
discussion of this issue) 
The final kind of ignorance is what Tuana terms “wilful ignorance” and it occurs 
when people do not know and do not want to know about something. This type 
of ignorance is motivated as it serves to protect one's interests, particularly in 
terms of how it allows people from advantaged and privileged backgrounds to 
deny their moral implication in relations of injustice. Indeed, as she stresses 
wilful ignorance constitutes a: 
“…systematic process of self-deception, a wilful embrace of ignorance that 
infects those who are in positions of privilege, an active ignoring of the 
oppression of others and one's role in that exploitation” (2006, pg 11) 
Similarly, Nancy M Williams differentiates between four different kinds of 
ignorance. The first kind of ignorance occurs when individuals deny the causal 
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connection between a given action and the ensuing suffering inflicted on its 
victims.  
Williams suggests that this type of ignorance is particularly manifested in the 
choice of language that perpetrators of injustices use to cognitively and 
affectively disassociate themselves from their immoral actions. (Williams, 2008) 
The second kind of ignorance involves requests not to be informed about a 
particular practice. Williams cites the example of a military commander who 
claims ignorance about the abuse of prisoners of war after ordering to use all 
means possible to extract information from them.  
This kind of ignorance, she argues, is morally culpable in that an agent has a 
“compelling reason”- and likely the capacities- to “carefully monitor or 
investigate” a phenomenon yet one neglects or refuses to do so. (Williams, 
2008, pg 373) 
The third form of ignorance, according to Williams, occurs in situations where 
individuals are motivated not to ask certain questions in order to avoid 
investigating a particular phenomenon. Williams cites the example of a mother 
who represses her suspicions that her husband is sexually abusing their 
daughter in the face of observations she makes about their behaviour. 
(Williams, 2008) 
Lastly, Williams argues that affected ignorance occurs when individuals 
“uncritically accept the dictates of custom and ideological constructions”. 
(Williams, 2008, pg 373) Indeed, as she stresses, this kind of ignorance 
particularly involves a “dogmatic adherence to conventional rationalizations” as 
well as a vested refusal to acknowledge that “majority opinions” or “widespread 
practices” are morally wrong. (Williams, 2008, pg 373) 
It constitutes a kind of “cultural and moral arrogance” which motivates people to 
remain blind to any justifications or evidence that would necessitate rigorous 
moral inquiry. (Williams, 2008, pg 373) Williams cites the work of Hoagland 
(1993) who notes situations where members of privileged groups narrowly 
interpret the behaviours of disadvantaged individuals via pejorative stereotypes 
as opposed to questioning the validity of these stereotypes in the first place.  
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The particularly pernicious aspect of this form of ignorance, Williams notes, is 
that it allows members from dominant social groups and communities to 
perceive their actions as being legitimate or morally exempt even if they are 
directly implicated in oppressive social relations and institutions. (Williams, 
2008, pg 373) 
In conclusion, therefore, one can draw a number of conclusions with respect to 
practices of ignorance. Firstly, such practices are inherently social in character 
and cannot be reduced to individual personality failings or practical limitations in 
accessing relevant social information.  
Secondly, practices of ignorance are profoundly connected to the re-production 
of unjust social relations and institutions as they hinder a critical examination of 
their functioning. Indeed, practices of ignorance often contribute to their social 
legitimation, rationalization and justification. 
Finally, practices of ignorance frequently serve to marginalise, ignore or exclude 
victims of oppression by creating an epistemic climate where it is extremely 
difficult for injustices to be publicly conceptualised or for members of 
advantaged communities to take their claims seriously. Indeed, feminist 
epistemology of ignorance stress that members of advantaged groups often 
have material or psychological investments in the status quo which can severely 
distort their epistemic practices. (Harding, 1998, pg 151) 
Consequently, this lack of interest and concern means that such individuals 
might be entirely ignorant that their knowledge procedures and resources might 
significantly distort and misrepresent the lived experiences of victims of 
oppression. There might be no appreciation that collective forms of ignorance 
play a role in the social legitimation, rationalization and justification of relations 
of domination. Practices of ignorance, therefore, function by presenting 
selective perceptions of reality as 'natural' while actively denying their myopic 
character. 
Importantly though, as Alison Bailey has demonstrated, “strategic” kinds of 
ignorance can also be a site of political resistance. For instance, Bailey argues 
that feigning ignorance can be an important means for oppressed communities 
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to acquire information, to sabotage their work, to avoid or delay harm or to 
preserve the dignity of their sense of self. (Bailey, 2007, pg 77; 88)  
It is also important to stress as well that while practices of ignorance are 
profoundly connected to the reproduction of oppressive social relations they can 
also “contribute positively to epistemic responsibility”. (Townley, 2006, pg 37) 
This is because recognising our ignorance can be an essential means via which 
our knowledge can be improved or increased. (Townley, 2006, pg 37) 
Accordingly, having outlined some of the voluminous feminist literature on 
ignorance, it is appropriate now to turn to the next significant insight afforded by 
feminist epistemologists of knowledge- namely the importance of standpoint in 
developing a critical consciousness.  
This emphasis is important as it is vital to explore the parallel facet of the 
connection between power and access to epistemic resources- namely, the 
reality that members of marginalised communities might be able to counter the 
operation of practices of ignorance by virtue of the epistemic insights afforded 
by their social positioning and location. 
The importance of standpoint in the development of critical 
consciousness: 
It is also vital to note that beyond discussing practices of social ignorance, 
feminist epistemologists have also argued that people who occupy relatively 
disadvantaged social locations can contingently have a more objective 
understanding of oppressive social relations in a given society.  
This insight stems from the fact that members of oppressed groups are 
excluded or marginalized by dominant epistemic frameworks while 
simultaneously having to negotiate them strategically in their quotidian routines. 
(Collins, 1991) 
Some theorists argue that the principle of “epistemic advantage” stems from the 
dialectical movement negotiated by individuals from marginalised social 
backgrounds between dominant, hegemonic social interpretations and their 
lived experiences of injustice. (Bowell, 2011; Pohlhaus, 2012, pg 720)  
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This movement produces a kind of epistemic tension or friction which enables 
people who come from comparatively disadvantaged social backgrounds to 
form more objective knowledge about the realities of oppression in given 
situational contexts. It allows them to understand the epistemically flawed 
nature of dominant interpretive resources.  
For instance, marginalised individuals might have a greater appreciation of the 
internal contradictions of dominant ideologies or how dominant epistemic 
resources ignore, marginalise or exclude their social knowledge and lived 
experiences. Consequently, Allison Wylie argues that members from oppressed 
groups can know different things or can be better knowers “by virtue of what 
they typically experience and how they understand their experience”. (Wylie, 
2004, pg 339) 
Indeed, as Harding suggests, feminist standpoint theory stresses that the social 
locations of marginalized social groups and communities are “better places from 
which to start asking causal and critical questions about the social order” given 
that these questions are typically obscured by dominant epistemic norms and 
frameworks. (Harding, 2004b, pg 130) 
Alternatively, epistemic advantage can stem from lived experiences of 
negotiating unjust power relations in their daily lived routines to achieve their 
social goals. It is in this sense that epistemic advantage is a social process of 
knowledge creation as oppressed individuals share certain common 
experiences and perspectives with respect to the operation of power. (Collins, 
2004, pg 249) 
Indeed, members of such groups and communities often respond by developing 
counter-hegemonic epistemic resources to understand and critique their lived 
experiences and realities. Moreover, it has also been argued that members of 
oppressed communities also can possess significant insight into how relations 
of oppression inform their interactions with members of more privileged 
communities. (Collins, 1991) 
This is to say that such individuals can contingently possess a greater 
understanding of asymmetries of power. Harding (2004) attempts to explain the 
notion of epistemic advantage thus: 
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“Thus, to the extent that an oppressed group's situation is different from that of 
the dominant group, its dominated situation enables the production of distinctive 
kinds of knowledge...Each oppressed group can learn to identify its distinctive 
opportunities to turn an oppressive feature of the group's conditions into a 
source of critical insight about how the dominant society thinks and is 
structured”. (Harding, 2004, pg 7) 
This is an important point as a critical standpoint for Harding constitutes an 
achievement- it is “something for which oppressed groups must struggle”. 
(Harding, 2004, pg 8) Epistemic advantage does not occur automatically and 
universally simply by being a member of a disadvantaged community or social 
group or by virtue of the insights offered by one's social location. (Wylie, 2004, 
pg 343)  
Contemporary feminist standpoint theory is not committed to the simplistic 
formula that the deeper the degree of oppression the stronger the level of 
epistemic advantage. The thesis of epistemic advantage does not presuppose 
that marginally positioned individuals inherently possess more privileged or 
objective knowledge simply due to their occupation of a given social position. 
Instead, it argues that some locations and standpoints can contingently cultivate 
greater epistemic objectivity.  
Moreover, it is also emphasised how achieving a more critical standpoint is a 
consequence of political contestation and/or consciousness-raising practices. It 
constitutes an acquired capacity to understand relations and structures of 
power. (Harding, 2004; Wylie, 2004)  
Moreover, achieving a critical standpoint is inherently a difficult and confronting 
process as it requires critically questioning- and even altering- our identities 
given that dominant epistemic norms and frameworks have often been deeply 
internalized; it frequently involves what Selgas terms “painful self-
transformations”. (Selgas, 2004, pg 302)  
Consequently, the thesis of epistemic advantage remains open to the possibility 
of what various theorists have described as the problem of 'adaptive 
preferences' or 'internalized oppression'. (Alcoff, 2001; Cudd, 2006; David & 
Derthick, 2014; Nussbaum, 2001) 
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Now let us consider the second aspect of the question outlined above- namely 
“how inherited frameworks and epistemic relationships foster social criticism”? 
Pohlhaus offers us an interesting account of how this process can occur, 
suggesting that “recalibrations” in collective epistemic resources can occur in 
the face of experiencing tension between the “world of experience” and the 
“resources that we use to make sense of our experiences”. (Pohlhaus, 2012, pg 
719) 
Indeed, beyond mere re-calibrations she argues that people can collaboratively 
create new epistemic resources that can abnegate the tension between our 
current epistemic resources and our lived social experiences. She suggests that 
this process “can result in new possibilities for knowing, providing new tools for 
organizing and making sense of experience”. (Pohlhaus, 2012, pg 719) 
This opens the possibility that people who occupy more privileged and 
advantaged social locations can eventually “recognize and learn to use 
epistemic resources calibrated from marginalised positions”. (Pohlhaus, 2012, 
pg 721) For instance, Harding suggests that members from advantaged groups 
can develop “traitorous identities” as they develop a critical appreciation of their 
privileges and learn how to become effective allies to marginalised 
communities. (Harding, 1991) 
It is this capacity to learn new and different epistemic resources which allows for 
people from advantaged and disadvantaged groups to develop a more critical 
standpoint vis-à-vis oppressive social relations and institutions, albeit this 
recognition and knowledge will inevitably be partial, flawed and extremely 
difficult to achieve. 
In conclusion, developing a critical standpoint is understood to constitute an 
achievement that requires significant consciousness raising and the 
development of what Jane Mansbridge and Aldon Morris have termed an 
“oppositional consciousness”. (Mansbridge & Morris, 2001)  
However, as Uma Narayan warns us, it is always important to stress that in 
context of power asymmetries the understandings developed by individuals 
from more advantaged backgrounds are likely to be “incomplete or limited” even 
in the face of “great effort and interest” (Narayan, 1989, pg 265).  
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Conversely, Wylie also warns us that oppressive social relations create 
inequalities of access to anti-hegemonic epistemic and material resources. This 
means that while members of oppressed communities might have significant 
insight into local manifestations of injustice, this might not necessarily translate 
into a more systemic understanding of how oppressive social relations are 
maintained and re-produced. (Wylie, 2004, pg 348) 
Rather, as Uma Narayan contends, standpoint theory maintains that it is both 
easier and more probable that members of oppressed groups to develop a 
critical consciousness as opposed to individuals from advantaged communities. 
(Narayan, 2004, pg 220) Indeed, as she insists: 
“The view that such an understanding, despite great effort and interest, is likely 
to be incomplete or limited, provides us with the ground for denying total parity 
to members of a dominant group in their ability to understand our situation”. 
(Narayan, 2004, pg 221) 
In addition, recent feminist theory stresses that epistemic communities are 
highly heterogeneous in their internal composition. While there might be 
fundamental similarities between the lived realities of marginalized people, their 
experiences of oppression can vary widely given other facets of their social 
identities. 
Finally, feminist epistemologists argue that while oppressed persons 
contingently can develop superior epistemic insight this does not entail that all 
positions are of equal epistemic insight. There will inevitably be limitations and 
flaws given the partiality of different epistemic vantage points. (Selgas, 2004) 
In conclusion, this section has foregrounded a number of important points about 
civil discourse and epistemic responsibility. Firstly, while I am to suggest that 
civility constitutes a trust-building epistemic practice, it is also vital for 
interlocutors to fairly and accurately judge between trustworthy testimony and 
non-trustworthy testimony.  
This need is vital given the reality that individuals occasionally participate in 
political affairs on the basis of morally blameworthy motivations and intentions 
and because dominant epistemic norms can negatively distort interlocutors’ 
epistemic motivations. 
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In addition, I have been suggesting that there is a need for accounts of civil 
discourse to recognize the impacts of epistemic exclusion and how our 
knowledge is fundamentally socially situated- that is, our social locations can 
contingently limit or afford privileged access to particular kinds of knowledge 
resources. The question therefore becomes how can accounts of civil discourse 
offer insight into how epistemic norms in society can be improved and what are 
the limitations of civil discourse in challenging oppressive epistemic norms. 
Accordingly, in the next section, I argue that civil discourse can contribute to 
challenging oppressive epistemic norms and vested practices of ignorance if it 
is re-framed through the prism of epistemic responsibility. Firstly, if civil 
discourse is interpreted to require the need to learn from different worldviews 
then it can be an important practice of recognizing the limitations of our 
knowledge, especially in terms of our taken-for-granted areas of ignorance.  
I understand learning from different worldviews to entail critical reflection about 
the epistemic grounds of our own beliefs, thereby facilitating the dialogical 
transformation of our preferences, interests, viewpoints and self-understandings 
in the face of experiencing epistemic tension between their pre-existing 
knowledge sets and new knowledge claims.  
From this perspective, questioning our own worldviews is an important vehicle 
of trust-building between people with very different beliefs, values and social 
backgrounds because it encourages careful consideration of their epistemic 
contributions.   
This is an important point because members of oppressed communities, as I 
pointed out in my criticisms of Taylor’s account of civility, frequently feel justified 
reluctance to share their knowledge with members of more privileged 
communities by virtue of dominant epistemic norms which discredit their 
knowledge claims. 
Of course, it might seem strange to argue to fairly consider the claims of others 
one must question oneself. Yet, as the previous section on testimony 
established, is important to understand that there is a relationship of deep 
dependency between a testifier and their listener whereby meaning is co-
interpreted and co-evaluated in a complex fashion. 
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Secondly, if civil discourse is interpreted to require interlocutors to question their 
positioning in broader relations of power, it can be an important means to 
develop a critical consciousness with respect to the distribution of norms of 
epistemic credibility, trustworthiness and reliability which unjustly marginalize 
the knowledge contributions certain individuals or social groups while unjustly 
privileging the knowledge contributions of other individuals or social groups.  
Accordingly, in this respect, I argue that it is imperative for individuals to develop 
a critical awareness of how stereotypes and prejudicial attitudes influence their 
social epistemic climates if they are able to fairly consider the claims of their 
fellow citizens. 
In addition, it is imperative for individuals to question their own privileges if they 
are to develop an understanding of how they might be unjustly resistant to 
epistemic contributions which question their own worldviews or their own self-
understandings more broadly. Questioning our privileges can de-stabilize 
dominant epistemic norms because it requires confrontation with our own moral 
implication in relations of oppression. 
Furthermore, it is also important for individuals to question whether dominant 
social categorizations or discourses are re-producing dominant epistemic norms 
which are excluding, marginalizing or stifling the expression of our own 
viewpoints publicly. This requirement is important because practices of social 
ignorance and hermeneutical injustices can be occasionally extremely difficult to 
discern by virtue of their social invisibility.  
The danger here is that individuals from marginalized social communities might 
uncritically support viewpoints which serve the interests of more advantaged 
groups while encouraging them to epistemically defer to their viewpoints in a 
manner which breeds epistemic diffidence. 
Finally, I argue that a willingness to learn about different worldviews allows 
interlocutors to extend appropriate respect to each other’s argumentative 
positions and to treat them with the respect they deserve as moral persons. In 
addition, learning about different worldviews can facilitate the entry of new 
epistemic resources into public discourse which can challenge vested forms of 
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ignorance while allowing for critical social viewpoints to be considered for the 
purposes of public decision-making. 
Civility as Epistemic Responsibility: 
This account of civil discourse, following my arguments in chapter one, 
presupposes that there is an intimate connection between our worldviews and 
the staking and reception of political claim-making. There I insisted that any 
discussion over contested public issues will invariably involve people making 
appeals or claims which explicitly or implicitly reference particularistic notions of 
the good and how these conceptions are intimately linked with our social 
identities. 
Indeed, I insisted that constricting public argumentation to “generally 
accessible” arguments will likely be highly insufficient to learning from and about 
non-dominant perspectives while also serving to marginalise individuals who 
cannot divorce their political claims from their broader worldviews.  
Subsequently, I insisted that public policies inescapably reference particularistic 
conceptions of the good, it is imperative for public decision-making processes to 
possess fair opportunities for negotiating claims animated by a diversity of 
worldviews. For instance, proposals to build a nuclear waste dump on 
indigenous land is clearly inseparable from fairly considering the cultural, 
spiritual and historical importance of the location to indigenous peoples in 
addition to any adverse environmental impacts or legal complications. 
Furthermore, as the chapter on Taylor illustrated, our worldviews have a moral 
urgency, gravity and import because they matter to us- they are an integral 
aspect of our identities and they serve as an explanatory and interpretive device 
for human beings to understand their social world. This point is also important 
given how our differing social positions and locations afford particular epistemic 
insights and perspectives which need to be explored in any public policy making 
process as they might offer unique and important contributions. 
Thirdly, as Taylor has further demonstrated, any attempt to understand other 
worldviews will invariably be shaped and delimited by our own worldviews. If 
civil discourse involves meeting our epistemic responsibilities with respect to 
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other people’s claims, it will necessarily entail critically questioning our own 
worldviews and to be willing to learn new epistemic resources from different 
worldviews. This process, Taylor notes, might allow participants to reach an 
overlapping consensus on contested political issues in spite of their divergent- 
and occasionally conflicting- worldviews.  
Of course, this discussion begs the question of what I mean precisely by a 
worldview. Accordingly, before I outline my account of learning from and 
learning about different worldviews, it is important to specify my understanding 
of the concept. 
It is clear that the notion of a worldview has been interpreted in a variety of 
different fashions via a number of academic disciplines. Consequently, while 
there is no generally accepted definition of the concept, there are a number of 
recurrent themes throughout the literature.  
Firstly, there is the sense that worldviews have an explanatory function in terms 
of articulating the purpose, meaning and value of a particular individual’s 
existence. They constitute a rather coherent cognitive and affective framework 
of intelligibility, allowing for the articulation of meaningful ontological, axiological 
and normative scheme which helps explain reality. (Aerts et al, 2007; Koltko-
Rivera, 2004; Vidal, 2008) 
 For instance, Mary Clarke suggests that a worldview refers to the “beliefs and 
assumptions by which an individual makes sense of experiences that are 
hidden deep within the language and traditions of surrounding society”. (Clark, 
2002, pg 5) 
Unsurprisingly, they are also frequently believed to have an existential 
reassurance function, promoting psychological wellbeing in the face of 
omnipresent human suffering. They allow individuals to create a narrative which 
explains their raison d'être. (Gutierrez & Park, 2015; Vidal, 2008) 
Secondly, worldviews frequently have a justificatory ambition, serving to explain 
and legitimate prevailing social and political arrangements. (Jost et al, 2009) 
Importantly, worldviews therefore serve to profoundly influence how individuals 
process and respond to the political claims of others. (De Zavala & Van Bergh, 
2007) 
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Accordingly, worldviews allow individuals to process information without having 
to subject it to rational interrogation as it provides a set of habitual, automatic 
and unconscious cognitive and affective heuristics of judgement. (Lodge et al, 
2010; Wagner et al, 2014) Significantly, worldviews also deeply influence how 
individuals frame their claims with respect to their choice of language. (Lakoff & 
Johnson, 2008)  
Worldviews, therefore, profoundly shape individuals, social groups and 
communities’ perceptions of reality given that they encompass a broad range of 
ontological, epistemological and axiological assumptions that inform social 
evaluation and interpretation. (Docherty, 2001; Nudler, 1990) 
Thirdly, worldviews have a motivational or volitional character which ensures 
conformity to dominant social norms, values and beliefs- it articulates a 
schedule of prohibited and approved social conduct. They serve to shape our 
social actions, even if we are unaware of being guided by their influence. 
(Koltko-Rivera, 2004). From this point of view, worldviews play an essential role 
in socialization and identity formation processes while also allowing members of 
a society to interact and co-construct social reality together. (Krakowski, 2013) 
Importantly though, while conflicting world-views can occasionally impede and 
frustrate effective communication, it is also worth stressing that they do not 
constitute a static, monolithic framework where there is no interchange with 
other worldviews and it is important to emphasise the dynamic nature of 
worldviews and the capacities of individuals to critically question their inherited 
worldviews and the worldviews of others.  
Indeed, I claim that there are two key methods which allow individuals to 
question their own worldviews. The first occurs by reflecting on the nature of 
their social experiences and the nature of their worldviews via examining 
whether there are any latent tensions, contradictions or gaps of understanding 
present. Secondly, I argue that one can question one’s own worldviews by 
dialogically engaging with people who come from different social backgrounds.  
In addition, I argue that questioning our worldviews is dependent on our 
capacities to perceive how their formation is profoundly influenced by our social 
positioning and location. This is to say that our worldviews simultaneously 
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enable and limit our understandings of different worldviews and, by extension, 
the claims of our interlocutors. 
This is because our worldviews profoundly influence our attentiveness to certain 
kinds of knowledge, encouraging us to seek and development kinds of 
information while also encouraging us to disavow, ignore or marginalise other 
kinds of information which does not conform to our prevailing worldviews.  
This is a particularly important point because given that our worldviews are 
acquired via processes of socialization and shaped by our quotidian social 
experiences, they profoundly shape whether we are granted opportunities to 
acquire certain kinds of knowledge or whether we are denied access to certain 
kinds of knowledge altogether. 
Moreover, our worldviews also profoundly influence our perception of particular 
claims as they influence how certain kinds of knowledge will be interpreted and 
evaluated. This is to say that our worldviews can place limits on our capacities 
to know about certain things while also enabling the development and sharing 
of knowledge about other things. 
Nevertheless, it is also important to stress that is because our worldviews 
undergo constant evolution over time and because they are open to revision by 
virtue of the fact that they are inherently partial and defined by their own internal 
contradictions and inconsistencies. Accordingly, the manner in which our 
worldviews mediate our attentiveness and perceptiveness of certain kinds of 
knowledge is never static or unchangeable. (Aerts et al, 2007; Vidal, 2008)   
Unsurprisingly, therefore, if people are able to question their worldviews they 
must develop a critical awareness how their social experiences and upbringing 
have contributed to their development of their worldviews, especially in terms of 
how they might have biased their areas of knowledge and ignorance in 
particular fashions. 
Accordingly, given this brief outline, it is important to specify what I mean by 
learning from different worldviews as an integral aspect of fulfilling the epistemic 
responsibilities of civil discourse. 
Learning from different worldviews 
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I argue that learning from different worldviews involves three different epistemic 
practices which enable us to critically appraise the limitations of our knowledge 
and to learn from different worldviews as they generate epistemic tension with 
our own pre-existing knowledge resources. 
The first epistemic practice refers to the need to reflect whether our worldviews 
are distorting our epistemic agendas in an unjust fashion. This is to say that it is 
vital to question whether one is motivated to fairly consider other people's 
claims or whether one is motivated simply to distort or misinterpret their 
testimony in order to simply re-confirm one's own pre-existing beliefs and 
values.  
This is an important point because, as a broad range of research in social 
psychology has established, it is clear that a wide variety of biases influence the 
manner in which one gathers evidence in favour or against a proposition as well 
as the way in which one interprets the available evidence. For instance, there is 
a growing empirical literature on the phenomenon of motivated reasoning. 
Redlawsk notes (2002, pg 1201) that this literature counters an influential 
conception of political reasoning which maintains that individuals are essentially 
“Bayesian updaters”.  
Indeed, as Mendelberg summarizes this line of research, motivated reasoning 
occurs at every step of the information processing process, from setting 
epistemic goals to gathering and evaluating evidence and even to constructing 
inferences and judgements. (2002, pg 168)  
Accordingly, learning from different worldviews requires a capacity to be self-
aware towards our resistances- cognitive and affective- towards questioning 
and altering our worldviews in the face of disconfirming knowledge claims.  
From this perspective, questioning our own worldviews is an important aspect of 
epistemic responsibility because a refusal or an unwillingness to do so might 
lead to us hold and defend our beliefs in a highly dogmatic fashion.  
Dogmatism, of course, is a profoundly difficult problem for liberal-democratic 
regimes to address as it reflects people rigidly and unjustifiably defending their 
convictions in a manner contrary to alternative, reliable and valid evidence. It 
demonstrates a fundamental indifference- if not outright contempt and 
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intolerance- towards those who hold differing viewpoints, especially if these 
viewpoints constitute a core challenge to one's perspectives. 
This tendency, of course, means that one cannot be appropriately responsive 
and accountable to others for our beliefs. Moreover, dogmatic views are 
especially problematic if such viewpoints serve to justify, rationalize and 
legitimate bigoted and prejudicial attitudes and viewpoints towards certain 
individuals on the basis of their group or community memberships. But how it is 
it possible to develop a critical sensitivity to the possibility of dogmatic closure? 
I argue that it is profoundly important to monitor whether one is motivated to 
deny or repress the epistemic contributions of others as being valid and 
relevant, especially when these insights demand a revision in aspects of one’s 
own worldview. In addition, it is also important to question whether one is 
attempting to compartmentalize the implications of other people’s claims by 
refusing to accept that other’s knowledge claims have broader implications for 
one’s own worldview.  
Furthermore, it is also important to question whether we are motivated to grant 
our own worldviews an unwarranted degree of privileged treatment when 
defending our own claims by refusing to consider the importance of alternative 
epistemic resources. 
Without this kind of critical questioning of our worldviews, the manner in which 
we process other’s testimonial claims- and how we understand their broader 
worldviews- will likely be distorted in a manner which serves to unreasonably 
defend or bolster our existing areas of knowledge and ignorance. This is a 
particularly problematic scenario where our worldviews serve to justify, 
legitimate and rationalize social inequalities. 
Accordingly, given knowledge is inherently social in character and given that all 
reasoning must inherently occur vis-a-vis a background of our pre-existing 
worldviews, it is vital to question whether worldviews are unjustly motivating us 
to avoid exploring new and different viewpoints. Without critically evaluating 
how our social location and background have simultaneously enabled and 
restricted knowledge in particular domains, it will be extremely difficult to 
appreciate the limitations and flaws of our knowledge.  
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A failure to integrate this connection will mean that one might be blind with 
respect to how our social locations and worldviews might narrow our 
perspectives, particularly in terms of how they foster vested interests in 
affirming, denying or ignoring particular kinds and sources of knowledge. 
As a result, it is important to question whether our beliefs have been tainted by 
epistemic motivations which impede critical social inquiry- for instance, by 
unfairly privileging particular kinds of knowledge, ignoring certain types of 
knowledge on the assumption that it is in our best interests or by denying 
certain types of knowledge exist in order to maintain the stability of our current 
beliefs. 
Ultimately, if one cannot accept that our knowledge has significant blind-spots it 
will be difficult to appreciate that one can learn something valuable from people 
who come from different social backgrounds and it will likely demotivate any 
attempt to seek out alternative and opposing viewpoints to our own.  
Importantly, an awareness of our social background and location can prevent us 
from making claims in situations where we are epistemically incompetent by 
virtue of a lack of appropriate knowledge. Epistemic responsibility requires us 
only to make claims which appropriately reflect the available knowledge one 
reliably has to hand as opposed to making pre-judgements about topics where 
one lacks adequate knowledge.  
Secondly, it is also vital to consider one's worldviews might be informed by 
selective exposure to certain kinds of knowledge and whether one’s 
interpretations of a given social phenomena are biased as a result. This is vitally 
important in order to avoid cases where one might make knowledge claims 
which rely on epistemically mistaken or flawed stereotypes, generalizations or 
prejudicial attitudes.  
This is to suggest that if one is to exercise epistemic responsibility and to 
consider other people's claims fairly, one needs to exercise caution with respect 
to both our evidential source as well as our methods of inquiry. Without this 
critical scrutiny it will be extremely difficult to understand how our worldviews 
serve to distort our patterns of attentiveness and inattentiveness to certain kinds 
of knowledge sources. 
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Indeed, it is vital to question whether one is dismissing or selectively 
misrepresenting evidence that contradicts our own perspectives. Without this 
kind of critical self-questioning, it is extremely difficult to access and consider 
evidence which might challenge our own beliefs and to fairly hear the claims of 
other people, especially in cases where they are presenting epistemically sound 
counter-arguments and claims to our beliefs. 
Moreover, critically considering the limitations of our sources of information and 
our methods of inquiry is essential if one is not to draw illicit conclusions on the 
basis of incomplete, irrelevant and inaccurate information and ignore potentially 
relevant sources of information from other people's testimonial claims. 
In addition, a failure to question our worldviews might encourage us to use 
manipulative discursive techniques and strategies in order to bolster our own 
arguments. It is an essential feature of civil discourse that people refrain from 
using manipulative techniques to secure the deference of other persons 
towards our opinions. Instead, civility requires that people use reasoned 
persuasion to convince others of the merits of their views. However, what 
precisely constitutes the difference between manipulation and persuasion? 
It is clear while there are slippages conceptually and behaviourally between 
these terms there are some ways to distinguish them. Perloff suggests that 
manipulation requires a testifier to disguise their epistemic goals, via misleading 
the receiver “by delivering an overt message that belies its true intent”. (Perloff, 
2010, pg 24) 
By contrast, persuasion depends on whether the motivations of testifiers are 
transparent and honest. (Perloff, 2010, pg 24) This is to suggest that 
manipulation is inherently characterised by insincere, ulterior intention that aim 
to control another party's thoughts or actions to the interests of the manipulator. 
Indeed, as Klemp notes, it fundamentally uses “hidden or irrational force” to 
influence people's “actions, beliefs or choices”. (Klemp, 2012, pgs 47- 48) 
Consequently, manipulative communicative behaviours do not treat our 
interlocutor's as autonomous subjects given that it deliberately aims to 
manipulate their will on the basis that they constitute merely an object whose 
interests and needs are subservient to one's own. Klemp suggests that three 
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key communicative practices of manipulation are lying, concealment and 
distraction as they serve to unduly limit the parameters of other people's 
autonomous decisions or cause them to make uninformed decisions. (Klemp, 
2012) 
Ultimately, the concept of manipulation, therefore, as Harre notes, necessarily 
implies an “asymmetrical direction of influence”. (Harre, 1985, pg 126) Indeed, it 
is typically the case that the victim of a manipulative communication situation is 
“unaware of the influences exerted” on them, thereby rendering it essential that 
people self-question their motivations if they are to be epistemically responsible 
and to act civilly towards others in a discursive interaction. (Harre, 1985, pg 
127) 
This is because civil discourse inherently involves participants engaging each 
other in a dialogue where the motivations of participants are relatively 
transparent. (Harre, 1985; Klemp, 2012) This is to say, following Klemp, that it 
allows people to change each other’s “beliefs or actions in ways that both 
parties understand”. (Klemp, 2012, pg 59) 
This process of critical inquiry can help us to develop a more self-reflexive 
relationship to the taken-for-granted background assumptions that shape our 
beliefs and how these background assumptions place limitations or constraints 
on the depth and breadth of our knowledge. 
Lastly, questioning our worldviews can occur by reflecting whether there are any 
areas of dissonance between our social experiences, our observations of the 
life experiences of others and our current worldviews. This requires 
interrogating whether there are any latent tensions, contradictions or gaps 
between our experiences and observations and our current worldviews.  
For instance, people might experience a disconnect between their 
rationalizations of social inequalities and their awareness that their living 
standards are suffering as a result of these inequalities. 
Accordingly, via questioning these connections, it might be possible to see 
whether we are striving to unjustly maintain the epistemic integrity of our 
worldviews in the face of better epistemic resources which would entail a 
revision of our own perspectives.  
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In conclusion, therefore, critically self-questioning the epistemic merits of our 
viewpoints is essential if one is able to place appropriate self-trust with respect 
to our viewpoints and perspectives. Of course, these different aspects of self-
questioning, of course, raise important questions of moral responsibility as it 
presupposes that one has meaningful opportunities to access countervailing 
social discourses and ideological constructs, to have the requisite motivation to 
critically appraise our own beliefs and to have sufficient cognitive skills.  
However, while it can be extremely difficult and taxing to question our own 
beliefs the costs and impacts of not questioning our beliefs are simply too 
important to be ignored. Nevertheless, at the same time, it is also worth 
acknowledging that self-questioning should not entail a paralysing scepticism or 
cynicism that would completely undermine our confidence in our beliefs.  
For instance, as Cheshire Calhoun in her discussion of the virtue of integrity, it 
is often epistemically and morally appropriate that people “treat their own 
endorsements as ones that matter, or ought to matter, to fellow deliberators”- 
that is one often has good reasons to “regard one's judgement as one that 
should matter to others”. (Calhoun, 1995, pg 258) 
Unsurprisingly, she also notes that in the absence of particular circumstances, 
concealing, deceiving, unjustly recanting or 'selling out' of or own beliefs and 
values is often morally blameworthy. Consequently, there are therefore 
appropriate limitations to the act of self-questioning as it is often vital to defend 
and/or refuse to alter one's worldviews in certain contexts. 
In conclusion, therefore, questioning our own worldviews is an important aspect 
of epistemic responsibility. It is an especially vital epistemic practice given that 
our worldviews are often so profoundly normalized that it is difficult to develop a 
critical stance with respect to our socialization into particular epistemic 
communities. This normalization renders it difficult to be aware of our areas of 
ignorance, especially if we are being asked to assess issues which are distant 
or alien from our own quotidian social experiences. 
This point is particularly poignant in light of the implications of the previous 
section where individuals can fail to question their viewpoints by virtue of 
practices of social ignorance that breed epistemic vices.  
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From this perspective, it is important to question our own viewpoints given 
people's vulnerability to actively avoid scrutinizing their own perspectives and to 
deliberately and intentionally avoid, dismiss or ignore counter-confirming 
knowledge. 
Without critically reflecting on the epistemic merits or demerits of our viewpoints 
it is impossible to test our beliefs to rational inquiry or to appreciate the fallible 
and partial nature of our beliefs. We thereby risk engendering a serious 
blindness regarding how our own worldviews profoundly shape not just the 
content of our political claims but also our communicative conduct when 
considering positions which do not conform to our pre-existing viewpoints. 
Unsurprisingly, without being prepared to learn from different worldviews, it can 
be difficult to develop sounder knowledge from different epistemic resources of 
our interlocutors. Indeed, an unwillingness to learn from different worldviews 
can be an important manifestation of perceiving others claims with an “arrogant 
eye” as Lugones terms it. (Lugones, 1987)  
This is a vital point to emphasize as it is clear that a failure to question our own 
interpretive horizons often leads to people rushing to unwarranted judgements 
about other people’s claims, thereby breeding unproductive misunderstandings 
while eroding relations of epistemic trust.  
Nevertheless, while an emphasis on learn from different worldviews is a 
necessary condition to being receptive to the political claims of others it is 
insufficient in light of epistemic injustices and practices of social ignorance.  
This is because only through questioning our positioning in broader relations of 
power is it possible for us to develop a greater critical awareness of how 
dominant epistemic norms marginalize, deny or supress our access to the 
knowledge contributions of marginalized communities while unjustly privileging 
the contributions of members from more advantaged communities. 
It is for this reason that it is vital to question our positioning in relations of power 
if we are to develop a critical sensitivity to how dominant epistemic norms bias 
the formation, maintenance and revision of our epistemic judgements. 
Self-questioning one's position within relations of power: 
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This section shall argue that if we are exercise epistemic responsibility it is vital 
for individuals to engage in an intersectional analysis regarding the connection 
between their social positioning and broader relations of power in two key 
senses.  
Firstly, it requires people to examine how this connection informs both how one 
interprets other people's claims as well as how one responds to them. Indeed, 
in particular, it is vital to question how relations of power might lead one to 
unjustly deflate or inflate the testimony of other people by virtue of dominant, 
unjust epistemic norms. 
This account thereby acknowledges the feminist epistemological insight that 
epistemic injustices frequently arise from a motivated unwillingness to recognize 
the limitations of one's own viewpoints or to acknowledge different epistemic 
resources. This motivation is enabled by broader patterns of inattention and 
indifference which serve to reproduce relations of oppression via implicit social 
agreements to actively “misinterpret the world” in Charles Mill’s words. (Mills, 
1997, pg 19) 
This tacit social agreement allows members of advantaged communities to 
ignore their moral and political complicity in social injustices. As a consequence, 
practices of ignorance are morally blameworthy in that they allow social actors 
to evade testimonial claims that have moral import and urgency. Without 
critically examining one's own moral implication in social injustices, fairly 
considering the testimonial claims of individuals from oppressed communities 
will be extremely difficult.  
Accordingly, an ongoing critical analysis of power relations is vital to 
appreciating how power asymmetries might cause one and others to unjustly 
deflate the credibility, reliability and trustworthiness of other people and their 
testimonial claims. 
Secondly, this account also demands that people intersectionally question their 
identities with respect to how their social upbringing has been influenced by 
asymmetries of power. This important as all individuals will invariably have 
internalized prejudicial or approbatory attitudes, social discourses and 
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categorizations to varying degrees and in varying kinds during the course of 
their socialization, thereby influencing their interpretive horizons. 
This complex of internalized frameworks of social interpretation is profoundly 
connected to the influence of dominant epistemic norms. These epistemic 
norms typically mean that the contributions of marginalised communities tend to 
be unjustly diminished as their claims are ignored, dismissed or misinterpreted 
while the contributions of advantaged communities tend to be epistemically 
privileged, accorded a degree of credibility that does not necessarily track a 
more critical assessment of their validity.  
Accordingly, in the following section I shall argue that if dominant epistemic 
norms are to be challenged it is vital for individuals to develop a critical 
awareness of stereotypes, social categorizations and prejudicial attitudes might 
have informed their interpretative faculties of judgement. 
This emphasis is warranted because epistemic kinds of injustices are a form of 
identity-based discrimination which is grounded in epistemically flawed, biased 
and distorted pre-judgements. These pre-judgements typically draw illicit 
associations or inferences between aspects of an individual's social identity and 
morally praiseworthy or morally blameworthy characteristics, qualities or 
properties, thereby validating or invalidating their testimonial claims. 
But what is the connection precisely between social stereotypes, social 
categorizations, prejudicial attitudes and epistemic injustices? In addition, if we 
assume that it is vital for individuals to develop a critical awareness with respect 
to the operation of stereotypes and prejudicial attitudes if relations of epistemic 
injustice are to be challenged, how can this critical sensitivity be developed? 
The following section shall attempt to address these questions in depth. 
The Epistemic Impacts of Social Stereotypes, Social Categorizations and 
Prejudicial Attitudes: 
The first noteworthy aspect of stereotypes and social categorizations is that 
they provide a cognitive structure that outline particular social characteristics 
and features of other social groups and communities, providing a framework 
through which social information can be rendered intelligible.  
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Practices of stereotyping and categorization ultimately stem from the 
psychological need of human beings to adequately understand their 
environment without suffering from cognitive and emotional overload given its 
inevitable complexities and uncertainties. (Hinton, 2000; Wilder & Simon, 1996) 
It therefore broadly refers to the process of forming generalizations and 
simplifications from one's interpreted perceptions of reality. Unsurprisingly, 
because stereotypes constitute a relatively rigid and unconscious heuristic 
device of interpretation and evaluation, it can be particularly difficult to de-
construct them. (Hinton, 2000) Stereotypical impressions of other social groups 
and communities are often resistant to new, counter-confirming information. 
It is also important to stress that processes of stereotypical and categorical 
judgement occur in an automatic fashion and that their operation in social 
circumstances is often unconscious. Moreover, stereotypes and categorizations 
also serve as devices of social sorting in that they minimize perceptions of 
difference between members of a particular in- group while exaggerating 
perceived social differences between different social groups. (Hogg & Terry 
2000; Terry & Hogg, 1996) 
These two inter-related processes, as Dovidio et al note (2008, pg 229) result in 
people having more positive affective experiences toward members of their in-
group compared to out-group members. Importantly, from the perspective of 
epistemic injustice, it can also encourage individuals to cognitively process 
more detailed information about in-group members rather than out-group 
members. (Dovidio et al, 2008) 
Accordingly, once social categorization processes become entrenched, 
individuals are often motivated to defend and bolster in/out-group distinctions 
due to the desire to maintain in-group cohesiveness and co-operation- as 
Dovidio et al note, this desire becomes “tantamount to protecting one's 
existence as well as one's positive sense of self”. (2008, pg 229) 
The motivation, therefore, to preserve one’s self-esteem means that people are 
also motivated to enhance the “positive distinctiveness’” of the social groups to 
which one belongs. This can foster practices of in-group favouritism, outgroup 
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derogation, out-group competition and discrimination to advance the status and 
power of one’s own social groups. (Dovidio et al, 2008; Spears, 2008)  
This tendency is particularly manifested both in contexts where people 
experience a threat to cherished values, goals, beliefs and norms and/or their 
access and control over limited material resources. (Dovidio et al, 2008; Spears, 
2008) Processes of social stereotyping and categorization, therefore, are potent 
exercises of social power and status differentiation. Importantly, given that their 
operation is automatic and unconscious, dominant social groups are often 
coded in terms that serve to obscure their advantaged social position. 
For example, as Conover (2009) notes, it is commonly presumed in the United 
States that white, young and heterosexual people constitute the “cultural norm” 
against which other people are “marked” as being inferior- that is, “default 
categories have priority or are “marked,” so that those individuals who seem to 
belong to them are judged more rapidly and marked linguistically”. (Conover, 
2009, pg 183) 
However, as some empirical research on inter-group contact illustrates, it is 
possible to counter the operation of stereotypical pre-judgements via two 
different strategies. Firstly, through prolonged dialogue it is possible for people 
to re-frame their stereotypical interpretive resources by the appreciation of 
individual differences and particularities within particular social groups and 
communities. (Voci, 2010) 
Stereotypical assumptions and categorical constructs can be challenged 
through processes of decategorization which aim to demonstrate the 
complexities of our social identities. This allows for rigid conceptualizations of 
social difference to be challenged and rendered more nuanced, particularly in 
terms of allowing people to appreciate the internal differences within particular 
groups and communities. 
This is an important process in cases where dominant epistemic serve to 
devalue the contributions of members of oppressed communities on the basis of 
assumptions that they are unreliable, untrustworthy and non-credible knowers. 
Importantly though, this process of decategorization does not just permit the 
appreciation of the internal differences between members of other social groups 
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and communities. It can also allow people to question the supposed similarities 
of identity within one's social groups and communities. 
This means that it is vital not simply to examine our stereotypical assumptions 
about members of other social groups and communities. It is also vital to 
critically examine the manner in which our social group identities are socially 
constructed, particularly in respect to whether collective interpretations of our in-
group identities are implicated in social injustices.  
The development of this critical awareness, in term, can allow us to discern 
whether dominant epistemic norms are according us overly inflated testimonial 
credibility to the exclusion of equally worthy epistemic contributions. 
Secondly, it is possible to counter stereotypical pre-judgements through 
extended social interaction as it can allow for areas of commonality to be 
perceived by people from different social groups and communities. This strategy 
involves re-categorizing perceived group-based identity differences by 
emphasising particular commonalities between the various social groups or 
communities or by highlighting mutual membership in a different group-based 
category. (Gaertner & Dovidio, 2011) 
Accordingly, it can serve to alter perceptions of alterity, dissemblance and 
distinction between people from different communities. It can allow them to 
understand their shared overlapping and subordinate social identities or enable 
them to appreciate their sharing of common interests, goals, preferences, 
values and beliefs. (Gaertner & Dovidio, 2011) 
Although this process is extremely cognitively and emotionally difficult, it seems 
to be an essential pre-condition for the critical interrogation of stereotypes and 
categorizations as well as enabling the critical evaluation of whether they foster 
relations of epistemic injustices. Processes of re-categorization can challenge 
unjust epistemic norms because they expose the contingent matter in which 
members of marginalized communities were constructed as deficit knowers in 
comparison to members of more privileged communities. 
The second aspect of critical engagement is the self-questioning of our 
prejudiced beliefs- something that is more difficult, I suggest, then critically 
questioning our stereotypical and categorical preconceptions. Following Allport's 
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(1954) classic definition prejudice can be defined as an “aversive or hostile 
attitude toward a person who belongs to a group, only because he belongs to 
that group and is therefore presumed to have the objectionable qualities 
ascribed to a group.” (Allport, 1954, pgs 7-8)  
Stephan & Stephan (1993, pg 37) also influentially define prejudice as involving 
“a negative affective response, which includes both cognitive evaluations and 
emotional reactions” (Stephan & Stephan, 1993, p. 37). From this point of view, 
prejudice differs from stereotypes and social categorizations in the sense that it 
refers to irrationally held prejudgements that favour or disfavour particular 
individuals on the basis of certain perceived social characteristics with respect 
to their group or community membership. (Fleras, 2014) 
Prejudicial attitudes are, therefore, reflect much more global negative attitude 
towards particular social groups and communities as opposed to stereotypes 
and social categorizations that often references only particular sets of 
characteristics or qualities of a particular group or community. 
Moreover, while stereotypes clearly function with respect to practices of 
discrimination, there are arguably less motivationally powerful than prejudicial 
attitudes that animate the discriminatory social treatment of particular groups or 
communities.  
Accordingly, critically apprising prejudicial attitudes is particularly challenging as 
they can be difficult to control by virtue of their implicit and automatic operation. 
The operation of prejudicial attitudes can be “impervious to conscious control, 
and it is relatively stable” as Henry and Hardin note. (Henry & Hardin, 2006, pg 
862) 
Given the difficulties associated with confronting prejudices how is it possible to 
challenge their operation? It is clear that there have been some suggestions in 
this regard. Firstly, it is vital to critically interrogate interpretations of social 
identity differences as prejudicial attitudes are based upon epistemically faulty 
perceptions about oppressed social groups and communities. (Robinson et al, 
1995) 
This interrogation is essential if people are to develop a critical understanding 
that these differences are socially constructed, historically variable and 
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intertwined with power-laden ideologies. Indeed, in particular, it is of particular 
importance to challenge and critically reflect upon dehumanizing, demonizing 
and exclusionary imagery, metaphors and mythologies that express prejudicial 
attitudes, and to appreciate the harmful impacts such discourses have upon 
their victims. 
These rhetorical mechanisms include negative trait ascriptions, social 
outcasting and pejorative political labelling and delegitimation by virtue of 
pejorative group-based comparisons. (Bandura, 1999, 2002; Bar-Tal, 1990; 
Volpato et al, 2010)  
Without critically evaluating the discourses in which difference is socially 
constructed it can be difficult to challenge prejudicial attitudes premised on the 
assumption that certain individual's identities reflect negative essential, 
immutable and group-inherited characteristics. 
This is task is particularly urgent in contexts where certain prejudicial attitudes 
facilitate practices of “moral exclusion” that serve to justify, legitimate and 
rationalize oppressive practices as being morally acceptable, desirable and 
even inevitable by virtue of the negative qualities of stigmatised group 
members. Practices of moral exclusion also serve to impede or even punish the 
elicitation of compassion, sympathy and empathy for them. (Opotow, 2001) 
Finally, it is possible to challenge the strength of prejudicial attitudes by 
encouraging mutual perspective taking between people who come from 
different social groups and communities. This process is particularly important 
as it can allow people from relatively advantaged social groups and 
communities to develop a sense of identification with people from less 
advantaged backgrounds. 
 It might enable them to re-evaluate the interpretive and evaluative assumptions 
through one has previously judged their behaviour or made assumptions about 
their lived experiences and realities. (Todd & Galinsky, 2012) 
Of course, there are limitations with respect to the extent to which this 
perspective-taking activity is symmetrical and reciprocal. After all, it would seem 
strange to expect members of marginalised communities to emphatically 
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engage with viewpoints and worldviews held by dominant communities that 
justify their marginalization and exploitation. 
Ultimately, if oppressive epistemic norms are to be challenged, it is imperative 
that citizens develop a critical awareness of the manner in which prejudicial 
attitudes are discursively constructed because they attach a set of negative 
associations with members of marginalized groups which subsequently 
translates into their epistemic marginalization.  
In addition, attempts to empathically engage with members of oppressed 
communities can also serve to disrupt unjust epistemic norms because it is a 
crucial pre-condition for attentiveness to their epistemic contributions in public 
discourses. 
However, while critically engaging stereotypical preconceptions and prejudicial 
attitudes is a necessary condition of fairly hearing other people's testimony it 
only addresses one facet of epistemic injustice: namely credibility deficits. 
Moreover, an account of self-questioning must also address the problem of 
credibility excesses as well. Indeed, one of the insidious aspects of epistemic 
injustices is that members from socially advantaged groups and communities or 
individuals in positions of institutional power tend to be accorded an unjust level 
of presumptive credibility when staking their claims. This unjust level of 
credibility is frequently disproportionate to a more objective appraisal of the 
epistemic merits of their claims. 
Moreover, it is often profoundly difficult for such individuals to appreciate that by 
virtue of their social identities, their choice of communicative idioms or by their 
use of particular social vocabularies, discourses and frames that they are 
epistemically advantaged in any testimonial exchange. Indeed, any attempt to 
indicate their privileges might backfire as individuals defensively deny that they 
are beneficiaries of oppressive social arrangements. 
Consequently, processes of self-questioning, as feminist epistemologists 
indicate, can be profoundly painful as people from advantaged groups and 
communities can be motivated to remain wilfully ignorant of social injustices. 
This is particularly significant with respect to the unearned advantages that are 
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bestowed on people by virtue of facets of their social identities- that is, their 
social privileges.  
Privilege, as Bailey (1998, pg 109) notes, refers to the “systematically conferred 
advantages individuals enjoy by virtue of their membership in dominant groups 
with access to resources and institutional power that are beyond the common 
advantages of marginalised citizens”. Crucially, these advantages are morally 
unearned and undeserved. (Superson, 2004, pg 36) 
Anita Superson argues that privilege is problematic from a social justice 
perspective as it can cultivate dominant group habits of “arrogance, self-
centeredness, and a refusal to accept responsibility”. (Superson, 2004, pg 35) 
Moreover, as José Medina (2013) has suggested, the habits associated with 
privilege are extremely difficult to challenge given the social advantages 
associated with them are often so taken-for-granted that it is difficult for 
members of dominant communities to perceive a need for self-critique and 
questioning in the first place. (Medina, 2013) 
There are a number of suggestions with respect to why individuals from 
advantaged social groups and communities struggle to understand their own 
privileged position. Pratto and Stewart (2012) suggest that members of 
advantaged groups often cannot conceptualize their privileged status as they 
lack adequate “social comparison information” which would allow them to 
identify with the lived circumstances of disadvantaged groups. (Pratto & 
Stewart, 2012; see also Sidanius & Pratto, 1999)  
Or, as Allison Bailey suggests, “one of the functions of privilege is to structure 
the world so that mechanisms of privileges are invisible – in the sense that they 
are unexamined – to those who benefit from them” (Bailey 1998, pg 112) 
Alternatively, Superson argues that the systemic nature of privilege allows 
advantaged group members to “believe that their unearned advantages are 
earned- through their “native” intelligence, strength and hard work- and to see 
their privilege as owed to them.” (2004, pg 37) 
Bob Pease (2013) further proposes that the social invisibility of privilege stems 
from the motivational difficulties associated with challenging one's own 
unearned advantages. He suggests that even if people from advantaged 
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backgrounds are in principle motivated to question their own privileges the 
outcome of this questioning might demand considerable resources of courage.  
Confronting one's privilege can be a distressing- and disorientating- experience 
as it involves acknowledging one's own moral implication in relations of 
oppression. (Pease, 2013) This is a function of the reality that individuals who 
occupy advantaged social positions are often ignorant of how their identities are 
connected to unjust relations and institutions of power- indeed, as Loewe (2013, 
pg 126) notes: “One of the effects of having social power, of having privilege, is 
the ability to live without questioning one's identity”.  
This is because people who experience privilege in some aspect of their lives 
perceive their superior social status as being entirely normal. Indeed, as 
Rosenblum and Travis (1996) stress, people occupying privileged positions are 
afforded an “unmarked status” which reflects “what a society takes for granted”, 
constituting a hegemonic norm against which unprivileged people are deemed 
to be deficient, incomplete and deviant. (Rosenblum & Travis,1996) 
The lived experiences of dominant groups, therefore, are conflated as being the 
norm of an entire society and the ideological constructions that legitimate group 
dominance are constructed as being culturally neutral and politically inevitable.  
In addition, people's lack of awareness regarding their privilege can also 
particularly frustrate dialogue processes because, as Rosenblum and Travis 
(1996) note, people who occupy privileged positions can hold a sense of 
entitlement that “…one has a right to be respected, acknowledged, protected 
and rewarded “, a feeling of entitlement “…so much taken for granted by those 
of us in non-stigmatised statuses, that they are often shocked and angered 
when it is denied them”. (pg 141) 
Moreover, it also worth emphasizing again the difficulties faced by people who 
occupy more privileged positions to intellectually and emotionally relate to the 
material conditions and lived realities of less privileged people's lives.  
This imaginative deficit can translate into an incapacity or motivated 
unwillingness to accept that their inferior social and economic status is a 
function of economic, social and political inequalities; indeed, it can foster 
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attempts to rationalize, justify and legitimate inequalities by asserting that they 
are an outcome of individual personality defects. 
Ultimately, therefore, questioning privilege seems to be a vital means for 
epistemic injustices to be challenged in society as it can disrupt patterns of 
discursive arrogance and to encourage a critical awareness of our flawed and 
biased epistemic assumptions of marginalized communities has skewed our 
interpretive horizons. 
However, it is important to note that there can be no guarantees, that all 
individuals will be willing to critique their social identities, even if they have the 
relevant opportunities and intellectual abilities, across all dialogical situations.  
Nevertheless, if we assume that our identities are intersectional, it is always 
possible that people might be able to engage in self-reflexive social criticism in 
a given dialogue context. Indeed, in particular if we assume that our identities 
are intersectional people might be able to critically reflect on their privileges by 
virtue of being able to identify with aspects of their lives where they experience 
oppression. 
Furthermore, Goodman (2000) also argues that people from relatively 
advantaged social positions can be motivated to challenge oppression for three 
additional reasons. First of all, individuals can experience “response empathy” 
which tracks an individual's personal relationship with someone from an 
oppressed group and one's capacity to identify with their experiences of 
injustice. (2000, pg 1062) Secondly, people can be motivated by key moral 
principles and spiritual values to critique and challenge relations of oppression. 
(2000, pg 1062) 
Finally, she argues that individuals can be motivated to challenge oppression 
due to their own sense of their self-interests. Self-interest, for Goodman, is a 
broad category as it includes reflection on how oppressive social relationships 
affect oneself negatively as a member of a dominant group. For instance, one 
might realize how one's life could potentially benefit from greater social equality 
or how one could cultivate more authentic relationships with people from 
oppressed communities. (2000, pg 1062) 
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Ultimately, if practices of civil discourse are to foster self-criticism they must 
necessarily involve the development of an ability to critique one's own 
implication within oppressive social relations and institutions. 
This self-reflexive stance is essential given that members of privilege groups 
lack the epistemic resources to understand the experiences of oppressed 
people and their privileges are rendered invisible, especially in circumstances 
where certain aspects of social identities are constructed as being universally 
normative- for instance, the experiences of white, male, heterosexual and 
relatively affluent men. 
This kind of reflection is dependent upon engaging with a number of contingent 
and first-person historical experiences, including one's past engagement with 
critical and non-hegemonic social discourses and ideologies, observations of 
other people suffering from injustice, personal memories of suffering or other 
experiences of insight into oppressive relations and institutions. 
In addition, the kind of self-criticism I am also advocating involves an ability to 
critically survey how oppressive social relations have informed one's own 
socialization and acculturation, particularly in terms of becoming aware of the 
ways one's own social background and positioning is connected to hierarchies 
of material and social advantage or disadvantage.  
This task will inevitably be incomplete and partial and would require ongoing 
critical dialogues with members of oppressed communities if individuals are 
able, in Bailey's words to “put our privileged identities at risk by traveling to 
worlds where we often feel ill at ease or off-centre.” (Bailey, 1998b, pg 40) 
In addition, as Miranda Fricker notes, our effective capacities and opportunities 
to engage in such critique shall inevitably be differential and might be vulnerable 
to circumstances of epistemic luck- for instance, in cases where people lack 
adequate conceptual resources to engage in social criticism by virtue of their 
social positioning. (Fricker, 2007) 
Moreover, it is also important to emphasize that this process of self-questioning 
shall be extremely taxing given that one's privileges and advantages can be 
extremely difficult to acknowledge as it will inevitably involve negotiating 
uncomfortable emotions.  
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This problem can also be compounded by the strength of deeply internalized 
oppressive social discourses, ideologies and categorizations that serve to 
render one's privileged status invisible and taken-for-granted. Indeed, in 
practice it might be suggested that this process of self-critique and questioning 
will often not occur voluntarily but will come in response to challenges and 
provocations by victims of oppression. (Curry-Stevens, 2007)  
However, given the inter-sectional nature of our identities it is possible that self-
critique can allow us to appreciate how social discourses, ideological 
constructs, stereotypes and our prejudices influence our consideration and 
treatment of other people's claims. 
Importantly, it must be noted that this critical sensitivity cannot culminate in 
renouncing or rejecting one's privileges altogether. Rather, I argue that 
individuals from epistemically privileged groups and communities must learn to 
become “epistemic allies”, strategically using their unearned epistemic 
privileges to subvert dominant imaginaries and to possibly assist the testimonial 
claims of members of marginalised communities as they stake their claims 
publicly. However, what does the notion of becoming an ally imply precisely? 
Firstly, it should be understood as a process or a journey as opposed to 
constituting a final, achieved status. It requires an ongoing critical examination 
of our position in relations of power, particularly in terms of how these relations 
have influenced our life biography and how others might interpret our claims. 
Obviously, such a process can be extremely confronting from a cognitive and 
affective point of view, demanding qualities such as courage, persistence and 
self-honesty. 
Secondly, being an epistemic ally demands acknowledging the difficulties 
involved in developing a more critical perspective in face of deeply internalised 
habits of domination. It demands an orientation of patience and humility. 
In addition, it also requires a degree of sensitivity to how dominant epistemic 
norms can undermine relations of trust between marginalised communities and 
privileged communities. As a result, one should expect that earning the trust of 
marginalised communities will invariably take time.  
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Thirdly, as José Medina notes, it might also be necessary to seek out alternative 
perspectives if one is to challenge our deeply internalized interpretive 
frameworks. It means acknowledging the limitations and biases of our epistemic 
frameworks and seeking alternative, counter-hegemonic resources. This activity 
is particularly important if one is to disrupt the social invisibility of epistemic 
privileges, especially if one devotes time to learning about oppressed groups 
and communities. (Medina, 2011; 2013) 
Fourthly, it requires that one speaks out against any situations where people 
from oppressed communities are unjustly being epistemically marginalised, 
excluded or ignored in any discursive context. This is a significant problem 
given that members of oppressed communities might lack the epistemic 
confidence to challenge unjust epistemic norms or they might fear the practical 
consequences of any contestation. 
Fifthly, it might require on occasion using one's privileges strategically to 
express counter-hegemonic viewpoints that otherwise would have been 
marginalised, ignored or dismissed unjustly. This situation, of course, raises 
peculiar moral difficulties. Indeed, as Linda Martin Alcoff notes, some feminist 
theorists have argued that any attempt to speak on behalf of or for others is an 
“arrogant, vain, unethical and politically illegitimate” exercise. (Alcoff, 1991, pg 
6) 
The concern in this regard is that any attempt by privileged persons to speak on 
behalf of more marginalised individuals serves to reinforce relations of 
oppression as it “does nothing to disrupt the discursive hierarchies that operate 
in public spaces”. (Alcoff, 1995, pg 99) 
While recognizing that such critiques have a degree of merit, Alcoff argues that 
given the intersectionality and fluidity of our identities the alternative of confining 
our claims exclusively to our social group membership is also profoundly 
unsatisfactory. (Alcoff, 1991) 
Instead, she argues that in practice there have been multiple historical 
instances of “speaking for others” which have served politically progressive 
ends. She argues therefore that speaking for others can constitute an 
219 
 
appropriate means of challenging unjust power relations under certain 
conditions. (Alcoff, 1991) 
This stance is also supported by Lorraine Code, who cautiously advocates the 
importance of “advocacy practices” as a means of subverting or unsettling the 
inertia of dominant social imaginaries. (Code, 2010, pg 47) She argues that 
practices of advocacy require “ongoing vigilance, negotiation, openness to the 
need for corroboration, contestation and revision”, especially if the advocates 
are members of privileged social groups or communities. (pg 47) However, what 
might this look like precisely? 
Alcoff outlines some useful normative conditions in this regard. Her first 
condition requires that individuals from privileged communities must carefully 
analyse their impetus to speak in the first place. This is essential to prevent any 
act of speaking serving desires for “mastery and domination”, particularly in 
terms of avoiding the tendency for individuals from privileged communities to 
“educate” members from marginalised groups as opposed to carefully listening 
to their testimony. (Alcoff, 1991, pg 24) 
The second condition requires that individuals from privileged communities 
“interrogate the bearing of our location and context on what it is we are saying”. 
The third condition demands that one always assumes accountability and 
responsibility when one speaks. Alcoff argues that the question to whom one is 
accountable in a given situation will invariably be contestable, contingent and 
“constructed through the process of discursive action” itself. (Alcoff, 1991, pg 
25) Indeed, as she subsequently explains:  
“What this entails in practice is a serious commitment to remain open to 
criticism and to attempt actively, attentively, and sensitively to “hear” the 
criticism (understand it). A quick impulse to reject criticism must make one 
wary.” (Alcoff, 1991, pg 26) 
Finally, individuals from privileged backgrounds must always “analyse the 
probable or actual effects of the words on the discursive and material context”. 
(Alcoff, 1991, pg 26) This requires a continual evaluation of prevailing relations 
of power between the speaker and their audience. Without this critical 
engagement, it is highly possible that a speaker could reinforce dominant 
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prejudicial and stereotypical ideas unconsciously even if they intend to improve 
the epistemic and political standing of oppressed communities. 
There is one final aspect that must be considered when considering the need 
for critical self-questioning- namely the problem of internalized oppression. This 
emphasis is important as negative evaluations might translate into 
inappropriately deferential behaviour towards members of more advantaged 
groups in dialogical exchanges or might lead one to uncritically support claims, 
viewpoints and justifications which serve the interests of more advantaged 
social groups, institutions or individuals. 
The realities of internalized oppression are also particularly pernicious as it 
might lead oppressed people to erroneously believe that their viewpoints are not 
epistemically worthy or valid. Their self-confidence qua knowers can be 
distorted by prejudicial attitudes as well as oppressive social categorizations 
and discourses. 
Indeed, in a tragic case of self-fulfilling prophecies, members from marginalised 
groups and communities can communicatively act in a manner that seems to 
confirm that negative stereotypical evaluations about them are true. Their 
actions can serve to reproduce these negative social assessments, thereby 
reinforcing power asymmetries. For instance, people from marginalised 
backgrounds might refrain from speaking in public because they fear that their 
contributions will be deemed irrelevant or epistemically faulty. 
It is in this regard that Lau (2010) has highlighted the importance of Appiah's 
notion of “identity scripts” in public discursive processes. Identity scripts refer to 
the social “expectations imposed on individuals based on their perceived 
identities”. (Lau, 2010, pg 902) These scripts serve to compromise the fair 
assessment of people's claims in three fashions, according to Lau. 
Firstly, ascribed and prejudicial identity scripts can serve as barriers to entry into 
deliberative processes as they are used to inflict certain asymmetrical costs or 
hindrances to people's equal right to political participation. (2010, 916)  
This is because certain individuals might have to exert significant energy to 
'regulate' their public performances- for instance, women might have to act in a 
fashion which confirms or disconfirms gender-based expectations about their 
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communicative behaviour, acting in a deferential manner or act highly 
assertively in order to gain attention for their claims. 
Secondly, ascribed and prejudicial identity scripts can serve to “distort 
{communicative} output via regulating the manner in which certain individuals 
stake claims.  
Lau, for instance, cites the example of Hilary Clinton's 2008 presidential bid in 
which she was forced to negotiate gendered identity scripts that portrayed 
women as being “inherently weak”, thereby raising doubts as to whether Clinton 
could be an effective commander-in-chief. According to this analysis, Clinton 
was forced to adopt a more “hawkish” position on foreign affairs issues to 
“disprove assumptions of weakness”. (2010, pg 920) 
Identity scripts, Lau further explains, can also further serve to distort discursive 
processes via pressuring individuals to self-censor their public claims as well as 
distort the manner in which their claims are received by others. For instance, he 
suggests that Hilary Clinton might have personally opposed the war in Iraq yet 
felt obliged to publicly support it for fear of being criticised the basis that such a 
response was a characteristically 'weak' feminine one.  
Moreover, Lau hypothetically suggests that if Obama had made such an answer 
he would not have received the same treatment as Clinton might have on the 
basis of socially ascribed traits of “black hyper-masculinity”. (2010, 927) 
Lastly, it is also possible for people from disadvantaged groups to develop what 
have variously been termed “adaptive preferences” and “deformed desires” 
whereby people's opportunities, motivations and abilities are limited by a 
psychological adjustment to their current (disadvantaged) status.  
Indeed, as Ann Cudd notes, adaptive preferences are partially maintained by 
the operation of inter-group comparisons and the reliance on interpreting 
information from fellow disadvantaged in-group members, thereby leading to a 
situation in which systemic injustices are misattributed to the 'personal failings' 
of individual group members and where people lack sufficient information to 
perceive their relative deprivation, marginalization and exclusion. (Cudd, 2006) 
In addition, adaptive or deformed desires are also maintained and reproduced 
via process of internalization of dominant values, myths, beliefs, values and 
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norms which cast disadvantaged groups in a pejorative light. Processes of 
socialization encourage people to act as if the pejorative categorizations and 
associations cultivated about their group memberships are valid and correct. 
(Cudd, 2006) 
The motivation to accept negative stereotypes might be animated by various 
reasons, including a desire to belong to a coherent in-group, to protect oneself 
from the pain of one's suffering due to institutionalized discrimination and 
prejudice and to prevent social isolation and ostracizing by more dominant 
groups or individuals.  
Obviously though, it should not be assumed that all persons from a 
marginalised group or community will suffer from internalized oppression and it 
is also important to note the inherent diversity of experiences and means of 
resistance available to individuals who are differently socially positioned. 
(Medina, 2013) 
Yet it seems that questioning how our own identities are connected to practices 
of epistemic marginalization is an important practice of generating opposition to 
norms which serve to silence one’s own contributions in public forums. 
Questioning our own identities, therefore, can be an important practice of 
epistemic confidence-building which can contest oppressive epistemic norms. 
Nevertheless, developing such a sense of critical awareness is incredibly 
difficult for a variety of reasons. Firstly, there is the problem of oppressed 
individuals lacking the opportunities to access counter-hegemonic epistemic 
resources.  
This is often a consequence of the fact that dominant epistemic communities 
can coercively use psychological or even physical force to suppress information 
which would challenge the unjust status quo or to actively support information 
exchanges which advance the interests of ruling elites. 
In addition, given that our interpretive resources are dependent upon countless 
negotiations with processes of acculturation and socialization it can be 
extremely difficult for individuals alone to develop critiques of the prevailing 
status quo, even in cases where they have first-personal experiences of 
suffering as a consequence of unjust regimes of power. 
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Without being able to participate in epistemic communities which value and 
facilitate critical inquiry it can be extremely difficult to challenge deeply 
internalized preconceptions about social relations and social institutions- 
especially in contexts where dissent is dangerous to one's personal safety or to 
one's ability to interact with one's social peers. 
Secondly, and relatedly, it can be extremely difficult to challenge one's 
positioning within relations of power as it requires perceptive capacities that 
oppressive regimes might actively attempt to restrict or restrain. Moreover, it is 
often the case that confronting the influence of prejudicial requires significant 
historical knowledge of the ideological discourses that constructed oppressed 
people as being inherently inferior or worthy of social mistreatment and 
opprobrium.  
Without this historical awareness, it can be difficult to expose the contingency of 
these constructs and to re-frame pejorative social categorizations or to de-
construct them altogether. 
Finally, it can be extremely difficult to question our social positioning within 
relations of power on a motivational basis given that the operation of ideological 
constructs can serve to render oppressive relations socially invisible or difficult 
to appreciate given that the status quo is often presented as being natural and 
inevitable dominant ideologies. 
 Nevertheless, despite these difficulties, I have argued that if one is to stake 
one’s claims in an epistemically responsible manner and to fairly consider other 
people’s testimonial claims it is a necessity to critically appraise one’s 
relationship in broader relations of power.  
Yet there is one further aspect of my account of civility which is also important to 
stress- namely the need to learn about different worldviews if one is to 
appropriately respond to other’s testimony. This is an epistemically fraught area 
because in the face of power disparities there is a need to simultaneously avoid 
unjustly appropriating other’s knowledge or treating others’ merely as an 
instrument of knowledge acquisition.  (Townley, 2011)  
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Accordingly, in the next section, I stress that without being willing to learn about 
different worldviews one is likely to treat other persons and their knowledge 
claims as simply being less worthy of one’s attention and consideration. 
Learning about different worldviews: 
This section shall argue that learning about our interlocutor’s worldviews 
compromises a fundamental pillar of civility for a number of reasons. Firstly, I 
claim that in the face of power differentials a willingness to learn about different 
worldviews is an important demonstration of one’s benevolence towards other 
people and their claims. Without being confident in others willingness to fairly 
consider one’s claims, civil discourse is simply not possible. 
Secondly, learning about different worldviews is an important because civil 
discourse aims to engender an epistemic climate of trust where people are 
encouraged to share their knowledge. If one is willing to try to understanding 
how other people’s testimonial claims are shaped by their worldviews one is 
more likely to form a more accurate understanding of their claims. 
Thirdly, learning about different worldviews is an important means to challenge 
epistemic injustices and practices of social ignorance as it can allow space for 
counter-hegemonic discourses to disrupt biased knowledge practices. This is a 
particularly important point, I argue, given the possibility that the knowledge of 
marginalised communities can actually be epistemically superior with respect to 
the particular social issues which affect them.  
Accordingly, given these justifications, I particularly argue that about different 
worldviews requires sensitivity towards people's social positioning. If civil 
discourse is to be an instrument for social criticism, it is vital that interlocutors 
develop a critical understanding of how people’s worldviews have been shaped 
by their social locations.  
In addition, I also argue that members from privileged groups and communities 
have to exercise particularly sensitivity when people from oppressed 
communities are describing their experiences of oppression by assuming on a 
default basis that their claims are true.  
Finally, I also claim that learning about different worldviews requires 
interlocutors to be accepting of a wide range of communicative and 
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argumentative styles if the contributions of marginalised groups and 
communities are to receive a fair hearing. Accordingly, it is important to start by 
explaining what is entailed in learning about learning from different worldviews. 
It is clear that learning about different worldviews raises a number of vexed 
issues in the face of power disparities between individuals who come from very 
different backgrounds. This is because it is essential to learn about others’ 
worldviews without treating them in an instrumental fashion- that is, using them 
purely as a knowledge informant for one’s own interests and purposes or 
appropriating their knowledge without their permission.  
Accordingly, there is an acute danger that members from privileged 
communities might embrace a voyeuristic or imperialistic approach towards the 
subjugated knowledge claims of marginalised groups and communities.  
Furthermore, it can obviously be extremely different to learn about different 
worldviews given the normalization of our own worldviews and given how 
different social positions might enable or constrain our access to different kinds 
of knowledge.  
This means that being receptive to other people’s worldviews can be inhibited 
by a lack of knowledge, an unwillingness to question our own taken-for-granted 
frameworks and by the operation of power asymmetries which marginalise or 
privilege certain kinds of social knowledge.   
Unsurprisingly, in such contexts, unproductive communicative practices- such 
as adversarial and competitive discursive behaviours- can dominate any 
interaction, frustrating the achievement of mutual understanding. Consequently, 
given these issues, I argue that there are seven principles are important if we 
are to ethically learn about different worldviews. 
Firstly, learning about different worldviews requires people to acknowledge the 
prima facie epistemic validity of other’s knowledge contributions. This requires 
people to suspend their judgements about the merits or demerits of other 
people’s claims until they are confident that they have formed a reasonably 
accurate understanding of their claims through a process of attentive listening.  
This requires a capacity to acknowledge the potential strength of other people's 
claims, particularly in terms of how they might influence the maintenance and 
226 
 
revision of different aspects of our own worldviews. In addition, it also implies a 
willingness to communicatively act in a way which illustrates that we are willing 
to learn from others. Indeed, it is particularly important to be willing to pose 
questions of clarification in cases where one does not fully understand the 
viewpoints of others.  
This stance is particularly important in cases where people are staking claims 
which criticise or illustrate the limitations, biases, blind spots and flaws in our 
own worldviews. It demands that one avoids considering all aspects of their 
claims as opposed to trying to filter their claims according to one’s own pre-
conceived interpretations of them.   
Accordingly, it is important to be tolerant towards the tension produced by any 
interaction between different worldviews. This tension occurs when we 
experience a sense of disconnect or dissonance between our own worldviews 
and the challenges presented to them by different worldviews.  
This is to say that one should be prepared to tolerant the lack of controllability 
and predictability which occurs when we experience a rupture between our 
previously taken-for-granted views and our encounter with unexpected and 
unfamiliar kinds of knowledge claims.  
This can be particularly difficult in cases where members from relatively 
privileged communities and groups are interacting with members from 
oppressed communities and groups as it might require processing very difficult 
emotional reactions to the latter’s claims, especially where their claims morally 
implicate oneself in relations of oppression. Of course, this can be particularly 
difficult given that dominant epistemic norms typically position members of 
privileged communities as being superior knowers. 
However, at the same, it is important for interlocutors to assume that this 
process of learning cannot result in a complete grasp of different world-views as 
this would be an epistemic impossibility. Instead, it is a process of continual 
discovery that shall always be partial and incomplete. 
In addition, I also stress that considering other people's worldviews does not 
entail, following Jonathan Quong's argument, that one has to accept the 
comprehensive moral values and principles that underpin them.  Instead, it 
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merely requires a recognition that these values and principles are of great 
importance to the identities of our fellow interlocutors and that one actively tries 
to understand their worldviews as accurately as possible. (Quong, 2002) 
Secondly, learning about different worldviews requires people to acknowledge 
that their normative, epistemic, axiological and ontological assumptions are 
simply different to one’s own and that these differences might be reasonable.  
This is to recognise that even though these perspectives are incommensurable 
with one’s own they are still worthy of one’s consideration. It also entails an 
appreciation of why other people’s worldviews are important to their own lived 
realities and how their worldviews are connected to their social experiences and 
their social practices. 
Without such acknowledgement, it is tempting to conclude that other people’s 
worldviews- and the claims which are framed with reference to them- must be 
intrinsically flawed, thereby rendering oneself intolerant to any disagreement 
between different worldviews and one’s own. 
Thirdly, it is also important to be sensitive to epistemic gulfs and to the 
limitations and flaws of our own knowledge sets when considering different 
worldviews. This sensitivity is essential if one is to avoid uncritically projecting 
one's own pre-conceptions on other individuals, social groups and communities 
when considering their viewpoints and claims. 
This requires a sensitivity to how people’s differing social backgrounds and 
experiences enables access to knowledge which one cannot access easily. 
Moreover, it also requires sensitivity to the limitations of our capacities to 
empathise with the lived experiences of people from very different social 
backgrounds or whose lived realities have been different to one’s own.  
For instance, Thomas Lawrence (1993) suggests that sometimes it be morally 
inappropriate for people from advantaged social groups and communities to 
express empathy with victims of injustice, citing the example of a male claiming 
to identify with the emotional suffering of a female rape survivor.  
This is to suggest that one has to develop sensitivity to the limitations of our 
capacities to perceive other people’s worldviews from their perspective via 
attempts of empathic projection. Accordingly, on occasion, it can be important 
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for people to acknowledge that they can never entirely understand the 
worldviews of other people or their lived realities and experiences in spite of 
their good-faith and good-will.  
Importantly though, this involves not only an appreciation of how one's social 
positioning is different to other people's but it also entails developing an 
awareness of how other one's interlocutor’s social positioning is rendered 
complex by various facets of their social identities. This awareness is critical if 
one is to avoid making presumptuous and erroneous assumptions about the 
connection between other people's social backgrounds and the nature of their 
claims. 
Indeed, one powerful means of constricting critical public inquiry is by assuming 
that there is an essential connection between a person's social characteristics 
and their political claims. For instance, by labelling someone as a “tree hugger” 
one emotively connects this label to broader social discourses that might 
potentially delegitimate the valid claims of environmental protesters. 
Accordingly, one should be critical both in terms of assuming that there are 
“essential” characteristics with respect to one's own social groups and 
communities or to assume that there are “essential” characteristics with respect 
to other social communities and groups. 
For instance, if one is discussing issues surrounding poverty with people who 
are poorer than oneself, it seems important not merely to take into consideration 
the particularities of their unique individual experiences but also how different 
facets of their social positioning might inform their experiences of poverty in 
particular ways.  
After all, the experiences of unemployment faced by a heterosexual, white and 
able-bodied man will be different to those of a homosexual, black and disabled 
woman in light differential patterns of social treatment and status. 
This is because whilst there might be common overlaps of experience among 
people who are experiencing poverty and agreement over the causes and 
consequences of their predicaments, it is also important to note how other 
facets of their social positioning- such as their gender and sexuality 
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identifications or their ethnic group memberships- might mean that their 
experiences of poverty are different in significant ways. 
This kind of critical questioning therefore is vital if one is avoid making hasty 
and unjust generalisations about individuals from particular communities or 
social groups as it allows one to appreciate the complexities of our social 
identities and how collective identity categories are in a state in constant flux 
and contestation. 
Fourthly, when considering other people’s worldviews, it is important to develop 
sensitivity to how asymmetries of power can negatively impact relations of trust 
between differentially socially positioned individuals and how these 
asymmetries’ of power can distort the development and sharing of knowledge.  
This is an essential capacity if interlocutors are to develop an appreciation 
whether there are any communicative boundaries which ought to be negotiated 
in any exchange. Indeed, as was discussed previously, members from 
marginalised groups might not be willing to share certain kinds of knowledge 
with non-group members for a variety of reasons.  
Sometimes access to certain kinds of knowledge might be regulated by 
particular norms which stipulate the conditions of its public dissemination. 
Alternatively, members of oppressed communities might feel resentment at the 
idea that they are obliged to share their claims to illuminate or critique to 
improve the defective knowledge forms shared between members of relatively 
privileged communities. 
This means that members of privileged communities need to empathise with the 
moral quandaries and dilemmas which arise when members of marginalised 
communities are asked to share their knowledge with relatively privileged 
communities and to respect their decisions not to share certain kinds of 
knowledge. This sensitivity is vital if members from privileged groups and 
communities are not to treat the knowledge claims of the oppressed with an 
imperialistic or instrumentalist attitude. 
In addition, it is also vital for members from privileged groups in particular to 
develop sensitivity to situations where claims cannot be staked intelligibility by 
members of oppressed groups by virtue of flaws and gaps in dominant 
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epistemic norms. This is to suggest that claimants occasionally might only lack 
a coherent conceptual language in which to stake their claims, but recipients 
lack the epistemic resources to recognise a complaint of injustice as being 
worthy of their consideration and address.  
Unsurprisingly, in cases of hermeneutical injustice, it can not only be extremely 
difficult to respond appropriately to other people's claims but it can also be 
extremely difficult for oppressed individuals to attempt to articulate their claims 
as there is uncertainty as to whether others are willing or capable of assisting 
the intelligibility of their claims. 
Accordingly, as Miranda Fricker suggests, it is important for people to develop 
the virtue of “hermeneutical justice” which involves an “acquired alertness or 
sensitivity to the possibility that the difficulty one's interlocutor is having as she 
tries to render something communicatively intelligible... {due} to some sort of 
gap in collective hermeneutical resources”. (2007, pg 169) 
This sensitivity reflects taking other people's differences into account, especially 
in terms of recognising the connection between their social identities and 
asymmetries of power that foster relations of epistemic injustice. 
In addition, it is also vital for people to develop a situational awareness of 
situations where the public expression and uptake of political claims are being 
frustrated or marginalised from public discussion by the operation of 'differends'- 
situations where people are staking their claims in vocabularies that are 
incommensurable with dominant interpretive resources and/or where dominant 
concepts are profoundly flawed as vehicles to accurately express particular 
claims. (Lyotard, 1983) 
Accordingly, the development of this kind of critical sensitivity is dependent on 
our capacities to be attentive to not only what is explicitly claimed but also that 
which is inarticulate or only implicitly suggested by our interlocutors. 
Fifthly, when learning about different worldviews it is important to exercise 
appropriate sensitivity when critically interrogating them. Indeed, as made clear 
by the ensuring public debate following the attack on the office of the French 
satirical magazine Charlie Hebdo, it is vital when engaging in criticism of 
different worldviews to be sensitive towards the social positioning of one’s 
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interlocutor, particularly when such groups and communities are socially 
marginalised. 
This sensitivity does not entail passivity or stifling self-censorship as it 
recognises that the viewpoints, interpretations and claims of those coming from 
marginalised social groups and communities might be epistemically and morally 
flawed. Indeed, it would be foolish to assume that a person's self-interpretations 
and understandings are entirely faultless given the complex connections 
between power and our social identities. 
Instead, fair criticism entails being sensitive to how one's criticisms might cause 
offence to its targets prior to staking them. In addition, such criticism would be 
dependent on striving to form as accurate an understanding of different 
worldviews as possible prior to staking a criticism. These steps seem essential 
if one is to avoid staking criticisms on the basis of distorted and flawed 
assumptions about different worldviews and to avoid undermining a potentially 
constructive interchange of conflicting perspectives. 
In addition, such criticism must be sufficiently nuanced and complex with 
respect to our social identities, recognising individual agency, considering the 
dynamics of power within particular groups and communities as well as the 
broader dynamics of power between different groups and communities within a 
given society, especially the historical relationships between dominant and non-
dominant social groups and communities. 
Without an appreciation of the complex and dynamic nature of our social 
identities, and the manner in which our social identities are connected to 
broader patterns of social and political contestation and interaction, criticism can 
merely degrade into a mechanism of derision, contempt and opprobrium against 
marginalised individuals and will inevitably rest on epistemically faulty grounds. 
Ultimately, therefore, social criticism will often inevitably cause offence it is also 
important to note that causing offence might be essential in challenging 
oppressive facets of different social customs, traditions and identities.  The 
ability to stake- and receive- fair criticism is therefore vital if people are to one to 
reject and revise one's prior viewpoints appropriately in the face of new 
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knowledge and information and to recognise our areas of ignorance different 
worldviews. 
Finally, this point provides a useful segue to the second principle when learning 
about different worldviews- namely, the need for people to be tolerant of diverse 
communication styles. It has been noted previously how feminist theorists have 
consistently highlighted how accounts of civility which privilege particular forms 
of communication style or argumentative forms can be exclusionary to socially 
marginalised and excluded communities. (Sanders, 1997; Young, 2000)  
Dominant communicative norms can privilege particular kinds of public 
articulation and expression- for instance, dispassionate and formal language 
use- in a manner which often tracks broader relations of domination. (Young, 
2000)  
This is a particular problem given how these accounts typically connect civil 
discourse to the legitimation of coercive political power via the claim that only 
generalizable political claims are acceptable for consideration in any public 
decision-making process. 
Accordingly, I argue it is important to be tolerant of diverse communicative 
styles and communicative forms for two reasons: namely ensuring that 
communicative exchanges are genuinely inclusive and ensuring that people 
have the epistemic resources to fairly consider the perspectives of others. 
The first reason why tolerating a wide range of communicative styles and 
argumentative types is an important mechanism of inclusion is that it recognises 
that public claim-making is never an exchange and evaluation of abstract claims 
as it inherently references important aspects of people’s identities.  
Indeed, our choice of communication styles and argumentative forms are 
profoundly influenced by our social background and socialization and their 
connection to our worldviews is often extremely strong. It is important, therefore, 
that any conception of civil discourse allows people to express themselves in 
the argumentative mode and style of their own choosing for two central 
reasons.  
Firstly, it fosters a climate where people believe that their claims will be fairly 
considered as it does not require them to bracket important aspects of their 
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identities from their political claims. It creates the expectation that they can 
explain why their claims have an existential import to them and how their 
worldviews support the arguments they wish to stake. 
Secondly, it mitigates the risk that public discourses will be biased towards 
particular communicative or argumentative styles, thereby not only excluding 
certain individuals but also negatively impacting the breadth and depth of the 
claims available for public discussion.  
Accordingly, it avoids unnecessary conflict as it allows citizens to stake their 
claims in a manner of their own choosing without having to depend on a prior 
meta-consensus regarding which kind of reasons are acceptable or 
unacceptable for the purposes of collective decision-making. These points have 
been forcibly noted by Iris Marion Young, who foregrounds the importance of 
democratic institutions accepting diverse communication forms, including 
greeting, rhetoric, narrative, as well as rational argument. (Young, 2000) 
The second reason to encourage a toleration of diverse communication styles 
and argumentative forms is because it can have important epistemic 
consequences. This is because tolerating such diversity can enlarge the scope 
and the depth of a public dialogue and encourage previously inaccessible 
insights via encouraging greater empathic perspective taking. (Black, 2008, pg 
96).  
This is important because diverse communication styles and argumentative 
forms can serve an important epistemic signalling device, articulating the moral 
gravity, urgency and import of a particular claim. This is a particularly important 
in cases where people are struggling to find common ground regarding a 
contested public issue or where dominant epistemic norms either serve to 
rationalize, legitimate or justify particular injustices or render certain injustices 
invisible. 
For instance, Smith (1998) discusses the importance of story-telling as a device 
of political resistance in the 19th century Abolitionist movement. She argues that 
story-telling played not only played an informative role but it also served to 
humanize the victims of slavery in a way which abstract, rational claims could 
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not due to widespread moral difference and callousness towards the plight of 
African Americans. (Smith, 1998, pg 357) 
Moreover, this diversity can not only increase our knowledge of the broader 
background worldviews which inform a particular claim but they can allow us to 
question our previously taken for granted interpretations of other people’s lived 
realities and circumstances. Indeed, Young understands plural kinds of 
communication as a significant epistemic resource for public dialogue as they 
can facilitate the sharing and development of shared knowledge between 
people who are very differently socially positioned. (Young, 2000) 
Young hopes therefore that by encouraging a broad range of communication 
forms and by understanding difference as an epistemic resource, dialogue 
processes can help to enlarge understanding and help people move beyond 
their own habitual frameworks and their “parochial interests”. (Young, 2000, pg 
109) 
Her approach is therefore profoundly different from the model of Rawls and 
Habermas as she insists rather than attempting to fix the discursive parameters 
of dialogue in advance participants in a dialogue should aim to widen their 
understandings of the subject matter, the idioms in which the subject matter is 
discussed and to contest standards of evidence which are presented in defence 
of people's claims and justifications. 
Accordingly, rather than pre-fixing the permissible kinds of discourse, this 
approach advocates welcoming a broad range of communication styles on the 
grounds that this is not only more inclusive but because such an approach 
might yield better epistemic insights as it encourages the exchange of a greater 
diversity of perspectives. 
Importantly, just because a broad range of communicative styles are included in 
a dialogue situation does not inherently mean that such dialogues will be 
blighted by critical deficits. This is because, as I have previously suggested, all 
kinds of testimony should be scrutinised in terms of their epistemic merits and 
demerits as well as the trustworthiness of the testifier. 
For instance, if people are exchanging factual claims one can critically evaluate 
their source or their manner of presentation to determine whether the facts are 
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being slanted or distorted by the ideological commitments of the testifier. If 
people are exchanging personal life narratives one can question whether a 
person has motivations to deceive others or interrogate whether there are any 
internal contradictions within their testimony. 
Accordingly, the claim that public discourses should encourage a broad range of 
claim-making styles does not imply that qualitative distinctions cannot be made 
between different forms of argumentation and communicative style. Nor does it 
mean that there can be no principled standards in terms of what kinds of claims 
should be excluded from any public dialogue.  
For instance, John Dryzek argues that the toleration of communicative diversity 
can reasonably be limited by the conditions that no claims should attempt to 
persuade others via coercive or manipulative techniques and that eventually 
these communicative claims should be able to articulated in a more 
generalizable fashion- that is, in a manner which is more broadly acceptable 
while still remaining faithful to its existential import. (Dryzek, 2000)   
Alternatively, as Iris Marion Young suggests, one could also distinguish 
productive from non-productive kinds of communicative diversity with respect to 
their capacities to deepen- or weaken- mutual understanding. (Young, 2000, pg 
66) 
Accordingly, given this outline of the epistemic responsibilities associated with 
learning about different worldviews it is now important to critically reflect on 
some of the difficulties associated with advocating civil discourse in the face of 
significant disparities of power.  
I argue in the next section, therefore, that on occasion if we are to meet our 
epistemic responsibilities it is also essential to critically survey the benevolency 
of our interlocutors towards ourselves, given that civil discourse depends on the 
good will and the good faith of all participants to consider each other’s claims 
fairly and to fairly stake one’s own in turn.  
And yet, this good will and good faith is frequently distorted by relations of 
epistemic injustice which can breed morally blameworthy kinds of 
communicative behaviour.  Accordingly, if one is to make appropriate 
judgements as to whether one ought to place one’s trust in others’ testimonial 
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claims, I argue that it is also simultaneously important for interlocutors to 
examine signs of each other’s benevolency towards oneself. But what do I 
mean here precisely? 
Questioning our interlocutor’s benevolency: 
It is clear that continually reflecting on the epistemic benevolency of other 
people is important for a number of reasons during any dialogical exchange. 
Firstly, questioning other’s epistemic benevolence is important because it allows 
us to judge whether they are willing to critically question their own worldviews 
and their own positioning in relations of power.   
This allows one to make a more informed judgement whether to risk sharing 
certain kinds of information with them, especially information that is deeply 
sensitive with respect to one's own life experiences. For instance, one can 
judge a person's benevolency by assessing the extent to which they 
demonstrate- or fail to demonstrate- appropriate consideration and sensitivity 
towards one's claims- that is, a person's “openness” to one's perspectives, 
feelings and behaviours.  
 Alternatively, one can assess their competency with respect to how they 
interpret one's claims and their consistency over time as to whether they will 
fairly consider one's claims. This need is pressing given diverse research in 
social psychology which illustrates the frequent resistance of individuals to 
incorporate new insights which contradict their established beliefs. 
(Bodenhausen et al, 2012; Haidt, 2013, Mercier & Sperber 2011; Mendelberg, 
2002; Richey, 2012) 
These “motivated reasoning” biases can frustrate- in an automatic, implicit and 
unconscious fashion- an individual's capacity to appropriately revise, reject or 
embracing new beliefs and attitudes. This tendency, I argue, is a violation of the 
epistemic responsibilities characteristic of civil discourse.  
Secondly, critically reflecting on other’s benevolence is important because it 
allows us to discern whether they are willing to learn about our own worldviews. 
This is to say that it enables us to question whether they will grant our claims a 
fair hearing. 
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Thirdly, critically reflecting on other’s benevolence provides us with an 
opportunity to critically scrutinize whether they are attempting to manipulate or 
deceive us via their testimonial claims, even their communicative behaviour 
seems “civil”. Accordingly, through questioning another person's benevolency 
one can judge whether a person is reliable as a source of knowledge and that 
one can depend on them to provide epistemically sound information. 
This problem is a pressing issue because, as I have been consistently stressing 
through this dissertation, relations of epistemic injustice can corrupt individual’s 
epistemic motives while rendering certain subjects effectively un-discussable.    
For instance, members from dominant groups might refuse to learn from 
different knowledge sources and refuse to recognise the limitations of their 
knowledge or their areas of ignorance on the basis that they do not care about 
the knowledge contributions of oppressed communities and groups. 
Accordingly, because civil discourse demands a certain degree of self-
vulnerability, it is important to question whether members of dominant groups 
are using civil discourse merely as a means to pretend that they are considering 
the claims of marginalised groups while actually continually refusing to examine 
their implication in relations of oppression. 
Indeed, asymmetries of power often mean that people in dialogical situations 
can be animated by the desire to pursue certain benefits or to inflict certain 
sanctions against others and are willing to engage in deceptive or manipulative 
practices in order to secure their interests. Indeed, as Annette Baier (1997) 
notes: 
“Where one depends on another’s good will, one is necessarily vulnerable to 
the limits of that good will. One leaves others an opportunity to harm one when 
one trusts, and also shows ones’ confidence that they will not take. Reasonable 
trust will require good grounds for such confidence in another’s goodwill, or at 
least the absence of good grounds for expecting another’s ill will or indifference. 
Trust, then, on this first approximation, is accepted vulnerability to another’s 
possible but not expected ill will or lack of good will toward one. (Baier, 1997, pg 
608) 
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Consequently, I argue that questioning other people’s benevolence is crucial if 
one is to appropriately place one’s trust in other’s testimonial claims. This an 
important point given that deceptive rhetoric might lead one to abandon 
epistemically sound beliefs, prevent one from revising one’s beliefs more 
legitimately or lead one to continue to hold beliefs which are epistemically 
flawed.   
Of course, this activity of critical scrutiny is a profoundly difficult task both 
cognitively and affectively, especially in cases where people have limited 
information as to the reliability of an informant due to a lack of past interaction 
with them. As Gambetta and Hamill note: 
“The trouble, in particular, is that the trustees’ trust-warranting properties cannot 
be discovered from observation. One cannot ‘see “self-interest”, “honesty,” or 
even “identity” as such”. (2005, pg 7) 
Potential trustees, therefore, must assess and evaluate observable signs of 
another person to discern whether these indicators can be “correlated with the 
unobservable trust-warranting properties”. (Gambetta & Hamill, 2005, pg 7) This 
is to say, following Hoy & Tschannen-Moran, that one needs to develop the 
“confidence that one's well-being or something that one cares about will be 
protected by the trusted person or group”. (Hoy & Tschannen-Moran, 1999, pg 
187)  
Finally, questioning other’s benevolency is vital because manipulative and 
deceptive discourse can distort the epistemic climate of democratic institutions 
in favour of vested and partial interests. Indeed, this kind of rhetoric can 
compound the power of unjust epistemic norms because it can help re-produce 
the marginalization or neglect of the knowledge resources of marginalized 
groups. 
In addition, manipulative and deceptive epistemic tactics can clearly have 
adverse impacts on democratic institutions, undermining relations of trust and 
potentially distorting the outcomes of political processes in favour of vested and 
partial interests. This means that the capacities of citizens to make autonomous 
and informed decisions can be significantly compromised via exposure to 
inaccurate, slanted, incomplete information. (Bok, 1978) 
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Accordingly, through questioning other people's benevolency we can judge 
whether their future behaviour augurs well for continued discussion. This is an 
important point as trust can only be cultivated by people, especially when they 
disagree intensely with each other or come from very different social 
backgrounds, through the public demonstration of continual good-will. 
Indications of their epistemic benevolence, therefore, serve to demonstrate 
whether a given dialogue will be productive or unproductive. 
However, if one accepts that it is important to interrogate the benevolency of 
individuals as they stake their testimonial claims what precisely should one 
critically evaluate? 
Firstly, I argue that it is vital for people to assess whether other parties are 
attempting to manipulate or exploit oneself through deception. This requires a 
capacity to discern whether people's testimony is characterised by the use of 
discursive equivocations-for instance, by the frequent use of ambiguous, 
contradictory or obtuse information- or discursive concealments where certain 
kinds of relevant and important information are intentionally or unintentionally 
not raised by a testifier. 
The classic instance of this in political life is 'spinning' whereby information is 
presented in order to encourage the acceptance of certain claims or to 
discourage the acceptance of certain claims. Alternatively, it can also be used to 
avoid making particular admissions or to evade attributions of responsibility for 
one's actions.  
Moreover, it is also important to assess whether a testifier is proffering highly 
exaggerated information or unduly understated information or whether the 
intelligibility of a claim has deliberately distorted or underpinned by the use of 
certain terms which are extremely vague, imprecise or ambiguous. 
Another discursive indicator might be the use of euphemistic language in order 
to disguise the implications of a certain proposition or statement. The need to 
scrutinize euphemistic language is of particular importance given that it is often 
used to rationalize, deny, legitimate or justify social injustices. 
Importantly, the need to question others testimony also extends to the need to 
discern whether a testifier is using implicature to promote a particular agenda or 
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line of argument which has not been explicitly raised. It is also necessary to 
monitor's other people's testimonial claims with respect to their use of allusions, 
particularly in cases where such allusions are being used to reference highly 
emotive topics, and whether the clarity of another person's testimony has been 
compromised by the use of confusing jargon or other kinds of technical 
language. 
Fifthly, it is also important to question whether other people's testimonial claims 
are intended to pander via the expression of viewpoints which do not actually 
reflect a person's genuine beliefs but which rather stem from a desire to gain 
the support of targeted individuals and groups via appeals to their perceived 
values and beliefs. 
Furthermore, it is also vital to question people's epistemic motivations and 
intentions with respect to the limitations of their knowledge and how their areas 
of ignorance are connected to asymmetries of power. There are a number of 
aspects to this kind of critical inquiry.  
It seems vital to interrogate whether the testimonial claims of persons are 
unjustly neglecting, overlooking, devaluing and de-legitimating the knowledge 
contributions made by oneself or others. This critical scrutiny is particular 
warranted if the testifying party comes from relatively privileged social groups 
and communities.  
In addition, one also needs to question whether the testimonial claims of others 
are animated by a desire to deny, ignore or obscure injustice, particularly in 
terms of whether their claims are justified with reference to oppressive 
stereotypes, social categorizations or prejudicial attitudes.  
Lastly, as my criticisms of Charles Taylor’s account of civil discourse stressed, it 
is particularly vital to maintain constant vigilance with respect to particular kinds 
of discursive strategies and techniques which engender manipulative and 
exploitative discourses. I therefore argue that some of the following kinds of 
discourses are intrinsically “uncivil” as they constitute a failing of our epistemic 
responsibilities towards each other and serve to reproduce relations of 
oppression: 
Discursive strategy: 
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Discourses which deny or ignore claims that political, economic or social 
injustices are occurring or which rationalize injustices as being morally 
acceptable. 
Discursive techniques: 
1. Hypocritical justification- a claim that the infliction of certain kinds of 
harms is morally permissible for some communities or social groups but 
morally impermissible for other social groups and communities.  
2. Euphemistic justification- framing justifications for harmful actions or 
inactions by using terms that neutralize, disguise or minimize their 
impacts, thereby encouraging others to accept these harmful actions or 
inactions as being morally acceptable or pragmatically necessary. 
3. Dissembling justification- framing justifications in a manner that ignores, 
dismisses, mischaracterizes or belittles the adverse consequences of 
certain unjust actions or inactions on certain individuals. 
Discursive strategy: 
Discourses which justify or excuse the denial of equal inclusion to certain 
populations or which assert that certain individuals or communities are of 
unequal moral, civil and political status. 
Discursive Techniques: 
1. Derogatory, patronizing or condescending justifications- the framing of 
claims which labels targeted individuals or social groups in an inferior 
light, ascriptively assigning them with morally blameworthy 
characteristics or traits or assuming that they lack agency and 
individuality. Targeted individuals are viewed more as “moral patients” 
than “moral agents”. (Bastian et al, 2011).  
2. Dehumanizing justifications- the staking of claims which position certain 
individuals or social groups as being beyond the boundaries of 
“humanity” via comparisons to non-human animals and objects or 
refusing to acknowledge their unique individuality as human beings. 
Alternatively, dehumanising justifications might reduce individuals to 
being mere objects to foster emotional distance or to breed sentiments of 
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opprobrium, contempt and derision for targeted groups. (Waller, 2007, 
Haslam, 2006). As a consequence, the lives of dehumanized individuals 
can be treated as expendable. (Bar-Tal 1990) 
3. Objectifying justifications- the framing of claims which suggests that 
certain individuals or social groups lack autonomous agency or inherent 
subjectivity. Objectivizing justifications can also legitimate a person's 
instrumental treatment that disrespects their needs, purposes or wants 
via asserting that they are essentially items of property. (Nussbaum, 
1995) 
4. Othering justifications- the framing of claims which positions certain 
individuals or social groups as belonging to fixed, essentialized 
categories that present some social threat. Othering justifications can 
also assert the inherent superiority of particular social groups to 
legitimate injustices committed against stigmatised communities or 
individuals.  
They serve to position some groups as being worthy of inclusion within 
the realm of legal and social protection while legitimating the institutional 
neglect and mistreatment of others on the basis that it is morally 
deserved or pragmatically necessary. (Opotow, 2001; 2002) 
5. Distancing or contamination justifications- the framing of claims which 
encourage people to view certain individuals or social groups as not 
belonging to a particular society, especially in terms of suggesting that 
they are a social pollutant or disease. They aim to breed a sense of 
disconnection between different communities, thereby allowing people to 
deny any interdependencies or mutual moral and political obligations. 
(Opotow, 1990) 
6. Violence normalising justifications- the staking of claims that position 
violence as being a morally acceptable “solution” to a social group or 
community viewed as a social problem. 
7. Essentialist justifications- the staking of claims which suggests that 
certain groups possess fixed, biologically immutable traits or properties 
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which explain their social behaviour. These essentialist traits or 
properties are typically pejorative in nature. (Gelman, 2003). 
Discursive strategy 
Discourses that deny self or group implication in relations of oppression 
Discursive techniques: 
1. Victim blaming and shaming justifications- the staking of claims which 
distribute casual responsibility for social injustices to the actions and 
inactions of their victims and/or which seek to make certain individuals 
feel shame, self-loathing or self-contempt for behaviours that are 
deemed to be socially deviant. Victim blaming narratives serve to divert 
attention from the causal agents responsible for a particular injustice or 
the broader social structures and processes that facilitate oppression. 
2. Disassociative justifications- the staking of claims that assert that one's 
actions or inactions are completely divorced from a particular social 
injustice or broader relations of oppression. Alternatively, disassociation 
can occur by partially admitting a degree of self-implication in injustice 
but rationalising this reality by suggesting that other agents are more 
responsible. 
3. Self-inflating justifications- the staking of claims which suggest that one's 
own behaviour- or that of broader social groups- is inherently more 
morally virtuous and praiseworthy in comparison to others who are 
deemed to be morally vicious, irresponsible or blameworthy with respect 
to their actions or inactions. 
4. Denial justifications- the staking of claims which either literally deny that 
an injustice is occurring, interpretively deny that an injustice is happening 
by rationalising their absolution of responsibility and blame and 
implicatively deny that an injustice has any relevance to one's actions or 
inactions. (Cohen, 2001) 
In conclusion, I have claimed that it is deeply misguided for people to simply 
trust other’s testimonial claims unconditionally as it cannot be assumed that all 
persons have benevolent intentions towards one and because one is at a 
244 
 
constant risk of being intentionally or unintentionally misinformed or deceived. 
Accordingly, it is important to continually question other people’s epistemic 
benevolence towards oneself in any kind of discursive interaction. This critical 
surveillance is also important as it might facilitate individuals challenging the 
use of the discourses I have identified as being undesirable from a democratic 
point of view. 
Nevertheless, at the same time, it would also be profoundly misguided for 
people to assume an attitude of complete suspicious distrust towards other 
people and their testimony. This is because it not merely would lead one to 
commit the injustice of unfairly considering the claims of others but it can also 
lead one to overlook important information and could result in the needless 
destruction of trusting social relationships. 
Consequently, questioning other’s epistemic benevolence can be a morally 
fraught and costly affair as the very act of scrutinizing other people’s intentions 
and motivations can be corrosive of trust and might lead one to unjustly dismiss 
the merits of other people’s point of view. Indeed, it might be said that such a 
stance is inherently dangerous given the epistemic limitations in accurately 
understanding other people’s intentions and motivations.  
Moreover, it might be objected that the very task of critically questioning other 
people’s intentions or motivations might corrode a necessary “presumption of 
charity” when considering other people’s viewpoints, especially if their views are 
in opposition to our own.  
From this perspective, questioning other’s intentions or motivations can lead to 
an unjust castigation of their credibility, trustworthiness or reliability as knowers 
and their equal political status as citizens. In addition, there are also good 
reasons to be cautious when attributing deception or manipulation to other 
persons given the possibility that others people’s claims might be animated by a 
desire to be sincere, even though, their claims are epistemically false or flawed. 
However, critical other-questioning is important to avoid being vulnerable to 
manipulative and deceptive testimonial claims. In addition, it is also an 
important regulatory principle which allows us to identify cases where engaging 
in civil discourse would be morally inappropriate.  
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For instance, it seems unreasonable for people to engage in public discourse 
when others refuse to reciprocate in kind, especially in cases where they 
advance beliefs, claims and interests that are animated by prejudicial, 
discriminatory and violent intentions and motivations. 
This contextual position, therefore, maintains that there are no moral obligations 
for people, particularly from marginalized communities and social groups, to 
attempt to emphasise with the prejudicial or discriminatory viewpoints of 
members of advantaged communities and groups. 
However, one might still be required to exercise a limited kind of civility that 
might govern one’s public responses to their claims and perspectives. This 
limited kind of civility simply involves refraining from framing one’s replies in a 
manner that would similarly degrade or question their moral status as equal 
citizens. 
Conversely, it is also important to recognize that in contexts of asymmetries of 
power manipulative and deceptive tactics by members of marginalized social 
groups and communities might be necessary- and morally justifiable- if their 
equal status, influence and access is frustrated or denied by relations of social 
injustice. 
This is particularly important in contexts of epistemic injustice where the claims 
of oppressed communities are systemically ignored, dismissed or 
misinterpreted by virtue of prejudicial attitudes and stereotypes. This situation 
justifies the use of manipulation and deception if such a strategy would improve 
the uptake of their claims or leverage dominant groups and institutions to take 
greater consideration of their interests. 
Accordingly, judgements with respect to the permissibility of using manipulative 
or deceitful tactics must be contextually sensitive and involve a critical appraisal 
of power relationships. Ultimately, the decision to scrutinize another person with 
respect to their benevolence must occur on the basis of sound epistemic 
reasons and it must recognize the inherent risks that such an effort inevitably 
entails. 
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Chapter Conclusion: 
This chapter has argued that insights from feminist epistemological theories 
allow us to develop a more inclusive and nuanced account of civil discourse 
given its keen acknowledgement of the connection between knowledge and 
power. I have argued that a feminist epistemological approach places the 
problem of trust at the foreground of concern when we think about the 
importance of civil discourse in society.  
Civil discourse can be an essential practice of trust building between 
interlocutors who come from very different social backgrounds and who share 
very different- and possibly incommensurable- worldviews. Yet in the face of 
significant power differentials, establishing and maintaining trust can be a highly 
fraught business. 
Accordingly, I argued that trust can be built only in circumstances where 
interlocutors share common epistemic responsibilities which shape their 
responsiveness to other people’s claims. I have argued that these 
responsibilities can be broadly divided into two key aspects- namely learning 
about other’s worldviews and learning from other’s worldviews.  
Importantly, these modes of learning require participants to critically reflect on 
their positioning in relationships of power and how these relationships of power 
breed epistemic injustices. The hope is that participants in a dialogue can 
develop a more self-reflexive stance with respect to how they stake their own 
claims and how they critically consider the viewpoints of others. 
However, I also cautioned that in the face of power differentials individuals are 
prudent to critically yet carefully reflect on the epistemic motivations of our 
interlocutors in case their testimonial claims are orientated towards discursive 
manipulation or exploitation. I have argued that such a stance is important 
because it might assuage fears that civility is merely a means for powerful 
groups to implement their agendas while disingenuously paying mere lip-service 
to other’s claims. 
However, it is also important to stress that there is an even more fundamental 
objection to the whole idea of advocating civil discourse in the face of vast 
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power differences. This line of objection might be termed the exclusion objection 
and it forms the central concern of the beginning of the next chapter.  
This line of objection, as we shall see shortly, maintains that advocating civil 
discourse is futile because it is only through coercive political disobedience that 
members of oppressed groups can have their claims fairly heard and 
considered by political elites.  
Alternatively, coercive political disobedience is the only means via which these 
elites can be displaced altogether and new political, social and economic 
relations and institutions implemented.  
Accordingly, the next chapter shall proceed by outlining the exclusion objection, 
stressing how its advocates have argued that only coercive civil disobedience 
can alter oppressive epistemic norms and broader aspects of oppression. I shall 
then explore the complexities of the term civil disobedience, surveying the 
different ways it has been conceptualized in the academic literature.  
Subsequently, I shall explore the accounts of civil disobedience proffered by 
John Rawls and Jürgen Habermas, arguing that their frameworks are limited by 
the strenuous conditions they place on its public justification.  
The final part of this chapter, therefore, develops a normative account to 
distinguish between morally praiseworthy and morally blameworthy acts of civil 
disobedience while emphasising the necessity of coercive disobedience in 
challenging oppressive epistemic norms in society. 
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Fourth Chapter: The Political Morality of Civil Disobedience. 
The previous chapter attempted to redefine the notion of civil discourse through 
the prism of epistemic responsibility. Nevertheless, if a consideration of the 
concept is to be complete, it is vital to explore some of the central objections to 
civil discourse from the perspective of power which I loosely term the 
“exclusion” objection.  
This objection fundamentally argues that practices of coercive disobedience are 
essential to challenging unjust relations of power in society, including epistemic 
injustices. Indeed, as a wide range of democratic theorists have demonstrated 
political coercion is often essential to defend fundamental democratic rights and 
to challenge unjust regimes.  
For instance, recent work by so-called “agonist” or “realist” political theorists 
have questioned the supposed privileging by recent liberal political theory of the 
attainment of consensus over the recognition of the importance of coercion to 
force institutional or structural change. (Fung, 2005; Galston, 2010; Mouffe, 
2000, Stears, 2007, Sleat, 2010) 
Even theorists who express a degree of sympathy with more deliberative 
conceptions of democracy acknowledge the limitations of advocating dialogical 
politics in the face of deeply entrenched power asymmetries. For instance, as 
Jane Mansbridge and Iris Marion Young respectively note: 
“{Liberal democracies}...committed to some rough approximation to equal 
power will require some forms of nonuniamously approved coercion to attain 
ends that most of their citizens approve”. (Mansbridge, 1996, pg 48) 
“The deliberative democrat claims that parties to political conflict ought to 
deliberate with one another and through reasonable agreement try to come to 
an agreement on policy satisfactory to all. The activist is suspicious of 
exhortations to deliberate because he believes that in the real world of politics, 
where structural inequalities influence both procedures and outcomes, 
democratic processes that appear to conform to the norms of deliberation are 
usually biased toward more powerful agents. The activist thus recommends that 
those who care about promoting greater justice should engage primarily in 
critical oppositional activity, rather than attempt to come to agreement with 
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those who support or benefit from existing power structures”. (Young, 2001, pg 
42) 
Consequently, after outlining this objection, I shall attempt to acknowledge the 
merits of this position while attempting to defend the proposition that the 
exercise of political coercion ought to be morally limited by some key principles 
of civility. Accordingly, given this brief outline, it is important to explicate the 
exclusion objection in further detail. 
The exclusion objection: 
The exclusion object rests on two sets of inter-related claims about civil 
discourse. The first claim is a normative objection which argues that norms of 
civility can effectively marginalise the contributions of oppressed minorities 
while allowing powerful social actors to dissipate, undermine, stifle, manage or 
re-direct contentious struggles against injustice. 
From this perspective, 'civil' discourse ultimately statically favours the status 
quo while fostering the exclusion of oppressed groups and communities. For 
instance, as Tracy (2008) argues, “it is important to recognize that calls to civility 
are political; the need for civility is regularly invoked by those with power to 
regulate those with less of it”. (Tracy, 2008, pg 185, citing Cmiel 1994) 
Alternatively, as Inayatullah and Blaney (2004, pg 19) note, one of the central 
problems which must be addressed by any account of public deliberation is why 
members of advantaged communities, who are the beneficiaries of oppressive 
relations, would be motivated to fairly consider the claims of marginalized 
communities and to potentially revise their interests, preferences and viewpoints 
as a result.  
This problem is urgent, as they further note, because the maintenance of 
oppressive relations partially depends precisely on individuals “evading or 
refusing the call to find in the other a source of critical self-reflection” (2004, pg 
219) whilst Wood (2004, pg. xx) stresses that it is precisely individuals from 
privileged social backgrounds who frequently lack the motivation to “interact 
dialogically with those who do not benefit from the same status and advantage”. 
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Unsurprisingly, therefore, from this point of view, advocating civility in the face of 
massive power asymmetries constitutes a diversionary device which aims to 
maintain relations of injustice. (Scott & Smith, 1969) 
This line objection has been forcefully raised by Mari Boor Tonn (2005) who 
criticises what she terms a “cult of conversation” in contemporary democratic 
theory, suggesting that theories of political discourse are often limited by their 
adoption of a quasi-spiritual or therapeutic ethos that renders them insensitive 
differences of power. 
From Tonn’s standpoint, dialogical processes which aim to promote greater 
political civility, social engagement and co-operation as well as personal 
empowerment can in practice become instruments to contain dissent to 
prevailing hegemonies, to marginalize contrarian voices, and to personalize 
structural problems whilst also cultivating a corrosive therapeutic approach 
toward public problems. (Tonn, 2005, pg 406)  
According to this line of argument, asymmetries of power invariably shape the 
procedural conditions of any dialogical exchange and the kind of discourses 
which are privileged, marginalized or ignored. 
The second aspect of the exclusion objection rests on more pragmatic 
arguments. From this point of view, civil discourse is simply an ineffective 
means to combating social injustices as opposed to the use of coercive political 
disobedience. More positively, this line of argument typically emphasizes the 
benefits of “uncivil” discourse as a strategy of political contestation and claims 
that the use of coercion has been the central means via which oppressed 
communities have challenged dominant relations of power.  
From this perspective, accounts of civility are problematic as they might become 
misconstrued as substitutes for the kinds of political contestation necessary to 
challenging structural inequalities, thereby inadvertently reproducing relations of 
injustice and domination.  
For example, Linda Zerilli suggests that recent calls for greater civility in political 
life might, in fact, constitute a displacement of the “real problem”- namely the 
“growing disaffection of Americans with their government and the withdrawal of 
citizens from public life”. (Zerilli, 2014, pg 112) 
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Zerilli further argues that as marginalized social groups, individuals or 
communities have frequently been accused of acting “uncivilly” when they 
challenge the prevailing relations of power, it is vital to consider that what 
counts as “legitimate” political behaviour vis-a-vis “critical questions regarding 
equal political access and voice in the democratic public realm”. (Zerilli, 2014, 
pg 108)  
Instead, Zerilli foregrounds how claims which were deemed to be “uncivil” by 
dominant groups in fact have been “crucial to enlarging the democratic public 
sphere”, especially in terms of the “creation of new publics and claims”. (Zerilli, 
2014, pg 112) 
Similarly, Kennedy argues that “moral progress” in liberal democracies stems 
from a broad range of activities which might conventionally be described as 
'uncivil', including: 
 “…conduct that is tainted with coercion (think of any strike or boycott), or 
aggressiveness (think of the punitive anti-slavery polemics of Garrison, 
Douglas, Wendell Phillips, or Charles Sumner) or out-and-out violence (think of 
John Brown, Nat Turner, Denmark Vesey, or Abraham Lincoln's Union Army)” 
(Kennedy, 2012, pg 34) 
This line of objection, therefore, centres on the claim that accounts of civil 
dialogue suffer from an inflated sense of optimism in regards to fostering large 
scale, structural social change. From this point of view, it is argued that social 
movements frequently have to use coercive tactics in order to advance 
democratic aims, including boycotting, striking, non-cooperation, monkey-
wrenching, jail stacking and marches.  
This is to highlight that these movements aim to create a political or moral crisis 
which forces a response from governmental or non-governmental actors. They 
serve to disrupt and undermine the hegemonic authority of ruling institutions, 
individuals and social groups by forcing them to acknowledge- and hopefully 
address- interests, concerns and claims which have been previously evaded, 
denied or ignored altogether. Alternatively, they aim to replace dominant political 
elites altogether. 
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In addition, this line of criticism often argues that coercive practices of 
disobedience have an important “shock” factor, allowing for the creative 
subversion of dominant epistemic norms while forcefully introducing new 
discursive frames into public discourse. From this perspective, practices of 
political disobedience are vital to disturbing practices of vested ignorance which 
allow members from advantaged communities to avoid examining their 
complicities in social injustices. 
For instance, political activists can challenge unjust and dominant epistemic 
norms by challenging their taken-for-grantedness, by illustrating the 
contingencies of their construction and by introducing new vocabularies and 
frames into collective public discourse.  
In conclusion, therefore, in contemporary liberal democracies it is often 
pragmatically essential for marginalised social groups to use coercion in order 
to contest dominant institutions and relations of social power. Nevertheless, 
while I am profoundly sympathetic to the view that coercive political action is an 
essential tool of political contestation, I also argue that its exercise should make 
reference to certain principles of civility. This is because even advocates of 
political coercion in the face of structural injustices recognize that the use of 
coercion must have principled limitations. 
Firstly, while the exercise of coercion is obviously an important means of 
altering unjust power relations, this does not mean that activists can pursue 
their activities carte blanche. For instance, it is commonly accepted in the 
academic literature that the exercise of coercion must be justified in terms of the 
selection of its tactics. It must be focused and restrained in terms of the ends it 
aims to achieve. (Falcón y Tella, 2004, Milligan, 2013, Rawls, 1999b; Smith, 
2013) 
Secondly, it is also clear that the use of coercion- especially if this coercion is 
violent- can occasionally unjustly infringe other people's democratic rights. For 
instance, in 2004 animal rights activists in the UK were widely criticised for 
desecrating the remains of an 82-year-old woman's grave. Her family were 
involved in the intensive raising of guinea pigs for medical research.  
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This act was precipitated by a long-running campaign by animal rights activists 
against the family which included the sending of hate mail, malicious phone 
calls, arson attacks, hoax bomb threats and the public smearing of household 
members as paedophiles. (BBC News, 2006a, 2006b) 
This differentiation thereby explains why the moral legitimacy of deploying 
coercion in political contexts is often treated with a degree of suspicion, 
particularly within the liberal political tradition. 
Occasionally, coercion seems to be prima facie morally questionable as it 
seems to violate or compromise people's freedom both a negative and positive 
sense. If one defines freedom in a negative sense- as absence from arbitrary 
interference by other people or any other kind of external restraints- then 
coercion can be morally problematic in that it typically involves one party 
imposing their will on another’s choices or actions. Coercion can occasionally 
compromise our autonomy as agents in an unjust fashion. 
If one defines freedom in a positive sense- as the possession of requisite 
material and psychological capacities, powers and resources to pursue one's 
ends free from internal constraints- then coercion can impact upon freedom by 
negatively impacting one's decision-making capacities. 
Coercion can unjustly impact on our capacities to make decisions on a self-
voluntary basis, free of distorting impediments to our own decision-making 
processes. The problem with coercion, from this perspective, is that it can 
threaten people's freedom to rationally plan and evaluate their own life, 
constituting a grave indication of disrespect, neglect or indifference for people's 
dignity qua autonomous agents. 
Similarly, Raz suggests that coercion unjustly constraints people's autonomy via 
undermining their capacities to exercise voluntary choice or to choose 
meaningfully between an agent's available options. (Raz, 1986) Importantly, as 
Raz notes, coercion typically occurs as a consequence of “manipulation” which 
serves to “pervert” the manner a “person reaches decisions, forms preferences 
or adopts goals”. (Raz, 1986, pgs 377-8) 
Thirdly, coercion seems to be prima facie morally blameworthy as it ultimately 
involves treating persons exclusively as a means rather than treating them as 
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having purposes of their own. From this perspective, coercion is morally wrong 
because it signifies a prima facie lack of respect for the autonomy of the 
coerced. From this point of view, coercion can only be morally permissible if 
there is a reasoned prior or post justification that accompanies its exercise. 
Finally, it has often been maintained that citizens have a prima facie duty of 
obligation to accept the decisions of democratically elected authorities. This 
obligation of obedience stands irrespective if one disagrees with particular 
policy outcomes. 
Accordingly, the use of political coercion can be problematic in that it might 
erode respect for the rule of law, thereby undermining political stability. The 
ultimate fear from this point of view is that citizens could be encouraged to 
disobey the law licentiously in accordance with their on subjective- and possibly 
morally frivolous or questionable- ambitions and desires. 
Accordingly, it is for these reasons that it is important for political theory to 
develop plausible normative accounts of morally permissible and non-
permissible political coercion. However, what constitutes 'coercion' and what 
precisely seems prima facie wrong with it in a political context? It is clear that 
the concept of coercion is complex and interpreted in a broad range of fashions. 
For our purposes I have developed the following definition of coercion: 
“Coercion occurs when Agent X (singular or plural) forces agent Y (singular or 
plural) to act in a manner agent X desires. It involves the prospective issuing of 
a threat of harm to harm agent Y or by the actual infliction of a negative 
punishment or sanction on agent Y. These threats include the use of physical 
force or the exercise of significant psychological pressure. It is a deliberate 
attempt to control the behaviour of agent Y by issuing credible and sufficient 
threats that force agent Y to act in a manner contrary to their previous 
intentions- that is to act against agent Y's will. It aims to oblige Y to undertake- 
or desist from- particular actions that serve the interests of Agent X.” (Hoffman, 
2007; Scruton, 2007; Wertheimer, 2001) 
Understandably, therefore, it is often presupposed that there is a significant 
differentiation between coercive and persuasive forms of political action as the 
latter involves encouraging other parties to adopt a course of action or to modify 
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their behaviour via an appeal to reasoned justifications while the latter involves 
the issuing of threats or implementing negative sanctions. (Khan, 2007, pgs 
103-105) 
Consequently, it would seem that the central question then becomes what 
conditions and normative principles ensure that the exercise of coercion is 
conducted while not unduly disrespecting or violating the democratic rights and 
entitlements of others. 
It is clear that one of the most important prisms for negotiating this tension has 
been the vocabulary of civil disobedience. It is clear though that the very 
definition of the term is subject to contestation and has been explicated in a 
broad range of fashions. This reality means that a precise and concise definition 
of the term shall be presented later in the discussion.  
Nevertheless, there seems to be a broad consensus that the ultimate intention 
of civil disobedience is to coercively hinder, obstruct or otherwise compromise 
the ability or capacity of targeted opponents to fulfil their desired goals. 
Significantly, civil disobedience also inherently involves forcing political or 
economic concessions from state and non-state actors. (King, 2013) 
This process might involve, as Adam Roberts notes (2009), increasing the costs 
(e.g. financial and reputational costs) to adversaries pursuing their particular 
policies or agendas, by undermining their sources of legitimacy and power or by 
otherwise compromising their public authority and social bases of support. 
(Roberts, 2009, pg X) 
Accordingly, given this broad description of the concept, I aim to illustrate the 
multiple definitions of the term, as well as the inherent complexities of the 
concept. I outline seven central criteria in this regard to explicate how the 
concept of civil disobedience has been understood in the academic literature. 
The first criterion broadly explores the relationship between protesters 
motivations and their connection to broader public problems. From this 
perspective, the exercise of political coercion can be justified if in some capacity 
it highlights an existing public problem that is being inadequately being 
addressed by the political process or if it is being neglected altogether.  
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Consequently, 'civil' forms of disobedience are typically characterised as a 
principled protest against government or non-government policies which violate 
principles of justice which are shared and recognized- to varying degrees- by 
the members of a given political community.  
From this viewpoint, civil disobedience constitutes an act of public 
communication which aims to draw attention to significant public problems, to 
proffer potential solutions and to encourage fellow citizens (and non-citizens) to 
petition their political and economic institutions to change their policies or 
remedy the consequences of their past actions. 
Accordingly, it is assumed that 'civil' kinds of disobedience require a particular 
type of justification for a variety of reasons. Without any process of political 
justification, coercive political action could potentially compromise the 
willingness of citizens to comply the decisions of their elected representatives. It 
could potentially levy unreasonable costs on fellow citizens and social 
institutions as opposed to lawful forms of political participation. 
The connection between motivation and publicity is an important one as civil 
kinds of disobedience must always appeal to shared principles of justice or 
notions of the 'common good'. It is typically maintained that appealing to 
partisan claims of group interest would be both socially divisive and morally 
questionable. (Rawls, 1999b, pg 181) 
The second common criterion of civil disobedience makes reference to the 
conscientious character of its participant’s motivations. (Brownlee, 2012) 
Conscientiousness in this sense refers to the sincerely held belief that protest 
action is morally required or morally permissible. The principle of 
conscientiousness is well explained by Simmons: 
“Thus, civilly disobedient law-breakers may believe that the legally required act 
is itself morally forbidden (or the legally forbidden act morally required), or that 
they are morally required or permitted to break some such law in order to 
protest injustice...or simply that it is morally wrong for the law to prohibit (or 
require) the act in question, so that disobedience to that law is morally 
permissible.” (Simmons, 2003 pg 52) 
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The third criterion broadly explores the relationship between the nature of the 
coercive acts and the kind of moral justifications pro-offered in their defence. 
'Civil' forms of disobedience require a public moral justification given that such 
actions infringe the principle that people have a prima facie duty to respect the 
rule of law. (Greenawalt, 1998, pg 367) 
In addition, some accounts of civil disobedience even suggest that there is a 
moral obligation to provide due notice to the source of one's protest. One 
should be prepared to publicise one's intentions to breach the law in advance. 
(Rawls, 1999b) 
According to this perspective, covert forms of civil disobedience are illegitimate 
on the basis that any kind of protest is an act of public communication. 
Consequently, it is maintained that people who engage in civil disobedience 
share a burden of justification given that their actions might potentially 
undermine the prevailing legal and social order in a democratic regime. Indeed, 
as Simmons suggests:  
“Justifications of civil disobedience are offered against the background 
presumption that illegal conduct is normally morally wrong, at least where the 
laws in question are not themselves profoundly immoral or unjust”. (Simmons, 
2003, pg 55) 
Moreover, as William Smith suggests, the duty of public explanation might serve 
as a check to prevent vested minorities from acting in an “elitist” fashion by 
claiming an “entitlement to speak and act in the name of what they believe to be 
an ‘authentic’ sovereign will”. (Smith, 2013, pg 62) 
It is in this regard that numerous theorists have maintained that the use of 
coercion should be evaluated with reference to norms of “reasonableness”. One 
proposal is that reasonableness should be judged with reference to the 
availability and accessibility of legal alternatives to civil disobedient action. From 
this perspective, some accounts of civil disobedience have maintained that it is 
only legitimate if all formal legal prospects or avenues of political change were 
exhausted or denied. 
The second suggestion is that reasonableness should be assessed in terms of 
whether the injustice being protested against is of a sufficiently 'grave' and 
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'urgent' nature, particularly in terms of whether the consequences of its 
commission or omission are irreversible or extremely difficult to remedy in the 
future.  
From this perspective, reasonableness from this point of view considers 
whether protesting parties earnestly and with good reason believed that the 
circumstances being faced were in some sense 'exceptional' or had the quality 
of being an 'emergency'. (Falcón- y- Tella, 2004, pgs 44; 198-9)  
Reasonableness has also been assessed in terms of whether the actions of the 
protesters can or have been morally justified with reference to “shared” 
principles of justice. (Rawls, 1999b) Significantly, there has been disagreement 
as to how widely these principles should be shared and to whether they ought 
to be shared “widely” or even “explicitly” across a political community. 
However, as Smith notes, it would clearly be inappropriate to justify civil 
disobedience in support for what could be judged to be “unreasonable causes” 
such as racial segregation. (Smith, 2013, pg 106) Reasonableness, therefore, 
also requires judgements in relation to critical democratic values such as 
dignity, autonomy and equality.  
Alternatively, reasonableness has also been interpreted to refer to the logical 
soundness or plausibility of the protester's claims. The implication being that if 
protesters cannot offer epistemically sound justifications for their actions then it 
might be legitimate to criticise their actions.  
The fourth criterion centres on the connection between the moral standing of 
the protesters and their willingness or unwillingness to risk the potential legal 
consequences of their actions. This criterion does not necessarily imply that 
protesters should accept the moral legitimacy of an arrest, incarceration or other 
forms of legal sanction from a moral standpoint. However, it does imply that 
protesters accept any potential punishment from a legal point of view. 
Consequently, it has been argued that 'covert' forms of disobedience, whereby 
protesters attempt to avoid the legal ramifications of their actions, cannot be 
legitimately cast as constituting 'civil' forms of disobedience. Indeed, some 
accounts of civil disobedience even demand that protesters provide authorities 
with 'fair notice' in advance of their protests. 
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However, this has been disputed by other accounts that suggest that it might be 
permissible only to offer justifications following- not preceding- acts of civil 
disobedience given the prevailing political circumstances. 
The fifth criterion broadly focuses on the connection between the nature of the 
coercive action and the social or moral standing of its target(s). This debate has 
predominantly centred on the question of whether or to what extent it is 
permissible to use violence against human and non-human beings and items of 
property broadly construed. 
Moreover, “standing” has also been interpreted to refer to the direction of civil 
disobedience- that is, whether it is 'direct' or 'indirect' in its orientation. Direct 
forms of civil disobedience are understood to refer to the purposeful violation of 
a particular and disputed law or policy. Indirect forms of civil disobedience refer 
to the purposeful violations of laws that are not the object of protest in order to 
protest other legislation or policies that are contested. 
It is also worth noting that the literature on civil disobedience has often made a 
distinction between civil disobedience directed towards state entities and civil 
disobedience targeted towards non-state entities. Civil disobedience, in the 
former, refers to protesting particular government laws or policies. The latter 
refers to protesting the actions of a non-governmental entity, irrespective of 
whether their actions are legal or illegal. 
The sixth criterion focuses the connection between the scope and target of civil 
disobedience. This criterion distinguishes civil disobedience on the basis of 
whether it is directed against state or non-state agencies. It also differentiates 
between reformist and transformative disobedience.  
From this reformist perspective, civil disobedience constitutes a self-correcting 
mechanism, allowing citizens to maintain just political arrangements in light of 
potentially deleterious change or to improve their institutions towards greater 
justice. (Rawls, 1999b) 
On the other hand, civil disobedience animated by a transformative political 
agenda urges radical changes in the prevailing political, economic and social 
arrangements. For example, environmental activists often advocate a 
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broadening of society's understanding of Justice in order to accommodate the 
perceived interests of non-human actors.  
Finally, the seventh criterion focuses on the character of the relationship 
between civil disobedience participants and their fellow non-participant citizens. 
From this perspective, civil disobedience has been defined as reflecting a 
particular kind of relationality between citizens of a polity. 
For instance, Andrew Sabl argues that civil disobedience reflects an acceptance 
that the “regime and the electorate that supports it are related to {civil 
disobedients} as fellow citizens, or at least as potentially reasonable human 
beings capable of recognising and acting on moral claims”. (Sabl, 2001, pg 308) 
This kind of relationality thereby distinguishes civil disobedience from elitist and 
vanguardist forms of coercive political action which frequently has resulted in 
grave violations of human rights as the case of the Soviet revolution sadly 
illustrates. 
This section has attempted, therefore, to outline a brief explication of the 
concept of civil disobedience. However, in order to formulate a deeper 
understanding of the notion it is worthwhile concentrating on Rawls and 
Habermas' conceptualizations of civil disobedience for a number of reasons.  
Firstly, it might be suggested that their accounts have possibly been the most 
influential within the liberal political tradition. Any brief survey of the literature 
indicates that other works on the topic are heavily indebted to their formulations. 
It would not be idle hyperbole to suggest that much of the literature on civil 
disobedience consists of a series of footnotes to both of them. 
Secondly, there are a number of interesting similarities and points of 
disagreement between their accounts which mirrors to some extent their dispute 
over the concept of public reason. 
Finally, there are significant limitations of their accounts of civil disobedience 
that provide the resources to build an alternative account of civil disobedience. 
This account shall be developed in the final part of this chapter and shall 
articulate the connection between civility and disobedience in a very different 
way to Rawls and Habermas.  
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Accordingly, it is now appropriate to examine Rawls' notion of civil disobedience 
in more detail before turning to Habermas' account. 
John Rawls on Civil Disobedience: 
It is interesting to note that while Rawls discussion of civil disobedience is 
extremely brief- a mere 13 pages in length- it has proven to be one of the most 
influential interpretations of the concept within liberal political philosophy. It is 
also important to stress that Rawls understands the function of civil 
disobedience in a liberal democratic society in a rather limited manner. This 
limitation stems from the fact that he argues that his conceptualization is only 
applicable to a “well-ordered” and sufficiently just society that occasionally 
suffers from major violations of justice. 
In addition, his account also presupposes that civil disobedience occurs in the 
context of a widely shared public presumption of the moral and political 
legitimacy of the prevailing constitutional order. Rawls assumes that there is a 
pre-existing, legitimately established and widely accepted constitutional 
framework. He stresses, therefore, that citizens should accept the authority of 
constitutional principles as well as the legitimacy of democratically elected 
authorities. (Rawls, 1999b, pg 319) 
This point reflects Rawls insistence that citizens of a democratic polity have a 
“natural duty to uphold just institutions”. Citizens have an obligation to “comply 
with unjust laws and policies” with the qualification that these injustices do not 
“exceed certain limits”. (Rawls, 1999b, pg 311) While Rawls is unspecific about 
the parameters of these limits, he contends that citizens have a prima facie 
obligation to obey unjust laws on the condition that the broader “basic structure” 
of society is “reasonably just” (Rawls, 1999b, pg 308).  
Importantly, though, Rawls also claims that the distribution of any injustices 
must not be concentrated on particular social subgroups over the long term. 
Moreover, he also insists that the impacts of any injustice should not be entirely 
unacceptable to those detrimentally affected. (Rawls, 1999b, pg 312) 
In addition, Rawls' also makes a more functionalist claim regarding the 
obligation to obey unjust laws. He suggests that citizens should prima facie 
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obey unjust laws because it might threaten the regulatory principle of majority 
rule. Rawls means by this that if citizens were to politically disobey every 
violation of justice this might threaten the important goal of social stability. 
Moreover, Rawls also cautions against protesting each violation of justice in 
society in the face of potential reasonable disagreement as to whether an 
injustice has been actually committed in the first place. (Rawls, 1999b, pg 311)  
Indeed, Rawls even insists that citizens should accept the potential risk of 
suffering from “defects” in their fellow citizens “sense of justice” if they are to 
benefit from the advantages of effective democratic governance. (Rawls, 1999b, 
pg 312) 
This argument stems from his claim that only democratic regimes can preserve 
a “state of near justice”. Furthermore, it is also derivative of his view that that 
there is simply no need to justify non-violent coercive political action to 
challenge unjust political regimes. (Rawls, 1999b, pg 319)  
From this point of view, Rawls argues that participants in civil disobedience 
must carefully negotiate whether their grievances towards a particular injustice 
are simply reflective of the “inevitable imperfections” within any constitutional 
order. (Rawls, 1999b, pg 312) Indeed, Rawls even insists that citizens have a 
“natural duty of civility” not cite “faults” in our social arrangements as a “ready 
excuse” to violate the law. (Rawls, 1999b, pg 312) 
Consequently, for Rawls, civil disobedience occurs where there is a rupture 
between the actions of government and the “considered opinion” of civil 
disobedient protesters. (Rawls,1999b, pg 320, emphasis mine) Rawls maintains 
that civil disobedience is “considered” if protesters can effectively claim that 
there are serious violations of shared socially recognized principles of justice.  
He particularly stresses that civil disobedience is a highly appropriate strategy if 
citizens are not being treated as “free or equal” or if the actions of government 
are undermining society as a co-operative system of mutual interest and 
advantage. (Rawls, 1999b, pg 320) 
According to Rawls, the key item of consideration is whether the inevitable 
injustices within a democratic society are sufficiently tolerable on the basis of 
the fairness of their distribution. (Rawls, 1999b, pg 312) Rawls then articulates 
263 
 
the following proposition and corresponding questions which help frame his 
subsequent definition of legitimate civil disobedience: 
“The problem of civil disobedience, as I shall interpret it, arises only within a 
more or less just democratic state for those citizens who recognize and accept 
the legitimacy of the constitution. The difficulty is one of a conflict of duties. At 
what point does the duty to comply with laws enacted by a legislative majority 
(or with executive acts supported by such a majority) cease to be binding in 
view of the right to defend one’s liberties and the duty to oppose injustice?” 
(Rawls, 1999b, pg 319) 
Accordingly, given this background assumption, Rawls defines civil 
disobedience as “a public, non-violent, conscientious yet political act contrary to 
law usually done with the aim of bringing about a change in the law or policies 
of the government.” (Rawls, 1999b, pg 320)  
Given this definition, it is also important to stress how Rawls views civil 
disobedience as a “stabilizing device” of the constitutional order as he claims 
that its considered use serves to “correct” any deviations from its just character. 
(Rawls, 1999b, pg 336)  
He subsequently insists that acts of civil disobedience should be guided by the 
activity of “addressing” the sense of justice held by the majority. This implies 
that civil disobedient participants must particularly stress how governmental 
authorities are not respecting the “principles of social cooperation among free 
and equal men (sic)”. (Rawls, 1999b, pg 320) 
This point is important because Rawls understands civil disobedience as an act 
that must be conducted and justified via appeals to principles of justice which 
regulate the constitutional order and public institutions more broadly. (Rawls, 
1999b, pg 321) 
It is also vital to stress that Rawls also confines the legitimacy of civil 
disobedience justifications to cases where injustices can reasonably be 
considered to be “substantial and clear” and he further suggests that there are 
two central instances where civil disobedience is a normatively acceptable 
strategy. (Rawls, 1999b, pg 327) 
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The first instance refers to cases where serious infringements of his first 
principle of justice occur. These infringements include the placing of unjust 
restrictions on the equal political and civil liberties of certain groups of citizens. 
The second instance occurs where there are serious infringements of his 
second principle of justice which concerns patterns of economic distribution in a 
society. Interestingly, though, Rawls argues that such “infractions” are typically 
“more difficult to ascertain” in the face of moral disagreement with respect to 
how wealth and income ought to be distributed within a society. (Rawls, 1999b, 
pg 327) 
Rawls' conception of civil disobedience is therefore premised on a background 
assumption that civil disobedient participants and their audiences share 
common “conceptions” or “senses” of justice which regulate their collective 
political affairs, especially the ordering of their constitutional framework. (Rawls, 
1999b, pg 321) 
These shared background understandings allow citizens and public officials to 
possess the requisite powers of moral insight to recognise and acknowledge 
any political or economic injustices in society. The implication here is that any 
civil disobedience claim which fails to reference to these common conceptions 
of justice will be incapable of clearly justifying itself to its intended audience. 
Accordingly, justifications of civil disobedience cannot appeal to controversial 
comprehensive doctrines of the good nor can they make appeals on the basis 
of the group and self-interest of civil disobedient actors.  
Although Rawls acknowledges that such doctrines are often fundamentally 
explanative of the motivations behind civil disobedience, ultimately they cannot 
serve as the public justification for its conduct. He fears that if civil disobedience 
was justified on such a basis it would be perceived to be overly “sectarian”. 
(Rawls, 1999b, pgs 338-339)  
Rawls stresses, therefore, that any act of civil disobedience must frame its 
claims to the “majority which holds political power”. (Rawls, 1999b, pg 321) This 
is an essential point because Rawls understands civil disobedience primarily as 
a public device of communication which not only references widely shared 
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principles of justice but which is also inherently conducted in a publicly 
transparent and accountable fashion. 
For instance, Rawls insists that civil disobedient participants must provide 
advance “fair notice” to the public authorities when conducting their campaigns 
and civil disobedience can never use covert or secretive tactics and strategies. 
Rather, Rawls construes civil disobedience to be a kind of public oratory which 
expresses “profound and conscientious political conviction” in order to morally 
persuade one’s fellow citizens and public officials of the legitimacy of one’s 
political grievances. (Rawls, 1999b, pg 321) 
Unsurprisingly, while civil disobedience inherently requires the breeching of the 
law because it does not aim to change the status quo via judicial or legislative 
means, Rawls insists that it is strictly non-violent by virtue of its communicative 
purpose. (Rawls, 1999b, pg 321) 
Any act of violence, Rawls argues, detracts from civil disobedience constituting 
a “mode of address” to the majority because it violates the fundamental liberties 
of our fellow citizens which ought to be respected by all members of society. 
Indeed, he asserts that any attempt to use violence as a means of political 
leverage will inherently “obscure the civilly disobedient quality of one's act”. 
(Rawls, 1999b, pg 321, emphasis mine) 
Another interesting feature animating Rawls' definition of civil disobedience as a 
non-violent act of public communication stems from his argument that it 
expresses disobedience to the legal order while remaining on the “outer edge” 
of expressing fidelity to the constitutional framework.  
Civil disobedience is ultimately “contrary to law” because it does not aim to 
present a “test case” for constitutional change. (Rawls, 1999b, pgs 320-1) This 
is to say that the use of non-violent opposition signifies that while they are 
deliberately breaking the law they are still willing to accept the rule of law 
precisely via the openly public and non-violent nature of their actions.  
Consequently, Rawls insists that civil disobedient protesters must be willing to 
accept the full legal implications of their actions if they are to publicly 
demonstrate their commitment to the rule of law and if they are to signify their 
respect for the underlying principles of the constitutional framework. 
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Non-violence, therefore, is a communicative act in and of itself because it 
signifies to the majority that their actions are animated by a conscientious and 
sincere concerns or grievances and that they aim to address the public's “sense 
of justice”. (Rawls, 1999b, pg 322) 
Indeed, as Rawls subsequently explains, to conduct civil disobedience in a 
publicly transparent and non-violent way is a public “bond” to one's fellow 
citizens which they can use to assure themselves of the motivations and 
intentions of civil disobedient protesters and to judge the moral validity of their 
claims. (Rawls, 1999b, pg 322) 
Finally, it is also vital to emphasize that Rawls also treats civil disobedience as 
inherently occurring as a last resort when “normal” avenues of moral appeals to 
the majority have been staked in “good faith” yet have failed. (Rawls, 1999b, pg 
327) Indeed, in particular, Rawls only understands civil disobedience to be 
appropriate after any legal means of redress of their grievances has failed. 
(Rawls, 1999b, pg 327) 
This implies that civil disobedient actors have a moral obligation to consider 
whether it is an appropriate strategy- that is, whether it is necessary or 
unnecessary- in their given political circumstances and that they must publicly 
justify their reasoning to their fellow citizens. 
Civil disobedience participants also have a particular duty to ensure that their 
actions are conducted in such a fashion which does not provoke “harsh 
retaliation” or “vindictive oppression” by the wider community and the state.  
(Rawls, 1999b, pg 330)  
Without this internal deliberation, civil disobedience risks being incapable of 
appealing to majorities to reconsider their interpretations of injustice, to 
empathically project themselves into the life circumstances of civil disobedient 
participants or to accept that the status quo is simply morally and politically 
unsustainable. (Rawls, 1999b, pg 336) 
In conclusion, therefore, Rawls' conception of civil disobedience reflects a 
broader understanding of society as a system of cooperation among equal 
persons. He maintains that citizens have no moral or legal obligation to support 
or maintain their allegiance to a political system characterised by serious 
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injustice. Rawls is adamant that this is especially the case when a regime 
undermines the principles of equal liberty and equal opportunity for all of its 
citizens. 
More positively, Rawls believes that legitimate civil disobedience can help 
stabilise a “well-ordered” and a “nearly just society”. It not only performs an 
essential check on government actions, but it can significantly improve the self-
esteem of marginalised social groups and communities in the face of relations 
of political oppression. 
Accordingly, having outlined Rawls account of civil disobedience, it is important 
to outline Habermas' conceptualisation of civil disobedience. While there are 
some fundamental similarities between their accounts, there are also subtle 
differences in terms of emphasis, as we shall see. 
Jürgen Habermas on Civil Disobedience: 
It is clear that the immediate political context that informed Habermas' 
conceptualization of civil disobedience occurred in the face of significant public 
demonstrations during the early 1980s against the presence of nuclear 
weaponry in West Germany. (Thomassen, 2010) More broadly, Habermas 
understanding of civil disobedience is also profoundly influenced by his interest 
in the new social movements that emerged from the late 1970s onwards. 
These protest movements, Habermas argues, developed differently from 
previous social struggles of the past by virtue of their new social composition 
and their political objectives. Indeed, he argues that they were characterised 
particularly by their “colorful spectrum of newly-fashioned, differentiated forms 
of expression of will”. (Habermas, 1985, pg 89) 
Both of these developments, Habermas notes, led certain public commentators, 
jurists and politicians to argue for significant restrictions to be placed on the 
exercise of civil disobedience in West Germany during the 1980s. (Habermas, 
1985, pg 101) 
This point is vital to note because Habermas’ reflections on civil disobedience 
are intended to constitute a direct rebuttal of this line of argument. Habermas 
was concerned the criticisms expressed against civil disobedience within the 
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West German context reflected a dangerous remanent of a cultural mentality 
that supported the ascendancy of the Third Reich.  
This remanent discourse, he suggested, maintains that any form of political 
disobedience intrinsically undermines the rule of law and the effective 
functioning of political and legal institutions. (Habermas, 1985, pg 101) This 
discourse, therefore, maintains that the promotion of political stability and 
relations of social peace requires the submission of citizens to the authority of 
the state, irrespective of whether one agrees with its decisions. 
However, Habermas suggests that this argument reflects nothing more than 
“authoritative legalism”. Indeed, such a mentality is dangerous, he argues, 
because it serves to concentrate unaccountable power while undermining the 
rights of citizens to exercise their political voice and influence. It is important to 
stress, therefore, that Habermas understands civil disobedience as constituting 
an intrinsic part of the “moral foundations and political culture of a developed 
democratic polity”. (Habermas, 1989, pg 107) 
Secondly, Habermas’ discussion of civil disobedience emerges from the 
influence of Rawls’ account of the concept in A Theory of Justice and the 
subsequent political debate it inspired within West Germany’s academic and 
legal culture. It is important to note, therefore, that Habermas’ understanding of 
civil disobedience is significantly indebted to Rawls’ conceptualization, albeit 
there are some subtle differences of interpretation between them. 
The first noteworthy connection between them concerns the relationship 
between the constitutional framework and civil disobedience. The central 
assumption of Habermas’ theory of civil disobedience is the claim that the 
constitutional state requires a normative justification with respect to the exercise 
of its coercive power. (Habermas, 1985, pg 101)  
Significantly, for Habermas, the deference of citizens to the authority of the state 
should not be premised on prudential concerns- such as fear of punishment- but 
rather it must be a function of their own voluntary will. (Habermas, 1985, pg 
101) This necessarily implies that fidelity to the legal system is inherently 
premised on a voluntary recognition of its normative claim to justice. 
(Habermas, 1985, pg 102)  
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Accordingly, obedience to the authority of the state can only be conditional 
because it rests on judgements as to whether its legitimacy is morally warranted 
or not. (Habermas, 1985, pg 102) This argument, of course, strongly counters 
any claim that the legitimacy of the state rests simply in its power to enforce the 
law coercively. 
Consequently, like Rawls, Habermas understands civil disobedience to be only 
a meaningful possibility in circumstances where citizens broadly accept the 
legitimacy of the underlying constitutional framework of a polity. (Habermas, 
1985, pg 103) This is to say that while civil disobedient protesters might reject 
particular laws as being unjust they nevertheless must broadly accept the 
legitimacy of the constitutional order. 
Secondly, like Rawls, Habermas also claims that civil disobedience must be 
justified with reference to widely accepted principles of justice. Habermas insists 
that it is morally illegitimate for civil disobedients to interfere with the exercise of 
other people’s democratic rights on the basis of particularistic conceptions of 
“private morality” or their claims to possessing privileged insights or “special 
rights”. (Habermas, 1985, pg 103)  
From this point of view, citizens can only justify civil disobedience by referencing 
“authoritative” claims that cite constitutional principles broadly recognised by all 
citizens. Indeed, as Habermas argues some years later: 
 “A democratic constitution can....tolerate resistance from dissidents who, after 
exhausting all legal avenues, nonetheless oppose legitimately reached 
decisions. It only imposes the condition that this rule-breaking resistance be 
plausibly justified in the spirit and wording of the Constitution and conducted by 
symbolic means that lend the fight the character of a non-violent appeal to the 
majority to once again reflect on their decision”. (Habermas IN Borradori, 2003, 
pgs 41-42) 
Thirdly, Habermas’ understanding is also similar to Rawls in that he 
understands civil disobedience to have a special function in democratic life- 
namely to uphold the principles of the constitution. This argument differs slightly 
from Rawls in that Habermas treats the constitution as being an “unfinished” 
product or project that is inherently vulnerable to various threats and sensitive to 
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constantly evolving political and social circumstances. (Habermas, 1985, pg 
104) 
Habermas claims, therefore, that there are three possible purposes for civil 
disobedience in a constitutional democratic regime. Firstly, it constitutes a 
vehicle of political influence for the politically disempowered or socially 
marginalised in the face of continual neglect or dismissal of their interests and 
viewpoints by democratic institutions. (Habermas, 1985, pg 104) 
Secondly, it also constitutes a means to “correct errors” in any process of public 
policy formation, thereby potentially improving the construction, implementation 
and practical consequences of any particular law. (Habermas, 1985, pg 104)  
Moreover, it provides citizens with a means to “set {new} innovations in motion”. 
This aspect of Habermas’ account of civil disobedience is interesting in that it 
differs slightly from Rawls’ conception who maintains that civil disobedience 
serves to preserve the stability of the current constitutional order. 
Unfortunately, though, Habermas does not elaborate his argument here, albeit it 
might be inferred that Habermas is arguing that civil disobedience encourages 
favourable changes in public policy in the face of institutional gridlock or inertia. 
(Habermas, 1985, pg 104) Ultimately, therefore, Habermas understands civil 
disobedience as intrinsic to contemporary liberal democratic societies. Indeed, 
as he suggests: 
“…civil violations of rules are morally justified experiments without which a vital 
republic can retain neither its capacity for innovation nor its citizens’ belief in its 
legitimacy”. (Habermas, 1985, pg 104) 
Fourthly, Habermas follows Rawls by insisting that civil disobedient participants 
have particular moral responsibilities when staking their claims.  
Habermas’ understanding of civil disobedience differs slightly from Rawls here 
though in that he particularly stresses how civil disobedient participants should 
acknowledge the potential epistemic fallibility of their claims. (Habermas, 1985, 
pg 105) This diligence is an essential normative requirement for civil 
disobedience, he argues, if its justification is not to be an exercise of dogmatic 
assertion.  
271 
 
Habermas’ agrees with Rawls though that perceived injustices are often 
disputed on the basis of underlying moral disagreements between citizens. This 
means that citizens should be willing to respect reasonable differences of 
opinion when articulating their political grievances via civil disobedience.  
Moreover, Habermas also argues that civil disobedient participants should 
“scrupulously examine” whether their choice of tactics and strategies are 
appropriate given their political situation. Interestingly, they must also critically 
question their motivations and intentions to check whether their claims are 
animated by elitist attitudes or “narcissistic” impulses. (Habermas, 1985, pg 
105) 
Lastly, like Rawls, Habermas agrees that civil disobedience must always be 
announced to the authorities in advance and that civil disobedient protesters 
must accept the authority of the police to regulate their activities. Most 
significantly though, civil disobedient protesters must always agree to accept 
any legal ramifications of their actions and they must never entertain the use of 
violence. (Habermas, 1985) 
Nevertheless, it is also important to stress that Habermas maintains that a 
liberal democratic culture should be quite tolerant of civil disobedience even 
after the exhaustion of all legal routes, noting that: 
“A democratic constitution that understands itself as the project of realizing 
equal civil rights tolerates the resistance of dissidents who continue to combat 
legitimate decisions even after all the legal channels have been exhausted- 
under the proviso of course that the “disobedient” citizens offer plausible 
reasons for their resistance by appealing to constitutional principles and employ 
non-violent, I.e. symbolic means. These two conditions define the limits of 
political tolerance in a constitutional democracy that defends itself against its 
enemies by non-paternalistic means, limits that are also acceptable to its 
democratically minded opponents.” (Habermas, 2008, pg 256) 
Civil disobedience, from this perspective, therefore, constitutes allows for 
majority rule to become more “self-reflexive”, facilitating the possibility of social 
critique in light of the possibility of a tyranny of the majority. Ultimately, 
therefore, Habermas understands civil disobedience to be an illegal activity yet 
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which is morally legitimate if it appeals to principles of justice articulated in the 
constitutional framework. (Habermas, 1985, pg 105) Accordingly, given this 
outline of his work it is important to explore some of the central limitations of 
Rawlsian and Habermasian conceptions of civil disobedience. 
The limitations of Rawlsian and Habermasian approaches 
towards civil disobedience: 
The problem with Rawls’ framework: 
It is evident that there are a number of significant limitations with Rawls' account 
of civil disobedience. Most strikingly, Rawls' justification of civil disobedience 
seems to be overly narrow. It restricts itself to violations of his two principles of 
Justice which a “well-ordered society” would understand as being the regulatory 
principles of the constitutional framework. 
It is also important to stress that Rawls insists that his theory of disobedience is 
only applicable to a “nearly just” society, thereby immediately begging the 
question of whether it can offer any practical insight into the non-ideal 
circumstances faced by contemporary democratic societies. Nevertheless, 
despite this charge of irrelevancy, it is worth exploring some more specific 
limitations of his approach as its failings might offer us greater insight into a 
more credible theory of civil disobedience.  
The first major problem with Rawls account of civil disobedience is his 
insistence that it must always be motivated by earnest moral conviction as 
opposed to the pursuit of perceived self and group interest. Remember that 
Rawls requires participants to appeal exclusively to “political” justifications, 
referencing widely shared principles of justice which underpin the constitutional 
framework of a society. Accordingly, it is illegitimate in his estimation to justify 
civil disobedience by referencing particular comprehensive conceptions of the 
good. 
Unfortunately, in practice, such distinctions are often problematic as was 
discussed in the first chapter. This reality is especially the case where minority 
groups are petitioning for fundamental changes in patterns of economic 
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distribution or for the social recognition and accommodation of their particular 
cultural practices. 
For instance, indigenous protest movements often appeal for financial 
reparations in compensation for colonial conquest, an appeal that is clearly to 
their group-based material advantage. But why is such an appeal fundamentally 
unacceptable from the perspective of civil disobedience given the material 
impacts of colonialization? 
Of course, in certain instances this approach might be morally inappropriate- for 
example, white supremacists protesting to maintain relations of discriminatory 
segregation. However, to rule such appeals invalid on default delegitimates 
important issues of distributional justice which are legitimately contestable via 
civil disobedience. 
Consequently, Rawls' approach to civil disobedience is also flawed due to his 
reticence to accept that civil disobedience is a legitimate means to contest 
economic inequalities. He argues that economic civil disobedience can 
generally only be justified in circumstances where these inequalities are 
“blatant”.  
This condition, it should be noted, is due to his argument that violations of his 
“difference principle” are inevitably subject to widespread disagreement in the 
face of deep moral pluralism. Yet, this argument simply ignores the reality that 
economic inequalities are frequently justified with reference to mythologies and 
ideological constructions which render unjust advantages as being “normal” or 
“inevitable”. 
Consequently, distributive injustices can be far from being “blatant”. Civil 
disobedience, as was demonstrated by the global Occupy movements, can be 
an essential means to raise public consciousness about the depth of distributive 
inequalities in society. Given that Rawls offers us no account of how to precisely 
distinguish between “blatant” and “non-blatant” violations of economic justice, 
this aspect of this theory of civil disobedience must be strongly rejected. 
Moreover, Rawls distinction between principles of personal morality and 
constitutional principles is flawed as well as his insistence that civil 
disobedience is illegitimate if it is animated by religious justifications. These 
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constrictions are completely unrealistic and are likely highly exclusionary to 
social minority groups.  
For instance, animal rights activists often appeal to principles of Justice which 
are not widely shared but which reference particular, substantive and contested 
claims about the moral impermissibility of using animals as mere instruments for 
human consumption purposes. The point of animal activism in this regard is not 
only to highlight an injustice but also to attempt to morally persuade their fellow 
citizens that their whole collective way of life is deeply involved in animal 
exploitation and cruelty. 
Another central problem with Rawls' account is how he restricts justifications of 
civil disobedience to widely held principles or values of justice shared by a 
majority. Rawls' approach, as Peter Singer notes, therefore, ignores the 
importance of public disobedience movements that aim to change majority 
understandings of Justice. (Singer, 1991) These kinds of civil disobedience 
movements often make reference to values, beliefs and social perspectives 
shared only by a minority of the population, as the case of factory farming 
protests illustrates. (Singer, 1991) 
Rawls seems overly sanguine that it is possible to precisely determine “grave” 
violations of his principles of Justice, offering the examples of the repression of 
religious groups and the suppression of minority voting and/or office rights as 
self-evident instances of oppression. However, as Peter Singer suggests, civil 
disobedience is often motivated by the desire to expose injustices that are often 
taken-for-granted by the majority. (Singer, 1991, pg 128) 
It is in this regard that there seems to be an important dimension amiss in 
Rawls' conceptualisation of civil disobedience: the recognition of the moral 
power of “comprehensive doctrines” as a motivating force behind a protest. 
Indeed, although Rawls insists that civil disobedience inherently involve “giving 
voice to conscientious and deeply held convictions” (1999b, pg 322) he also 
maintains that “Intensity of desire or the strength of conviction is irrelevant when 
questions of justice arise”. (Rawls, 1999b, pg 318) 
Accordingly, although he partially recognises how deeply held convictions 
animate civil disobedient action the intensity of these motivations is irrelevant to 
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the justificatory merits of the protest itself. However, this disconnect is 
profoundly flawed. Civil disobedience is typically conducted by those who hold 
certain convictions to a much stronger degree than their fellow citizens. 
(Brownlee, 2012) Indeed, the very point of protest is to persuade their fellow 
citizens that they should reflect upon and ultimately care about the particular 
issue at hand. 
Similarly, what would Rawls make of the Abolitionist Movement, the American 
civil rights movement and the actions of contemporary religious civil disobedient 
groups like SoulForce which were/are profoundly influenced by religious tenets? 
Indeed, in the case of the civil rights movement religious language clearly 
suffused its claim-making practices on a regular basis, citing not only a wide 
range of biblical texts but also theological figures such as Martin Buber and 
Paul Tillich. 
Ultimately, the narrowness of Rawls' privileging of the right over the good 
means that civil disobedient action motivated by sentiments of interest (broadly 
construed) and particular conceptions of the good are placed at a serious 
disadvantage within his framework.  
Rawls ignores the simple reality that protest movements will often stake their 
claims according to vocabularies that are most meaningful to their participants. 
While ideally they should stake their claims in a widely shared vocabulary, this 
should not be a default requirement for their actions to count as “civil” 
disobedience. Indeed, given the impacts of hermeneutical injustices and 
practices of social ignorance such a requirement will likely be profoundly 
exclusionary. 
Rawls account of civil disobedience is also problematic because it presumes 
that civil disobedients have a coherent conception of the good which is capable 
of being translated into a “political” appeal to constitutional principles. This 
assumption is questionable given situations where marginalized or excluded 
groups are still struggling to find a vocabulary to understand and articulate their 
grievances and lived experiences. 
It seems deeply questionable, therefore, that such groups would wish to engage 
in a political process that would place a significant burden of translation on 
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them. This problem is especially glaring given the connection Rawls renders 
between the sincerity of an act of civil disobedience and a protester's 
willingness to accept any legal sanctions or punishments. 
Rawls precludes the possibility that one can be entirely earnest in one's 
rejection of a particular policy yet one remains unwilling to accept imprisonment 
because the law itself is deemed unjust. Why should an unwillingness to accept 
punishment inherently undermine its claim to authenticity? 
Another related difficulty is that Rawls insists that civil disobedience should be 
confined to “serious infringements” of the principles of equal liberty and equal 
opportunity. This requirement, of course, seems to place unreasonable 
restrictions upon the kinds of justifications admissible for public protest.  
For example, why would it be illegitimate to engage in civil disobedience simply 
because the law(s) in question are ill-advised, ineffective or improperly 
implemented? It is also unclear why civil disobedience should be limited to 
“clear” infringements of principles of Justice alone. 
Indeed, it is often the case that civil disobedience movements are protesting 
due to failures of public institutions to meet certain normative standards. They 
are being criticised for “serious omissions” of their perceived duties and 
responsibilities. For instance, one could note how global climate change 
movements are rigorously pressuring governments to take meaningful, 
international action on climate change. 
This point is also complicated by Rawls insistence that civil disobedience is only 
legitimate once all legal avenues have been exhausted. However, this is 
problematic because it obliges those who believe they are politically, socially or 
economically oppressed to pursue and wait for legal avenues for the hearing 
and resolution of their grievances. 
This assumes of course that such recourse is even a meaningful possibility. 
Indeed, as Martin Luther King famously argued in his Letter from Birmingham 
Jail: 
“Frankly, I have yet to engage in a direct-action campaign that was “well timed” 
in the view of those who have not suffered unduly from the disease of 
segregation. For years now I have heard the word “Wait!” It rings in the ear of 
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every Negro with piercing familiarity. This “Wait” has almost always meant 
“Never.” We must come to see, with one of our distinguished jurists, that “justice 
too long delayed is justice denied”. (King, 1963 IN Schumaker, 2010 pg.344) 
Finally, Rawls account is severely limited by its failure to encompass coercive 
political action. This point was articulated by Ronald Dworkin who highlights that 
civil disobedience can involve both persuasive and non-persuasive dimensions. 
The former type of disobedience seeks to convince the majority that certain 
injustices ought to be tackled. (Dworkin, 1985) Yet the latter type of 
disobedience involves making it difficult for public authorities to enforce and 
enact particular laws via disruptive actions that levy a variety of costs on them. 
Indeed, as Dworkin summarises the latter kind of political disobedience: 
“It aims not to change the majority's mind, but to increase the cost of pursuing 
the program the majority still favours, in the hope that the majority will find the 
new cost unacceptably high”. (Dworkin, 1985, pg 109) 
This form of coercive politics might be termed under the guise of “direct action” 
and includes a variety of activities, including boycotting, physical occupations, 
unofficial strikes. It is in this regard that direct action can be distinguished from 
civil disobedience in the sense that it does not necessarily conform to the 
standards of minimalism and publicity associated with the latter. (Humphrey, 
2006) 
Significantly, given the secrecy that surrounds such activities, the use of direct 
action seems to contradict Rawls' emphasis upon demonstrating fidelity to the 
law via accepting the possibility of legal punishment. Dworkin, for instance, 
highlights that the practice of jail-going, far from reflecting fidelity to the law 
might be seen as a strategic or tactical decision to increase the costs of 
pursuing a particular policy. (Dworkin, 1985)  
Indeed, Dworkin's approach has the merit that it recognises that it is precisely 
the moral and political legitimacy of the constitutional order which is disputed in 
civil disobedience. (Dworkin, 1985, pg 115) Ultimately, given the contemporary 
pertinence and historical examples of the use of such tactics, it seems deeply 
unfortunate that Rawls' account of civil disobedience fails to consider the role of 
direct action, thereby raising serious questions in relation to its practical 
278 
 
applicability to the central problems of our time. It is worthwhile, therefore, 
explicating Habermas’ the problems associated with Habermas’ conception of 
civil disobedience. 
The problems with Habermas' approach: 
The first problem with Habermas account of civil disobedience is that it seems 
to narrowly circumscribe the justifications for legitimate civil disobedience. 
Firstly, Habermas’ insistence that civil disobedience should be conducted only 
once all legal avenues have been exhausted is deeply problematic.  
Habermas simply does not adequately conceptualise the barriers that frustrate 
people's access to legal avenues of contestation within his theory of civil 
disobedience. Indeed, he particularly fails to consider the significant costs 
involved in legal appeal processes.  
For instance, it is a tragic reality that individuals from disadvantaged 
communities frequently lack access to affordable legal services. This lack of 
affordability stems not simply from the economic deprivation suffered by 
marginalised communities but also from a lack of state-funded legal assistance 
services. 
If state or community legal aid services are available, such institutions are likely 
to be significantly understaffed and underfunded in the face of significant 
demand. This means that individuals from marginalized communities often have 
to rely on the willingness of legal firms acting on a pro bono basis, a rather 
capricious and hard-sought form of assistance. 
Habermas' also fails to appreciate that Constitutional legal appeals are often 
highly complex, require specialist expertise and are hugely time-costly. These 
considerations are a significant problem as most legal practices charge hourly 
and given the complexities associated with settling court hearings it might be 
impossible to accurately anticipate the full costs involved in pursuing legal 
action in advance. 
In addition, Habermas fails to appreciate the epistemic barriers associated with 
taking legal action in the first place. It is often a sad reality that people lack 
awareness of legal recourse. Indeed, they might not be informed of their legal 
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rights in certain cases or they might not even appreciate that they have been 
victims of criminal or civil offences. 
Alternatively, even if people have a coherent understanding of injustices 
committed against them, they might fundamentally lack faith in the integrity of 
the legal process to fairly consider their claims and to punish perpetrators of 
injustice. For instance, as feminist epistemological theorists have frequently 
noted, the testimony of women regarding sexual violence have been often being 
dismissed or ignored and conviction rates for sexual assault remain derisory 
poor as a consequence. 
Another fundamental problem with insisting that civil disobedience is only 
permissible following the exhaustion of all legal avenues is that it avoids a 
serious consideration of power inequalities. Habermas fails to consider how 
legal processes are also profoundly connected with the assumption of 
asymmetrical risks given prevailing power imbalances. 
For instance, in cases of systemic sexual harassment in workplaces it can be 
extremely difficult for victims to pursue legal action in the face of fears of 
retribution by their employer, particularly if such victims come from low-income 
communities or if such individuals belong to sole-income households. 
Accordingly, civil disobedience can be a highly rational first strategy in 
circumstances in conditions where power asymmetries render legal appeals 
impossible or extremely burdensome.  
Practices of civil disobedience, therefore, should not be seen as an action of 
“last resort” given these empirical difficulties. Habermas also seems to ignore 
that certain injustices have an immediate urgency about them which means that 
civil disobedients cannot rely on lengthy and uncertain legal processes to 
address their grievances. 
This problem perhaps stems from Habermas' insistence that civil disobedience 
constitutes a 'guardian' of democratic legitimacy, thereby implying, like Rawls, 
that it constitutes an essential mechanism for maintaining the justness of the 
constitution or returning the political order to a more just state. 
Indeed, Habermas portrays civil disobedience as a kind of collective warning 
device to political elites and institutions, allowing them to “correct” their actions if 
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they infringe fundamental constitutional principles- as he notes civil 
disobedience often constitutes “the last chance to correct errors in the process 
of the realisation of a legal order or to set innovations in motion”. (Habermas, 
1985, pg 104). 
These assumptions explain why Habermas' account of civil disobedience insists 
that its justification must appeal exclusively to constitutional principles. He also 
requires that civil disobedient protesters support the prevailing legal, 
constitutional and political order. 
However, these conditions are profoundly contestable. Habermas' 
conceptualisation of civil disobedience precludes the possibility that 
demonstrators might conscientiously believe that they are not morally beholden 
to accept any legal punishment or sanction for their actions by the state. 
For instance, protesters might hold the belief the State's right to enforce such 
punishment is illegitimate or that the principles, values and norms animating the 
Constitution are morally wrong. It is worth noting as well that for some civil 
disobedients accepting any potential punishment would implicitly validate the 
state's authority- an authority which they fundamentally dispute. Habermas, 
therefore, cannot adequately conceptualise cases of civil disobedience where 
the legitimacy of the State itself is under contention. 
Given that Habermas underestimates the contestability of the legitimacy of the 
State, one can appreciate the limitations of any account of civil disobedience 
which attempts to distinguish legitimate from illegitimate protest by virtue of a 
prior acceptance of the legitimacy of the prevailing legal system and the 
legitimacy of the State itself. 
Habermas also seems to entertain a naïve faith in the willingness of political 
authorities to seriously consider the moral claims of civil disobedience. 
However, this willingness cannot be assumed on a default basis, particularly in 
cases where powerful elites manipulate the political process and where 
relations of epistemic injustice hinder the fair reception of civil disobedients 
claims. 
This problem brings us to another problem with Habermas' approach- namely 
his account of publicity that has a number of significant limitations. Firstly, it 
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seems incapable of accommodating covert kinds of protest actions which have 
played an important vehicle of political contestation in contemporary societies 
yet would violate Habermas' condition that acts of civil disobedience should only 
visibly occur in the public sphere. 
For instance, it is clear that electronic or cyber disobedience- also known as 
'hacktivism'- has become an important means of exposing governmental 
corruption or leveraging costs against individuals, organizations and institutions 
who are deemed to be perpetuating injustices.  
It is obviously a covert kind of disobedience in that its perpetuators take 
significant steps to disguise their personal identities, ranging from the use of 
public sobriquets to using sophisticated counter surveillance tracking 
equipment, and do not necessarily claim public responsibility for their actions, 
albeit this often does occur. (Himma, 2007; McLaurin, 2011) 
Accordingly, not only are these kinds of politically disobedient actions covert but 
it is also the case that their perpetrators are secretive precisely due to a desire 
to avoid the legal consequences of their actions- thereby further infringing 
another condition of Habermas' notion of civil disobedience. Of course, they 
also violate Habermas' condition that civil disobedience participants should offer 
the public and the authorities a fair notice in advance for their actions. 
Interestingly, it is also worth noting that members of an electronic disobedience 
collective might be secretive towards each other- that is anonymous with 
respect to each other's identities- partly on the grounds of security but perhaps 
also on a desire for greater personal autonomy.  
This also seems to implicitly violate Habermas' condition of publicity as civil 
disobedient protesters should be united by a public and shared commitment to 
breaking the law on the basis of public moral convictions. 
Moreover, it is also worth considering that electronic civil disobedience groups 
are not typically directly accountable to the public for their actions given their 
secrecy however, they are also often non-transparent with respect to their 
internal operations, particularly in terms of how their targets are selected and 
how this selection is morally justified. 
282 
 
A legitimate question therefore can be raised as to whether Habermas' notion of 
publicity is appropriate in light of significant changes in contemporary forms of 
civil disobedience, especially in respect to the emergence of electronic 
disobedience that violates a number of different facts of his publicity condition.  
Finally, it is also important to criticise Habermas' account of civil disobedience 
through the prism of epistemic injustice. Relations of epistemic injustice, as 
previously demonstrated, serve to fundamentally distort a society's interpretive 
resources. This distortion results not simply in particular individual's claims 
being unjustly inflated or deflated by virtue of prejudicial attitudes and social 
categorizations.  
Rather, they also result in the obscuring of important facets of social reality 
which can make it occasionally difficult for oppressed individuals to stake their 
claims intelligibility. Importantly, as Rebecca Mason has noted in her critique of 
Fricker's notion of hermeneutical injustice, even though it can be difficult for 
oppressed individuals to stake their claims publicly in an intelligible manner by 
virtue of the social invisibility of certain injustices this does not necessarily entail 
that they lack a critical, first-personal awareness of the nature of the injustices 
that they face. (Mason, 2011) 
Nevertheless, it can be extremely difficult for civil disobedient members to stake 
their claims publicly- not simply because its intended audience might refuse or 
fail to receive their claims fairly but also because it can be extremely difficult to 
find an appropriate voice in which to stake those claims in the face of 
hermeneutical injustices. 
However, Habermas' account of publicity does not explicitly address this 
problem as compared to Rawls, who at least does acknowledge some of the 
difficulties civil disobedients face when staking their claims. Habermas naively 
seems to presuppose that the symbolic nature of protest alone will be adequate 
in ensuring that majority group members will accord appropriate attentiveness 
and sensitivity to the claims of civil disobedients, particularly if their claims are 
couched in generally acceptable principles of justice. 
This ignores the reality that the reception of political claims can be distorted via 
the operation of deeper ideological and discursive background assumptions, 
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values and beliefs, particularly in cases where injustices have been legally 
institutionalized, thereby rendering it difficult for public authorities or the public 
to acknowledge that injustices are occurring in the first place. Alternatively, 
some dominant political actors might not even care about the fact that injustices 
are being committed at all. 
Of course, if these scenarios are the case, it also throws into question 
Habermas' insistence, like Rawls, that moral justifications for civil disobedient 
action should to the “sense of justice” held by most members of the polity.  
This is assumption is problematic, of course, because it cannot be safely 
assumed that majorities actually possess such a “sense of justice” by default 
given that the uptake of political claims might be compromised by relations of 
epistemic injustice.  
For instance, as Melanie Joy outlines in her book “Why We Love Dogs, Eat 
Pigs, and Wear Cows” the realities of factory farming are also often socially 
obscured by an ideology of “Carnism” which defends the notion that animal 
consumption, particularly for meat, does not constitute a belief system but 
rather it constitutes a “natural” feature of being human. (Joy, 2010) 
Indeed, Joy's attempt to develop the notion of Carnism is an interesting 
instance of an effort to challenge relations of hermeneutical injustice. Joy was 
prompted to coin the term in response to a lack of a vocabulary to describe the 
beliefs and values of individuals who voluntarily choose to eat animals, 
particularly in terms of their meat consumption. (Joy, 2010) 
Carnism is therefore a deliberate counter-description to the term 'carnivorism' 
which people often use to describe their meat-eating practices (E.g. “I can never 
be a vegan- I am a carnivore!”) which incorrectly implies that one has to eat 
animals in order to live (barring certain important exceptions like Inuit peoples). 
(Joy, 2010) 
Carnism, therefore, as an ideology functions to render the suffering involved in 
factory farming as normalized yet invisible while also providing individuals with 
an ideological framework in which animal consumption can be morally 
rationalized. This rationalization occurs despite one's otherwise compassionate 
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attitudes towards animals in other domains. (E.g. the love one feels for one's 
dog) (Joy, 2010) 
Indeed, Joy argues that Carnism fosters a kind of psychic numbing which 
serves to selectively alter our perceptions of different animals in morally 
arbitrary, inconsistent and hypocritical fashions. It also serves to engender a set 
of defence mechanisms which obscures the moral harms associated with 
consuming factory-farmed animals. (Joy, 2010) 
Furthermore, it justifies eating animals as being biologically necessary, 'natural' 
and socially normal and creates a vocabulary that objectivizes animals into 
consumable items of property. Carnism, therefore, simultaneously fosters denial 
about the suffering of factory-farmed animals while also justifying the slaughter 
and consumption of animals via the constructing of social discourses and 
mythologies which treat it as being natural, normal and necessary. (Joy, 2010) 
Accordingly, in light of his example it is easy to note how an appeal to publically 
shared principles (e.g. it is morally wrong to inflict suffering on animals) will 
often be insufficient in ensuring that one's claims receive a fair hearing as 
people's interpretations and evaluations of these principles are distorted via 
deeply entrenched historical norms, cultural values and ideological discourses. 
When a society's dominant and widely shared interpretive resources serve to 
hinder individuals, especially those from advantaged social groups and 
communities, from critically questioning or even recognizing social injustices 
and/or perceiving alternative, new interpretations of social reality it can be 
incredibly difficult for civil disobedience movements to have their claims 
considered fairly- for instance, by state authorities, the mass media or 
bystanders to their protests. 
Indeed, it might even generate hostile social opprobrium and even lead 
authorities not to recognize an act of disobedience but instead deem it as an act 
of morally blameworthy vandalism, terrorism or harassment, etc. Alternatively, 
particular injustices might be legally institutionalised and deeply socially 
normalized on the basis that certain injustices are simply not recognized as 
being injustices in the first place. 
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For instance, civil disobedience campaigns against factory farming are not only 
actively frustrated by state authorities under the auspices of anti-terrorism 
legislation but state agencies actively provide public subsidies and legislative 
protection to the factory farming of animals. 
Civil disobedience is therefore often implicated in struggles not simply of how to 
frame, articulate or disclose one's claims in a publicly intelligible manner but it is 
also involved in challenging the background and publicly shared interpretive and 
evaluative resources of a given society. 
This struggle often involves attempts to position civil disobedient participants as 
being authoritative knowers and to disrupt, alter, disorder, upset and unsettle 
collective interpretive resources and discursive frames. Civil disobedience, as 
Martin Luther King stressed, is deliberately crisis generating as it involves 
forcing particular issues into the public agenda that were previously 
marginalized, ignored or denied.  
Ultimately, therefore, given Habermas' earlier work on the distorting impacts of 
ideology on public discourse, it is rather strange that this awareness has been 
evacuated from his understanding of civil disobedience. 
Another problematic aspect of Habermas account of civil disobedience is the 
narrow manner in which civil disobedience is judged to be morally legitimate or 
illegitimate. Habermas insists that civil disobedience must be justified with 
respect to constitutional principles with the ambition of encouraging changes in 
governmental policy. 
Unfortunately, this stance is profoundly problematic as if one legitimates civil 
disobedience according to his standard of publicity, legitimate instances of civil 
disobedience might go unrecognized. Given that certain injustices can be taken-
for-granted by a majority and legally enshrined within a constitutional 
framework, any appeals citing constitutional principles might be ignored or 
dismissed by virtue of dominant social interpretive resources. 
In addition, Habermas justification of civil disobedience seems to ignore forms 
of disobedience which are animated by more pragmatic concerns- for instance, 
frustration at the incompetent delivery of public goods or an unwillingness to 
accept the construction of public infrastructure in one's own community- or a 
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desire to simply to fundamentally withdraw from social institutions and practices 
implicated in social injustices. 
Moreover, it also seems to ignore forms of disobedience which are animated by 
a desire to disrupt- rather than to alter via moral persuasion- certain government 
or non-governmental policies via the leveraging of unacceptable costs. 
Habermas approach is, therefore, limited by his rigid insistence of the non-
violent nature of civil disobedience. It not simply ignores how problematic- and 
contestable- the notions of “violence” or “non-violence” are in a given political 
struggle- but also it ignores how a degree of violence might be essential for the 
claims of oppressed groups and communities to be heard. 
Given that Habermas' readily acknowledges a wide-range of trends that de-
legitimatise democratic agency within contemporary society, it therefore seems 
strange that he refuses to accept the possibility that means beyond his narrow 
construal of civil disobedience might sometimes be necessary to advance 
democratic goals.  
In conclusion, therefore, as indicated in my initial criticisms of his approach, 
Habermas, like Rawls, narrowly construes civil disobedience, framing it as a 
guardian of the moral principles and traditions inherent within the Constitution.  
This means that he ignores how civil disobedience constitutes a vehicle for 
exercising collective democratic agency, particularly in terms of citizens being 
able to press for fundamental changes which would challenge previously taken 
for granted injustices. 
This chapter so far has attempted to outline the conceptualization of civil 
disobedience as proffered by Rawls and Habermas and has tried to outline 
some of its central limitations.  
Accordingly, in light of these limitations, it is important to outline a different 
conceptualisation of civil disobedience. This account should be sensitive to the 
empirical nuances of civil disobedience movements while proffering robust 
normative standards via which such movements can be critically evaluated.  
Moreover, it should also be sensitive to the problem of epistemic injustices. Civil 
disobedience seems meaningless if it cannot force change in dominant 
epistemic norms, obliging non-participants to critically assess their own 
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complicity in social injustices and to question their how interpretive outlooks are 
connected to dominant social imaginaries. 
Accordingly, I emphasize that any account of civil disobedience must raise 
issues of epistemic responsibility and epistemic contestation at the forefront of 
consideration. This focus requires a different understanding of publicity than the 
accounts of Rawls and Habermas expound. But what does it involve precisely? 
Developing an alternative account of civil disobedience: 
The discussion of Rawls and Habermas accounts of civil disobedience has 
indicated that there are a number of significant issues with their 
conceptualizations. Firstly, both assume that civil disobedience is only morally 
justifiable when all other legal avenues have been exhausted. The requirement 
places grave and unrealistic burdens upon civil disobedient protestors, 
especially where these legal avenues might be non-existent in the first instance. 
Secondly, their approach is limited by their insistence that it should only concern 
'serious infringements' of justice and that all members should appeal strictly to 
constitutional principles that are currently and widely shared. This condition 
thereby disadvantages protesters attempting to challenge dominant moral 
frameworks, thereby risking the unfair discounting of their concerns. 
Accordingly, given these central limitations it is important to develop a new 
account of civil disobedience that transcends these limitations yet which can 
differentiate between morally praiseworthy and morally blameworthy kinds of 
political disobedience.  
Consequently, I propose that civil disobedience should be understood as a 
means to challenge practices of social silencing and forms of vested ignorance 
in a polity as opposed to merely understanding it as an appeal for redress to 
constitutional authorities via citing constitutional principles. This is to say that 
civil disobedience aims, in Andrew Sabl's words, to “challenge existing moral 
sentiments about justice”. (2001, 316) 
In addition, I also argue that civil disobedience can provoke social criticism by 
challenging dominant epistemic norms which allow members from dominant 
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groups or institutional actors to remain ignorant in their complicity in unjust 
social relationships.  
It particularly aims to challenge “common sense” frameworks of understanding 
which render relations of injustice invisible or natural by either subverting 
hegemonic discourses or introducing new counter-hegemonic discourses which 
open different political possibilities. 
For instance, with respect to the first form of civil disobedience, the work of 
Judith Butler illustrates how queer activists have attempted to destabilize the 
gender/sex binary in a number of fashions. For instance, queer activism has 
attempted to subvert heteronormative discourses of sexual and gender identity 
by re-appropriating pejorative terms of social opprobrium as signifiers of 
collective pride and esteem. (Butler, 1990, 1993) 
This kind of civil disobedience, therefore, aims to illustrate the contingency and 
provisionality of socially constructed social scripts, routines and rules and their 
oppressive consequences for certain members of a community. 
Alternatively, civil disobedience can be a vital means of contesting a society’s 
broader social imaginary. A social imaginary, Lorraine Code suggests, 
constitutes an implicit yet an effective complex of “images, meanings, 
metaphors, and interlocking explanations-expectations woven through a social-
political order, within which people in specific time periods and cultural-
geographical situations enact their knowledge and subjectivities, and craft their 
self-understandings”. (Code, 2010, pg 35) 
Code, in turn, further differentiates between instituted and instituting imaginaries 
following the work of Cornelius Castoriadis. The former refers to the complex of 
normative social meanings, customs, experiences, assumptions, values and 
permissions which people “affirm, challenge, internalize or reject as they make 
sense of their place, responsibility and options”. (Code, 2010, pg 35) 
The latter refers to a “locus of social critique and change” as it refers to the 
“critical-creative activities” of a society that allows individuals to critique 
prevailing social relations and structures. Indeed, in particular, it serves to 
establish dominant epistemic norms, particularly in terms of its “pretensions to 
naturalness and wholeness”. (Code, 2010, pg 35) The function of civil 
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disobedience therefore is to challenge the taken-for-granted dominant epistemic 
frameworks which serve to justify, legitimate and rationalize relations of 
oppressions. 
Ultimately, if it is the case that the criticisms I have been making against Rawls 
and Habermas are correct, and if I am correct that civil disobedience is 
essential in challenging epistemic kinds of injustices, it is now important to 
outline a different set of conditions which justify the exercise of coercive civil 
disobedience. 
Politically justifying civil disobedience: 
I have been claiming that there are significant limitations to framing justifications 
of civil disobedience exclusively with reference to constitutional principles. This 
perspective is flawed because it significantly underestimates political 
contestation of the legitimacy of the state and its constitution- especially in post-
colonial societies- and because not all claims against injustice can make easy 
reference to constitutional principles. 
Accordingly, a less restrictive account of the justification of civil disobedience is 
needed. I specify four conditions that facilitate the normative evaluation of acts 
of civil disobedience in terms of its moral justifiability and terms of the normative 
conduct of its participants. 
Firstly, I argue that participants should proffer reasoned moral justifications- 
either pre-emptively or retrospectively- to explain the motivations and intentions 
of the protest. Importantly, these moral justifications do not necessarily have to 
appeal to a notion of the urgency or the gravity of an injustice nor do they 
necessarily have to appeal to principles of justice that are 'clear' or widely 
shared by a majority of citizens. 
This qualification is significant as it opens the possibility that civil disobedience 
can legitimately occur without providing prior notice to the authorities or the 
targets of the disobedient action, thereby permitting covert kinds of political 
contestation. In addition, it avoids the difficulty of potentially excluding claims 
that are advocating transformative change in publicly shared values, principles 
and beliefs. 
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Nevertheless, this condition does imply a requirement- even if proffered 
anonymously or even retrospectively- to publicly communicate the moral 
inspiration behind the protest and to explain the connection between the 
intended outcomes of a given protest action and the moral reasons which 
inspired it. 
Secondly, it shall be argued that there is a normative expectation for civil 
disobedient participants to offer moral justifications for the choice of tactics 
involved in a particular action, pre-emptively or retrospectively. Public 
explanations should be offered in terms of explaining why these tactics were 
justified by the nature of the moral and political concerns involved. 
In addition, participants should also publicly explain how the targets of their 
actions were appropriate given the ambitions of their cause and they should 
demonstrate that they have reasonably considered the impacts of their actions 
on non-participants or bystanders.  
My account also places certain restrictions on the use of language in civil 
disobedience movements. Civil disobedience actors must always avoid using 
language that grievously threatens or harms non-participants or the targets of 
their actions, particularly in terms of discourses that question or undermine 
people's status as moral and political equals. 
Finally, civil disobedience participants must be willing to be reasonably 
responsive to criticism of their actions- anonymously or non-anonymously- and 
are prepared to incorporate valid public feedback into their future activities of 
civil disobedience. Accordingly, it is important to explore this account in further 
detail. 
The first condition that defines civil disobedience in my account is the 
willingness by participants to offer reasoned moral justifications to non-
participant bystanders and the targets- direct or indirect- of any civil disobedient 
activities. This need for reasoned moral justification is necessary given that civil 
disobedience actions often result in the temporary restriction or infringement of 
the freedom of non-participants. 
Participants, therefore, owe a public justification their actions to non-
participants, particularly in terms of explaining what the intentions and 
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motivations behind the protest. This requirement is important as civil 
disobedience must be motivated by issues of public interest and import as 
opposed to issues that could reasonably be deemed trivial or contrived. Indeed, 
in particular, participants need to justify morally to non-participants why the 
potential harm caused by their actions is proportionate to the gravity of the 
cause that animates the actions of civil disobedient participants. 
Moreover, it might also involve explaining how the focus of the protest is 
directed relevantly against its intended target, especially in circumstances 
where participants might cause some harm- intentional or unintentional- on non-
participants. This willingness seems to be particularly important when civil 
disobedient action leverages certain costs against an opponent in order to 
prevent them from pursuing their normal activities or to at least hinder their 
operations. For instance, if civil disobedient participants are blockading a public 
road to prevent or hinder the actions of a mining company prior consideration 
must be given to the needs of other road users. 
Ultimately, therefore, participants in civil disobedience actions must explain how 
the object of protest is worthy of public attention and redress. Moreover, it must 
also be explained how the actions of civil disobedience participants contribute 
towards raising consciousness of a particular injustice and how it might 
contribute to its correction.  
Ideally, all of these moral justifications should be articulated during the course of 
any civilly disobedient action or should be made in response to demands for 
explanation from non-participant members. However, in instances where civil 
disobedience activities must take place covertly, this duty of justification might 
reasonably be undertaken after the event.  
It does not need to be addressed directly to the target of the disobedient action, 
albeit it must be somehow easily publicly available. This qualification reflects the 
reality, as Brownlee notes, that requirements of prior publicity can undermine 
the prospects of political contestation as it can provide public authorities with 
opportunities to prevent hinder or disrupt protest activities. (Brownlee, 2007, 
2012) 
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In addition, it is also important to stress that public justifications of civil 
disobedience do not necessarily have to appeal to a common or widely shared 
'sense of justice'. This is an important qualification as it opens the possibility 
that reasoned moral justifications can legitimately aim to challenge a majority’s 
sense of justice. 
For instance, civil disobedience might aim to transform the terms of public 
debate regarding a particular issue. It might try to articulate grievances that are 
difficult to voice publicly given hermeneutical injustices. It might aim to alter 
people's moral perceptive capacities in new ways in order to problematize 
injustices that were previously invisible, naturalised or taken for granted. 
From this perspective, civil disobedience should be understood with reference 
to a different principle of publicity. Rather than confining publicity to staking 
claims with reference to constitutional principles addressed to constitutional 
authorities, it should be understood as a process which challenges dominant 
epistemic norms and frameworks on the basis of their claimed injustice. If civil 
disobedience is re-described in this fashion, there is more room to argue that 
civil disobedience has two vital epistemic functions. 
Firstly, it can counter epistemic diffidence by members of marginalised 
communities, allowing them to publicly take pride in their marginalised social 
identities, to challenge internalised forms of domination, to re-claim pejorative 
labels and to provide them with a forum in which to voice their grievances 
publicly. It provides a space where essential solidarities can be formed in order 
to leverage collective political power. 
Secondly, civil disobedience is essential to introducing disruptive epistemic 
resources into the public sphere, challenging the hegemony of dominant social 
interpretive resources. It challenges the epistemic practices which render 
injustices socially invisible, forcing bystanders and political institutions to reflect 
on their complicities in these practices. 
Without an ability to challenge dominant epistemic imaginaries, it is extremely to 
voice one's claims intelligibly and to disrupt dominant norms and habits of social 
interpretation and perception. Civil disobedience can therefore disrupt 
significant gaps in collective interpretive frameworks, allowing members from 
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oppressed communities to conceptualize their grievances in a publicly 
intelligible fashion. 
For instance, as Miranda Fricker has noted, feminist activist groups introduced 
the vocabulary of sexual harassment to describe deeply entrenched- and 
frequently socially invisible- behaviours of gendered violence. (Fricker, 2007)  
This public naming, in turn, allowed for a coherent political agenda to be 
articulated which culminated in the implementation of sexual harassment 
legislation and changes to workplace norms in many countries. Civil 
disobedience is therefore instrumental in expanding participants’ sense of 
epistemic and political agency. 
In addition, it is also worth noting that given this understanding of civil 
disobedience, the justification of civil disobedience does not necessarily have to 
appeal to principles of justice per se. Civil disobedience can also be legitimately 
justified with reference to pragmatic arguments. For instance, on the basis of a 
claim that the means or outcomes of public policy are flawed or misguided with 
respect to addressing a particular social problem. 
Nevertheless, it might still be wondered why articulating these conditions of 
justification are beneficial in the first place. A number of suggestions can be 
proposed here. Firstly, they might allow civil disobedience members to cultivate 
sympathy from the wider public regarding their grievances, thereby enabling 
them to expand their movements and to leverage more power against their 
opponents. 
This point reflects the reality that coercive political tactics can potentially be 
counter-productive in terms of publically advocating a cause as it can breed an 
unwillingness to fairly consider the claims of civil disobedience participants. This 
problem is exemplified in cases where civil disobedience imposes certain costs 
or inconveniences on parties who are not the direct targets of a given action. 
Secondly, it allows participants in a civilly disobedient action to deflect criticisms 
from their opponents which alleged that their grievances are contrived or 
nonsensical. The willingness to justify their claims morally is a public sign of 
assurance that they are animated by sincere commitments and that their 
grievances are worthy of public consideration. 
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Thirdly, acting in such a manner upholds important democratic norms, 
particularly in terms of upholding the principle that moral justification for using 
coercion to advance political ambitions has certain limitations. It upholds the 
principle that any coercive activity should be complemented with an attempt to 
persuade a wider audience about the relevance, urgency, cogency and 
legitimacy of one's actions. 
Finally, a willingness to partake in moral justification for civil disobedience 
actions demonstrates to one’s fellow citizens that there has been a process of 
critical prior reflection about the morality of engaging in political coercion. 
This includes considering whether their protest actions will result in gratuitous 
risk-taking, demonstrate insufficient respect or unreasonable disrespect for 
other people and their property and lead to unjustifiably harsh or cruel treatment 
of protest targets. It might also involve considering whether one's actions might 
unjustly infringe the democratic entitlements and rights of one’s fellow citizens 
or result in broadly counter-productive or adverse social outcomes. 
'Civil' disobedience as the reasoned, moral justifications of tactics: 
The previous section focused on the epistemic character of public justifications 
for civil disobedience. This section shall now discuss the morality of the specific 
tactics involved in civil disobedience. This discussion is premised on an 
analytical distinction between internal and external justification. 
Internal justification refers to the discursive practices within civil disobedience 
movements which allow space for contestation about the selection of tactics 
and strategies. External justification concerns the discursive practices of civil 
disobedience movements and wider society, particularly bystanders and other 
members of broader society. However, why are these activities important in the 
first place?  
An internal justification of tactics is necessary for a number of reasons. Firstly, 
providing inclusive spaces for the reasoned discussion of tactics allows a civil 
disobedience movement to accommodate its internal diversity, especially in 
terms of acknowledging divergent viewpoints and interests. This requirement 
might foster an environment where all participants possess equal opportunities 
to shape the direction and agenda of their movement. 
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Secondly, it is important because such an activity is likely to ensure the 
sustainability of the movement over time, especially in the face of significant 
external pressures. Thirdly, allowing space for the reasoned discussion of 
tactics is likely to facilitate creative thinking about how to advance the goals of 
the movement. 
The operating norm for internal justification is a fair and critical analysis of how 
a particular choice of tactic will influence the entire protest group, how a 
particular protest act furthers the ambitions of the group and how the nature of 
the act is morally consistent with the objectives of the particular movement. 
However, this activity alone is unlikely to render civil disobedience effective 
because, given that the actions of these movements often impinges on the 
rights of bystanders, there is also a need to justify the selection of tactics to a 
wider audience.  
Accordingly, the duty of external justification is primarily conceived as one which 
is mostly conducted during an act of civil disobedience or following its 
completion- the latter especially where there are compelling reasons for 
secrecy. 
In addition, the principle of reasoned justification also allows one to delineate 
what kinds of civil disobedience are morally permissible and non-permissible. 
Firstly, the selection of tactics must be demonstrably targeted at the object of 
civil disobedience; that is, the tactics must aim to raise attention to an injustice 
or to thwart the operation of a given injustice. 
Secondly, the selection of tactics must reasonably consider the impact of civil 
disobedience actions on the democratic rights of non-participants, particularly in 
terms of not compromising their safety or well-being. For instance, civil 
disobedient protesters could legitimately obstruct an airport runway, providing 
that this would not endanger the lives of passengers, but they generally could 
not hinder the operation of the airport's control tower as a whole. 
Indeed, in particular, there are two kinds of contestation for which the reasoned, 
moral justifications of tactics are required- namely the use of violent 
disobedience and the use of covert types of disobedience. 
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It is clear that the legitimacy of violence in political contestation is a particularly 
vexing and complex question. Firstly, there are problems associated with the 
definition of violence itself as well as the contested questions of which kinds of 
authorities and agents can legitimately use violence to advance their aims.  
Secondly, within the civil disobedience tradition it seems that there is a broad 
range of positions regarding the use of violence ranging from its complete 
rejection to its avocation within particular contexts or certain moral boundaries. 
For instance, there is a strong strand of thought which emphasises the 
liberating and empowering dimensions of violence- for example in the work of 
Fanon and Malcolm X- as well as other strands of thought which highlight the 
moral and pragmatic limitations of violence vis-a-vis the ethical and pragmatic 
advantages of non-violent contestation. (Fanon, 2001; Gandhi, 2001; King, 
2011; Malcolm X, 1992) 
This strand of thought has been used to develop a line of argumentation which 
suggests that some accounts of civil disobedience unrealistically privilege non-
violence in contexts of the violent suppression of dissent by state or non-state 
actors. As Andrew Sabl frames this concern: 
“Why should a maltreated group assume that those who treat it tyrannically 
have sentiments of goodwill or dispositions of fairness towards it, actually or 
even potentially...civility in resistance might seem poorly grounded: when others 
are violent and show no disposition to treat us fairly, violent responses might 
seem natural, even justified?” (Sabl, 2001, pg 308) 
Unsurprisingly, within recent years it has been acknowledged that there is a 
limited role for violence- and using threats of violence- in order to advance 
democratic goals or to frustrate anti-democratic developments, albeit subject to 
certain moral conditions. (Brownlee, 2012) Yet, what are these moral terms 
precisely?  
Firstly, it is arguable that violent coercion is morally permissible by participants 
in civil disobedience in response to unwarranted, aggressive violence from their 
opponents or bystanders; that is participants in civil disobedience have a right to 
proportional self-defence. 
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Secondly, violent coercion is permissible in causing relatively minor property 
damage in order to thwart unjust practices or actions- for example destroying 
the fences to factory farms where there is demonstrable evidence of legal yet 
morally unacceptable suffering. 
Thirdly, a degree of violence might also be permitted in contexts where there 
are fundamental democratic deficits; after all it would seem strange to disavow 
violence against repressive military regimes, for example. Accordingly, given 
these three contexts it is important also to outline the moral conditions that 
constrain the use of violence in civil disobedient action. 
The first constraining condition in the context of violent civil disobedience is that 
it does not intentionally cause severe and permanent physical injury or bodily 
harm to one's opponents or non-participant bystanders. Obviously, this 
condition also prevents violent civil disobedience from the intentional killing of 
opponents or bystanders as well. In addition, the same criteria apply to threats 
of violence as well- threats that may or may not be acted upon in practice. 
Importantly though, the legitimacy of using violence- or merely threatening it- 
must be premised on a public justification of violence is being used to challenge 
social or political injustices. This practice is essential to ensure that such 
violence does not become a wanton license; that is, the intentions of those 
engaging in violent civil disobedience must be distinctively moral.  
It must also be publicly demonstrated why the use of violence is both 
proportional and relevant, particularly in terms of outlining why alternative 
avenues of political contestation are ineffective or non-existent and why the 
selection of the targets of violence are related- preferably directly- to relations 
and structures of injustice. 
Accordingly, civil disobedients must conduct their campaigns on the premise 
that the most morally praiseworthy modes of political contention are non-violent 
in nature, thereby committing them to justifying violence publicly only on 
condition that non-violent avenues have already been exhausted and that 
should opportunities arise for non-violent contestation arise in the future these 
opportunities shall be embraced, subject to the condition that this shall not 
detrimentally impact civil disobedience movements in the face of oppression. 
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There must also be some justification for the efficacy of violence- that is, a 
public justification of the intended or expected outcomes of using violence over 
alternative means of political contestation; this criterion is necessary so as to 
distinguish between acts of violence which are orientated towards attaining just 
ends and acts of violence which are gratuitous and irrational. 
Finally, as Tony Milligan notes, substantive efforts must be made in order to 
ensure that non-participants will not be recklessly endangered by civil 
disobedience actions, particularly when such actions are violent. (Milligan, 
2013)  
This standard is relevant as it would seem to reject some of the tactics which 
have been deployed by certain disobedience groups, particularly within animal 
liberation circles, such as the posting of letter bombs, the use of arson or the 
contamination of products which might not merely threaten the life and limb of 
their targets but might also substantially harm bystanders or people who are not 
the intended targets of violent civil disobedience.  
This means that participants in civil disobedience action must conscientiously 
consider the potential ramifications of using violent coercion not simply on its 
targets but also on wider non-participants. 
Another significant dimension of contemporary disobedience which is not 
adequately considered in the accounts of Rawls and Habermas is covert kinds 
of protest which have been extensively used by environmental and animal rights 
movements as well as by online disobedience organisations in a trend which 
has been termed 'hacktivism'.  
This covert kind of protest typically involve sabotaging essential assets of an 
opponent; for instance, certain environmental groups engage in so-called 
'ecotage' in which genetically modified crops are destroying or trees due to be 
felled are spiked.  
Ultimately, the purpose of covert disobedience is to leverage unacceptable 
economic costs upon their opponents, thereby forcing them to abandon their 
plans or activities, on the basis that their practices are morally unacceptable.  
The conduct of such protests is typically undertaken in a clandestine manner on 
the grounds that activists fundamentally reject the authority of the legal system 
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that they believe legitimate fundamental injustices or because activists believe 
that there are no alternative processes through which the activities of their 
opponents can be hindered effectively. 
This kind of disobedience, therefore, does not typically aim to engage in 
processes of public persuasion or to engage in appeals to political authorities; 
instead it aims to directly challenge perceived injustices by targeting its alleged 
perpetrators.  
Indeed, it is typical for such activists to avoid being identified by public 
authorities in order to prevent any legal ramifications for their actions; this desire 
not only informs the nature of their tactics but also their organization in that 
covert disobedience groups tend to be non-hierarchical networks based on 
relations of interpersonal trust. 
It is arguable though that such activity can be permissible within the scope of 
civil disobedience on condition that it meets a number of qualifications. Firstly, it 
must ensure that any covert activity is appropriately targeted- that it is, it 
primarily aims to directly target the activities of opponents and should not 
unduly obstruct or otherwise inconvenience the activities of bystanders.  
Secondly, in light of the conditions previously established above, such actions 
should strictly be non-violent with regards to human or animal life and should 
any property damage occur it must not result in the actual or potential 
endangerment of non-participants or people associated with their opponents.  
And finally, even though civil disobedient actors do not have to provide advance 
warning to the authorities about their actions they must eventually publicly 
justify their actions through appropriate public channels, even if this justification 
occurs on an anonymous basis. 
Civil disobedience requires discursive restraint: 
Another important aspect of my account of civil disobedience demands that 
participants exercise a particular kind of discursive self-restraint when publicly 
justifying their politically disobedient actions. This condition demands that 
disobedience protesters refrain from using language that is threatening or 
abusive, albeit some kinds of insulting language might be acceptable depending 
on the context at hand. 
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Indeed, in particular, it requires that civil disobedience participants avoid all 
types of hate speech which evoke stereotypical prejudices against specific 
individuals, social groups or communities on the basis of identity characteristics- 
for instance, on the basis of 'race', religion, ethnicity, nationality, age, gender, 
sexuality and ability. 
In addition, it is worth noting that these discourses encompass a broad range of 
rhetorical devices and forms and that they aim to inflict a wide range of 
psychological harms on its targets. For the sake of simplicity, these discourses 
might be placed under the umbrella term 'hate speech'. 
Of course, there is no settled, universally accepted definition of the term hate 
speech and its particular articulation within legal frameworks varies widely from 
society to society. The complexity and dynamic character of hate speech, 
therefore, means that any definition and its status as a normative criterion to 
evaluate particular instances of civil disobedience- will be subject to political 
contestation. It will require a case-by-case analysis of the particular situational 
dynamics at play. 
It might seem strange prima facie to restrict civil disobedience on the basis of 
the avocation of hate speech. After all, there is ongoing dispute as to whether or 
how hate speech is empirically harmful to its targets and what the best means 
of regulating hate speech should be in a democratic regime, particularly in light 
of criticisms that hate speech regulations might constrict freedoms of 
association and expression quite considerably. 
Accordingly, in light of these definitional issues and some of the normative and 
empirical objections to the notion of hate speech regulations, it is important to 
articulate a) why hate speech is incompatible with civil disobedience and b) why 
civil disobedience participants have a moral duty to avoid hate speech. It has 
been previously argued that that any civil disobedient act should be judged with 
reference to norms of reasonableness that allow participants and non-
participants to evaluate justifications for engaging in civil disobedience. 
It is in this regard that we can see how hate speech is entirely incompatible with 
civil disobedience. Firstly, hate speech is inconsistent with civil disobedience as 
it is fundamentally discriminatory against certain groups, individuals or 
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communities by virtue of specific identity-based features. Indeed, in particular, 
hate speech expresses and advocates targeted hostility and opprobrium, 
thereby justifying, legitimising or rationalising the infliction of harm on them. 
Secondly, hate speech is incompatible with civil disobedience as it rejects of the 
equality of all persons in a given political community and typically justifies this 
rejection via ascribing its victims with a set of undesirable traits. These traits are 
deemed to be naturally constitutive, ineliminable and immutable qualities or 
properties of their person hood. The rejection of the political, moral and civic 
equality of certain individuals, social groups and communities contradicts 
fundamental liberal-democratic values, principles and norms that must be 
appealed to in any justification for civil disobedience. 
Thirdly, civil disobedience is incompatible with hate speech because these kinds 
of discourses often encourage discriminatory violence against particular 
individuals, groups and communities by virtue of their perceived identity 
characteristics. Accordingly, from this point of view, on occasion the principle of 
hate speech provides a morally justifiable warrant for public authorities to ban, 
disrupt or disperse politically disobedient protest. 
This legal and moral limitation on civil disobedience is important as regulating 
the legitimacy of political disobedience in this manner can have significant 
symbolic value in terms of publicly articulating democratic ideals of toleration 
and mutual respect which ought to be aspired to by citizens, denizens and 
public officials. 
Finally, hate speech is incompatible with civil disobedience on the basis that the 
justifications for undertaking disobedience characterised by the use of hate 
speech is epistemically flawed, thereby undermining the principles that the 
public justifications for engaging in civil disobedience must be reasoned and 
that those engaging in civil disobedience ought to be publicly responsive to 
criticisms of their actions. 
Civil disobedience as responsive accountability: 
The final condition regulating civil disobedience might be termed 'responsive 
accountability'. This criterion particularly focuses on the conduct of civil 
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disobedience groups, particularly in respect of the moral constraints that 
regulate their engagement in protest activities. 
Responsive accountability in context of civil disobedience occurs when 
participants are willing to be reasonably responsive to public criticism of one's 
actions- anonymously or non-anonymously- and are prepared to incorporate 
valid public feedback into one's future activities of civil disobedience or to adjust 
one's activities in the face of criticisms during the conduct of civil disobedient 
activities. 
This responsive accountability condition operates retrospectively and pre-
emptively in that it governs the behaviour of civil disobedient participants prior to 
engaging in their activities and afterwards. 
It is vital for civil disobedience movements to the responsive to the criticisms of 
the broader public for both pragmatic and moral reasons. From a moral 
standpoint, a willingness to receive criticism and to criticise one's own actions 
as a member of civil disobedient group can be an important indication of the 
moral sincerity and moral contentiousness of one's actions.  
This is a vital point given that civil disobedience aims to raise attention to or to 
thwart the operation of injustices in society as opposed to pursing frivolous 
purposes or aims which are animated by exclusive self-gain; as Elliston notes it 
is imperative that civil disobedient actors publicly demonstrate their moral 
integrity when justifying their dissenting actions. (Elliston, 1982, pg 24) 
Indeed, by willing to receive critical feedback with respect to the conduct of civil 
disobedience, one demonstrates a respect for the interests of others by critically 
engaging with the impacts of one's actions on them. On occasion, receiving 
valid public criticism might entail a need to apologize publicly for any mistakes 
or oversights which occurred during a civil disobedient action and possibly even 
to re-evaluate both the means and ends of their protest. 
From a more pragmatic standpoint, being receptive to criticism can also be an 
important means for civil disobedient groups to establish their trustworthiness 
and credibility with the wider public, especially in the face of initial hostility 
towards their claims. Of course though, while civil disobedient groups should be 
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receptive towards any public criticism, this does not necessarily entail that they 
accept it as being valid. 
Indeed, being willing to respond to criticism which is misguided can be an 
opportunity for civil disobedience movements to reiterate why their protests 
were relevant to securing their moral objectives and how they exercised a 
proper degree of responsibility when considering its impacts on non-participants 
and other bystanders. (Keeton, 1964) 
In addition, being responsively accountable for the actions of civil disobedience 
groups can be an important means to avoid epistemic dysfunctions within their 
own deliberations. It is clear that a wide range of empirical research has 
recently demonstrated that the social composition of civil disobedience 
movements tends to be composed of relatively homogeneous social networks 
who share common interests and ideological frameworks.  
The social composition of these networks means that they can lack access to 
alternative and conflicting information sources and that they can be motivated 
only to rely on a relatively small body of information which reinforces or confirms 
their pre-existing beliefs, thereby creating conditions of group polarization and 
group-think. 
Accordingly, being publicly responsive to criticism is important if civil disobedient 
movements are to recognise the potential fallibility of their claims and the 
limitations of their social experiences and knowledge claims.  
This is to say that it can present civilly disobedient groups from oppressively 
attempting to minimize internal disagreement by avoiding the consideration of 
conflicting and alternative perspectives, by marginalizing any internal 
disagreement or by embracing the most possibly “extreme” position with respect 
to their political means and ends via group polarization effects. 
This is an important point given that given that civil disobedient groups often 
feel the need to develop critiques of their social situation divorced from any 
external influences or actors which might corrupt the formulation of their 
agenda, especially in cases where the intelligibility of their grievances is 
frustrated by relations of hermeneutical injustices.  
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Yet these pragmatic needs can potentially narrow the epistemic resources civil 
disobedient groups while potentially breeding the development of dogmatic 
beliefs and the cultivation of an elitist mentality Habermas identified in his 
discussion of civil disobedience.  
For instance, historical experience illustrates that conceptions of political 
disobedience premised on a “vanguardist” model can fail to lead to morally 
bankrupt outcomes both in terms of the inclusion of diverse internal 
perspectives but also with respect to the interests and needs of the broader 
public. 
Ultimately, therefore, as Prosch (1967) suggests, an attitude of responsive 
accountability can help civil disobedience movements address the following 
central normative issue regarding political disobedience: 
“The problem, therefore, becomes not simply how to ram one's own interests 
through, but how the meaning and importance of these interests and 
convictions can be communicated to those who do not share them, to the end 
that they can acquire the best and fullest accommodation possible, given the 
necessity to “give and take,” which the other interests and convictions 
practically operative in the society require.”  (Prosch, 1967, pg 189) 
Conclusion: 
This chapter has attempted to suggest that coercive political tactics have an 
essential role to play in contemporary liberal-democratic regimes in light of 
significant asymmetries of power. However, it also been suggested that the use 
of coercion has important moral constraints and that the notion of “civil” 
disobedience can usefully outline such limitations.  
Accordingly, the two influential accounts of civil disobedience by Rawls and 
Habermas were outlined and critiqued, and an alternative conceptualisation of 
civil disobedience adumbrated. This account of civil disobedience is different 
from Rawls and Habermas in that it loosens the requirements for civil 
disobedience to be exclusively non-violent and to appeal to constitutional 
principles or the sense of justice of a majority, albeit it recognizes the dangers 
that such a move sometimes represents.  
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In addition, it also highlighted some areas of civil disobedience that Rawls and 
Habermas' notions of civil disobedience inadequately captured, such as the 
moral permissibility of covert kinds of civil disobedience under certain 
conditions. 
However, whilst this account has presented a somewhat looser account of the 
moral requirements of civil disobedience I have also attempted to outline the 
normative conditions that would allow one to distinguish between morally 
legitimate civil disobedience and morally illegitimate political coercion. 
I have stressed that a degree of coercion is acceptable in liberal democracies in 
light of its capacities to force previously neglected issues onto the public order, 
issues which were illegitimately restricted, excluded or ignored by other political 
actors by virtue of unjust power relationships.  
Moreover, political coercion can also be vital in re-framing contested issues and 
in altering the parameters of associated social discourses, particularly in 
circumstances of hermeneutical injustice. 
In addition, I have argued that a degree of coercion is permissible because it 
can be an effective vehicle for political change, especially in the face of 
institutional inertia or in the presence of power-holders who refuse to alter their 
policies. 
This reflects the reality that appealing to the good faith of power-holders via 
participating in formal democratic institutions is often a profoundly naïve 
strategy and, in light of the insights offered by feminist epistemology, there is 
often good reason to be doubtful about wider appeals to the conscience of the 
broader public given the strength of vested forms of ignorance about social 
injustices. 
This point is especially urgent where an injustice is so moral urgent that it 
requires significant and immediate action to challenge the authority of power-
holders. Of course, this being said, I have also argued that there are significant 
moral constraints upon the use of political coercion as manifested through civil 
disobedience.  
Whilst civil disobedience does not necessarily have to be entirely within the 
public gaze as I have defended the use of covert resistance in certain 
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circumstances, it is vital that reasons morally justifying a particular action must 
be presented public following the act. 
In addition, whilst I have stressed that political coercion does not inherently be 
non-violent, there are strong pragmatic reasons to use non-violent tactics and 
the use of violence should never target persons unless in extreme 
circumstances- for instance, fighting back against a military force for the 
purposes of self-defence.  
Moreover, civil disobedience must conduct itself in a manner that fundamentally 
respects the entitlements and rights of other citizens, albeit it can legitimately 
inconvenience them to a certain degree; that is, without endangering their 
safety or unduly harming their well-being. 
Indeed, in this regard, I have argued that civil disobedient groups cannot use 
language that can reasonably be defined as hate speech towards its targets as 
this would contradict the principle that civil disobedience groups must 
demonstrate respect for the rights of others.  
Finally, civil disobedients must be prepared not merely to offer reasons for their 
actions, particularly in terms of how their actions are orientated towards 
resolving public problems, but they must also remain responsive to criticisms of 
their actions. 
This responsiveness is crucial not simply in distinguishing between socially 
constructive and unduly disruptive political contestation but it also fulfils the 
normative requirement to demonstrate respect for the rights of other citizens, 
especially those directly impacted by a particular protest action. 
Ultimately, therefore, I have argued that the use of political coercion constitutes 
a fundamentally important aspect of democratic life as it generates and sustains 
productive social tension and conflict, provided that the use of coercion meets 
the moral conditions I have stipulated above. On this note, it is now appropriate 
to summarize my thesis. 
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Thesis Conclusion: 
This thesis has aimed to critically explore the concepts of civil discourse and 
civil disobedience. My thesis is premised on the belief that academic 
discussions of these concepts have been unhelpfully polarized between the 
view that civility is essential to preventing or at least mitigating destructive 
political conflict and the view that advocating civil discourse is either futile or 
counter-productive in the face of asymmetries of power. 
I have attempted to present a normative account of civility which argues that it is 
compatible with critiquing relations of power while also acknowledging its 
limitations in challenging unjust regimes of power, emphasising the importance 
of coercive political disobedience in this regard. 
My project began by critically interrogating the proceduralist framework of Rawls 
and Habermas with respect to civil discourse. I argued that a number of its 
central premises are deeply questionable.  
Firstly, Rawls and Habermas fail to appreciate how their distinctions between 
the public and private and the right and the good will likely exclude individuals 
who feel that their substantive commitments cannot be divorced from their 
public claims. Their approach is exclusionary in that it will likely undermine the 
willingness of such individuals to participate in public decision-making 
processes. 
Indeed, I would also argue that they do not make an adequate defence of the 
claim that persons discussing their comprehensive doctrines in public political 
forums necessarily indicates disrespect towards their fellow citizens. Of course, 
the experience of discussing controversial topics by invoking conflicting 
doctrines can be a highly frustrating process and it can even engender 
dangerous escalations of conflict as the case of 'deeply divided' societies sadly 
illustrates.  
However, Rawls and Habermas seem to ignore the possibility that the 
unrestricted public expression of comprehensive doctrines might deepen 
relations of respect between citizens as it can improve mutual understanding of 
their different positions, thereby clarifying the differing assumptions and 
perspectives which animate their disagreements. 
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This mutual understanding can, in turn, generate deeper trust between parties 
who believe that the gravity and import of their claims are being earnestly 
considered by their opponents. Without the cultivation of this trust, any notion of 
reaching political compromise or consensus is a distant prospect.  
In addition, Rawls and Habermas’ proceduralist conception of civil discourse is 
flawed because it fails to consider how dominant epistemic norms can unjustly 
privilege certain individuals while marginalizing the contributions of members 
from oppressed groups.  
Moreover, they also fail to appreciate how dominant epistemic norms can 
literally render certain things unsayable or create an epistemic climate 
inhospitable to the fair consideration of counter-hegemonic claims. 
Indeed, even if marginalised communities can find an adequate vocabulary in 
which to stake their claims, there is no guarantee that such claims will be 
understood as being “reasonable” in the face of malicious epistemic conduct by 
members of advantaged groups and by practices of social ignorance which 
distort a society’s collective resources of interpretation. 
Given that there are no internal resources within their accounts for the critical 
interrogation of dominant epistemic norms, public reason might rig public 
discourse in favour of the interests and perspectives of privileged communities. 
Practices of ‘translation’ are simply insufficient to tackle deeply rooted 
inequalities in epistemic status and to correct deeply rooted deficiencies and 
blind spots in collective interpretative resources. 
This problem is compounded by the possibility that citizens who refuse to 
translate their claims into more generalizable frames might be considered to be 
“unreasonable”, thereby generating further social hostility and opprobrium 
towards marginalized communities. 
Consequently, I proposed that any account of civil discourse should proceed 
from a serious consideration of the epistemic inequalities faced by marginalised 
communities as well as how dominant epistemic norms and practices of social 
ignorance can compromise the willingness and abilities of members of 
advantaged communities to fairly consider their claims. 
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These considerations lead me to a consideration of Charles Taylor's conception 
of civil discourse. On the face of it, Taylor's philosophical framework offers many 
interesting resources for an account of civility which might be able to address 
the challenge of epistemic injustice.  
Taylor's work directly acknowledges the difficulties in clearly distinguishing 
between the right and the good and he stresses the importance of citizens 
justifying their political claims on the basis of their own comprehensive 
doctrines. Consequently, he is sceptical of attempts to base models of ‘civil’ 
discourse on the basis of epistemic distinctions between different kinds of 
justifications, particularly between religious and secular reasons. 
In addition, it is also noteworthy that Taylor does not connect civil discourse to 
political legitimacy. While he recognizes that public policy should not by justified 
exclusively with reference to a singular comprehensive doctrine, he ultimately 
maintains that there can be no universalizable principles to regulate public 
discourse given the complexities of circumstances faced by different 
democracies. Instead, Taylor argues that civil public discourse is important for 
different reasons. 
Firstly, civil political discourse can help foster an orientation towards the 
common good. This to say that Taylor’s conception of civil discourse does not 
stipulate what kinds of justifications are acceptable or unacceptable in advance 
but it does stipulate a conception of the normative orientation which participants 
in public discourse ought to adopt.  
This aspect of Taylor’s thought is animated by his fear that contemporary 
democracies are faced by deepening political alienation, polarisation, 
fragmentation and factionalism. Without an orientation towards the common 
good, Taylor believes that it will be impossible for citizens and public officials to 
provisionally form an “overlapping consensus” concerning their central 
regulating principles of Justice. 
Moreover, without citizens fairly considered the viewpoints of their fellow 
citizens, Taylor claims that liberal democracies will be plagued by narrow 
factional interest groups which can eventually breed destructive political conflict. 
An orientation to the common good, he claims, allows citizens and public 
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officials to negotiate and fairly compromise between competing demands, 
encourages the fair consideration of different perspectives and prevents the 
framing of public issues in zero-sum or winner-takes-all terms. 
Secondly, civil political discourse for Taylor in a diverse society reflects a 
willingness of citizens to re-assess their own self-understandings and their 
prejudgements about individuals from different cultural, religious and ethnic 
communities. Indeed, in particular, he stresses that civil discourse is essential to 
deconstructing pejorative stereotypes and social attitudes towards minority 
groups or what he terms “block-thinking”. 
Thirdly, civil discourse allows citizens from diverse backgrounds to form a sense 
of attachment and allegiance to their political community. Taylor believes that 
without this sense of attachment and allegiance citizens in diverse democracies 
will be incapable of perusing common purposes and interests. 
Public dialogues over what kinds of goods underpin this sense of collective 
solidarity is an ongoing activity and particularly requires citizens to listen to each 
other’s different perspectives and claims. Citizens, he argues, must continually 
strive to understand each other if they are to articulate a more inclusive 
collective sense of identity and to share “identity space” with each other.  
Civil discourse, therefore, requires developing an appreciation of the 
complexities of our social identities. Unsurprisingly, Taylor insists that civil 
discourse is fundamentally connected to the fair public recognition of the 
distinctiveness and uniqueness cultural, religious and ethnic particularity.  
Moreover, it is also noteworthy that Taylor ties his conception of civil discourse 
to the need for individuals in a diverse society to accord their interlocutor’s 
claims with an initial “presumption of equal worth” for the purposes of further 
discussion.  
Civility is manifested when individuals assume that different cultures have 
potentially “universal insights” into the human condition and when interlocutors 
acknowledge that their own cultural horizons potentially harbour significant 
limitations, blind spots and faults.  
This is to say that civil discourse can help expose the contingencies of our own 
cultural frameworks, thereby fostering critical reflection, while acknowledging 
311 
 
the potentially valuable contributions that different cultures can make to the 
collective life of a political community. This acknowledgement, in turn, can 
provoke a shift in our identifications, beliefs and values which previously went 
unquestioned. This process, therefore, requires learning new vocabularies of 
cultural expression and substantially learning about the values and beliefs of 
different cultures or worldviews. 
Nevertheless, I claimed that there are a number of problems with Taylor’s 
conception of civil discourse. Firstly, I suggested that there is a serious tension 
between Taylor’s conception of civil discourse, which requires individuals to 
critically re-negotiate their self-conceptualizations, with his rather rigid account 
of our group identities and his defence of cultural survivalism in the case of 
Quebec. 
Secondly, I argued that Taylor's notion of civil discourse also did not adequately 
consider the moral and political difficulties faced by marginalised individuals, 
groups and communities in public dialogue processes. I argued that his 
framework needed to consider how epistemic injustices can breed self-
censorship by members of marginalised social groups and groups.  
In addition, I also maintained that Taylor does not offer adequate criteria for how 
citizens and public officials should approach situations where they faced with 
the expression of 'uncivil' sentiments, viewpoints and attitudes. For instance, the 
expression of bigoted viewpoints or instances where individuals dogmatically 
assert their claims without wishing to consider alternative viewpoints. 
Consequently, in the third chapter I attempted to develop a different 
conceptualization of civil discourse which was indebted to a number of insights 
from feminist epistemology. My approach stressed that the purpose of civil 
discourse is to facilitate the fair yet critical hearing of other’s testimonial claims 
and the self-reflective staking of one’s claims. It is orientated towards building 
trust between individuals from very different social backgrounds and who 
possess diverse viewpoints on contested public issues. 
Accordingly, I stressed that civil discourse requires interlocutors to assume 
particular epistemic responsibilities towards each other. Firstly, individuals must 
be mutually willing to learn about each other’s worldviews if they are to fairly 
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consider each other’s political claims. In addition, they are to stake their own 
claims fairly, and to appreciate the limitations of their own knowledge, they must 
also strive to learn from each other’s worldviews. 
Crucially though, I also stressed that individuals must be willing to question their 
own positioning in relations of power in order to develop a critical 
consciousness with respect to how the staking of their own claims and the 
reception of the claims of others might be adversely affected by relations of 
epistemic injustice and practices of social ignorance. 
This kind of critical self-questioning involves the development of a deeper 
critical self-awareness with respect to how power differentials can potentially 
distort one’s interpretation of the testimonial claims of others in a given 
communicative exchange. Without this self-interrogation, it will be impossible to 
appropriately re-adjust one's credibility assessments in order to ensure that one 
accords appropriate attention and consideration to the perspectives of others. 
Indeed, a failure to question one's positioning in relations of power might lead 
one to unjustly deflate or inflate the credibility of others testimony by virtue of 
dominant social categorizations, stereotypes and prejudicial or favourable social 
attitudes.  
Moreover, self-questioning is also important given the intersectionality of our 
social identities. It might contingently be the case that certain facets of our 
identities might render individuals vulnerable to losing an appropriate degree of 
epistemic self-confidence in our claims. This lack of self-confidence stems from 
the operation of oppressive social categorizations, stereotypes and prejudicial 
attitudes.  
However, while critical self-questioning is essential in ensuring the fair 
consideration of other people’s claims and the self-reflective staking of one’s 
own it is also important to complement this practice with rigorous observations 
of the benevolency of our discursive partners. 
This questioning is necessary to ensure that not only are the claims of others 
epistemically sound and reliable but also because a failure to critically question 
other people's testimony might leave one vulnerable to discursive manipulation 
or exploitation.  
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Finally, the last chapter considered one of the most pressing objections to 
defending the notion of civil discourse in contexts of power asymmetries- 
namely the idea that coercive political disobedience, as opposed to reasoned 
and respectful persuasion, constitutes an essential tool in challenging relations 
of oppression.  
I argued that while this critique has significant merits, I also maintained that it is 
important to place substantive limitations on the use of coercion in pluralistic 
democratic regimes via the normative prism of civility. I explored this problem 
via a critical consideration of the accounts of civil disobedience proffered by 
Rawls and Habermas, arguing that there were a number of significant 
limitations in their theories of civil disobedience.  
I subsequently suggested that one should understand civil disobedience as a 
means to challenge practices of social silencing and forms of vested epistemic 
ignorance in a polity as opposed to merely understanding it as an appeal for 
redress to constitutional authorities via citing constitutional principles. 
I therefore tried to develop an account of civil disobedience which was informed 
by an account of public reasoning which stressed the importance of civil 
disobedients offering public justifications for their actions, only using violence in 
extreme and limited circumstances, providing appropriate consideration for the 
potential impact of their actions on bystanders, avoiding the use of hate speech 
and remaining publicly accountable for their actions. 
Ultimately, therefore, I hope that this dissertation has offered some insight into 
the morally complex relationship between persuasion and coercion in unjust 
and pluralistic liberal democratic societies, recognising the importance of both 
reasoned persuasion as well as disruptive political coercion. 
In addition, I further hope that the findings of this research project will be 
significant as a starting point for future academic research. For instance, in this 
thesis I discuss the kinds of epistemic injustices faced by animal rights activists 
who are striving to expose the suffering associated with factory farming.  
One area of future research might be to explore the discursive strategies animal 
rights protesters use to raise public consciousness of animal suffering in the 
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face of apparent collective denial and indifference and powerful vested 
economic interests.  
The second reason why I believe this research has significance is that it raises 
important questions of institutional design. If the normative ethos I defend here 
can combat epistemic injustices, what kinds of procedural mechanisms and 
processes can support its cultivation? What kinds of structural changes would 
be required to encourage greater epistemic equality between citizens or 
denizens who come from a broad range of social backgrounds? 
Indeed, as Elizabeth Anderson notes, it is clear that the literature on epistemic 
injustice currently does not adequately outline how their impacts can be tackled 
from an institutional point of view. (Anderson, 2012)  
While I have not systematically reflected on this question, and I recognize that it 
is a significant limitation of my thesis, it seems apparent that a number of 
institutional considerations might contribute to the cultivation of the discursive 
ethos I advocate. 
Firstly, if political institutions are to become more epistemically diverse and 
more politically inclusive, it is vital to promote the quantitative participation of 
historically marginalised and excluded groups and communities in democratic 
institutions.  
A variety of practices and proposals have been suggested in this regard, 
including the imposition of quotas or seat reservations into representative 
bodies which specify minimal levels of representation for particular groups and 
communities or by allowing minority communities to block legislation via 
referendum processes. 
Secondly, it is also vital to increase what might be termed the effective abilities 
of marginalised groups and communities to participate in political processes. 
This is particularly vital given that many individuals from such backgrounds 
might lack the requisite skills, qualifications and experiences that would allow 
them to participate on an equal basis with individuals from more advantaged 
groups and communities with a long-standing history of participation. 
Indeed, this problem can also be compounded by relations of epistemic injustice 
as people's lack of experience or their favouring of particular communicative 
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idioms and styles might be interpreted as being a reflection of certain character 
failings with respect to their competency and reliability. 
Without improving the capacities and self-confidence of individuals from 
marginalised communities to effectively participate, it is likely that their 
testimony will be treated with suspicion and derision, even in the presence of 
formal opportunities of participation. After all, there is little point in having the 
formal opportunity to participate if one's claims or the claims of fellow group or 
community members are treated with persistent dismissal. 
This is a particularly difficult issue to address given that relations of epistemic 
injustice privileges the claims of more advantaged groups and communities. 
They simply tend to receive greater social legitimacy and validation irrespective 
of their epistemic merits or demerits. 
For instance, Stryker & Danielson's (2013) review of the empirical literature 
reveals that people from relatively advantaged social groups or communities 
generally tend to contribute more in public debates, frequently interrupt others 
with relatively inferior social status, are more confident and assertive with their 
own claims, command greater attention from their audience and are judged 
more positively with respect to their public contributions. (Stryker and 
Danielson, 2013, pg 5) 
It is clear that this question has been accorded quite significant attention in 
recent political movements, especially the Occupy Movement which deployed 
innovative techniques such as providing mediation and facilitative services as 
well as discursive stacking in favour of individuals who identified with 
marginalised social groups and communities. 
In addition, if political institutions are to become more epistemically inclusive it is 
vital also to explore how members of marginalised groups and communities can 
be supported with appropriate material support to facilitate their participation on 
an equal basis.  
For instance, via the provision of funding for transportation costs or providing 
direct financial compensation for their involvement. This is vital to ensure that 
participation in political institutions is not biased towards those who are well-
educated and from relatively wealthy backgrounds. (Mendelberg, 2002) 
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Political institutions, therefore, need to be more attuned to the manner in which 
participation asymmetrically leverages costs on people's material and time 
resources in accordance with their financial means; a relative lack of financial 
resources often significantly hinders the opportunities, abilities and motivations 
of poorer citizens to participate politically. Of course, this effort will also need to 
be accompanied by major re-distributions of wealth given the current vast 
economic disparities in most liberal democracies. 
Moreover, it will also inevitably require tackling deeply entrenched social norms 
that position certain kinds of communities and social groups as being less 
authoritative, less trustworthy and less competent or reliable with respect to 
social knowledge.  
For instance, there seems little point in increasing the participation of women in 
political institutions numerically if oppressive social norms constrict the manner 
of their involvement- for example, conventions over to whom, when and where 
they ought to speak or not. 
Political institutions therefore also need to find ways to develop counter-
stereotypical resources which can allow people either to gradually shift their 
prejudicial attitudes over time or at least to frustrate or suppress the automatic 
activation of their implicit and often unconscious interpretations and evaluations 
of oppressed groups and communities. This might be fostered, on a broader 
institutional basis, via a systemic programme of education about the impacts of 
cognitive and affective biases in political reasoning processes. 
Thirdly, and relatedly, political institutions must be tolerant of a broad range of 
communicative styles, idioms and presentation styles if they are to be respectful 
of difference and able to effectively include all participants. This, of course, does 
not mean there can be no principled standards for delineating what kinds of 
contributions are acceptable or not.  
However, it is to say that the question of what rules ought to be applicable will 
be dependent upon the type of institution or social setting where a dialogue is 
taking place and that these standards must be open to contestation and revision 
by participants. 
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Indeed, in particular, political institutions must be sensitive to the reality that 
discursive norms can be biased towards dominant cultural norms and values 
that, as Iris Marion Young reminds us, can implicitly function to devalue or 
silence the contributions of people from cultural minorities. (Young, 1997; 
1997b; 2000) 
Accordingly, it is fundamentally important that political institutions subject the 
procedural terms of their participation to inter-cultural negotiation and 
accommodate the particular needs of cultural minorities on a case-by-case 
basis; that is, political institutions must facilitate the “reasonable 
accommodation” of cultural minority requests for institutional support, 
allowances or special exemptions. 
For instance, the communicative disadvantages faced by minority groups might 
in part be addressed by providing adequate translation and interpretation 
services for people who do not speak a society's majority language. 
This is particularly important in post-colonial societies where dialogues between 
indigenous and non-indigenous people are difficult due to ongoing and historical 
distrust as well as the reality that dialogues can be frustrated by different 
protocols of communication and different conceptual understandings mediated 
by (partially) incommensurable axiological, ontological and epistemological 
frameworks. 
Accordingly, it is vital that there be adequate opportunities to contest the 
parameters of public debate, particularly in respect to challenging the 
interpretive and evaluative frames that animate public policy discussion.  This 
means that meaningful opportunities must exist for participants to contest which 
subjects and issues ought to be included- or excluded- from debate; no 
question or issue can be ruled out a priori from the political agenda. 
Fourthly, there must also be room for contestation over the status of those who 
claim to represent- and, therefore, speak on the behalf of- particular social 
groups and communities; that is, there must be effective opportunities to critique 
their claims to discursive legitimacy. 
Finally, if political institutions are to be epistemic inclusive it is vital that 
participants must have the opportunities and the capacities to challenge the 
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frames in which discussion subjects are couched, to expand the scope of the 
dialogue into new arenas and to introduce new interpretative and evaluative 
vocabularies which will allow for the topic to be explored in new ways. 
Without this kind of contestation, there is not simply the danger of exploitation 
and deception but also members from marginalised or historically excluded 
backgrounds might engage in self-censorship or face difficulties in staking their 
claims intelligibility to others. 
In addition, besides allowing opportunities for contestation, it might also be 
advisable to encourage so-called 'enclave deliberation' opportunities that allow 
marginalised groups and communities to form what Fraser terms “subaltern 
counter-publics”. (Fraser, 1990)  
These counter-publics can enable individuals from oppressed groups to build 
their consciousness of oppression, to frame their claims distinctly and force-
ably, to develop greater solidarity and resilience and to develop the political 
leadership potential of their members. 
This effort is particularly important, as I have frequently noted, in cases where 
individual group members have developed “adaptive preferences” and have 
internalised pejorative social categorizations, stereotypes and prejudicial 
attitudes about themselves. 
Penultimately, there seems to be no point in fostering more inclusive 
participation if political dialogues will merely constitute talk shops where 
grievances can be raised yet no structural change facilitated.  
Accordingly, it is vital that institutions are not just procedural inclusive but that 
there is accountability and transparency with respect to their outcomes. It is also 
essential that institutions be responsive and flexible as possible with respect to 
the inevitable limitations of time and resources that can frustrate dialogue 
processes. 
In addition, given that political institutions are never isolated entities, divorced 
from broader social processes, it is also vital to foster cross-cutting social 
interactions if prejudicial attitudes, stereotypes and social categorizations are to 
be challenged over time. This need, as Elizabeth Anderson notes, is particularly 
challenging given the preponderance of relations of residential segregation that 
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continue to separate ethnically and culturally different groups and communities 
as well as households with different wealth. (Anderson, 2010) 
If relations of epistemic injustice are to be countered, it is also clearly necessary 
to make changes to the broader social structures within which political 
institutions are housed. For instance, minority groups- and their diverse 
viewpoints, perspectives and claims- will require greater representation within 
the mass media and popular culture. 
Ultimately, therefore, significant reform within the media industries of liberal 
democracies will likely needed to be implemented, not simply in terms of 
challenging media monopolies with fixed ideological agendas (e.g. Fox News) 
but also in terms of altering the tendency for political reporting to descend into 
entertainment or, as Richey (2012) notes, to treat politics as a kind of “spectator 
sport” characterised by an “win-at-all-cost attitude that marginalizes political 
discourse quality”. (pg 17) 
 
Footnotes: 
Chapter 2, pg.116 
 
1This conception of language, it must be noted, also reflects the profound 
influence that Aristotle, Hegel, Gadamer, Herder, Heidegger, Wittgenstein and 
Merleau-Ponty have had on Taylor's work, particularly his work during the 1960s 
and the 1970s. (Taylor, 1964; 1977) 
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